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ENGINEERING VICTORY: THE INGENUITY, VERSATILIITY, AND PROFICIENCY 
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Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Heather Cox Richardson 
 
My dissertation explores the critical advantage the Union held over the Confederacy in 
military engineering. The skills Union soldiers displayed during the war at bridge building, 
railroad repair, and road making demonstrated mechanical ability and often revealed ingenuity 
and imagination. These skills were developed during the antebellum period when northerners 
invested in educational systems that served an industrializing economy. In the decades before 
the war, northern states’ attempt at implementing basic educational reforms, the spread of 
informal educational practices directed at mechanics and artisans, and the exponential growth 
in manufacturing all generated a different work related ethos than that of the South. The 
northern labor system rewarded mechanical ability, invention, and creativity. The labor system 
in the South failed to do this. Plantation slavery generated fabulous wealth for a tiny percent of 
the southern white population.  It fostered a particular style of agriculture and scientific farming 
that limited land use.  It curtailed manufacturing opportunities, and it stifled educational 
opportunities for the middle and lower classes because those in political power feared that an 
educated yeomanry would be filled with radical ideas such as women’s equality, temperance, 
and, worst of all, abolition. 
 xii 
These differences in the North and South produced unique skill sets in both armies, and 
consequently, resulted in more successful and resourceful Union engineering operations during 
the war. Moreover, without the unique and astonishing engineering operations conducted by 
common laborers, machinists, shipbuilders, and both common school educated and West Point 
trained engineers, it was unlikely the North would have won the war. The outcome of the Civil 
War depended on the Union Army’s ability to improvise and take the war to the South. Northern 
armies operated on unfamiliar terrain, which included mountain ranges, swamps and wetlands, 
alluvial plains, forests, and rugged hills, all of which were difficult to access because of dismal 
road systems and poorly mapped landscapes. Union generals were forced to execute a strategy 
that demanded the control of 750,000 square miles of territory and the defeat of enemy armies, 
partisan raiders and cavalry constantly threatening long and tenuous supply lines. Between 1861 
and 1865 the North engineered victory.
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CHAPTER 1  
THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA 
 
“When I learned that Sherman’s army was marching through the Salk swamps, making its own 
corduroy roads at the rate of a dozen miles a day and more, I made up my mind that there had 
been no such army in existence since the days of Julius Caesar.” 
                                                             
                                                                  Confederate General P. T. G. Beauregard, 1865 
 
“That engine was made in our shop; I guess I can fit her up and run her.” 
          Private Charles Homans, Company E, Eighth Massachusetts Infantry, 1861   
 
Only the landscape’s semi-tropical climate, dismal swamps, numerous alligators, 
countless mosquitoes and mayflies, cottonmouth water moccasins, and occasional quicksand 
matched the enormity of the task before Union officers and their sweat-soaked dirty men. 
Operating on the western side of the Mississippi River, Colonel James Keigwin of the 49th Indiana 
Volunteer Infantry was ordered to “reconnoiter the region between Somerset and the Louisiana 
shore opposite the mouth of Bayou Pierre, and see if there were a practicable road through 
Tensas Parish to facilitate the Union army’s march to Hard Times and beyond.”1  The orders 
Keigwin received were part of General Ulysses S. Grant’s attempt to besiege the city of 
Vicksburg. Grant’s army was in its fifth month of operations in April 1863. On seven occasions 
Grant had attempted to reach dry ground east of the city, and seven times he failed.2  
                                                             
1 Edwin Cole Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, vol. 1, Grant Strikes a Fatal Blow, (Dayton, 
Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1986), xiii and 285. 
2 In December 1862 the Union Army, under Grant’s command, attempted to breakthrough 
Vicksburg’s outer defenses striking at Chickasaw Bayou. This action failed to bring the desired 
result. Union forces did succeed in capturing Arkansas Post on January 11, 1863, which 
prevented Confederate cavalry from operating against Grant’s supply line north of Vicksburg.  
Again, between January and April 1863, Grant attempted five more initiatives, this time to get 
naval transports and 22,000 men, 9,000 horses, and 300 pieces of artillery past the Confederate 
guns guarding the river. Once out of danger from fire atop the bluffs protecting Vicksburg, Grant 
would move far enough south of the city to cross the river and operate from the dry ground on 
 2 
 On April 25, before Keigwin’s patrol left the semi-dry ground of their camp to begin their 
reconnaissance, Grant’s army had performed yeoman’s work in cutting a road forty miles long 
from Milliken’s Bend to New Carthage.  The spongy and bleak terrain required a two hundred 
foot bridge constructed from barn timbers over Roundway Bayou, a corduroy road, twenty feet 
wide from Milliken’s Bend to Richmond, Louisiana, a drain to draw water away from the vital 
road network, and a dam built by the 1st Missouri Engineers and 127th Illinois Infantry, to retain 
water in Roundway Bayou.3   
 When Grant arrived at New Carthage, however, he discovered the flooding there from 
the soaking rains of the past three weeks made the position untenable as a jumping off point for 
his three army corps to cross to the east bank of the Mississippi. The Kentucky Company of 
Engineers (100 strong), Company I 35th Missouri Infantry (the army’s pontoon company), and 
the 34th Indiana Infantry built four more bridges, and two miles of connecting roads that 
required, in some places, layers of planking to create sufficient buoyancy over quicksand to 
Perkin’s Plantation.  
 It was with the Missouri engineers attending to the bridges and roadway from Milliken’s 
Bend to New Carthage, and the Kentucky engineers opening a passage to Perkin’s Plantation, 
that Grant decided to extend his line of march to Hard Times and perhaps beyond. The 
commanding general now needed more engineering troops so Grant turned to the infantry.  He 
had used infantry regiments before, with great success, when confronted with a shortage of 
engineering forces, so Colonel Keigwin’s 49th Indiana, 114th Ohio, a detachment of the 2nd Illinois 
Cavalry, and a section of guns manned by the 7th Michigan battery set out to find a passable 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the eastern shore. The five operations included Grant’s Canal, the Lake Providence Expedition, 
the Yazoo Pass Expedition, the Steele’s Bayou Expedition, and finally the Duckport Canal. 
3 Civil War Talk, “Milliken’s Bend to the Big Black,” http://civilwartalk.com/threads/millikens-
bend-to-the-big-black… 
 3 
route to Hard Times. Cypresses, cottonwoods, Spanish moss, several bayous, and 500 
Confederate cavalrymen with guns stood in the way of Keigwin’s detachment. Lieutenant 
Francis Tunica of the Corps of Engineers accompanied Keigwin on the march.4   
 In four days the patrol built four bridges totaling a distance of 450 feet. They secured 
lumber for the bridges by tearing down buildings on nearby plantations, and foraging parties 
found tools and rope. Three of the bridges were particularly complicated to build because the 
bayous were wide, the currents strong, and the quicksand abundant. In these cases infantry 
officers (Lieutenant Colonel John W. Beekman, Captain William H. Peckinpaugh, and Lieutenant 
James Fullyard) supervised the construction because Tunica was recalled to headquarters.   In 
addition, Keigwin received frequent harassment from Major Harrison’s Confederate cavalry.5  
 On April 29th Keigwin reported to army headquarters that a practical road from 
Somerset (just north of Perkin’s Plantation) to Hard Times was open for traffic. Yet, the story 
was not over. Grant decided to move his Mississippi River staging area fifteen miles further 
south to Deshroon’s Landing. Four more bridges were built and three required “excavation to 
level the exit and entry points.”6 When the Union army finally crossed the river on April 30th they 
had extended their major supply line through terrain the Confederates deemed impassable. 
Starting at Milliken’s Bend and ending at Deshroon Landing, through rain, mud, and swamps in 
thirty days Grant’s soldiers travelled 70 miles and built 2,000 feet of “floating roads” and 
bridges. Furthermore, since Grant had only about 100 engineer troops, and none of them 
                                                             
4 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies, (hereafter cited as O. R) Ser. I, Vol. XXIV, pt. I, 187, 571-572. Colonel Keigwin and 
Lieutenant Tunica filed separate reports and they were different from each other, especially 
regarding the role Lieutenant Tunica played in the operation.  
5 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIV, pt. I, 571-573. 
6 O. R. ser. 1, vol. XXIV, pt. 1, 571-573.  
 4 
commanded by West Point trained officers, some of the building was undertaken and 
completed by men from infantry regiments.  
 Grant’s reputation as stubborn and determined, “I can’t spare this man, he fights,” as 
Lincoln was apocryphally known to say, was proven again and again throughout the war. From 
this we can be certain that once he determined to find a staging area for his 40,000 men on the 
west bank of the Mississippi, he pressed his commanders to do so regardless of the obstacles. 
Three times he observed for himself potential staging areas at New Carthage, Perkin’s 
Plantation, and Hard Times, and three times he ordered further reconnaissance south. It was 
clear that Grant believed the men in his army possessed the skill, regardless of difficulty, to 
deliver him to the desired strategic point. This symbiotic relationship between the commander’s 
strategic and tactical objectives, and his men’s ability to deliver the army to those points, gave 
Grant a significant advantage over his enemy.  
 British Field Marshall Archibald Percival Wavell, a veteran of the Boer War, World War I, 
and World War II, wrote about this critical relationship between a commander’s plan and the 
reality of its execution. “The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on 
administration and transportation….It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would 
like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can 
place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.”7  Grant understood this long 
before Sir Archibald, yet a careful reading of Grant’s memoirs reveals that the general took this 
idea for granted. In his recollection of the Vicksburg Campaign and the march from Milliken’s 
Bend to Perkins’s Plantation he wrote, “Four bridges had to be built across bayous….The river 
falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and 
                                                             
7 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 231-232. 
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permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the “Yankee soldier” was equal to any 
emergency.”8  This comment and several others throughout his post war musings gave credit to 
his citizen-soldiers’ abilities and skills to deliver his army to where he wanted it, and to sustain 
the supply lines necessary to allow his men to operate against his opponents in favorable 
positions. 
 Grant, however, was not the only one who seldom mentioned the Union Army’s 
engineering efforts, and the remarkable skills displayed by his soldiers. The participants on both 
sides, and the writers, journalists, and historians who followed them, produced an infinite 
number of carefully argued reasons why the North won the American Civil War.  In this 
historiographical corpus, reasons for Union victory ranged from overwhelming resources, better 
civilian and political leadership, failed economic planning by the Confederacy, a stronger Union 
navy, and according to Robert E. Lee, God’s will. 
 This dissertation serves as a corrective. The critical advantage the Union held over the 
Confederacy was its ability to engineer victory. The North won, in part, because in the decades 
before the war Northerners invested in educational systems that served an industrializing 
economy. Furthermore, the labor system in the North rewarded mechanical ability, ingenuity, 
and imagination. The labor system in the South failed to do this. Plantation slavery generated 
fabulous wealth for a tiny percent of the southern white population.  It fostered a particular 
style of agriculture and scientific farming that limiting land use.  It curtailed manufacturing 
opportunities, and it stifled educational opportunities for the middle and lower classes because 
those in political power feared that an educated yeomanry would be filled with radical ideas 
such as women’s equality, temperance, and, worst of all, abolition. 
                                                             
8 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 254. 
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 In the North, each state’s attempt at implementing basic educational reform, the 
introduction of the natural sciences into university curricula, the spread of informal educational 
practices directed at mechanics and artisans, and the exponential growth in manufacturing all 
generated a different work related ethos than that of the South. Ironically, southern politicians 
such as South Carolina’s James Henry Hammond and Edmund Ruffin viewed the northern 
industrial economy as a chimera. They argued that workingmen’s associations, immigration, and 
rampant unemployment destabilized the North, and it was only a matter of time before the 
North would explode in a class war creating chaos, collapse, and future uncertainty. It was for 
this unstated reason, Southern fire-eaters continued, that Northern politicians, especially Whigs 
and Republicans, demanded free territory in the west. This was the place, according to 
Hammond, where northerners sent immigrants and the unemployed to free eastern cities of 
social unrest. The North would come to see that Southern slavery provided a stable social 
structure, and that Southern agriculture was not susceptible to the ebb and flow experienced by 
Northern manufacturers. In the end, indeed, “Cotton is King.”9  
 The slaveocracy missed the larger picture not because they were uneducated, but 
because their system was structured around the brutality of slavery—it was what they knew. As 
a result of this complete commitment to their “peculiar institution,” when the Civil War broke 
out, few Southern officers were either trained or inclined to solve the massive logistical 
operations necessary to win the war. Even fewer common soldiers were interested in or skilled 
enough to maintain roads, build bridges, repair railroads, or dig fortifications—this was work for 
slaves.  
                                                             
9 Expression made famous by Senator James H. Hammond of South Carolina as part of a speech 
he delivered to the United States Senate on March 4, 1858. James H. Hammond, Selections from 
the Letters and Speeches of the Honorable James H. Hammond of South Carolina (New York: 
John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 311-322. 
 7 
It is possible to argue, however, that since most of the war was fought in the South, 
Confederate armies in the field did not need extensive logistical support. Southern generals 
knew the geography better than their Northern counterparts, they understood the road 
systems, could count on accurate intelligence from their fellow Southern citizens who wanted to 
rid their territory of the hated, invading Yankees, and Confederate generals often would 
determine the place of battle.  
 Some historians argued that having few mechanics, civil engineers, and artisans within 
the ranks of the Confederate Army made little difference in the South’s ability to win the war. 
This cannot be said for the North. Without the unique, novel, and remarkable engineering 
operations conducted by common laborers, machinists, gun makers, and both common school 
educated and West Point trained engineers, it seems unlikely the North would have won the 
war. In a letter dated October 10, 1861, Confederate Secretary of War George W. Randolph 
wrote, “They may overrun our frontier states and plunder our coast, but as for conquering us, 
the thing is an impossibility. There is no instance in history of a people as numerous as we are 
inhabiting a country so extensive as ours being subjected if true to themselves.”10 Union 
generals were forced to execute a strategy that demanded the control of 750,000 square miles 
of territory and the defeat of enemy armies, partisan raiders and cavalry constantly threatening 
long and tenuous supply lines. Between 1861 and 1865 the North engineered victory.  
 This dissertation examines how differences of emphasis in cultural values shaped the 
formation of the Union and Confederate armies. During the antebellum period the nation 
enjoyed shared values: manifest destiny, hard work, a social hierarchy, racism and gender bias, 
capitalism, and individual freedom and liberty. Yet the growing emphasis in the North on 
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manufacturing and universal education was a stark contrast to the South’s emphasis on strict 
social controls and slavery. These differences in the North and South produced unique skill sets 
in both armies, and as such, resulted in more effective and efficient Union engineering 
operations during the war. The outcome of the Civil War depended on the Union Army’s ability 
to improvise and take the war to the South. Northern armies operated on unfamiliar terrain, 
which included mountain ranges, swamps and wetlands, alluvial plains, forests, rugged hills, all 
of which were difficult to access because of dismal road systems and poorly mapped landscapes. 
Union generals, therefore, came to expect engineers and their men to adapt to what Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described as the “fog of war.”11    
 Union engineers and often Union infantry-turned-engineers, succeeded at responding to 
multiple problems in the field, which allowed the army to maintain the initiative. Colonel 
Keigwin, the 49th Indiana, and the 114th Ohio infantries provided an example of these Northern 
mechanical and building skills. This dissertation will argue that like the North, cultural, 
economic, and social influences before the war in the South were reflected in Confederate 
engineering operations during the war. Unlike the North, however, these elements in the South 
produced a limited number of men (especially among the infantry’s rank and file) with 
mechanical ability or engineering skills. This vacuum resulted in critical strategic and tactical 
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blows to the Confederacy. For example, Fort Donelson was so poorly constructed that during 
the “ordinary rise of the Tennessee River, the lower river battery would be under nine feet of 
water.” In addition, “It was only after the fall of Fort Donelson that Confederate General Albert 
Sydney Johnston learned that his engineers had failed to construct a second line of defenses at 
Nashville.”12  
 This dissertation contributes to the rich historiography about why the North won, and 
the South lost, the American Civil War. Yet, this dissertation’s argument might have detractors. 
Many professional historians believe that the Civil War has been covered ad nauseum, and that 
military history serves limited purposes better suited, perhaps, to soldiers and statesmen, rather 
than serious history students who investigate and explore cultural, social, economic, 
transnational, and gender formations and occasionally political and diplomatic history.  
Many Civil War topics have, indeed, been covered ad nauseum. Historian Edward Tabor 
Linenthal explained about Gettysburg: “Fixation on the battlefield itself played out in the 
extreme in battlefield reenactments, celebrated American martial courage and ignored the 
more profound legacy of the battle and war.” Works by David W. Blight and Drew Gilpin Faust 
have addressed both the remarkable and awful legacies of the war. Yet, as Linenthal wrote, 
academics were contemptuous of the “Which regiment took the Peach Orchard?” approach to 
history.13 
Furthermore, since the Reagan Administration and the rise of neo-conservative 
ideology, academic historians have feared the growth of conservative popular culture and the 
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direction this might take us in the future. This fear, based on the entrenchment of partisanship 
in Washington, the racist treatment, by some, of our first African-American president, new 
attacks on women’s rights, conduct by the general public (like chanting U. S. A. / U. S. A. in front 
of the White House after Osama Bin Laden was killed), and the vitriol spewed by right-wing 
political commentators, is real.  Scholars perceived reenactments, motion pictures, and 
computer games as the public’s fascination with war, and as historian Andrew J. Bacevich 
pointed out, the development of the new American militarism.14 
This new American militarism is dangerous. “It subordinates concern for the common 
good to the paramount value of military effectiveness.”15 It takes the American people away 
from President Abraham Lincoln’s vision of becoming the nation that represents the “last, best 
hope on earth,” and instead, drives us to imperialistic policies that continue to isolate us from a 
global world.  James Madison wrote: “Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the 
most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the 
parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the 
known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few….No nation could 
preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.”16 
It is precisely because the new American militarism is so dangerous that we need to 
study military history. Unfortunately, it remains the elephant in the room. Whether we like it or 
not, war remains a condition of the human race, and it is imperative that academic historians 
pay heed to the subject. If we choose to ignore it then radio and television commentators, 
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Fendall, ed., Letters and other Writings of James Madison, vol. 4 (Philadelphia, 1865), 491. 
 11 
politicians, reenactors, popular writers, and filmmakers will interpret war’s lessons and legacies, 
and shape our understanding of what happened and why it matters.17  
This dissertation addresses the general topic of “Why the North Won the Civil War,” and 
specifically why Union soldiers were better than Confederate soldiers at engineering that 
victory.  My goal in this study is to explain why and how Northern and Southern engineering 
differed, and why the difference mattered. 
To introduce my idea into the larger conversation historians continue to have about the 
reasons for Union victory requires a review of the historiography. It is difficult to believe that 
among the books, articles, monographs, and dissertations written about the American Civil War, 
none draw comparisons between Union and Confederate engineering. A number of works 
highlight the North’s industrial growth in the antebellum period including works by Paul W. 
Gates, George Taylor, and David Walker Howe.18 Each of these scholars discussed the rising 
capacity of Northern manufacturing and production before the Civil War and supported the 
notion of the North’s overwhelming resources during the war.  
The North did possess overwhelming material and manpower resources. General Robert 
E. Lee recognized this fact. His soldiers were never outfought, nor did they ever display a lack of 
personal courage or manly skill. After Lee surrendered his tattered and torn Army of Northern 
Virginia to Union forces at Appomattox Court House he wrote to his men: “After four years of 
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arduous service marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia 
has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.”19 
In 1960, historian Richard N. Current re-enforced the general’s assessment of why Lee’s 
army surrendered. Current, a revisionist historian influenced by World War II and the Korean 
War, witnessed first hand how the industrial might of the United States defeated the Germans 
and Japanese. He argued that it was improbable that the agrarian South could have defeated 
their industrial enemy. The North’s overwhelming resources included sixty-one percent of the 
white population, sixty-six percent of railroad mileage, and eighty-one percent of the factories.  
According to Current these numbers made it only more remarkable that the Confederacy lasted 
so long. It would have taken a miracle for the South to win. (Interestingly enough, he canonized 
Robert E. Lee anyway.) Current wrote that, “as usual, God was on the side of the heaviest 
battalions.”20 
After the Vietnam War, historian James McPherson pointed out that, “God was not 
always on the side of the heaviest battalions.” With American withdrawal from Southeast Asia 
historians and strategists began the investigation as to what went wrong. Our economic power 
prolonged the conflict, but it did not bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees. As in our own American 
Revolution, an undersupplied, underfed, undercapitalized people defeated wealthier nations. 
Thus, Civil War historians like McPherson determined that Current’s thesis did not adequately 
answer the question; why did the North win the Civil War? Many turned elsewhere for possible 
answers. 
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Before a new generation of historians in the 1970s investigated fresh ways of better 
understanding the reasons for Union victory and Confederate defeat, they had several theories, 
besides Current’s, to consider. Besides President Abraham Lincoln’s belief that “the Almighty 
has His own purposes,” General Lee’s belief that the Union had endless resources, and 
Richmond editor Edward Pollard’s belief that it was all Jefferson Davis’s fault, it was not until the 
1920s that a group of Southern historians determined it was time to defend Southern honor. 
This included placing the blame for the war “at the doorstep of abolitionists.”21 These scholars 
became southern apologists and generated considerable treacle, describing the South in a 
moonlight and magnolia way, which laid the foundation for novelist Margaret Mitchell’s, Gone 
with the Wind. 
So it was that Frank Owsley wrote States Rights in the Confederacy (1925). He 
maintained, using governors Zebulon Vance of North Carolina and Joseph Brown of Georgia as 
examples, that Southern adherence to the states’ rights principles of the founding fathers, 
handicapped the central government in Richmond from mobilizing men and supplies for war.  
The issue of supplies for war raised serious concerns about the Confederacy’s economy 
and how it was managed. Influenced by the social upheaval of the 1960s, a new group of 
historians designated the New Left, looked at the relationship between “corporate” interests 
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and “populist” interests.22 The New Left argued that both were liberal and reform minded, but 
over time had come to turn away from their bedrock principles and instead focused on abject 
“consumerism.”23 David M. Potter was one such historian and argued that the southern 
Confederacy established economic policies during the war that centered on this consumer 
culture and consequently, the government was shortsighted in their economic planning. This 
lack of economic imagination cost the Confederacy the resources to conduct a prolonged war. 
Potter argued that Confederate policies in reference to taxation, cotton, impressments of 
supplies, and the use of slave labor damaged the South’s efforts to win independence. More 
creative and innovative policies might have made a crucial difference in the war’s outcome. 
Potter suggested, however, “the long years of defending slavery and building protective 
legalistic safeguards for the South as a minority section within the Union may have impaired the 
capacity for affirmative and imaginative action on the part of Southern leaders generally.”24  
Further understanding of the Confederacy’s economy prompted economic historians, 
with an arsenal of computerized data at their disposal, to investigate the relationship between 
fiscal and monetary policy and Confederate defeat. Stephen R. Wise’s Lifeline of the Confederacy 
(1988) suggested that the South lost the war for some reason or combination of reasons, but it 
was not as a result of the Union blockade.25 Using a quantitative approach to the subject, Wise 
demonstrated that the Union navy was not capable of preventing blockade-runners from 
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delivering the necessary supplies to sustain the war effort. This, coupled with the success of the 
South’s makeshift industrial revolution, “negated whatever impact the blockade had.”26  
The same year Wise’s book came out, James M. McPherson published his epic Battle Cry 
of Freedom, in which, he challenged Wise’s thesis. He wrote, “While it is true that five out of six 
runners got through, that is not the crucial statistic. Rather, one must ask how many ships 
carrying how much freight would have entered southern ports if there had been no blockade.” 
The effectiveness of the blockade, McPherson argued, was that it reduced Southern “seaborne 
trade to less than a third of normal.”27 
Expanding upon David Potter’s New Left interpretation of Confederate economic failure, 
Stanley Lebbergott challenged the view that southern planters abandoned the cotton crop 
during the war, and instead he argued, grew vast amounts of their “premier cash crop” at the 
expense of perhaps growing crops to feed armies in the field and starving civilians. Lebbergott 
concluded that, “an army of slaves grew cotton for private profit instead of serving the needs of 
Confederate independence.”28 Also building upon Potter, Douglas B. Ball’s Financial Failure and 
Confederate Defeat (1991), did not mince words when analyzing failed Confederate fiscal 
policies. According to Ball, the Confederate government, especially Secretary of the Treasury 
Christopher Memminger and President Jefferson Davis made disastrous decisions regarding the 
cotton embargo, “the failed control of the banks’ limited supply of specie, missed opportunities 
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to float bonds in Europe and buy local cotton,” and the failure to coordinate the purchase of 
supplies overseas. 29 Ball wrote, “A bankrupt treasury played a significant role in Confederate 
defeat.”30  
If Lebbergott and Ball focused on failed economic leadership and imagination, John 
Solomon Otto added to Confederate criticism by directing his sights on Richmond’s “botched 
agricultural mobilization.”31 The government not only generated poor fiscal policies, but it also 
failed both to invest in a deteriorating infrastructure and to focus on feeding its people. By 1864 
“Confederate soldiers possessed first-class ordnance but had second class accouterments and 
ate third class rations.”32 
The problem with economic analyses as a way to explain Confederate defeat, however, 
is just the other side of Professor Richard N. Current’s coin. For Current, Union economic might 
and sound fiscal and monetary policies delivered the victory. For Potter poor fiscal and 
monetary policies led to defeat. Both sides of these economic deterministic arguments failed to 
address the human equation. It is true that if the economies of the North and South had been 
reversed it would have been almost impossible for the North to conqueror the South. As it was 
the South came close to winning its independence. So how did this happen? To come closer to 
answering this question a different line of inquiry must be pursued.  How badly did Southerners 
want independence, and how long would they fight for it? How long would Northerners fight to 
maintain the Union? What if Union blunders on the battlefield led to Confederate victory? What 
motivated the rank and file to stand and fight? What motivated the societies standing behind 
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the soldiers to continue to support the war effort? These questions appear more important in 
answering why the Union won or the Confederacy lost, the Civil War. 
In the past twenty years, gender studies of the North and South during the war years 
have offered both engaging and compelling theories as to why the war turned out the way it 
did. Drew Gilpin Faust argued in 1990 that Southern women had more to do with Confederate 
defeat than any Southern economic blunder, Northern resource, battle, general, or politician 
between 1861 and 1865. She wrote that as the war raged on and entered the crucial years of 
1863 and 1864, Southern women had come to realize they “had embraced the attendant 
ideology of sacrifice as part of a larger scheme of paternalistic assumptions,” but that white 
Southern males failed to provide “the services and support understood as requisite to their 
dominance.” Faust continued, “The way in which their interests in the war were publicly 
defined…gave women little reason to sustain the commitment modern war required. It may well 
have been because of its women that the South lost the Civil War.”33 
Faust expanded her thesis in her 1996 book Mothers of Invention: Women of the 
Slaveholding South in the American Civil War. She challenged traditional notions of Confederate 
defeat by exploring the relationship between women of the planter class and their husbands 
away at war. As these women undertook new roles as heads of the households, and their 
responsibilities expanded dramatically to include the management of money and slaves, a 
dissonance developed between their memory of idealized prewar years and the realities of their 
wartime lives. Faust argued that women came to resent a war that turned life upside down, and 
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consequently wrote to their men to come home. As farmers broke down and slaves fled 
plantations, many men did walk away from the battlefield. 
In 2001 historians George Rable and Jean V. Berlin joined the discussion regarding the 
role home front morale played in bringing about the collapse of the Confederacy. Rable opined 
that Southern morale was a complex issue and “to say that Confederate morale collapsed in the 
spring of 1865 is at best a partial truth.” Perhaps, some women maintained hopes beyond 
despair, but these were sustained at a growing physical cost. As Yankees struck closer to home, 
and sometimes home itself, war weariness snuffed out any chance of active resistance.34 
Jean Berlin took direct aim at Professor Faust and challenged the notion that 
Confederate women, disgruntled by the role they were forced to lead as a result of the war, 
contributed directly to Southern defeat. Questioning whether Southern defeat on the 
battlefield, or women’s demands that their men return home, precipitated Confederate 
collapse, she argued that women neither “hastened or postponed defeat.”35 Instead she 
determined that like Confederate men on the front, white female experiences were a 
complexity of emotions tied to their spirituality, the availability of food for their families, and 
the news from the killing fields. 
That Southern women, demoralized by the news from the battlefield, and the hunger 
and deprivation felt at home, encouraged or demanded their men return was real. Yet it is 
impossible to know for certain if men deserted because of this beckoning, or soldiers threw 
down their guns because the constant stench of death, disease, and decay compelled them to 
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do so. Nonetheless, for as many who walked away from the war, more remained to fight. 
Similarly, for as many women who became dispirited, more continued to fight. The reality that 
Southern women carried on the struggle with undaunted courage and unwavering 
determination, was argued skillfully by Jacqueline Glass Campbell in When Sherman Marched 
North From the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front (2003). Women saw themselves 
“as both mothers and warriors,” and invading Northern soldiers were both astonished and 
enraged by the fierceness women defended their homes.36 Using diaries and letters, Campbell, 
demonstrated that like men on the front, women were determined to defend hearth and home. 
As a result, instead of displaying a submissive persona, women displayed blind hatred for the 
Yankees. Harriott Middleton wrote to her cousin “that it would be better to “’form an army of 
women’” with which they defended themselves, “rather than live under Yankee rule.”37 Facing 
the enemy reinvigorated loyalty to the Confederacy.38  
When women’s loyalty waned, starvation was often the cause. The work force 
designated to grow the crops, dig the fortifications, and work in the factories started an exodus. 
By the thousands, African American slaves left their farms, plantations, and workplaces to begin 
their journey to Union lines and freedom. How they were actually treated by their hosts is 
another story, yet the abandonment of their owners was a devastating blow to the South and a 
blessing to the North. In the last twenty years some scholars have argued that African Americans 
took freedom in their own hands and caused the defeat of the Southern Confederacy.  
Dudley Taylor Cornish was one of the first African American historians to argue that 
black soldiers made a direct contribution to Union victory. His book published in 1956 at the 
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conclusion of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, gave agency to black Union soldiers. Cornish took 
aim at the normative description of whites, who with grand benevolence and moral certitude, 
sacrificed and “died to make men free.” Instead, Cornish pointed out, black soldiers made their 
own sacrifices and won their own freedom.39  
For Joseph T. Glatthaar African American success in bringing about the end of the Civil 
War went beyond the battlefield. It was true that 180,000 blacks joined the Union Army and 
served as skilled soldiers on the frontlines and behind the lines. Yet, it did not end there. As 
slaves walked away from plantations this resulted in a significant labor shortage connected to 
Confederate military operations. For example, by 1863 the superintendent of the Virginia 
Central Railroad, a major supply artery for Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, reported to 
Jefferson Davis that repairs to tracks and railroad ties “were impossible because laborers 
[slaves] were unavailable.”40  
Slaves who remained behind on plantations also operated as a fifth column against their 
Confederate masters. Slaves hid escaped Union prisoners of war, “sabotaged farm and labor 
equipment…and promoted widespread insecurity among whites at home” including the fear of 
servile insurrection. As Glatthaar demonstrated, by 1864 Confederate Major General Patrick 
Cleburne and many of his officers insisted, “slavery has become a military weakness.”41 
Immediately after the war Major Martin Delany told a black crowd, “Do you know that if 
it was not for the black men this war never would have been brought to a close with success to 
the Union, and the liberty of your race if it had not been for the Negro?”42 This question about 
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the role African Americans played in bringing about Confederate defeat took on the tones of a 
public debate when historian Barbara Fields introduced the theory of black “self-liberation.” 
Fields argued that only by walking away from plantations by the tens of thousands, and into 
Union lines, did the Lincoln administration confront the moral question of the day. According to 
Fields, Lincoln was finally pushed by thousands of escaping slaves to issue the Emancipation 
Proclamation. His commitment to emancipation was weak; black commitment to emancipation 
was strong and determined.43 It was not the government but the slaves themselves who 
deserved the credit, for “by the time Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation, no human 
being alive could have held back the tide that swept toward freedom.”44 
In response to Fields, James McPherson, an advocate of black agency, wrote that 
Fields’s argument pushed too far off the mark. She failed to recognize Lincoln’s moral aversion 
to slavery clearly stated in numerous prewar speeches including his House Divided Speech, the 
remarks he made during his debates with Stephen Douglas in 1858, and his Cooper Union 
address. For McPherson “slaves did not emancipate themselves; they were liberated by the 
Union army.” Since Lincoln’s line-in-the-sand position regarding the free territories placed 
Northern armies in motion, and since it was Lincoln who issued the Emancipation Proclamation, 
and since it was Lincoln who stood firm against the onslaught of criticism even to the point of 
death, then it was Abraham Lincoln who “freed the slaves.”45 
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In Gary W. Gallagher’s important work, The Confederate War (1997), the author argued 
that Confederate nationalism “transcended class lines,” and despite Southern defeats on the 
battlefield, politicians’ blunders in congress, and civilian hardships at home, morale remained 
high until Lee surrendered at Appomattox.46 Social historian Armstead L. Robinson soon 
challenged Gallagher’s interpretation. A graduate student under Eugene Genovese, Robinson’s 
work had a significant impact on Civil War scholarship and African American history. Robinson 
believed that social history could provide fresh insights into political and military history, and he 
argued that Southern political leaders could neither identify nor reconcile “simmering tensions 
between nonslaveholders and small yeoman farmers, on the one hand, and wealthy 
slaveholding planters, on the other.”47  For Robinson, “the major Confederate defeats in the 
western theater during 1863—Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge—were directly attributable to 
the growing disenchantment and the internal class conflict that underlay it.”48 
Class conflicts, the threat of servile insurrection, southern women’s rage directed at 
Northerners or at the circumstances that placed them in charge of plantations without the 
support of their patriarchal politicians, and bondsmen turned freedmen who added 180,000 
men to the cause of freedom, all deftly assisted in our understanding of the collapse of the 
Confederacy.  Yet, these inquires, whether we like it or not, still leave questions about why the 
North won or the South lost the Civil War. Would class conflict have been assuaged by Southern 
battlefield victories at Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge? Regardless of suffering morale, 
shortages in food and labor, and losses to Union armies, would the election of McClellan instead 
of Lincoln in 1864 have led to Southern independence? If there was no Antietam would there be 
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an Emancipation Proclamation? Did having more soldiers guarantee Northern victory, especially 
in a war where the tactical defense trumped the full-scale frontal assault? What accounts for the 
Union armies ability to access Southern armies hidden, protected, and operating in 750,000 
square miles of territory with bayous, river systems, mountain ranges, and coastal wetlands?  
For many scholars, exploring military causes to the question of why the Southern 
Confederacy collapsed is trivial and unimportant. For them, achieving battlefield success is as 
formulaic as the study of military history is itself. The skill of commanders, the courage of 
soldiers, and the solution to ubiquitous logistical problems has little to do with the great 
question of victory and defeat that live outside the killing zone. Yet, to understand, as James 
McPherson brilliantly proposes, the role of contingency in Civil War history, or to fail to 
understand military answers to why the Confederacy lost a war is a failure indeed. So now we 
must turn to those historians who have suggested military reasons why the North won the Civil 
War.  
In Why the South Lost the Civil War (1986) the authors introduced their topic quoting 
from an article written by Henry Steele Commager in the New York Times Magazine in 1963. 
Questioning the doctrine of inevitability, Commager posits, “…how can we explain the 
widespread assumption in Europe—and even in parts of the North—that the South would make 
good her bid for independence?”49 The authors continued that the “how indeed” was 
investigated by writers and historians since John Russell Bartlett published his book in 1866, and 
interpretations advanced are too multiple to calculate.50  Yet there is a body of work that has 
survived the test of time and has offered military explanations for the war’s outcome.  
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 One book that offered a most compelling discourse regarding the question about why 
the North won or the South lost the Civil War is George Edgar Turner’s Victory Rode the Rails 
(1953), an investigation into both side’s railroad operations during the war. For Turner when the 
war ended, “the railroad system in the North was stronger than it was when the war began. 
Except for the lines taken over by the Federal army and rehabilitated for its military use, 
practically all the railroads of the South were a pitiable mass of wreckage.”51 Turner pointed out 
that the South’s ability to repair track and trains paled in comparison to the Union’s efforts 
conducted by qualified engineers and construction crews. In addition, the North found in the 
person of Herman Haupt, a skilled engineer and equally skilled organizer and leader, the 
backbone of all Union railroad operations. The South, Turner concluded, found no Haupt.52 Yet, 
Turner’s focus was on the war itself and so he did not attempt to answer the ancillary, and 
perhaps more important question, why did the North produce such a skilled engineer as Haupt, 
and the South did not? 
Just three years after Turner’s book was published, Frank E. Vandiver looked at 
command and logistics from a Southern perspective in Rebel Brass (1956). Unlike Turner, 
however, Vandiver considered the accomplishments and effectiveness of the Confederate 
command system remarkable. He argued that even with the gravitational pull of state-rights 
governors such as Zebulon Vance and Joseph Brown demanding decentralized government, “the 
Confederacy was able to organize and direct a massive war effort for four years.” This effort was 
thanks to Confederate logisticians.53 Yet Vandiver’s analysis of engineers and engineering 
operations was limited to one sentence, and his assessment of Southern railroad use and 
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maintenance was summed up with conclusion that “this new dimension in rapid transit was not 
used to the best advantage.”54 
A comparative study of command systems led Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones to 
conclude that the North won the war because of the superiority of its logistical operations and 
traced the origins of its success to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s War Board. Edward 
Hagerman’s The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare argued that both armies 
adapted the new industrial technology to the particular ideological, social, and geographical 
realities of the mid-nineteenth century America, Hagerman also described how the Union 
Army’s regular Corps of Engineers could not meet the demand for engineer units, but “citizen 
soldiers” were able to perform such technical military duties, and therefore, displaced the Corps 
of Engineers. He was silent on Southern engineering.55  
Writing at the same time as Turner and Vandiver, T. Harry Williams published Lincoln 
and His Generals (1952) and pointed to President Lincoln’s military genius as the reason for 
Union victory. “He [Lincoln] was in actuality as well as in title the commander in chief who, by 
his larger strategy, did more than Grant or any other general to win the war for the Union.”56 
Williams acknowledged Grant, however, as the muscle behind the President’s ideas. Lincoln told 
his generals, especially McClellan, to make the enemy’s armies the objective not Richmond. 
Grant agreed with and employed Lincoln’s strategy, and beginning with operations in southern 
Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia in 1864, the general “broke the back of the Confederacy.”57  
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Gary W. Gallagher took up the question of military leadership in his essay ““Upon their 
Success Hang Momentous Interests””: Generals” (1992) and first paid his respects to historians 
who explored the “complex and interrelated factors” away from the battlefield that caused 
reasons for Confederate defeat. Then Gallagher continued, “…no shift in civilian morale North or 
South—and really none of the non-military factors—can be fully understood outside of the 
context of the military ebb and flow.”58 Gallagher agreed with James McPherson “that defeat 
caused demoralization,” and thus major military events during the course of the conflict altered 
the direction of the struggle. For McPherson this was the role of contingency, the moments 
when “victory or defeat hung in the balance, and the issue might easily have been resolved 
either way.”59 The four “turning points” were McClellan’s failure to capture Richmond, the 
failure of the Confederate’s offensives at Antietam and Perryville, Union victories at Gettysburg, 
Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, and Sheridan’s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley and Sherman’s 
capture of Atlanta ensuring Lincoln’s election.60 Thus, for Gallagher, he proceeded to “the 
assumption that generals made a very great difference in determining the outcome of the 
war.”61 Following closely upon this logic he concluded the two generals who needed the most 
careful scrutiny were Grant and Lee.  
Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, T. Harry Williams, and Brooks D. Simpson took up the 
cause of General Grant. A man who was on the brink of destitution before the war, Grant 
emerged as an unlikely leader among the West Pointers available to command Lincoln’s armies. 
Grant, himself a West Point graduate, did not look back upon his years at the academy with 
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even a tinge of sentimentality and pride, and instead remembered his time there as a period of 
drudgery and unhappiness. On the battlefield he did not cut a dashing figure. His frock coat 
could be distinguished from that of a private only by the two, then three stars he worn on his 
shoulders.  Shelby Foote, the Southern oracle for the Civil War period, described Grant as “a 
dust covered man on a dust covered horse.”  
Revisionist interpretations of why the North won the Civil War, however, developed 
around the thesis that it was Grant, unencumbered by the theories of Antoine Henri Jomini, the 
French intellectual of the early nineteenth century who first established the principles of 
modern warfare, who was responsible for the Union’s victory. Jomini analyzed the campaigns of 
Napoleon pointing out why the emperor’s campaigns needed to be studied and emulated.  
Grant later admitted that he never paid much attention to these lectures on Jomini in his West 
Point classrooms. Grant’s strategy of annihilation, historian Russell Weigley argued, was more 
like the warfare of the future rather than the warfare of the past. Brooks Simpson, in his 2001 
essay “Facilitating Defeat: The Union High Command and the Collapse of the Confederacy,” not 
only credited Grant with creating and then implementing a strategy of annihilation, but in 
addition, credited Grant with winning the peace, which helped to avoid a Southern guerrilla war 
in the years following Appomattox. “In the end, of course,” Simpson wrote, “it was Grant and 
Lincoln who succeeded in devising a way to remove Virginians from the Confederate army. The 
general believed that the Appomattox terms, embodying Lincoln’s notion of a lenient peace, 
would facilitate the end of the war.”62  
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Historians have challenged the notion, however, that Grant was the most intrepid and 
skilled general the war produced. Just recently Albert Castel wrote that Robert E. Lee was the 
war’s most brilliant general.63  Not surprisingly, Castel was in good company. Beginning 
immediately after the war, former Confederate generals started looking for answers as to why 
they lost the war. (Lee never commented on this.) Several scapegoats emerged from the ashes 
of past battlefields and an aura grew around the stately, honorable, courageous, and stoic 
Robert E. Lee. Lee became the son to the father George Washington.  For five score years Lee 
was sacrosanct.  
One of the principle scapegoats was Jefferson Davis. It was argued that his micro-
management, arrogance, and timid decisions, unlike Lincoln’s boldness, cost the South the war. 
Yet, in a provocative reappraisal of the Confederacy’s strategic decision-making, Thomas 
Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones argued that Lee’s central concern about the Virginia 
theater of operations influenced Davis’s judgment concerning the crucial western theater. 
Western generals such as Joseph E. Johnston, Braxton Bragg, and P. G. T. Beauregard, according 
to the authors, formed a “western bloc” that challenged the strategic ideas of Lee. Davis was left 
to decide between the two factions and he chose Lee’s suggestions. Lee’s tunnel vision strategy 
of the war then led to the loss of western battles, territory and ultimately the war itself. “R. E. 
Lee, as Davis’ adviser, was a major obstacle to the realization of more frequent national 
applications of Jominian-Napoleonic concepts….” 64  
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Following Connelly and Archer’s book, other historians continued to challenge the Lee 
myth. Attack and Die (1982) by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson argued that 
Confederates, especially Lee as commander of such disastrous frontal assaults as Malvern Hill 
and Gettysburg, lost the war “because they were too Celtic….”65 Their bloodlines flowed with 
the need to attack, to race forward with vengeful eyes, enflamed hearts, and rebel yells. “As 
their enemies were quick to point out, Celts shared certain warlike characteristics. They glorified 
war, seemed genuinely fond of combat, and usually fought with reckless bravery.”66 This 
reckless bravery, nonetheless, cost the Confederacy too many men, and hence they were unable 
to sustain the effort needed to defeat the invading enemy.  
Alan T. Nolan also believed that General Lee cost the Confederacy its independence. He 
argued that Lee “squandered Confederate blood and resources in campaigns and battles that 
did not resolve anything and, worse, precluded victory.”67 Yet, whether Nolan accused Lee of 
losing the war, or other historians such as Emory M. Thomas, Charles P. Roland, or Albert Castel 
credit the general with sustaining the Southern war effort against terrible odds, was it possible 
for any one man to win or lose the Civil War?  Did the fighting men on both sides, the dirty, 
hungry, terrified foot soldiers help determine the outcome of the war? This was a fair question 
to ask, and Reid Mitchell attempted to address this in his essay “The Perseverance of Soldiers.” 
Mitchell, unlike Drew Gilpin Faust, focused on the morale in both armies and wondered 
aloud not only why Southern soldiers lost the will to fight, but why Northern soldiers, in the face 
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of a prolonged struggle and the slaughter of men in the Wilderness and at Cold Harbor, 
continued to fight.  He concluded it was “the soldiers’ ideology [that] continued to motivate 
them through the hellish second half of the war.”68 Yet Southern soldiers, Mitchell continued, 
withstood the killing and maiming throughout 1864 with the same courage, bravery, and 
determination as the Yankees. So what changed in 1865?  Nothing changed, but the war 
continued to take a devastating toll on the battlefield and at home. Confederate soldiers 
deserted because rations were too low in the army and because they assumed their families 
faced malnutrition and starvation at home. One soldier wrote, “my little boy was sick and Eliza 
was give out wek with the rumitiz.”69  
For Mitchell, however, the “ideological weakness and principal structural weakness was 
the fact that the Confederacy was created as a means to defend racial slavery.”70 The 
Confederacy went to war as a divided nation, those who controlled the government to protect 
slavery, and those who had no stake in the “peculiar institution,” but fought to protect their 
homes from the Northern invaders. Southern soldiers went home because slavery “undermined 
the loyalties of its soldiers in the field.”71 Also, Mitchell said his divided nation thesis explained 
why the Confederacy chose to fight a conventional war not an insurgency, or, after April 1865, a 
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guerrilla war. “Many Southern whites proved willing to adopt guerrilla warfare….The 
Confederacy did not….[T]he Confederacy did not choose to fight a guerrilla war—because, in 
large part, it did not seem possible to fight a guerrilla war and keep slavery intact.”72 
The question of why the South did not fight a guerrilla war remains fertile ground for 
historians. In the Fortenbaugh Memorial Lecture at Gettysburg College, George M. Fredrickson 
compared Southerners to Afrikaners in the Boer War. He wrote that, “The most significant and 
salient difference was not in the probable extent of racial fear or anxiety but rather in the 
degree of class stratification and potential class conflict among the whites in the two societies.” 
An insurgency would “turn the social order on its head by making coarse and uncivilized back 
country whites the leading actors in the drama.”73 
Fredrickson, Mitchell, and Faust have added immeasurably to our understanding of why 
the Confederacy collapsed. They have demanded we look at issues beyond the battlefield and to 
consider class conflict, slavery, and gender as important factors in both the formation of the 
Southern Confederacy and its demise. Yet, as patriarchal as the South was, as internally divided 
as it was between the yeomanry and planter class, and as insidious and barbaric as the 
institution of slavery was, still the South almost won the Civil War. To all the actors in this drama 
it was never inevitable. As the war continued through the spring and summer of 1864, and 
Grant was stopped at Petersburg and Sherman frustrated in Georgia, the Northern home front 
grew tired of the bloodshed. Citizens North and South were well aware that if Lincoln were re-
elected in November he would continue to prosecute the war.  They also knew that if the 
President’s Democratic opponent, General George McClellan was elected he might continue the 
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struggle or he might negotiate a peace for an independent Confederacy, or more likely, a 
negotiated peace with slavery intact in a re-United States, meeting all the demands of the 
South. We can only speculate what McClellan would have done as president, but in July 1864 
hopes sprung eternal in the hearts and minds of Southerners. 
Therefore, new interpretations about why the South lost or the North won the Civil War 
continue to interest historians. In 2011 William C. Harris published his masterful book Lincoln 
and the Border States suggesting that it was Lincoln’s deft political skill that kept the Border 
States in the Union and, as a result, brought about the emancipation of slaves and the downfall 
of the Confederacy. So crucial were the President’s efforts that, “The failure of Lincoln’s border 
states policies would have ensured the independence of the Southern slave republic, dealt a 
serious blow to the Republican Party in the North, and greatly complicated emancipation, even 
to the extent of postponing indefinitely the death of slavery.”74  
Most recently, the role of the United States Navy in bringing about Union victory has 
drawn popular attention.  James McPherson’s War on the Water (2012) builds upon Gary D. 
Joiner’s 2007 book Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy, and argued that the navy deserves as much 
credit for Northern victory as the army has received. The navy’s efforts as early as 1861 in 
destroying Confederate forts guarding Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina, the capture of New 
Orleans in 1862, the part played by the Mississippi squadron in 1863, and the victory at Mobile 
Bay in 1864 have for too long gone unrecognized.75  McPherson was quick to point out, 
however, that the navy’s role did not supersede that of the army’s, and he remained firm in his 
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belief that a different result of just one battle, specifically Antietam, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, 
Chattanooga, or Atlanta, would have changed the outcome of the war. 
Why did McPherson believe this? Because with a Confederate victory at Antietam or 
Gettysburg, peace democrats in the North would apply unrelenting pressure on the Lincoln 
administration to negotiate a settlement with the Davis government. A successful invasion of 
the North would have had a damaging impact on Northern public opinion.  Furthermore, in the 
case of Antietam, the preliminary emancipation proclamation would not have been issued and 
those political voices in the North, and in the Union Army itself, that subscribed to the notion 
that the war should not be about slavery, would have gotten louder than they already were. 
Yet, even with victories at Antietam and Gettysburg, the South’s geographic advantage 
loomed large, and the strategic theory that the North could conqueror the South remained 
remote. In addition, political problems remained for the Lincoln government. The border states 
would stay on tentative ground, the idea of placing weapons in the hands of Northern blacks 
would be experimental at best, and the Northern public would not tolerate and support a long 
war. Union Army operations against specific geographic points and the Southern armies who 
guarded them were the key elements in destroying the Confederacy.  Control of the Mississippi 
River, extending supply lines and operations into the Confederate heartland, the destruction of 
the South’s army defending Virginia, and the avoidance of Union military disasters defined the 
Union’s strategic goals.  
Therefore a study of the campaigns, which broke the back of the Confederacy, led to the 
demoralization on the Southern home front, and broke the will of Southern citizens to continue 
to fight, must be reconsidered. The campaigns of momentous consequence, Vicksburg, 
Chattanooga, Atlanta, Petersburg, and the Carolina Campaign, maintained the Union’s strategic 
initiative, improved Northern morale, and weakened the South’s strategic defenses.  All of these 
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have one thing in common; complex engineering operations were essential to their success. 
Seldom highlighted in Civil War literature, Northern engineers over enormous geographic space 
with limited time, kept supply lines open, built roads to move tens of thousands of men through 
impassable terrain, repaired roadways, bridges, tunnels, and railroad lines almost as quickly as 
enemy soldiers and partisan raiders destroyed them, and thus emerged as a critical resource. 
Engineering was the key to victory. 
Several studies by preeminent historians have explored the scientific and technological 
advantage the North had over the South before the war. Military Enterprise and Technological 
Change: Perspectives on the America Experience edited by Merritt Roe Smith challenged the 
notion that the rise of nineteenth-century American “industrial capitalism” was solely linked to 
and influenced by private individuals and firms operating in the marketplace. Instead, the author 
argued, the military enterprise played a major role in the United States’ rise as an industrial 
power. Specifically, there were three areas of technological change in the nineteenth century 
tied to the military: interchangeable manufacturing, machine tools, and railroads.76 
Dirk J. Struik’s Yankee Science in the Making: Science and Engineering in New England 
from Colonial Times to the Civil War explored how New England engineers began to transform 
the American landscape, how doctors contributed to advances in medicine, and how 
communities established educational institutions devoted to the study of science and 
engineering.77 
Several Civil War studies described the operations of Northern engineering regiments. 
These works offered insight into the formation and composition of such units, described how 
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bridges were built, canals dug, road systems created, and how engineers provided vital support 
for battlefield operations and campaigns. The two best books on Northern engineering during 
the war are Phillip Thienel’s Mr. Lincoln’s Bridge Builders: The Right Hand of American Genius, 
and Mark Hoffman’s “My Brave Mechanic”: The First Michigan Engineers and Their Civil War. 
These two books make a case for the skills of Union engineers but both are limited. Thienel’s 
focus was limited to bridge building feats and Hoffman’s work looked specifically at the role of 
an engineer regiment serving in the Civil War’s western theater. Hoffman emphasized that the 
First Michigan Engineers were versatile soldiers and that not only did they repair bridges, 
railroad tracks, and telegraph lines, but also fought in a number of engagements.78  
There are few books devoted to Confederate engineering. Two studies in the last fifteen 
years that brush the topic are Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Staff and Headquarters Operations 
in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865 by J. Boone Bartholomees, and Retreat from 
Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics & the Pennsylvania Campaign by Kent Masterson Brown. Both works 
are well done but give little coverage to the engineers. Brown actually and unintentionally, 
exposed the ineptitude of Lee’s engineers. Lee’s escape across the swollen Potomac River after 
the Gettysburg Campaign almost met with disaster because Southern engineers attempted to 
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anchor a pontoon bridge by filling used ammunition crates with rocks.  Since the crates could 
not dig into the mud at the bottom of the river the swiftness of the current broke the bridge 
apart. It was only after this fiasco that Lee decided to establish an engineer regiment attached 
to his army.79  
Some studies by battlefield archaeologists have focused attention on Southern 
fortifications built around Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Petersburg, and offered insights into the 
construction of Confederate trench lines protecting these important cities. These works 
suggested the competency of Southern engineers. A study ten years ago by Robert J. Fryman 
concluded that Confederate military engineering during the Atlanta Campaign was adequate to 
meet the onslaught of Union artillery fire, but that the fortifications, as General William T. 
Sherman remarked, were just field entrenchments “peculiar to America.”80 There was nothing 
imaginative or unique about the entrenchments. The preparations of defensive positions, such 
as “Hardee’s Salient, the Kennesaw Mountain Line, and the Chattahoochee River Defense Line, 
were all constructed in advance of their occupation by the Confederate Army of Tennessee,” 
and so required little in the way of imagination because the engineers had ample material and 
time to correct problems.81 
Yet, even Southern fortifications and the engineers who built them have come under 
careful criticism. In two highly detailed and technical books, Earl J. Hess evaluated both Union 
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and Confederate fortifications during the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns and concluded 
that Southern engineers were unable to adjust to the shifting movements of Grant’s army, and 
especially at Petersburg, forced Lee to evacuate his position much sooner than necessary. Hess 
wrote, “…there is little doubt that the Federals gained more from their use of fortifications that 
the Confederates gained from their use of earthworks.” Initially, Southerners were able to 
punish Grant’s attacks and prevent him from striking at Lee’s flanks. “But Confederate fortifying 
began to serve Lee less and less well from September onward…and his engineers continued to 
rely on heavy belts of obstructions in front of the trenches rather than enclosed works to 
minimize the number of troops holding the line.”82  
The question, however, of why the Confederacy had so little in the way of engineering 
support, and why the Union had much in the way of engineering support has not been 
answered. Was there a relationship between labor, manufacturing, agricultural, and educational 
systems in the North and South before the war and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
engineering operations during the war? This dissertation looks critically at these relationships 
and asks three primary questions: 1. How did the economic, social, and educational patterns in 
the North differ from those of the South before 1860? 2. How were Union and Confederate 
engineer regiments formed, and how did they differ, if at all, from each other? 3. What role did 
engineering play in the critical campaigns of the war?  
So we are finally back with Colonel James Keigwin of the 49th Indiana Infantry, and as 
the calendar turned the page to May 1, 1863, he and 33,000 soldiers passed to the eastern bank 
of the Mississippi River. General Grant now began the task of chasing Confederate General John 
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Pemberton’s army across southwestern Mississippi to move within striking distance of 
Vicksburg. It took Grant eleven months to get into this position. To invest or besiege the city’s 
earthworks, the army faced a final challenge. On the morning of May 17th, the Union offensive 
against Southern forces stalled. The muddy, sluggish, deep, and football field wide Big Black 
River stood between the Confederate fortifications surrounding Vicksburg and Grant’s army. 
Retreating Confederate forces had destroyed the existing bridges over the Big Black. Grant 
wanted to cross the Big Black immediately in order to maintain the initiative and prevent giving 
the Southerners time to plan an escape across the Mississippi, but the equipment to build 
floating bridges, known as pontoons, sat fifteen miles from the river. Unfortunately, moving the 
essential material quickly forward proved herculean. Heavy traffic of men, horses, munitions 
and quartermaster wagons clogged the roadways between the river and the pontoons. To bring 
the train forward required time—at least eight to ten hours.  
The pontoon train itself, formed by 34 pontoon wagons, 22 chess wagons, 4 tool 
wagons, 2 forge wagons, and approximately 300 horses and 100 to 500 men, always lumbered 
to its destination. The pontoon wagons carried multiple small, flat- bottomed boats, very heavy 
and hard to transport. The chess wagons delivered the boards used to hold the pontoons 
together, and once soldiers built the roadway, the engineers used remaining boards to build 
side rails. The tool wagon consisted of shovels and carpenter tools, and the forge wagons 
contained anchors and horseshoes. 
Bridling under the pressure of time, Grant asked his engineers to find solutions to the 
bridging problem without waiting for the pontoon train. Under considerable pressure and 
lacking equipment, three different teams of engineers came up with three different solutions to 
the problem of crossing the Big Black River. Each built a bridge using scant resources and a large 
dose of Yankee ingenuity. One group, led by Captains Tresilian and Hickenlooper (a non-West 
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Point artillery officer when the Campaign began) used cotton bales found in an old warehouse. 
Directed by the officers, men recruited from the closest infantry regiments to the river fastened 
these 500- pound bales of cotton to frameworks the men built out of salvaged timber. The men 
built three sections of frames, fastened them together and then tied them to guy lines.  Now 
under cover of darkness, two men, in a makeshift raft, stealthily crossed the river and anchored 
the guy lines to trees on the opposite bank of the river.  Everyone knew that Confederate 
skirmishers might be nearby, ready to move to the river and fire on the vulnerable bridge 
building party. This fear added an element of anxiety and haste to the operation. The work on 
the Union side of the river continued as men used bayonets, sticks, and rocks, (the shovels were 
in the tool wagon miles away) to cut away the river bank in order to meet the grade of the road. 
Planks from the warehouse nailed to the top of the cotton bales made a roadway that 
completed the bridge. 
The bridge was finished by 3:00am May 18th. In the next nine hours 15,000 men, horses, 
wagons, and artillery pieces crossed to the west side of the river. Two other bridges built 
downstream helped the rest of Grant’s army to cross and besiege Vicksburg. With no obvious 
escape route for the 30,000 Confederate soldiers inside the fortifications, Confederate officials 
surrendered the city forty days later. The Mississippi River was, once again, open to Union river 
traffic inspiring President Lincoln’s ageless statement, “The Father of Waters again goes 
unvexed to the sea.” 
Why was it that Grant’s engineers and his infantry, turned engineers, were able to solve 
these unusual problems with unusual solutions?  The answer rested in the textile mills, railroad 
yards, small farms, and plantations of antebellum America.
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CHAPTER 2 
EDUCATION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: COMMON SCHOOLS AND MECHANICS INSTITUTES 
 
“A Yankee mixes a certain number of wooden nutmegs, which cost him ¼ cent apiece, with a 
quantity of real nutmegs, worth 4 cents apiece, and sells the whole assortment for $44; and 
gains $3.75 by the fraud. How many wooden nutmegs were there?” 
 
              Southern algebra textbook by Daniel Harvey Hill, 18571 
 
 As Colonel Keigwin’s men swatted mosquitoes and kept a keen eye out for alligators, 
perhaps some turned to thoughts of life before the war. Standing in knee high water and feeling 
the bone-chilling dampness, these soldiers may have dreamed of the warmth of hearth and 
home and a work environment that did not require dodging Confederate bullets and artillery 
shells.  
 The division commander chose the 49th Indiana and 114th Ohio because many of the 
men had mechanical ability learned before the war on farms or in machine shops and factories. 
Their bridge building assignments required the ability to solve problems in unconventional ways 
with limited raw materials and tools. It was a significant advantage for Union generals over their 
counterparts to be able to send forward a regiment of soldiers with both the skills to build 
bridges and the combat experience to fight off Confederate raiding parties and guard the 
bridges once built.  
Why was it that so many of these Union soldiers had some mechanical skill? A look back 
at the country’s schools, literacy levels, technology, manufacturing, and agriculture before the 
war provides answers. Furthermore, understanding the prewar background of soldiers North 
and South explains the subsequent arguments made in this dissertation regarding the different 
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approaches and practices of the Union and Confederate armies. An investigation into 
conventional attitudes in the North, South, and West about, economic development, societal 
structures, and cultural formations does make clear in large measure the reasons for the 
disparity in military engineers between the Union and the Confederacy, and explains why, 
thanks to its engineering prowess, the Union prevailed at places like Vicksburg and Chattanooga 
and ultimately won the Civil War.  
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century American schools reflected the national 
ethos. Wealthy merchants, plantation and business owners, attorneys, ministers, and scholars 
sent their sons to the small number of regional private schools and then on to the great 
universities where these young men studied Latin, Greek, classical literature, and philosophy. 
Knowledge in these areas of study defined what it meant to be a gentleman in American society. 
Young men were trained to quote Shakespeare, command respect, and fight to defend family 
and honor. Upper class women were trained to look for these traits in a man. 
 For the sons and daughters of artisans, craftsmen, yeoman farmers, and storekeepers, 
to learn republican virtues, the Christian faith, and basic literacy and arithmetic required a 
rudimentary education.  Schools were operated by local communities, if at all, and many 
children learned their lessons at home because boys spent most of their time assisting on the 
farm and girls assisted in rearing the younger children and running the household.  
The Bible, The New England Primer, and Noah Webster’s The American Spelling Book 
were the standard texts used in what developed into the common school.  Webster’s original 
edition published in 1783 at the close of the American Revolution attempted to establish a new 
American culture by using language to transform thirteen independent states into one 
independent nation. In his introduction Webster wrote, “Every state in America and almost 
every town in each State, has some peculiarities in pronunciation which are equally erroneous 
 42 
and disagreeable to its neighbors. This [the Webster speller] is designed to introduce uniformity 
and accuracy of pronunciation into common schools….Such a standard, universally used in 
schools, would in time, demolish those odious distinctions of provincial dialects, which are the 
objects of reciprocal ridicule in the United States.”2  
 By the 1830s common schools operated throughout the North. Local communities 
controlled the funding, maintained the cold and dreary one-room schoolhouses, provided 
teachers who were often “only a few steps ahead of their pupils,” and did not require 
attendance.3  The 1840 Census revealed the dismal state of American common school 
education. In Massachusetts and New York, of a total population of children between the ages 
of five and sixteen years old, only twenty-three percent attended some kind of common school.4 
This did not necessarily represent the literacy rate, which was hard if not impossible to 
determine, but the numbers suggested a failed system.  
In the South, the limited number of towns over 2,500 people and unregulated schools 
made it more difficult for census takers to determine the number of children attending school, 
but the numbers reported revealed the lack of emphasis Southerners placed on education. The 
average number of children who attended common schools in Virginia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina was three percent of the school age population. Thomas Jefferson had failed 
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twice to push the Virginia legislature to pass a “free schools bill.” In 1807 he wrote to Joel 
Barlow, “There is a snail-paced gait for the advance of new ideas on the general mind, under 
which we must acquiesce.”5  
 During the first two decades of the nineteenth century when efforts to better organize 
and run common schools was inconsistent and stagnant, the Northeast began to show signs of a 
structural change to its economic system. Early educational reformers were concerned that the 
current system might not provide enough workers with the skills necessary to meet the 
demands of the new economy. With the rapid growth of textile manufacturing and the parallel 
development of machine tool industries there occurred a transformation to the work force.6  
Commerce, transportation technology, finance, and innovation highlighted the importance of 
reading, writing, and arithmetic. Furthermore, an influx of immigrants from western Europe was 
now competing for jobs with the native born. Also new political parties encouraged an 
expanded electorate, which placed greater emphasis on reading newspapers and staying 
informed.   
 By the third decade of the nineteenth century most Americans worked in the 
countryside, worshipped in Protestant churches, believed only property owning, white men 
should vote, and believed their state representatives were more important than their national 
representatives. Jeffersonian principles of small government and individual self-sufficiency were 
republican virtues inherited from the patriots of the revolution. Women were cast for particular 
roles, immigrants—especially Catholic ones—were mistrusted, and free blacks and Native 
Americans were third-class citizens. African slaves were property, not people. 
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 During this decade, however, a rural economic change was in the offing. New roads, 
canals, and railroads opened access to urban markets, and population growth forced young 
people to search for occupations other than farming. Christopher Clark in The Roots of Rural 
Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860, argued that “the use of credit, the emergence 
of cash and negotiable paper instruments, and the charging of interest on debts all contributed 
to the development of rural capitalism.”7 Formal education outside the home became 
important, and reformers in Massachusetts like Horace Mann called attention to the decrepit 
state of common schools. In 1838 Mann wrote, “It is commonly believed down to the present 
hour…that in all the world there is nothing to be compared to the common school system of 
New England….Till dreamings and gloryings as contemptible as these are banished from our 
firesides and legislative halls, nothing will be accomplished, and our common schools will 
continue in the process of deterioration.”8 
 Mann’s concerns alone, however, were not enough to launch a widespread educational 
reform movement throughout New England, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and the Northwest. 
The expansion of factories, white male suffrage, political parties, new technologies, civic 
responsibility, urbanization, and Protestant values, all contributed to the transformation of 
education in general and the common school movement in particular. Men who became leaders 
in reform did not necessarily agree with each other about why change was essential, but they 
left a mark by their work that helped to impress upon bankers, merchants, mechanics, farmers, 
and politicians the value of education for everyone. 
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 Yet by the late 1830s there were growing tensions and economic divisions between 
workers and business owners. The growth of the market economy, increased competition, 
urban growth, and inexpensive labor comprised of French and Irish immigrants, contributed to 
these tensions. With varying concerns about cultural assimilation, the negative and destructive 
influence of the Catholic Church on America’s democratic society, and an increase in poverty 
and crime among the urban unemployed, educational reformers believed the solution to these 
problems rested in a vastly improved educational system.  
As grassroots reformers, the Workingmen’s Associations believed that public education 
overcame “inequalities of birth,” and worked to destroy “the unfair advantage that well-to-do 
citizens derived from [private] academies and colleges….”9. Education would develop talented 
citizens from families of the poor as well as the rich. It would produce informed citizens who in 
turn could influence party platforms and legislation within the framework of a broadening 
popular democracy launched in the mid 1820s by the Democratic-Republicans. Education would 
also provide moral training and discipline, essential skills for Americans unique among the 
people of the world. 
 Francis Wright, a New York City radical in 1829 said if citizens should unite around one 
reform, “this measure will be found in a plan of equal, universal, and republican education….”10 
This comment was followed one year later by a “Report of a Committee of Philadelphia 
Workingmen,” in which the committee advocated for a strengthening of common schools in 
order to strike at “an aristocracy of talent…in the hands of a privileged few,” and for these 
chances to be orchestrated by the state legislature to ensure that liberty and “equal prosperity 
and happiness” be attainable for everyone not just the cities or towns committed to educational 
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reform.11 This request of the Philadelphia Workingmen to have the state government pass 
legislation to establish and regulate public education was a radical departure from the standard 
practice of allowing local government to determine the extent of support for their own common 
school without interference from the state. In 1831 Pennsylvania passed a law making state 
funds available for schools. It was a first step. 
 Four years later, legislators drafted a bill to repeal the Public School Act of 1834 because 
it “removed instruction from religious control, and it forced the whole group to pay for 
instruction to benefit only those who had children in school.”12 Does this sound familiar? It took 
a resolute Thaddeus Stevens to convince his colleagues to pocket their proposed repeal. “In 
New England free schools plant the seeds and desire of knowledge in every mind, without 
regard to the wealth of the parent, or the texture of the pupil’s garments,” he insisted.13  
 If state government could regulate transportation, commerce, financing, and banking, 
then as New York Governor William Seward in 1840 declared, it could then use “the same 
resources to improve the public morals and increase the general happiness.”  Nothing was more 
important to the achievement of these goals than common schools.14  
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 In Connecticut, the impetus behind educational reform was the result of urbanization 
that accompanied industrialization. For example, in mill towns and cities unemployed teenage 
boys, “transient mill workers and immigrants” who worked on jobs like the Farmington canal 
project and new railroads, were seen as threats to social stability and as contributors to 
prostitution, drunkenness, poverty, and crime.15 Henry Barnard, the first secretary of the Board 
of Commissioners of Common Schools in Connecticut reported his concerns to the legislature in 
1840 arguing that the state could not combat the social problems of recalcitrant, uneducated 
teenagers running amuck if the government would not commit to increased funding and 
improved teacher training. “That our schools are not as good as they should be, or as they can 
be made with or without a school fund, that there are defects, and great defects…is painfully 
evident.” Furthermore, “the source of much if not all of the inefficiency of common schools 
everywhere [is] the want of a suitable number of well qualified teachers.”16 
 As a result of Barnard’s passionate persuasion, the state passed legislation in 1841 to 
revamp the common school system by granting district school societies the power to levy school 
taxes and “prescribe rules and regulations for the management, studies, books, classification 
and discipline of the schools in the society.”17 Each district school organized its own curriculum 
and all common schools taught reading, arithmetic, spelling, writing, and history. Some schools 
also began to teach rhetoric, geography, geometry, algebra, chemistry, surveying, and 
                                                             
15 Christopher Collier, Connecticut’s Public Schools: A History, 1650-2000 (Orange, CT: Clearwater 
Press, 2009), 74.  
16 Henry Barnard, 2nd., Second Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of Common Schools 
in Connecticut Together with the Second Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board, May 1840 
(Hartford: Case, Tiffany and Burnham, 1840), 42.  Barnard reported that in 1839 the average 
cost to each child attending school was $3.20. The states’ “school fund” contributed $1.25 to 
the cost, the “Town Deposite Fund,” the money from which came as a result of the 1836 Federal 
surplus, contributed thirty cents, and the rest was raised through a Town Tax, District Tax, and 
tax on parents of children attending school.  
17 Collier, 80.  
 48 
bookkeeping.18 Yet, like other Northern states before the Civil War, the Connecticut system of 
public schools looked good on paper.  In reality, significant problems remained.  
 The system was haphazard. In 1852, 217 school societies supervised 1,642 districts.19 
Fifty districts had school for 200 days or more. The Fairfield North School District in 1857-1858 
was a district that kept school for 200 days, and that year during the winter term, twenty-two 
students were enrolled. The average daily attendance was eighteen.20  For the decade of the 
1850s, fifty-seven percent of the school age population was enrolled in Connecticut common 
schools. Yet, as the Fairfield District example pointed out, the number of days a student was 
actually in school varied by gender and age. When they were in school, however, students were 
learning to read and spell using the McGuffey Reader, younger students were memorizing 
multiplication tables and doing “mental arithmetic,” and older students solved arithmetic word 
problems.21  
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 By 1860, learning to read, to calculate, and to keep books, were deemed valuable skills 
for practical work.22 Learning was an accepted part of masculine identity in the North, and men 
who used knowledge to become skilled mechanics, craftsmen, or inventors were admired in 
cities and rural areas, as well.  Teaching in the common schools, however, was becoming more 
closely associated with women, and what started as the young female teacher, after the Civil 
War, morphed into the schoolmarm.  
 Henry Barnard, Noah Porter (a Yale president,) and most men believed women were 
more effective in the classroom and especially with younger children. “As a class,” Barnard 
wrote, “schools taught by females, are better governed than males [because of their] gentle 
manner….”23 Noah Porter agreed. “Female teachers are cheaper; female teachers are better for 
this immature age. Their influence is more gentle; it forms the girls to mild dispositions and 
graceful manners; it infuses a portion of its own sweetness into the harsh and self-willed 
perservereness [sic] of early boyhood.”24  Many teenage girls began teaching in the summer, 
and as it became increasingly acceptable for women to teach, these young women moved into 
cities or villages to teach year round. The view was that married people “ought not be hired as 
teachers for fear they might neglect their jobs in deference to their domestic duties.”25  
 Gender bias remained resilient. Male teachers were still preferred before 1860, and 
females were grossly underpaid. In the decades of the 1840s and 1850s, approximately 2,700 
teachers were employed each year in the state of Connecticut. During winter terms, Barnard 
                                                             
22 The standard textbook used in bookkeeping instruction was written by Nicholas Harris and 
published in Hartford in 1841 under the comprehensive title First Lessons in Book-Keeping: 
Exhibiting Simple and Approved Methods of Recording Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Accounts, By 
Single Entry Accompanied by Valuable Suggestions in Doing Business; Introductory Lessons in 
Double Entry, Followed by A Series of Mathematical Tables, and Rules for Performing 
Computations in Business, Designed for Common Schools. 
23 Collier, 111. 
24 Collier, 111. 
25 Collier, 112. 
 50 
reported, males taught almost exclusively, and during the summer months females taught in the 
common schools. Sixteen hundred males taught per year and only 150 taught in the same 
school the entire year. “Most had no previous acquaintance with the schools [they taught in] 
and left quickly.”26  Men’s average wage in the summer was $20 a month and $17.50 in the 
winter with board. Women made $6.30 per month in the summer and $8.69 with board in the 
winter.27  
 Although most women were silent on the issues affecting female teachers, Catherine 
Beecher was a voice in the wilderness. She advocated for the training of women as professional 
educators, for fair pay, and for a shift in the mission of common schools, which she believed 
would only happen if women taught in the classroom. In several addresses throughout the 
North, Beecher challenged her listeners to “remedy the evils which now oppress their country,” 
and to help secure proper teacher training so the nation could deal with tens of thousands of 
neglected children all over America.28  She argued that educating children was a noble 
profession worthy of the best minds in the United States. Beecher compared it to the military 
profession which “custom rendered elegant…the killing of others…viewed as glorious…and 
the…young and generous and enthusiastic have been drawn into it!”29 She continued, “If one-
half the poetry, fiction, oratory, and taste thus misemployed had been used to embellish and 
evaluate the employment of training the mind of childhood, in what an altered position should 
we find this noblest of all professions,” and the country itself.30  
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 Beecher’s criticism was forged by what she saw in some states including Connecticut, 
yet she was also quick to praise other states for reform minded systems of common schools. 
“Wherever education is most prosperous, their women is [sic] employed more than men. In 
Massachusetts, where education is highest, five out of seven of the teachers are women….”31 
There was no doubt that New England and New York had a significant influence on schools 
systems and educational reforms in the Midwest. Reformers in Ohio such as Caleb Atwater, 
Nathan Guilford, and Ephraim Cutler were born in New England. Michigan leaders John Pierce 
and Isaac Crary were from New England, and the first state superintendent of Indiana, William 
Larrabee was born in Maine, taught in Connecticut and New York, and then moved to the 
Midwest.32 “All but one of Wisconsin’s state school chiefs until 1880 were born in New York or 
New England, as were all of Michigan’s superintendents.”33  
 More importantly, the mid-western states believed common schools demonstrated a 
culture committed to individual freedom, an informed citizenry, free enterprise, and self-
government.34 Michigan reformer John Pierce wrote, “Justice, truth, and equity are the glory of 
a nation, but these attributes of virtue are not to be found among an ignorant and vicious 
people.”35 Midwestern educators learned valuable lessons about curricula, administration, state 
support, and teacher training from eastern reformers like Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, and 
Catherine Beecher, but the state school system that garnered the most attention, and received 
the highest adulations was that of New York. It was well deserved. 
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 Perhaps the secret to New York’s success, or at least one of them, rested with the 
creation of the Regents of the University of the State of New York. Established in 1784, the 
Regents “were a corporation empowered to act as trustees of Columbia College… and of every 
other college and academy incorporated in the state thereafter.”36 After the state developed a 
system of common schools in 1812 the responsibilities of the superintendents and Regents 
overlapped until 1842 when the Superintendent of Common Schools became a member of the 
Board of Regents. The organizational structure of the New York State school system provided 
significant advantages over other school systems in the North. The state monitored teacher 
training, local library development, curriculum development, textbook use, and attendance, in 
addition to serving as a powerful voice within the halls of the state legislature and governor’s 
office. On January 4, 1831, using data supplied by the Regents, Governor Enos T. Throop, 
addressed the legislature stating clearly, “There is no one of our public institutions of more 
importance, or which has better fulfilled public expectations, than that providing for instruction 
in common schools.”37  
 After reporting an increase in the number of children enrolled in school from the 
previous year, and accounting for state money apportioned among school districts, the governor 
challenged lawmakers and educators to consider more change: “For mere purpose of reading 
and arithmetic, selections may be made among various books extant, of such as are perfectly 
adopted to the purpose. But I feel confident that, under proper regulation, a vast amount of 
knowledge in the arts and sciences, connected with agriculture and handicraft, which are simple 
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in their principles…might be taught to children during those years which are usually spent at 
common schools.”38 Thirteen years later, the state encouraged school districts to teach 
rudimentary farming principles to their pupils, which included a basic understanding of 
chemistry. In 1856 New York attempted to establish, with limited success, two-acre farms near 
common schools to be cultivated by the male children, under the supervision of a teacher. 
“Young ladies” were encouraged to attend to an ornamental garden.39 
 Abstracts of reports submitted to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (the title was 
changed in 1854) paint an extraordinary canvas. The ratios between the total number of 
children in each county and the children taught were impressive. Furthermore, counties were 
required to maintain libraries with some such as Oneida County boasting as many as 54,000 
volumes. Of course these varied, and the small Maine County had only 1613 volumes in its 
library. The state apportioned money for the purchase of new books. 40 
 Problems, however, remained. In a letter by E. Powell, School Commissioner for Oswego 
Tioga County to Superintendent V. M. Rice in 1856, Powell reported, “The obstacles that lie in 
the way of the progress of our schools in standing; [sic] character are numerous and various; 
prominent among which are, the change of teachers twice a year, a want of uniformity as 
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regards a system of instruction, and of text books, inexperience of teachers and a dire want of 
interest among the inhabitants….”41  
For those in the North regardless of their common school experiences and their states’ 
problems in fixing them, continuing educational opportunities remained. Lyceums, mechanics 
institutes, country fairs, and agricultural societies were the epicenter of adult learning. The 
dissemination of knowledge and useful information to a broad audience, rural and urban, 
contributed to greater farm and manufacturing production, and also opened the way to 
potential upward mobility for those men interested in inventing new and more efficient tools 
and machines that contributed to the overall wealth of a region.  
 The idea for the lyceum as developed first in the North probably began in the United 
Kingdom. The story goes that Henry Brougham, an English proponent of popular education, 
often had to repair his own scientific equipment, and consequently, he had to explain the actual 
steps to the smiths, glassblowers, and carpenters involved in doing the repairs. He, therefore, 
decided to “deliver a series of lectures upon the mechanical properties of solid and fluid bodies, 
abounding with experiments and conducted with the greatest simplicity of expression and 
familiarity of illustration, solely for persons engaged in the practical exercise of the mechanic 
arts.”42  
 Brougham founded the London Mechanic’s Institution in 1824. The concept of this 
organization crossed the Atlantic and in 1826 a former laboratory assistant to Benjamin Silliman 
at Yale, Josiah Holbrook, started the Millbury (Massachusetts) Branch Number One of the 
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American Lyceum. 43 For Holbrook the lyceum was an educational and social institution, and a 
crusade to diffuse knowledge to thousands who might otherwise develop habits “which will lead 
to their ruin….”44 Holbrook believed that the lyceum would extend to everyone in the 
community, “old and young, the male and female, the learned and illiterate,” that it would bring 
together ideas regarding the improvements of common schools, and for a young person growing 
up “under the advantages and influence of an Association well conducted,” the lyceum would 
provide “more useful, practical information than he would be likely to obtain in a College [sic] 
course.”45 
 The Millbury Lyceum was the first of many and as the idea spread, so did the 
breath and depth of the presentations and lectures. In 1836-37 the Salem Lyceum offered 
lectures by Daniel Webster on “Popular Knowledge as applied to Scientific Improvements,” the 
“Application of Science to Common Life,” by Elisha Bartlett, and “Electro Magnetism,” by Charles 
G. Page.46 Other speakers included Charles Francis Adams, George Bancroft, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Horace Mann, George Catlin, and John Quincy Adams and topics ranged from 
“Common School Education” to “The Legal Rights of Women” to the “Life and Times of Oliver 
Cromwell.”47 The Lincoln, Massachusetts Lyceum recorded that on January 19, 1847 the speaker 
was Henry David Thoreau, and after his lecture a discussion question was posited: “Are the 
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present customs of society in this country calculated to develop the mental and physical powers 
of its young men?” Two men were appointed to argue in the affirmative and two in the 
negative. The arguments were not recorded, yet we were told that after hearing the discussion 
the “house voted in the affirmative.”48  
In the North the common school and lyceum movements provided citizens with an 
opportunity to expand their knowledge base, collect new ideas, and compete in a growing 
industrial and mechanical environment. To the contrary, the opportunity for commoners to 
receive a basic education in the South was so inadequate, for example, that by 1860 only 
eighteen percent of children between five and nineteen years old attended a common school.49 
This inadequacy was not just because the Southern economic system centered around 
agriculture and slave labor, but also because men in power with hierarchical notions of how 
society was controlled, chose to reject educational reform. Furthermore, some Southerners 
encouraged by Northern industrial success sought to open new manufacturing operations. The 
dominant planter class who controlled state legislatures often blocked these efforts.  
  Wealthy planters and middle class professionals could afford to hire private 
tutors to instruct their children, and they had the additional option of sending their children to 
the large number of academies, denominational schools, and subscription schools. By 1850 the 
number of academies in the South as a whole (2,700) surpassed the number of academies in the 
Middle Atlantic region (2,100) or New England (1,000).50 Episcopalians, Methodists, Baptists, 
and Presbyterians, all established academies. Finally, some communities built log cabin 
schoolhouses in old fallow fields, hired teachers, charged tuition, and provided a basic 
elementary education for anyone who could pay. These “old-field schools” operated at the 
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whim of the community, and often recruited men who were looking to make some money 
instead of teach. Governor George Gilmer of Georgia recalled his old-field teachers as a “…loud, 
violent Irishman, an impoverished Virginia gentleman who drank too much, and a well-qualified, 
sober Georgian.”51 Benevolent societies, and states such as Virginia that had a small fund for 
teaching poor children, would also reimburse old-field schools for pupils whose families could 
not afford the tuition. 
 The institution of slavery represented the most ubiquitous obstacle to the formation of 
common schools in the South. It was the sine qua non of conservative social thought. 
Southerners argued against the North’s competitive, free-market, wage-labor system.  They 
sounded like Marxists as they said that in the North, “the interests of capitalists and laborers are 
antagonistic.”52 Henry Hughes said, “Want is not eliminated…. The young, the old, and other 
inefficients”[sic] are not supported. Under slavery, Edmund Ruffin wrote, “there is no possibility 
of the occurrence of the sufferings of the laboring classes” that characterize the “class-slavery of 
labor to capital.”53 
 For conservative thinkers, hierarchy, aristocracy, and social control were the 
fundamental principles of God’s divine plan where rich and poor, intelligent and illiterate, 
leaders and followers could coexist in harmony and happiness. Education could upset the social 
balance. Public education could be dangerous. Extreme pro- slavery ideologue South Carolina 
attorney William Harper argued, “Men of no great power of intellect, and of imperfect and 
superficial knowledge, are the most mischievous of all…. Of all communities, one of the least 
desirable, would be that in which imperfect, superficial half-education should be universal.”54 
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The free exchange of ideas and the ability of the entire population to read them could produce 
revolutionary ideas among slaves, as it did with Frederick Douglas, and radical thinking among 
some Southerners who might sympathize with Northern abolitionists. An 1852 article in the 
Southern Quarterly Review succinctly stated its case, “Throughout the whole country, from the 
Hudson to the Bay of Fundy, a settled determination exists to abolish slavery at the South….The 
diffusion of education in New England is likely to effect a dissolution of the Union.”55  
 Large plantation slave owners dominated the halls of state assemblies, controlled local 
government, and in a paternalistic relationship with yeoman farmers and others in their sphere 
of influence, commanded loyalty in turn for protection from outside interference. Virginia and 
North Carolina, however, attempted, with marginal success, to establish common school 
systems more in keeping with their sister states in the North.  Local citizens targeted distinct 
regional areas where slavery played a small role for educational reform, although there 
remained significant push back from state legislators whose interests were closely aligned with 
the plantation aristocracy. In both states, westerners called for “equitable representation and 
free common schools.”56 
 Western Virginia in the three decades before the Civil War clamored for better public 
education based on a belief that their section of the South had the natural resources in coal and 
other minerals to forge an industrial center similar to those areas in the North. Business 
interests in western Virginia were not afraid of Northerners’ ideas about slavery, and instead 
sought Northern advice and guidance regarding manufacturing and commerce. Henry A. Wise, a 
Whig congressman, challenged his constituency to “Educate your children, all your children—
every one of them!”  After attacking the Southern educational system as one based on charity 
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instead of one based on opportunity and the privilege of citizenship, Wise continued, “Does 
anyone suppose that if education had been diffused universally among our people…that her 
[Virginia] agriculture and mechanic arts would be in the low state they are now in? That the rich 
bowels of her inexhaustible mountain mines of iron and coal would be undug [sic] and almost 
unexplored? That her manufactures would have languished as they do?”57  Wise reminded men 
that the axe helve, plow handle, handspike, and ox chain were all “levers of knowledge.”58 Yet 
eastern plantation Democrats made it exceedingly difficult to create the common schools and, 
in 1860, when western Virginia voted against secession, the Wheeling Intelligencer reported that 
one grievance against eastern Virginia was that tidewater plantation owners denied western 
Virginians common schools.59  
 In western North Carolina, where Regulators had protested unfair planter control of the 
legislature in the 1820s, where ”people had showed a distaste for nullification and secession 
philosophies,” where Quakers and churchmen talked of anti-slavery feelings, and where the 
Whig Party was strong, there the common school movement enjoyed more success than any 
other place in the South. In the late 1830s, a common school law set the stage for further 
improvements in the system including a bill passed in 1852 to establish the office of 
superintendent.60  
 Superintendent Calvin H. Wiley’s first annual report to the North Carolina legislature in 
1854 demonstrated the progress the state was making in public education reform. He 
documented the growth of both common schools and the number of children who attended 
                                                             
57 Henry A. Wise, “Address to His Constituents, 1844,” in American Writings on Popular 
Education: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Rush Welter (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
Inc., 1971), 122 and 128.  
58 Wise, 131. 
59 Kaestle, 210. 
60 Kaestle, 211. 
 60 
them. The 1840 census, he reported, showed the state with 632 common or subscription 
schools and 14,937 enrolled. By 1850 that number jumped to 2,131 common schools and 83,873 
pupils in attendance.61 Whereas Virginia distributed about eight cents per capita for white 
education, North Carolina spent fifty cents. This compared favorably with Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania at ninety-five cents per capita and Ohio and New York at one dollar.62 North 
Carolina had three times as many children in school as South Carolina and six hundred more 
common schools than Virginia and Virginia’s population was 340,000 more than the Tar Heel 
State. Wiley wrote, “Upon a calm review of the entire facts, it is neither immodest nor unjust to 
assert that North Carolina is clearly ahead of all slave-holding states with their system of public 
instruction, while she compares favorably in several respects with some of the New England and 
Northwestern states.”63 The superintendent predicted that in ten to twenty years the state 
would produce as well educated a citizenry as Massachusetts. The 1860 Census confirmed North 
Carolina was on the right educational path. Massachusetts had fifty-seven percent of their 
children between five and nineteen in common schools, and North Carolina had forty-two 
percent. These numbers were in stark contrast to Virginia’s twenty-one percent and South 
Carolina’s dismal eighteen percent. 
 Yet, North Carolina, like the entire South had significant cultural obstacles to overcome 
before it educated all its children. Many men believed “book learn’n” useless and, as a result, 
many male teachers had to travel North to receive proper training and common schools often 
had to rely on Northern instructors.  Again, the institution of slavery was written into the 
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equation. At the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1845, the “Report of the Committee on 
Education” read, “Southern men should have southern heads and hearts, with sentiments 
untarnished by doctrines at war with our rights and liberties. It is of the first importance that 
correct impressions be made upon the minds of children; for it is difficult to unlearn what has 
been learned amiss.”64 When young scholars returned home from their Northern school 
experience, often, the report note, these men had to be “re-acclimated” to the Southern way of 
life.  
 In comparison to Northern states, the Southern states suffered from little interest in 
schooling, a lack of funding and teacher training, and a powerful planter class whose vision of a 
harmonious world did not include universal education. A state such as Tennessee was not overly 
concerned about the negative influence of Northern teachers, nor were they opposed to 
providing educational opportunities to all their white children. They just did not want to pay for 
them. 65  
The education Southern children did receive was bread and water learning—basic 
instruction in reading, spelling, grammar, writing, and arithmetic. Southerners relied on 
textbooks from the North since there was no textbook industry in the South, and this also 
placed them at a disadvantage. Furthermore, the Northern concept of the school district and 
the active engagement by those who administered common schools provided opportunities to 
evaluate curriculum needs. Thus, in many states mental arithmetic, bookkeeping, and farming 
principle and farm chemistry were introduced. Finally, when the young Northern student left 
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school to find a farm to work or mechanical skills to learn, they entered a society that valued 
education and had vehicles in place to assist in continuing their education.  
 At the outbreak of Civil War, the new Southern Confederacy took stock of its institutions 
to determine which ones had been tainted by excessive Northern influence, and then offer the 
proper prescription to correct the illness. Education was wounded because of the “curse of New 
England Society, and the great revolutionary element of the North.” Edward Pollard, associate 
editor of the Richmond Examiner wrote: “We believe that the education of the New England 
common school is carried out to that point where learning is dangerous.”66 Other writers also 
believed that common school education in the North had produced an indoctrination and 
radicalism among the masses. “Nothing is more to be dreaded than a community half-educated, 
and who consider themselves learned.”67 
 The problems faced by Southern educational reformers like Calvin Henderson Wiley 
were daunting.  The war would require significant economic resources from the states, and the 
central government in Richmond would not encourage the promotion of public education.  As a 
result, public school systems were not developed during the war. 
 The easiest problem to manage for educators in the Confederacy was that of textbooks. 
Textbooks were produced quickly as part of a call for Confederate cultural nationalism and 
educational independence. As Michael T. Bernath pointed out in his book Confederate Minds: 
The Struggle for Intellectual Independence in the Civil War South, the new Southern textbooks, 
often edited copies of Northern schoolbooks, “were safe for southern children because any 
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poisons hidden within northern textbooks had been carefully screened by watchful southern 
eyes.”68  
 Finding teachers to instruct the Confederacy’s youth in the ways of cultural 
independence and homogeneous values under the rubric of Christianity, however, would prove 
as difficult as recruiting men to serve as engineer troops in the army.   Most men joined the 
army or worked farms to support the war effort and very few were available to teach. This 
situation placed educational reformers in a conundrum. Before the war, Southern men believed 
that the female mind was inferior to the male, and therefore, little educational opportunities 
were given to young girls. Women who did receive an education were most often daughters of 
the planter class, and the expectation was that they would marry well, rear children, and carry 
on the cultural refinements of the noblesse oblige. Now, in 1861, “Patriotism calls women to the 
school room.” Editor J. D. Campbell of the North Carolina Journal of Education wrote in January 
1862, “Ladies, it is a duty that you owe your State, in this her time of trial; think of it, act upon 
it.”69 Normal schools for teacher training were not yet in place. Furthermore, as the war dragged 
on and women were required to run businesses and farms, buy and sell slaves, work in 
hospitals, make homespun uniforms, and deal with wartime shortages, few women entered the 
teaching ranks.  
 Poor public school systems, an inadequate number of textbooks, a dearth of teachers, 
and an ideological belief that education for the masses was a repulsive Northern concept, 
limited basic literacy, mechanical aptitude, and inventiveness in the antebellum South. The 
region, nonetheless, did witness the rise of an emerging middle class, with non-agricultural 
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professionals making up about ten percent of urban populations.70 Before the war, the sons of 
these men did receive a solid education at an institution that would make its mark on Southern 
society in the antebellum period and in the years that followed—the Southern military academy.  
 In her careful analysis of schools such as the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), historian 
Jennifer R. Green saw a link between middle class alumni of military schools and Southern elite, 
although the former possessed “a separate status.”71 VMI alumni by 1850 made up twelve 
percent of the total of all students who attended colleges in the South that year, Green argued. 
These young men served as instructors or superintendents in the ninety-six military secondary 
schools or military colleges in the South by 1860. Some served in the twelve military schools in 
the North.72 
 The South Carolina Military Academy (now the Citadel) superintendent reported that of 
the eighty-seven men who graduated in 1854, ten percent became agriculturally employed and 
the rest served as teachers, businessmen, attorneys, or doctors. Unlike non-military private 
academies and colleges, some private and all state military schools received public funding, and 
unlike civilian schools, military academies taught advanced mathematics, science, and French. 
(Most military engineering treatises were written in French.) The Southern elite received a 
classical education, which included ancient history, literature and poetry, the classics, Greek and 
Latin.73 Finally, academy cadets did share with Northerners an appreciation for self-discipline 
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and industry, but they were also schooled in Southern values of community, hierarchy, honor, 
and, of course, these young men were pro-slavery.74   
 Just as the southern upper class felt no compunction to lead in the common school 
movement, they felt no responsibility to lead the lyceum movement.75  This meant that lyceums 
could form only in more densely populated areas where middle class artisans and mechanics 
had a vested interest in joining a society that supported continuing education. It was not 
surprising then to learn that the few cities in the South that did have lyceums included large 
urban areas with a middle class like Richmond, Savannah, Macon, and Nashville. Thomas Grimké 
attempted to start a lyceum in Charleston in 1834, but nothing ever came of it, and a “Yankee 
enclave” in New Orleans established the Library and Lyceum Society in 1844.76  
 In addition to population density, there were other factors that worked against the 
South in terms of education. First, with easy transportation available only to cities, it was 
difficult to bring in outsiders to lecture, especially from the North. Second, starting after Nat 
Turner’s Rebellion, a culture of caution informed decisions about inviting Yankees to speak. The 
fear of abolitionist viewpoints led to a pervasive anti-intellectualism. Third, the prevailing 
technique of “shifting cultivation…stunted rural population growth.”77 Southern farmers added 
unimproved acres to their property so they could cultivate a portion of their land for five years, 
strip it of its nutrients and then burn another section of their fallow fields or woods. The burning 
would add nutrients to the soil, this land would be cultivated, and the previously used field 
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would sit fallow for twenty years in preparation to be again burned.78 In his book, Modernizing A 
Slave Economy: The Economic Vision of the Confederate Nation, John Majewski wrote, “A region 
composed of isolated farms and plantations generated fewer subscribers for periodicals and 
newspapers, had fewer potential members for mechanics’ institutes or literary associations, and 
provided fewer students for schools and colleges.”79   
 The lyceum movement, born and raised in New England did stretch over the mid-
western states making significant strides in Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. By 1850, Wisconsin 
would boast of lyceums in Milwaukee, Madison, Beloit, Racine, and Sheboyan, and in Iowa, 
Davenport and Iowa City had organizations. Yet, in the South, where a plantation economy and 
a social hierarchy was embedded into the regions culture, the lyceum movement made little 
headway. 
The differences between the North, West, and South were significant when it came to 
the common school and lyceum movements. Yet these were not the only opportunities people 
had at self-improvement. When the Saturday Evening Post reported on February 14, 1824, that 
the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia formed to “advance the general interests of Manufactures 
and Mechanics,” this ushered in a new wave of organizations that by 1861, would produce large 
numbers of skilled mechanics, artisans, and farmers, and encourage entrepreneurs and 
inventors. Soon these same men in the North would become soldiers and their mechanical skills 
would prove critical to the success of the Union Army.  
 The Institute’s transformation over the next three decades reflected the changing 
nature of the role manufacturing played in what citizens identified as both improvements in the 
quality of their lives, and in the opportunities technology provided in improving their financial 
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positions. Technology was perceived as a great leveler in mid-nineteenth century America 
because with mechanical ability you would make more money than the average worker or you 
could sell what you invented. The skills you had could advance you economically and help 
overcome any perceived disadvantage you had by being born into a lower class family. Learning 
mechanical skills or inventing new technologies was the possible pot of gold at the end of the 
rainbow. There was, however, debate over pedagogical questions of how information was 
disseminated to workers who wanted to learn new skills and techniques. The early history of the 
Franklin Institute demonstrates these growing pains. 
 Just sixteen months after the Institute was founded, the cornerstone for the new 
building on Seventh Street, between Market and Chestnut Streets was laid on June 8, 1825. 
Governors Geddes of South Carolina and DeWitt Clinton of New York listened with the other 
guests as chairman of the building committee, Peter A. Browne delivered the principal address. 
He said, “Knowledge ceases to be monopolized by few and is becoming the property of the 
many…the workman and the philosopher are united in the same person.”80 Then, in a prescient 
remark, Browne, referencing Europe, challenged Old World attitudes about education. These 
“Old World” positions would be echoed by plantation Southerners when they revealed their 
reasons opposing the common school movement.  Aristocratic governments “trembled in 
apprehension of the mischiefs [sic] of education among the working people,” but in America 
“we had no such fears, where the rights of all were equal.”81 
 The Institute wrestled, nonetheless, with the mission of its program. First, members of 
the Committee of Instruction proposed establishing a high school to prepare students from the 
                                                             
80 United States Gazette, June 9, 1825. See also Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia’s Philosopher 
Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1824-1865 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974), 48. 
81 Sinclair, 48. 
 68 
public schools for university studies. Peter Browne argued that a classical education, including 
knowledge of Greek and Latin, was a waste of time since the central purpose of the Institute 
was to provide technical education to boys before they were apprenticed to crafts and trades.82 
Ultimately, the committee adopted their own plan rejecting the “idea that secondary education 
should be vocational….Knowledge should be the vehicle for social advancement, as well as a 
useful occupational tool.”83 
 The Institute’s efforts at establishing a high school in the liberal arts tradition were not 
successful. Yet as historian Bruce Sinclair pointed out, the Franklin Institutes experiment was 
significant. “They were an essential part of the larger process whereby Americans worked out 
their ideas about technical education.” The New York Mechanic and Scientific Institution under 
the direction of John Griscom opened a “science-oriented high school in 1825,” and in Troy, 
New York educational reformers Stephen Van Rensselaer and Amos Eaton opened a school that 
taught “the application of science to the common purposes of life.”84  
 By the 1840s changes were essential to bring vibrancy to the Institute, and John F. 
Frazer, a member of the Board of Managers and a leading citizen in Philadelphia applied his 
organization’s skills to the job of reforming the Institute. He recruited speakers with superb 
reputations to lecture adult members and guests on topics such as hydraulics, civil engineering, 
and practical chemistry. He successfully repositioned the Institute’s previously derailed Journal 
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by enlisting specialists to submit articles for the new journal.85 For example, John C. Trautwine 
wrote articles on various engineering problems including one on a route survey for a ship canal 
through the Panamanian isthmus.86  
 Frazer encouraged Trautwine and others such as Colonel Joseph Totten of the Corps of 
Engineers, to publish their research in book form, which they did. Once published, the Institute 
became the copyright proprietor of Trautwine’s and Totten’s work.87 These articles were a 
significant resource for the entrepreneurs in the city and their manufacturing of heavy 
machinery like large lathes, railroad turntables, and large boring machines.  These articles also 
helped to sustain the Franklin Institute.88 In addition, in 1841 the Institute, under Frazer’s 
leadership, made the decision to hold annual fairs that provided fivefold benefit. First, the prize 
money at the fairs encouraged new inventions and improvements to machines and tools, which 
buoyed domestic manufacturing throughout the country. Second, the fairs provided craftsmen, 
artisans, and working men with an opportunity to study the new machinery, learn valuable 
information about repairs to their own equipment, and to immerse themselves in the culture of 
America’s emerging technological revolution. Third, the fairs brought in essential revenue for 
the Franklin Institute. Fourth, the fairs reinforced the notion that education, scientific study, and 
mechanical aptitude were appropriate masculine pursuits. Finally, not only did the fairs inspire 
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the creation of other fairs throughout the North, but they also led to collaborative efforts with 
the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanics’ Association “for proper American representation” at 
the 1851 Crystal Palace exhibition in London.89 By 1854, approximately 100,000 people were 
visitors to the Institute’s exhibitions.90 
 One year before the Crystal Palace exhibition in London, the Massachusetts Charitable 
Mechanics’ Association opened its sixth exhibition in Boston on September 11, 1850. Groups 
from Bangor, Portland, Salem, Lowell, Worcester County, Providence, the New Bedford 
Mechanics Association, and the Franklin Institute were present. Notes of support were received 
from the American Institutes, the New York Agricultural and Mechanic Institution, and the 
Montreal Mechanic Institute. Chairman of the Board of Managers, Henry H. Hooper, remarked 
on the contributions the exhibition received from around the country, but lamented that there 
were not more contributions from the West and South. “It was highly gratifying to find in the 
Exhibition, specimens of the skill of Machinists and Manufacturers of the West and South. We 
regret that we had not more of this honorable competition.”91 The managers had made a 
concerted effort to attract artisans and inventors from different sections of the country. Within 
the cauldron of simmering sectional tension including the free soil movement and the 
Compromise of 1850, the managers wished it “to be distinctly understood that the Exhibitions 
held under the sanction of our Association bear no sectional character. They are designed to 
promote the interests of our whole country….” The managers implored every section of the 
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country to “unite with us on this occasion, and thereby strengthen the cords which unite us as 
one body striving to promote the best interests of the whole.”92  
 The reasons for the absence of Southern and Western participation in the exhibitions 
could be explained partially by distance. Time and money were needed to transport new 
inventions or machinery to Boston and the requisite stay of nearly three months was an onerous 
burden for many to undertake. There was the cost of getting yourself to the city, finding lodging 
and food for the required two months residency before the fair, then the seventeen days the 
fair operated, and then getting home. Another reason, however, for a lack of participation from 
the South was explained by the limited interest in manufacturing and in little economic support 
demonstrated by the powerful businessmen.  Manufacturing accounted for a small percent of 
the South’s wealth in the years before the Civil War, and the industrial goods sought after and 
purchased were imported from the North. This had a downward spiral effect when it came to 
education and life-long learning.  The planter class was reluctant to support general education 
initiatives. Staple crops such as sugarcane, rice, tobacco, indigo, and cotton generated extreme 
wealth. This wealth was used to great advantage for the very few that controlled it. Planters 
were the best educated and they learned to rule their slaves and to serve as a patriarchal figure 
to the rest of white society.93 Patronage and political power was their lot in life. Since they could 
afford to import manufactured goods from the North, there were a very limited number of 
artisans and mechanics in the region. A limited number of artisans meant few opportunities in 
continuing education because there were not enough money people interested in investing in 
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mechanics institutes. The mechanics in the South, therefore, were few in number, faced with 
constrained educational opportunities, and unable to stay abreast of the latest developments in 
new technology.  
 Before 1800, manufacturing was a viable option for economic growth in the South, 
especially in Virginia. Yet, the expansion of slavery, the wealth produced by cotton, the growth 
of urban areas, transportation improvements, and geographic circumstances, led to the creation 
of early industrial growth in the North. For example, textile mills in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, 
and Connecticut provided opportunities for the creation of industries in machine building. 
“Under urban influences a cabinetmaker’s shop became a furniture factory and a smithy 
expanded into engine works.”94 Cheap coal made steam available in Philadelphia.  Expanding 
rural settlements in New York and Pennsylvania produced more lumber than any state in the 
Union, but their consumption exceeded their output. Maine was a small consumer of lumber so 
by 1832 their annual output was 38,000,000 board feet.95 Bangor was the greatest sawmill 
center in the country, yet by the 1850s Saginaw, Green Bay, and sections of Minnesota and 
Wisconsin rivaled Bangor. After the introduction of the steamboat, Cincinnati, Buffalo, 
Cleveland, Pittsburg, and Louisville became the center of the river steamboat industry. By the 
1840s the industry attracted capital and workmen from the east, “encouraged local 
manufacturers of cordage and naval stores,” increased the number of sawmills, led to the 
creation of machine-shops and engine works, and “disseminated a knowledge of mechanical 
arts and science….”96 
                                                             
94 Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States, Volume I 1607-1860, 1929 
edition (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), 465. 
95 Clark, 467. See also Niles’ Register, L, 378, August 6, 1836. 
96 Clark, 467 and 471. See also American Annual Register, 1826-1827, II, 460; Buffalo, Annual 
Statement of Trade and Commerce, 1856, 26. 
 73 
 The growth of industry in the West coincided with the development of the region’s 
common school movement and the formation of mechanics institutes. The Ohio Mechanics 
Institute founded in Cincinnati in 1828 was established to facilitate the “diffusion of useful 
knowledge” to “ingenious artisan and mechanics,” and the Akron Mechanics’ Association 
founded in 1846 was established to do the same.97 By 1860, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio boasted 
of having approximately 5,000 civil mechanical engineers, 43,000 carpenters, and 4,000 
ironworkers. At the same time, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina reported a 
combined total of 1,300 civil and mechanical engineers, 14, 000 carpenters, and 880 
ironworkers.98 
 A report, both praiseworthy and resolute, made by Joseph Whitworth and presented to 
the House of Commons in 1854 identified the “energy” and “peculiar aptitude” of the laborers 
of the North to capitalize on their natural resources and ingenuity to produce machinery in 
“almost every department of industry.”99 After recognizing the great fertility of the soil in the 
South, Whitworth believed the natural resource most skillfully used in the North was wood. “In 
no branch of manufacture does the application of labour-saving machinery produce by simple 
means more important results than in working in wood.”100 From the building of saw mills, 
planing machines, furniture, agricultural implements, mowing machines, and carriages and 
wheels, the skill of carpenters provided options for any scheme imaginable. Whitworth keenly 
observed that the intelligent and educated artisan was free to earn all he could “by making the 
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best use of his hands,” and particularly in the North, “education is, by means of the common 
schools, placed within the reach of each individual, and all classes avail themselves of the 
opportunities afforded.”101  
 Throughout the antebellum period patterns were cut out around the economic fabric of 
the three regions of the country. Geography played a role in establishing favorable conditions 
for particular economic development, especially the fertile soil and growing conditions in the 
South, the important river systems in the West, and the running streams and woodlands of the 
North. This alone, however, was not the only reason for regional differences. How each section 
of the country defined democracy, community, labor, education, and upward mobility 
determined how resources were spent, laws made, schools formed, and labor regarded. These 
were choices. To encourage common school education or to warn of the dangers of learning, to 
establish institutions to improve workers’ skills or to regard labor as nothing more than a 
necessary cog in the social hierarchy.  These were the conscious decisions woven into each 
region’s fabric.   
 The development of manufacturing, agriculture, science, technology, and higher 
education was also a choice for each region of the United States. How these endeavors were 
adopted and utilized was important to each region, and consequently, became important to the 
individuals living in those regions. Aspirations, goals, values, and dreams guided people on their 
journey.  On the eve of the Civil War, more than one million Northerners worked in large and 
small factories scattered throughout the states. Technological innovations increased industrial 
production. Mechanics such as Christopher Spencer, Francis Pratt, and Amos Whitney worked 
out ideas in their years at the Colt Armory in Hartford, Connecticut, and then built their own 
business. Henry and Clement Studebaker learned the trade of blacksmithing from their father in 
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South Bend, Indiana, and then turned a small carriage and wagon shop into a major 
manufacturing operation in 1860. 
 Equally impressive to the North’s industrial growth was the West’s economic 
development.  By people’s willingness to move into the new states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa, they demonstrated their natural entrepreneurial 
spirit. To be able to replicate and advance what was happening in the northeast demonstrated 
skill and tenacity. Capital, land, and education were available. And there was not the obstacle of 
slavery. 
 In the South, before the war, farming generated great wealth, and slavery served as the 
foundation of that wealth. Any attempt to question the value or integrity of the “Peculiar 
Institution” met with harsh rebuttals on the grounds that this labor system provided the 
essential component to the South’s continued social stability and wealth. The South’s 
hierarchical structure and aristocratic character created an ethos unique to the region. As the 
country drew toward civil war, little did it appreciate or understand how these regional 
differences would influence the fighting and impact the outcome.      
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CHAPTER 3 
MANUFACTURING, AGRICULTURE, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 
It’s well known among engineers that the most important inventions in a particular field are 
often made by people who are new to that field—people who are too naïve and ignorant to 
know all the reasons why something can’t be done, and who are therefore able to think more 
freely about seemingly intractable problems. 
 
                                     The Contrarian’s Guide to Leadership, by Steven B. Sample 
 
 We begin with a tale of two men and two places: David Ross of Campbell County, 
Virginia and Chauncey Jerome of Canaan, Connecticut.  In 1811 Ross was approximately 
seventy-two years old and Jerome was eighteen. Ross had emigrated from Scotland to the 
American colonies sometime in the mid-1750s, established himself as a tobacco merchant and 
ship-owner in Richmond and Petersburg, and by 1788, according to the tax lists, owned four 
hundred slaves and more than one hundred thousand acres of property scattered across twelve 
Virginia counties.102 Sometime around 1777 (the precise time is undocumented) Ross opened 
the Oxford Iron Works south of the James River eight miles from Lynchburg. By 1811, he 
employed 220 black bondsmen at his works.103 This number represented ninety percent of his 
labor force. The slave labor force in other industrial operations in Virginia told a similar story. By 
1850 the Buffalo Forge and Etna Furnace, (combined to form the Bath Iron Works) both in 
Rockbridge County had 100 to 120 bondsmen between the two sites. The Tredegar Company in 
Richmond, by 1860, employed approximately 800 slave laborers.104 
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 At Oxford Ironworks, slaves were taught every job and so worked as carpenters, 
blacksmiths, colliers, founders, forge men, miners, and general furnace hands.105 The small 
percentage of whites employed served as supervisors and bosses. The red-hot glow of the 
furnaces, however, did nothing to ignite Ross’s profit margins. Instead by 1812, profits were 
significantly dampened, and his iron business faced insolvency. Increased competition, 
mismanagement, and poor workmanship led Ross to chide, “The ruin of the estate is founded in 
the management of it.”106 He believed that his manager and clerks were “a very trifling people 
and incapable of making use of the means in our power.” Oxford had “Mechanicks & labourers 
[sic] adequate to every purpose,” yet his nephew, Robert Richardson “has not improved in the 
Smallest [sic] degree.” Ross continued with venom directed at his nephew, “those that ought to 
represent the master are not infrequently inferior to the Servant.”107  
 Ross recognized that his slaves had little incentive to increase productivity and improve 
the quality of their work, yet good supervision, he believed, would have corrected the 
bondsmen’s poor and redundant performances.  Forever hopeful, Ross developed plans to move 
his operation nearer the James River, but severe credit problems prevented Ross from acquiring 
the necessary loans and thus his business continued to spiral downward. Plagued by continuous 
health problems, he died on May 4, 1817. His accrued debts were finally paid off with the 
liquidation of the Oxford slave force by 1819.108   
 The paradox of this story was that Ross understood that the system of slavery limited his 
ability to improve his workers performance, not only because bondsmen lacked incentive, but 
also because he would not allow traveling free ironworkers access to his slaves for fear free 
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workers would spread incendiary ideas. He recognized his slaves lacked fresh technological 
knowledge, but he was also consciously willing to deprive them of this knowledge because he 
believed it was more important to protect the institution of slavery than to educate his workers. 
He admired and wanted to emulate the technological growth taking shape in the North, but he 
did not want his labor force to have contact with those who might be able to share the 
information necessary to spawn that growth.   
 Historian Charles B. Dew, in his book Bond of Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge 
pointed out that in contrast to Ross, William Weaver, owner of Buffalo Forge actually paid slaves 
for “overwork” and some slaves like Phill Easton built up considerable earnings on the overwork 
ledgers or “Negro Books” as they were called, to improve his family’s quality of life, and as Dew 
suggested, “…to stake out some precious independence…in the midst of a system that 
theoretically held him totally bound to the will of his owner.”109  
 Weaver, like Ross, recognized the cost effectiveness of using slaves instead of free labor, 
but unlike Ross, by adopting an overwork system, Weaver provided his slaves with some 
positive incentives, and as a result, he curtailed incidents of manufacturing sabotage. To 
discipline a slave by beating or threatening to sell them only destabilized the business and 
slowed or significantly damaged production. Weaver believed in a system that trained a group 
of skilled slave artisans and provided them with some monetary incentive, and it worked. The 
result was that Weaver came to emphasize, for four decades, stability in the work force not 
innovation.110  Weaver ignored the technological innovations that had revolutionized northern 
industry, and during the Civil War when the Confederacy need wrought iron, Weaver’s forge and 
others like it, could only produce a limited amount. Furthermore, slaves skilled in industrial arts, 
                                                             
109 Charles B. Dew, Bond of Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1994), 108-115.  
110 Dew, 107-108. 
 79 
by virtue of their social position, could not contribute, or if they had been given the opportunity, 
would not contribute to successful Confederate engineer operations during the war.111 
Therefore, a central reason why there was a shortage of skilled engineering soldiers in the 
Confederate army was because during the antebellum period many artisans and mechanics who 
worked for southern manufacturing businesses were slaves.112 
Extending along the spine of the Appalachian Mountains, approximately 550 miles 
northeast of Ross, Chauncey Jerome was born in Canaan, Connecticut in 1793. At the time of 
Ross’s death, Jerome’s life had been as painful as the crude shoes he walked in. When he was 
eleven years old, his father died of the “black colic,” and consequently, made him the man of 
the family. His mother sent him off to be a farm hand until at fifteen he became a carpenter’s 
apprentice. Neither enamored with his work nor pleased with his lack of boots and warm 
clothing, Jerome arranged to have four months during the winter to find other work by which to 
earn enough money to purchase a coat. He went to Waterbury, Connecticut and found work-
making dials for old-fashioned long clocks.113 Jerome continued as a carpenter and part-time 
clock dial maker until after the War of 1812 when by chance he landed a job in Plymouth, 
Connecticut helping clock maker Eli Terry set up his new business manufacturing his patented 
shelf clock.114 
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 Jerome studied Terry’s operation and the machinery used to produce his clocks 
including “arbors” and “mandrels,” prototypes of lathes and jigs, and Terry’s secret weapon, a 
circular saw, a novelty only Terry possessed.115 After learning from Terry, the master of his craft, 
Jerome went into business for himself as a “jobber” assembling clocks, casing them, or 
manufacturing cases. Four years later things started to get interesting for Jerome. Relying on his 
mechanical education, business acumen, and desire to improve his station in life, he sold his 
house and lot to Terry for six hundred dollars, one hundred of it in wooden clock movements, 
“with dials, tablets, glass, and weights.”116 
 Then travelling to Bristol, Connecticut in 1821, Jerome bought a two-story house with 
seventeen acres of land. The price asked for by the original owner was two hundred and 
fourteen Terry Patent Clocks. Jerome wrote, “I told him I would give it, and closed the bargain at 
once. I finished up the one hundred parts which I had got from Mr. Terry, exchanged cases with 
him for more, obtained some credit, and in this way made out the quantity for Mitchell [the 
seller].”117 
 With his brother, Jerome’s clock business began to make a self-described Bronze 
Looking-Glass Clock to compete with Terry’s “Patent Shelf Clocks.” To manufacture his clocks, 
Jerome installed the first circular saw ever seen in Bristol, although quite familiar to Plymouth, 
Connecticut and Mr. Terry. Fifteen years later Jerome introduced a one-day brass clock, which 
he cheaply mass-produced and sold for between one dollar and fifty cents and two dollars.118  
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By comparison, wooden one-day clocks sold for fourteen dollars and brass eight-day clocks sold 
for twenty dollars.  
 Business boomed as Jerome sold his inexpensive timepieces domestically and overseas. 
As a result of his business success, he moved his entire operation to New Haven, Connecticut, 
discovered a method of stamping rather than using casting gears, formed a joint-stock company 
with Benedict & Burnham, brass manufacturers of Waterbury, Connecticut, became the New 
Haven Clock company, and by 1853 was selling 444, 000 clocks annually.119  
 Yet, like David Ross in Virginia, as a result of a poor business decision, Jerome found 
himself bankrupt by 1855. In a buyout of a clock company in Bridgeport, Connecticut, owned by 
the great bamboozler of the nineteenth century, P. T. Barnum, (a cousin to my great 
grandmother, Mabel Watson Whaley, who was as kind and considerate as Barnum was devious 
and cunning), Jerome found Barnum had sold off important assets and left Jerome with 
considerable debt. He never recovered from the burden, and he died penniless in 1868. 
 David Ross and Chauncey Jerome shared parallel experiences in the course of operating 
their nineteenth-century American businesses. Both enjoyed success and both suffered from the 
vicissitudes of doing business. Both made good and bad investment decisions, and both took 
risks. Each man died broke. Yet, they were also different from each other in ways that revealed 
the influence their surroundings had on each business and the influence each business had on 
their surroundings. 
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 Ross arrived in Virginia and immediately understood the value of shipping and 
commerce with Great Britain. Tobacco was in demand, and he shipped enough of it to purchase 
an enormous plantation and more than two hundred slaves. Having imagination enough to see 
the potential for mining operations and iron production, he started a business venture that 
generated a huge profit. Using some of his own slaves along with bondsmen he rented from 
other slave owners, Ross used his black labor force in his companies’ mines and forges. He 
recognized the mechanical abilities and skills of white miners and ironmen, many from the 
North, and he recognized the need for skilled whites to train his workers in areas of new 
technical developments. He also recognized, like his fellow slaveholders did, the dangers of 
allowing whites, who might have radical ideas, to come in contact with his bondsmen. Also, 
white workers’ attempt to gain economic security was viewed as a threat to the status quo.  In 
1851, James Henry Hammond wrote in Marxian terms but with a different solution that, “in all 
other countries, and particularly manufacturing states, labor and capital are assuming an 
antagonistical [sic] position. Here it cannot be the case; capital will be able to control labor, even 
in manufactures with whites, for blacks can always be resorted to in case of need.”120  
 Ross understood, albeit superficially, that his black workers had little incentive to work 
hard, minimize the waste of resources, and carefully follow directions.  He expected his 
management team to compensate for all these problems, by remaining current with recent 
technological changes, better supervising his workers, and demanding more productivity from 
them. Finally, after his death, Ross’s slaves were sold to other plantations and the mining and 
forging business ended. The slaves, who had learned the skills necessary to work in the iron 
business, were forced either to work in other forges or to keep their skills and ideas of about 
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iron making to themselves. Any slave risked a severe beating or even death if he or she 
presumed to know more than a white overseer or owner. 
Chauncey Jerome started out with nothing, working as a farm hand and carpenter’s 
apprentice, neither of which he liked. In the surrounding towns, however, new mechanical 
inventions were cropping up, and he was fortunate enough to find work with clockmaker Eli 
Terry. Terry’s mechanical skills and imagination rubbed off on Jerome and the young man, in 
turn, designed and built his own clocks using Terry’s work as his own model. Related inventions 
and businesses contributed to Jerome’s success—circular saws, lathes and jigs, planing 
machines, a sandpaper wheel, and the brass industry. Laborers, at first paid by the piece, had 
incentive both to produce a number of parts and perhaps invent a new machine or process and 
then leave and start their own business. Jerome was an example of this. 
In his book, A New Nation of Goods: The Material Culture of Early America, historian 
David Jaffee argued that men such as Terry and Jerome represented the “face of a 
manufacturing and market revolution that drew in a broad range of consumers throughout the 
United States.”121 It was in rural communities where innovative artisans and Yankee peddlers 
transformed American material culture. Jaffee wrote: “The flexible and decentralized rural 
system of production—pioneered by clockmakers and soon to be found elsewhere—relied on 
the labor of countless young men and women in the countryside willing to work for wages and 
on the desire of middle-class families across the nation to fill up their parlors with consumer 
goods.”122 
 Craftsmen working the floors of the factory were given the freedom to suggest 
improvements and even design their own tools. All this created a unique and evolving work 
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environment that gradually created a sociological phenomenon difficult to pinpoint, but real 
nonetheless.  The job of laboring in mills or factories was a completely different experience from 
working in the fields. Thus, it was not just the type of employment that changed, but men had to 
make psychological and emotion adjustments to this new kind of work.   
For many centuries most men and women farmed. It was hard, backbreaking work, and 
it was also isolating.  Large farms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries needed farm 
hands—peasants, indentured servants, or slaves—to manage the planting and harvesting. These 
farms required some teamwork from everyone working the property, but most farmers, large or 
small, in the new thirteen colonies, celebrated farming as the embodiment of individuality, 
freedom, and independence. 
 The new machinery and technology made Americans in the North redefine democracy 
and freedom. Inventor Robert Fulton believed that technology assisted republicanism because it 
led to economic opportunity “of equality in class status, and of the welfare of the many as 
opposed to the special privileges of the few.” Fulton said, “Every order of things, which has a 
tendency to remove oppression and meliorate the condition of man directing his ambition to 
useful industry, is, in effect, republican.”123  At the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in London, 
Edward Riddle, who reported to the commissioner of U. S. patents on the exhibition wrote, “The 
Russian exhibition was a proof of the wealth, power, enterprise, and intelligence of Nicholas; 
that of the United States an evidence of the ingenuity, industry, and capacity of a free and 
educated people.”124 
Manufacturing changed the idea of working alone to the idea of working as a group, as 
part of the wheel of production. Everyone had to do his or her job in order to build the finished 
                                                             
123 Hugo A. Meier, “The Ideology of Technology,” in Technology and Social Change in America, 
ed. Edwin T. Layton, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), 81. 
124 Meier, 81 and 85. 
 85 
product. In the case of Jerome’s clocks, the carpenters built the clock’s case, others built the 
dial, glass tablet, machinery, and weights.  Eventually, Jerome’s business faltered, but his 
workers moved on with marketable skills, and they spread their knowledge to others within the 
region and perhaps improving upon machinery in the new and evolving manufacturing 
endeavors. 
 The clock business was only one of hundreds of new industries emerging in the North 
and Northwest in the decades before the Civil War. The growth, for example, in textile, iron, 
lead, shoes, lumber, glass, paint and tobacco manufacturing over the first six decades of the 
nineteenth century was staggering. Between 1810 and 1860 the manufacturing value of the 
aforementioned products grew by a factor of ten to $1,885,861,676.125  Furthermore, comparing 
numbers from the three regions of the country between 1840 and 1860 revealed remarkable 
evidence of the differences in these sections when it came to economic development during the 
antebellum period. 
 The American population in 1820 was 9,638,453 of whom 1.5 million were slaves. The 
South’s total cotton crop amounted to 160,000,000 pounds or 40,000 bales of 400 pounds each. 
In North Carolina the state’s total amount of capital invested for manufacturing was $353, 460 
with New Hanover and Stokes the largest districts reporting. In the former, seventy-eight 
thousand dollars was invested in making vats for evaporation in sugar refining, and in the latter 
thirty-eight thousand dollars for producing leather goods and whiskey. South Carolina reported 
a capital investment of $380,700 and Georgia reported $309,543 in investments.126 During the 
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same period Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut together showed a capital 
investment in manufacturing to be around $10, 000,000.  
The skyrocketing economic growth in the North from the turn of the nineteenth century 
to 1820 reflected changes in technology and market demand.  Men such as Joshua Lindly of 
Providence, and Samuel Slater of Pawtucket, Rhode Island improved upon the first English made 
carding and spinning machines, and eventually Slater built a water-frame of forty-eight spindles 
and two carding machines. Seven years later opened a new cotton mill in Pawtucket. 
In 1800, fourteen mills operated fewer than two hundred spindles.  By 1804, the 
number of mills in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut had doubled. Furthermore, 
men who had learned the business from Slater founded mills in New Hampshire, the upper 
Mohawk Valley, and the central lake region of New York.127 By 1820, there was approximately 
one loom for every one hundred sixty spindles, and an estimated 167,000 spindles in Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire.   
Although inchoate in the early years of the century, the growth in all manufacturing in 
the northern and western states increased between 1820 and 1840.  By 1860, the rate of 
manufacturing development was phenomenal. The Southern states also experienced 
unprecedented economic development in the same four decades earning the sobriquet, “The 
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Cotton South,” and “King Cotton,” but the region’s focus was on producing the raw material not 
refining it. As the North and West demanded raw materials from the South, and the South 
demanded finished products from the North and West, a symbiotic relationship developed 
between the various sections of the country. This led to distinct labor patterns, business and 
management systems, and tangential ideas to support and develop the differences in each 
section. These distinctions were prevalent on the eve of the Civil War. 
The cotton plant, from which extraordinary wealth derived, was commercially known as 
short-staple (black seed), green seed, and Upland cotton and the amount of cotton grown was 
remarkable.  The cotton crop in 1830 was 350,000,000 pounds. By 1840 the crop grew to 
790,000,000 pounds, and by 1860 2,154,820,800 pounds were picked and ginned by four million 
African American slaves. The latter produced 5,387,052 bales of four hundred pound each.128  
 Rice, sugar, and tobacco also generated considerable wealth. All of these staple crops 
were refined and produced by the hands of slaves. Iron manufacturing and coal mining 
operations also hired slaves to do most of the work, much to the grievance of the white artisans 
or mechanics. Plantation owners hired out their slaves to work as masons, coopers, and 
carpenters. In 1847, the white mechanics in the Tredegar Iron Works of Richmond struck 
because the owner hired mechanics from the North to teach slaves the skilled processes of 
puddling and rolling.129 The owners ignored the strikers.  The Richmond Times and Compiler 
declared that such strikes attacked the foundations of slavery by maintaining the principle that 
“the employer may be prevented from making use of slave labor.”130  
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Where white operators did outnumber slaves was in the small and modestly successful 
textile industry in the South. Of course some mills employed slaves as workers, such as the 
Rocky Mount Manufacturing Company, located at the falls of the Tar River in North Carolina or 
the Salem Cotton Manufacturing Company in the Piedmont section of North Carolina.131 William 
Gregg of South Carolina, however, advocated the establishment of textile industries to diversify 
the economy of the South, and he proposed using poor whites as the labor force. Many in the 
state’s legislature, controlled by the planter class, were hostile to Gregg’s ideas.132 He continued 
to work toward his goal of building a mill and employing white operatives and in 1846 finally 
constructed a factory in Graniteville, South Carolina. This factory combined with mills in Macon, 
Eatonton, Columbus, and Athens, Georgia gave rise to a stable textile industry. The 1840 census 
reported 1,581 hands employed in textile factories in Georgia, 2,122 in South Carolina, 1,830 in 
North Carolina, and 6,081 in Virginia.133 
Twenty years later the textile industry in the South had flat-lined.  Thirty-three mills 
operated in Georgia with approximately eighty-three workers per mill for a total of 2,813 
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employees. South Carolina listed 891 factory hands in seventeen mills, North Carolina 1,755 
workers in thirty-nine mills, and Virginia declined to 1,631 workers in just seventeen mills. As 
well, by the 1850s bondsmen were supplied by slave owners to factories to defer operating 
costs.  
Other forms of manufacturing in the aforementioned states that also represented over 
one million dollars of capital investments included tobacco manufacturing, coal mining, and iron 
production (bar, sheet, and railroad) in Virginia, turpentine distilleries in North Carolina, and 
steam-engine manufacturing in Fulton County Georgia, the county that included Atlanta.  All 
four states invested in lumber mills and the manufacturing of flour and meal. The total capital 
investments in manufacturing in these states came to $54,451,894. Yet, this number fell short of 
the capital investments made just in the counties of Middlesex, Essex, and Worcester, 
Massachusetts.134 These numbers encapsulate the significant difference in manufacturing 
output between sections of the country. They also provide a transparent view of the labor 
forces associated with economic growth in the country during the antebellum period, and the 
education and training necessary to sustain sanguinary fiscal expansion. 
As the demand for cotton grew to feed the nascent Northern industry, mills built on the 
Slater model sprung up in the Quinebaug-Shetucket and Blackstone River valleys. Census figures 
showed unprecedented expansion in textile manufacturing. For example, Massachusetts 
employed 26,000 people in the textile business in 1840 with a capital investment in the same 
industry of $17,414,099. By 1860 those numbers grew to 37,145 workers and $32,685,514 in 
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capital investments.135 In addition, unlike the period before the War of 1812, when most textile 
mills made their own machinery, machine shops separated from the mills and began to 
specialize in machine construction.136  
In the early nineteenth century there was also no distinction between mill and machine. 
The water wheel was built with the mill and each operation within the mill had its own wheel, 
controlled by its own water gate.137 Therefore, increased improvements in machinery demanded 
improvements in “water wheels, speed controls and power distribution.”138  Power was 
generated to the machines through a system of shafts, gears, and pulleys. Shafts were first 
made of wood then iron, and often water power initiated by the total fall of a river passed by so 
many machine works, gristmills, lumber mills, and textile factories that they rendered a mill’s 
water wheel inefficient, as a result of the water’s overuse.  The replacement of heavy gearing 
with lightweight leather belting, and improvements in metallurgy and iron water turbine 
technology, first developed in France in 1832, captured the efficient use of rivers and canals. To 
cope with the complexity of a mill operation, traditional millwrights gave way to men who 
specialized in engineering the construction of mills and their power sources.  
These mechanical engineers were trained through an apprentice system. Like Chauncey 
Jerome of clock making fame, Paul Moody, a mechanic with the Merrimack Manufacturing 
Company in Lowell, Massachusetts, learned his engineering skills first as a machine-shop 
laborer. Other workers left the textile mill to design and make their own metal products, 
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machine tools, locomotives, sheet-iron ware, carpenter’s tools, and brass clocks. Between 1840 
and 1860 the Northern labor force dramatically changed. Approximately seven times more 
carpenters, civil and mechanical engineers, and factory hands worked in the North than in the 
South. New York and Pennsylvania together employed 67,000 carpenters, 8,300 engineers, and 
5,000 ironworkers in 1860. Virginia and North Carolina together employed 12,000 carpenters 
and 1,000 engineers. Only 600 ironworkers worked in those two southern states.139  
English observers reported on the quality of the mills and skills of the work force 
throughout the Northeast. Joseph Whitworth presented his report on New England 
manufacturing to the House of Commons in February 1854. Whitworth was no stranger to 
machine operations and engineering. He pointed out that industrial development “on a national 
scale demanded that nuts and bolts of the same diameter be interchangeable” he wrote.140 
Interchangeability required a standard system of measurement, “which fixed the contour of 
screw threads and established for each diameter the number of threads per inch.”141 Whitworth 
had proposed such a system in 1841 and by 1854 it was in common use in England. He was 
considered the world’s foremost manufacturer of machine tools. At the Crystal Palace Exhibition 
in London in 1851 he had displayed his lathes, his machinery for planing, shaping, slotting, 
drilling, boring, punching, and shearing, and his standard gauges and measuring apparatus.142  
He also devised a rifled breech loading cannon and a rifled gun with a hexagonal bore, both of 
which were used by the Confederacy during the Civil War. 
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It was not until 1857 that the United States, however, would begin to develop standards 
for screw threads. Other measurement standards were already developed in the clock and 
firearms industry.143 It was William Sellers of Philadelphia who first introduced a gear-cutting 
machine in 1857 that “marked the advent of commercially interchangeable nuts and bolts.”144 
Before this machinists developed their own system to meet particular construction needs, and 
because the use of special threads prevented outside repairs on their own machinery. This, at 
least in part, explained the use of various track gauges by American railroad companies, 
especially in the South.  
Whitworth commented extensively on both the manufacturing companies he visited 
and the labor force he observed. For example, he noted how the Hadley Falls Company was 
formed in 1847 for the purpose “of turning to account the water power supplied by the river 
Connecticut, buying water privileges, and purchasing land to form the site of a manufacturing 
town.”145 The town laid out streets and constructed across the river a dam, 1,000 feet long.  
Whitworth also applauded town officials for appropriating $3.72 per student for the education 
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of each child. In seven years Holyoke, Massachusetts had two cotton mills employing 1,100 
workers, a machine shop employing 365 workers, and a paper mill up and running.146  
He concluded his report by saying that “the intelligent and educated artisan [sic] is 
left…free to earn all that he can, by making the best use of his hands, without hindrance by his 
fellows. It may be that the working classes exhibit an unusual independence of manner, but the 
same feeling insures the due performance of what they consider to be their duty with less 
supervision than is required where dependence is to be placed upon uneducated hands.”147 
Furthermore, he found that any workman who developed “peculiar skill,” could rise to become a 
superintendent of the mill. This was so, Whitworth wrote, because of common schools, “placed 
within the reach of each individual, and all classes avail themselves of the opportunities 
afforded.”148 
Whitworth did not visit the South on his tour of the United States, but conversations, no 
doubt, raised questions in his mind about the effectiveness of slave labor. Whitworth was part 
of a commission appointed by the British government to attend the New York Exhibition, and 
the commissioners gathered in the city to discuss their observations, before returning home. 
Another commissioner, George Wallis, reported, “…in some middle States…attempts are being 
made to bring slave labour to bear upon manufacturers, to the reduction of prices, and, 
consequently, of the remuneration of free labour.” Wallis continued, “…the prevailing idea is, 
that slave labour can never by any possibility be made to compete, or to pay in comparison with 
                                                             
146 Whitworth, 358.  
147 Whitworth, 389.  
148 Whitworth, 389. 
 94 
free labour. This is held equally by the opponents and advocates of the institution of 
slavery….”149  
The New York Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1853 placed on display new technology from 
around the world, and the city’s mayor Jacob Aaron Westervelt, member of the General Society 
of Mechanics and Tradesmen, presided over the exhibition. Westervelt was not only a skillful 
politician, but he was also credited with the designs of some of America’s fastest clippers and 
steamships. 
In the two decades before the Civil War, skilled labor and new machinery was at a 
premium and sought by owners of factories and mills, especially in the North.  Unskilled 
workers, and there were many of them, were not as effusive in their assessment of how new 
tools and inventions offered remunerative opportunities to the laborers. Many people were 
impoverished and machinery threatened to take away the finite number of jobs available. In 
addition, with immigration burgeoning in the 1840s and 1850s, it appeared to many that there 
were an infinite number of unskilled laborers ready to fill those jobs. This was particularly true in 
the South where even skilled labor felt threatened by new machinery. Inventions could displace 
workers, yet unlike in the North, there were fewer factories and thus fewer opportunities to 
labor elsewhere. Owners of iron forges, coaling operations, and textile mills further weakened 
the white labor market by using slave labor for both skilled and unskilled jobs. The difference in 
attitude toward machinery among skilled workers North and South can be no better explained 
than in the manufacturing of guns, cannons, and ordnance in the twenty years before the Civil 
War. The operations of the United States armories in Springfield, Massachusetts and Harpers 
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Ferry, Virginia demonstrate that to one side technology was progress, and to the other side 
anathema. 
Sometime before 1819, Thomas Blanchard, a New England inventor, designed an 
apparatus for manufacturing gunstocks. After revising his patent specification in 1820, he 
presented to the superintendents at Springfield and Harpers Ferry his “engine for turning or 
cutting irregular forms out of wood, iron, brass, or other material or substance, which can be cut 
by ordinary tools.”150 Springfield’s superintendent Roswell Lee embraced the new machinery; 
Superintendent James Stubblefield at Harpers Ferry did not. Other technological improvements 
in water wheels, trip hammers, and machines for milling, drilling, and trimming iron components 
were also slow to take hold at Harpers Ferry. As historian Merritt Roe Smith pointed out, 
traditional artisans were not receptive to mechanization because it threatened their job security 
and their traditional way of life. “Combined with close-knit local kinship groups that held 
outsiders suspect and outside ideas alien to customary practices, these inbred feelings fostered 
curious technological conservatism at Harpers Ferry.”151 
The relationship between Stubblefield and his workers grew out from a culture of 
patriarchy and patronage. Stubblefield was a leading member of Harpers Ferry’s leading family. 
His brothers-in-law operated the major businesses in town, and Stubblefield was friends with 
Virginia senator James Barbour and Kentucky’s Henry Clay.152 In order to maintain his business 
interests, quell class antagonism, and hold his political power, Stubblefield protected worker’s 
jobs at the armory, and in return, workers voted as he desired and accepted his paternalism.153 
Change felt threatening to everyone, so change, and anyone associated with it, was a pariah. 
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The Clock Strike of 1842 embodied this prejudice against new ways of operating at the Harpers 
Ferry factory. 
The origins of Clock Strike dated to the appointment of Major Henry K. Craig as the first 
military superintendent at Harpers Ferry. He inherited from Stubblefield a work force that still 
believed in the idealized craftsman, a skilled laborer who took pride in his work by applying 
individual attention and artistry to each piece he made. Not only did new machines devalue a 
laborer’s expertise, but they also punctured an artisan’s identify as a person. Technology 
challenged workers’ belief in human agency. Skilled laborers found anonymity, rather than 
satisfaction, in their results.  For several decades, innovations in arms manufacturing crept into 
their lives, lightened their physical labor, increased their output at least theoretically, and 
altered their culture. These men lived in two worlds: one defined by a lifetime of habits, 
traditions, and values unique to each man outside the armory’s four walls.  The early industrial 
revolution in America mesmerized northerners, and many Yankees were not sure they approved 
of the changes. At least industrialization in the North was visible to everyone. From farmers in 
upstate New York to teamsters in Providence, Rhode Island, if innovation was not a direct part 
of their daily lives, people could see it from where they stood. Conversely, the men at Harpers 
Ferry, and many people in the South, might enjoy the material goods industrialization produced, 
yet their culture and customs were still bound by farming, plantation life, paternalism, and 
slavery. 
For years, James Stubblefield understood that to maintain harmony among his workers, 
in what they considered a threatening environment, he had to allow for certain customs such as 
twelve hour days so workers had time to complete piecework at their own pace, and in the 
same twelve hours allow for time to read a newspaper, argue and debate, drink alcohol, and 
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take long breaks in the middle of the day. Unfortunately for the workers at Harpers Ferry, Major 
Craig did not see things their way. 
 Written rules and regulations were needed to operate the armory efficiently. 
Furthermore, violations of the rules needed to be accompanied by stiff fines.  One regulation 
that antagonized workers was a new ten-hour workday. No drinking or debating, no trips home 
at lunchtime, all work need to be finished in ten hours, and the work had to be of high quality.  
Craig dismissed their complaints. For craftsmen, Craig believed, time should not be governed for 
it degraded the workers and made them feel like “mere machines of labor.”154 Consequently, on 
March 21, 1842, the entire labor force, led by the pieceworkers, walked off the job. This began 
the Clock Strike.  A select handful boarded a boat headed to Washington to present their 
petition for the removal of Craig to President John Tyler.  
The president told the petitioners to “go home and hammer out their own salvation.”155 
Tyler’s answer did not satisfy the workers.  According to Merritt Roe Smith, Major Craig’s 
regulations “not only struck at the craft ethos but also threatened basic norms within the 
community. These factors awakened the armorers to a spirited defense of the old order.”156 It 
was so spirited that by December 1858 Secretary of War John B. Floyd removed the current 
superintendent because the armory had fallen into disarray. The quality of the work was poor 
and expenditures had exceeded production.157 Even as Southern politicians and business leaders 
in the 1850s encouraged some industrial development, the quality of the work suffered for 
reasons of limited access to improved materials, limited machine-tools and training, and general 
unease about how the new technology would alter their way of life. Industrial development also 
                                                             
154 United States Department of the Interior, “Harpers Ferry,” National Park Service, 
www.nps.gov/hafe/forteachers/upload/materials%20packer… (accessed December 20, 2012). 
155 Smith, 272. 
156 Smith 273. 
157 National Park Service, “Harpers Ferry,” 11. 
 98 
required a skilled labor force, engineers who understood the latest technology, and competent 
managers who would adapt to new ways of doing business. For example, Southern railroads 
tripled their track mileage in the decade before the war yet, a shortage of skilled tradesmen, 
industrial managers, planners, and engineers, inhibited the South from creating a railroad 
system, and the quality of the work done left a lot to be desired. 
 The records of the men who led Southern railroads in the antebellum period are difficult 
to locate, but some provide a glimpse of the type of people who worked on the railroad below 
the Mason-Dixon. Some were Southern born and reared in families that owned and operated 
small businesses. Many of these sons of the South’s middle class were educated at private 
academies and then studied civil engineering at colleges like Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and 
the University of North Carolina. After graduating they eventually went to work for newly 
formed railroad companies as engineers. Others were born into the planter class, were 
educated at the best schools, trained as lawyers, owned their own plantations, and finally 
expanded their business interests by building railroads. A fair number were born and educated 
in the North then migrated South to find their wealth and happiness. 
 William Mahone, for example, was born in the little town of Monroe, Virginia, in 
December 1826, and his father, Fielding Mahone was instrumental in bringing an end to Nat 
Turner’s Rebellion five years later. The Mahones then moved to Jerusalem, Virginia, on the 
Nottoway River when young William was thirteen, and the father opened a tavern and hotel 
business, with the help of his family and three slaves.  William, described as a “sandy-haired, 
freckled-face little imp, who hung around the stores in Jerusalem…. He was the leader in all 
deviltry, and the terror of all good country mothers whose boys occasionally went to town.”158   
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Unlike many of his mischievous companions whose fathers paid little heed to education, 
Mahone was forced to attend a private school in Rosedale, Virginia, held at the home of Captain 
William J. Sebrell and conducted by Hannah and Sarah Armstrong, natives of Maine.159  At 
fifteen he was enrolled at the Littletown Academy, where prominent families sent their sons, 
and then two years later he received an appointment to the Virginia Military Institute as a State 
cadet, consequently given free board and tuition.160  
Whereas his upper class classmates excelled in literature and foreign language, Mahone 
was at the top of his class in mathematics, engineering, and chemistry. He graduated eighth in a 
class of thirteen. Mahone may have been described as a tobacco chewing, prolific swearing, 
gambler of the coarse, unrefined middle class, but he dedicated himself to becoming a civil 
engineer working on several railroad project, surveying expeditions, and on building plank 
roads, which many Southern leaders believed were superior and much less expensive than 
railroads.161  
By 1850, however, in the State of Virginia, businessmen began to question what they 
considered the shortsighted nature of the state’s transportation policy. Plank roads were fine, 
but the commercial future of cities like Norfolk depended on the railroad. The railroads that did 
exist had established short-line roads that cut-off crucial connections to the major cities. In 
particular, the city of Norfolk had failed to keep pace with other seaports along the Atlantic 
coast. Therefore, a railroad running from Norfolk to Petersburg and connecting there with other 
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railroads extending into the interior of the South was essential for future economic 
development. Norfolk would become the taproot of transportation and trade with the rest of 
the United States and even Europe.162   
Mahone was elected the chief engineer of the proposed Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad 
in 1853 and within five years the line was completed. The entire project was well engineered, 
including Mahone’s innovatively designed twelve-mile roadbed that skirted the edge of the 
Great Dismal Swamp between South Norfolk and Suffolk, Virginia, and a log foundation laid at 
right angles beneath the surface of the swamp. By 1861, Mahone was both president and chief 
engineer of the railroad. By 1861, Mahone was both president and chief engineer of the 
railroad.163  The phlegmatic Confederate leader who stopped the Union advance at the Battle of 
the Crater in 1864, which earned him a place of honor in Confederate folklore, built one of the 
great railroads of the South.  
In contrast, David Levy Yulee, John Motley Morehead and William Sheppard Ashe were 
men of refinement, plantation and slave owning elite of the “Old South” who became involved 
in railroad building as a horizontal expansion to their lucrative sugar, cotton, and rice 
businesses. All had studied law and promoted Southern railroad expansion. Yulee, known as the 
father of Florida’s railroads, was the first Southerner to use state grant money. With it he 
successfully built a line from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico.164   
Yulee was born in the West Indies and at nine years old was sent to a private school in 
Norfolk, Virginia. He eventually moved to St. Augustine, Florida Territory, where he was 
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admitted to the bar in 1836. He devoted considerable efforts toward Florida statehood with 
slavery, and when it became the Union’s twenty-seventh state in 1845, Yulee was elected its 
first Democratic senator. The following year he purchased a 5,000-acre sugar cane plantation 
along the Homosassa River in the western part of the state. To provide transportation to 
deepwater ports on the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean, Yulee started to plan building a 
railroad. Using federal and state land grants, in 1853 he chartered the Florida Railroad. 
Construction began in 1855 and the railroad was opened in 1861 running from Fernandia on the 
Atlantic coast to Cedar Key on the Gulf of Mexico.165  The Florida Railroad was his private 
enterprise. In 1862, when the Union navy captured both Fernandia and Cedar Key, the 
Confederate government hoped to dismantle the railroad’s track so it could be used elsewhere. 
Yulee argued for an injunction against the state and won. The track remained untouched for the 
rest of the war.166 
John Motley Morehead was a keen proponent of internal improvements in North 
Carolina in the 1840s and 1850s.  As a boy he attended private schools and then went on to 
graduate from the University of North Carolina in 1817. As an attorney, politician, and 
businessman, Morehead advocated for the western part of the state, calling for constitutional 
reform to recognize the growing population in the western half of the state. He promoted the 
common school movement and the construction of railroads. He served four years as governor, 
and shortly after his tenure became invested in a cotton mill. Recognizing the need to move 
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textiles from plantation to mill to consumer, he started the North Carolina Railroad and became 
its first president.167 
Henry Varnum Poor, editor of the American Railroad Journal, preached that the most 
successful railroads were the ones where the chief executive knew the business from top to 
bottom.  This was not the case with Morehead.  Yet, his financial and political skills made up for 
his lack of technical knowledge. For Morehead, between 1850 and 1855, when the road was 
under construction, he viewed his job as hiring a good engineer and letting that man worry 
about the details of building the line.168  
The man Morehead hired as chief engineer was Walter Gwynn, an 1822 graduate of 
West Point, and an accomplished civil engineer. Born in western Virginia, Gwynn had work on a 
sizeable number of railroad projects, and he managed the North Carolina Railroad construction 
with professionalism and skill. The line was completed in early 1856. Morehead also hired a New 
Englander, Thomas E. Roberts, to serve as master mechanic, a position he held until 1860.169  
Unlike the Florida Railroad that operated as David Yulee’s own business, three-quarters 
of the North Carolina Railroad were owned by the state. As a result of this, state representatives 
on the board of directors kept a tight handle on the purse strings. NCRR salaries for the 
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president, superintendent, road master, and treasurer were near the bottom of comparable size 
railroads. In addition, there were frequent disagreements over how much money should be 
spent for company shops.170 
Like Morehead, William Sheppard Ashe was also not a railroad man. Born in North 
Carolina, he studied at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, became a lawyer and owned a 
plantation that cultivated rice. His stature in the local community and the state qualified him to 
become president of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad.  Ashe’s chief engineer, however, was 
from the North. Sewall L. Fremont was born in Vermont, appointed to West Point from New 
Hampshire and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1841. After serving in 
various postings he resigned from the army and became assistant engineer in the service of the 
United States on improvement of the Cape Fear River, North Carolina, in 1854. In the same year 
he was appointed chief engineer and superintendent of the Wilmington & Weldon.171 
William M. Wadley, another New England native moved to Savannah, Georgia at twenty 
years old after learning the blacksmith trade. Known for building the railroad bridge over the 
Oconee River, he served as superintendent of the Georgia Central Railroad (1849 to 1852), the 
Western & Atlantic (1852 to 1856), and the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad 
(1858).172   
The president of the New Orleans railroad was also a Northerner. Henry Joseph Ranney 
was born in Middletown, Connecticut, and educated at the Partridge Military Academy from 
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which he graduated as a civil engineer in 1828.173 Working first as an assistant engineer for the 
railroad Ranney eventually became its president in 1861.  Ranney, like all of his Southern 
colleagues tried to establish a rudimentary management system with a chain of command that 
included a general superintendent, resident engineer, treasurer, general freight agent, 
conductors, baggage masters, a master machinist, journeymen machinists, carpenters, and 
watchmen.174 Unlike many Northern railroads that required the addition of separate divisions of 
personnel to operate over several hundred miles of the company’s roads, Southern railroads did 
not develop the divisional system because most companies had less than 200 miles of track, and 
a decentralized management system required a skilled work force.175  Furthermore, the 
“patriarchal principle” preached by the Virginian intellectual George Fitzhugh, after the Panic of 
1857, reinforced the “positive good” theory of slavery, and this ideas tacitly supported the 
concept of the owners complete control of every aspect of plantation life or business.176 
As Professor John E. Clark, Jr. argued, railroad management involved constant 
inspection, superintendents, mechanics, track repair supervisors, and stationmasters all along 
the line. This was especially true for railroads that operated over two hundred miles of track. 
“Decentralized management required unprecedented delegation of authority.  Size and distance 
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dictated that local managers had to master every aspect of their responsibility. They alone 
would have to resolve whatever problems arose, to find solutions and make decisions regardless 
of the problem’s nature or complexity.”177  
In “The Corps of Engineers and the Rise of Modern Management, 1827-1856,” historian 
Charles F. O’Connell, Jr. argued that early military management procedures had a significant 
influence on the development of railroad management.178 Between the efforts of Secretary of 
War, John C. Calhoun (October 1817 to March 1825) and Brigadier General Winfield Scott’s 
General Regulations for the Army, completed in 1821 and revised in 1825, the Army built a 
comprehensive organizational hierarchy, which included personal, and for officers, financial 
accountability especially in the quartermaster, ordnance, and engineer departments.179 
Then with the passage of the General Survey Act of 1824, the Army became involved 
with private internal improvement projects, and by 1827 eleven military engineers were 
assigned to the new Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. One officer, Captain William G. 
McNeill, was asked by the company’s president to draft an official code of regulations to govern 
the operations of the B & O’s Engineering Department. McNeill drew upon Scott’s General 
Regulations of the Army, and McNeill succeeded in establishing a management structure to be 
followed by all railroad employees.180  O’Connell wrote: “These concepts were not completely 
alien to the American business community, but there were few, if any, business organizations 
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that could boast of such a detailed management hierarchy or such advanced bureaucratic 
management procedures.”181 
The management, financing, accounting, and building and repairing of the railroads 
continued, however, to presented enormous challenges to owners, trustees, superintendents, 
and workers. Working with the Pennsylvania Railroad in the early 1850s, Herman Haupt, West 
Point class of 1835, modified the B & O management model, devising an organization plan that 
divided responsibility for the operation of the railroad among four departments: Transportation, 
Maintenance of Way, Motive Power, and Maintenance of Cars. Haupt also created a General 
Transportation Office whose responsibility consisted of “regulating all the other offices of the 
line, and in securing accuracy and uniformity in their accounts.”182 Furthermore, Haupt’s 
innovations were shared among companies through periodicals, the most prominent of which 
was the American Railroad Journal.  
It was in the Journal, that editor Henry Varnum Poor, first commented on the new 
management system established by the general superintendent of the Erie Railroad, Daniel C. 
McCallum. Poor wrote, “Mr. McCallum’s strong point lies in his power to arrange and 
systematize, and in his ambition to perfect his systems.”183McCallum designed a management 
chart marking the five operating divisions and the various subdivisions under them. Orders had 
to follow a chain of command within the proper branches of the company. “All subordinates,” 
McCallum commented, “should be accountable to, and be directed by their own immediate 
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superior only; as obedience cannot be enforced where the foreman in immediate charge is 
interfered with by a superior officer giving orders directly to his subordinates.”184  
McCallum attended common school in Rochester, New York, and then became a 
carpenter and eventually a design expert before working with and then becoming president of 
the Erie Railroad. Poor was impressed with McCallum’s work, as he was with that of John Edgar 
Thomson of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Thomson took McCallum’s ideas to create, according to 
historian James A. Ward, the first line and staff managerial organization in American corporate 
history.  Ward wrote, “Thomson’s scheme allowed men at the lower levels enough authority to 
demonstrate their talents, although always under the oversight of higher line officers…. The new 
corporate structure, which took effect in early 1858, freed Thomson from the necessity of 
overseeing his road’s daily operations for the first time in six years.”185 This new system would 
become the model for the United States Military Railroad in 1862. Southern railroad 
superintendents before the war were aware of Thomson’s ideas, but had little time to 
implement the new manage system before hostilities broke out between North and South. 
Moreover, given the South’s traditional views about centralized authority, and the relationship 
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between master and slave, it was hard to imagine the Confederacy establishing an 
administrative structure beyond anything outside their cultural and societal norms.    
The South’s rudimentary management system, with a limited number of skilled 
supervisors to operate it, however, was only one of five major problems Southern railroads 
faced before the Civil War.  The other four included a lack of capital investment in building and 
maintaining railroads, insufficient trunk lines, a limited number of companies where equipment 
and engines could be built and repaired, and a limited number of white men would had the 
mechanical ability to maintain the tracks and trains.  Each of these problems would impact the 
Confederacy’s ability to command and control the essential features of transportation and 
logistics during the war.  
By 1861 Southerners boasted of a capital investment of $237,138,482 in railroads, which 
included iron rails, rolling stock, ties, turntables, machinery, and engines. These numbers were 
particularly impressive, argued historian James Ward, considering Southern railroads received 
less government assistance in the 1840s and mid-1850s than their Northern counterparts.186 
Ward claimed that “the depression of 1839, the reduced market price of cotton, and the 
weakened European markets in the mid-1850s, due to the Crimean War,” injured the South’s 
transportation network.187  
Yet, the South’s capital investment in railroads (this included Kentucky and Missouri) 
represented only twenty percent of the nations’ total investment of $1,177,993,818.  As Robert 
C. Black, III in his book, The Railroads of the Confederacy wrote, “in terms of capital investment 
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per line mile,” the South faired poorly when compared with the expenditures and investments 
made by Northern railroad companies.188  
 Second, where major railroads in the North succeeded in building and operating trunk 
lines, the largest lines in the South—and few were longer than 200 miles—had to rely on thirty 
to fifty mile roads built by local investors to serve local needs. For example, the Hartford & New 
Haven had 65 miles of secondary track and siding connected to 61 miles of main line. Between 
Albany and Buffalo, the New York Central had approximately 550 miles of track; it also boasted 
of 314 miles of secondary track.189 In the South, the longest line operated by a single railroad 
company was the Mobile & Ohio, which ran from Columbus to Mobile covering an impressive 
469 miles.  The directors first proposed that the railroad should run through the towns of 
Columbus and Aberdeen, Mississippi, but the towns refused. After several months of 
deliberation Columbus decided it did want the railroad, yet by then the owners had moved the 
trace of the line west and the line cut through Artesia, Tupelo, and Cornith, Mississippi. 
Eventually, a trunk line was built, the only one on the Columbus & Mobile line, about twenty 
miles from Artesia east to Columbus, Mississippi, which rested beside the Tombigbee River. 
 Furthermore, there were few junction points along these main lines of operation and 
the lines that formed junctions with the main lines were often part of a series of tracks managed 
by different railroad companies, with different gauges, designed to serve different purposes. A 
line such as the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, from Meridian to Vicksburg carried local freight 
to the Mississippi River, and consequently, was built of material that could withstand only a 
limited amount of tonnage. Before the war began there was no line that extended beyond 
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Meridian east to the Tombigee River about fifty miles. Along the 469 miles of track running 
north/south there were only three junctions along the Columbus & Mobile.190 
 In addition, serious gaps existed between lines. As trunk and small railroad company 
lines reached toward other lines, they often did not connect. There was no direct line from 
Wilmington and Charlotte, North Carolina to Atlanta, Georgia. In Nashville no track was built 
west of the city, and the central line from Nashville to Chattanooga was broken off before 
reaching Tullahoma. Competing interests between railroad men and teamsters, and 
shortsightedness and parochialism among city fathers prevented the creation of “integrated 
transportation service.”191  The teamsters had lobbied the Virginia legislature to pass a law that 
prohibited railroads from laying track in the streets of the city without permission of the local 
authorities, and “as late as 1861 local liverymen had prevented the intersection of any of the 
five railroads entering Richmond.”192 Because of bridging difficulties, the line between 
Savannah, Georgia and Charleston, South Carolina ended on the riverbank opposite of 
Charleston, where passengers and freight were unloaded and reloaded onto to ferry boats to 
complete the final 500 yards over the Ashley River.193 
 Next to the tracks themselves, the spewing, roaring, rattling, and hissing locomotives 
were the central ingredients to the existence of the railroad. But in the South, the final two 
problems they faced were the lack of repair facilities and the skilled workmen to maintain them. 
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Unfortunately, Southern railroads had few engines compared to their Northern brethren and 
Southern companies were often destitute of repair parts and the mechanics to fix the trains. 
Although no one in the country could anticipate the scope of the war to come, the comparison 
of the railroad industry in the South and North foreshadowed the availability of track mileage, 
locomotives, and men skilled enough keep the trains operating.  Similar to the development of 
educational reforms, technological innovations, labor formations, and new management 
systems, railroad operations exposed an Achilles heel in the South’s future ability to conduct a 
war over vast spaces.194  The South relied too much on Northern engineers to build, maintain, 
and manage their railroads to the detriment of their logistical operations in the war to come. 
 According to the 1860 census, nineteen American companies built 470 engines worth 
$4,866,900. Fifteen of the companies were in the North, two in Kentucky, one in Maryland, and 
one in Virginia: the Tredegar Iron Works. Two shops in Philadelphia alone constructed 172 
locomotives. Most companies averaged 600 workers and purchased their machinists’ tools from 
seventeen companies, nine of which were in Massachusetts, three in New York, two in New 
Haven, and one each in New Jersey, Delaware, and Philadelphia, which turned “out machinists’ 
tools of acknowledged excellence.”195 In Massachusetts, the two largest locomotive shops were 
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in Taunton. One with 175 workers built twenty-three engines, and the other with 425 men built 
“cotton machinery and fourteen complete locomotives.”196  
 For most of the backbreaking track repair, and in some cases the skilled work of 
carpenters, brakemen, and firemen, slaves were used. Again, as was the case with blacks 
working in iron foundries or textile mills, many of them learned and developed unique 
mechanical ability, but were not allowed to pass their skills onto white workers or bring them to 
other companies. When it came to investing in “cognitive and aspirational” capital, during the 
antebellum period the South earned low marks.197 Many lines spent as much as $125,000 per 
year to purchase slaves. Remarkably, the twenty-nine mile, five foot six inch gauged Baton 
Rouge, Gross Tete & Opelousas invested $115,000 in slaves.198 An article in the December 16, 
1861 Richmond Daily Examiner, reported that the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad was looking to 
hire bondsmen as laborers, carpenters, train hands, and blacksmiths to work on the roads and in 
the repair shops.199  
Whether or not individual companies used slave or free labor, operated hundreds of 
miles of track or just twenty-nine miles, or managed their business with tight or loose controls, 
the antebellum period in the United States was the “age of the railroad.” These lumbering 
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leviathans rumbled across the American landscape moving passengers and freight to small 
towns and growing cities, bringing with them American pride and American wealth. The 
railroads’ importance as part of the country’s transportation revolution was clear, and the 
merchandise and products the trains most often moved were agricultural.   
Railroads hauled enormous quantities of grains, fruits, dried and salted beef and pork, 
cotton, and sugar to major urban centers and port cities throughout the United States. The 
wealth derived from such freight directly contributed to economic growth of the country. In 
fact, agricultural historian Paul W. Gates wrote, “Northern farming was more important to the 
economic growth of the United States than the plantation economy of the South….”200 It was 
also true, however, that Southern cotton made up the largest American export. Thus, the 
business of surveying, sectioning, advertising, selling, banking, and collecting the proceeds from 
crop sales, according to Gates, represented the largest single area of economic development in 
the country.201 In 1850 sixty-four percent of Americans worked as farmers.202 Many of the 
soldiers who served as engineer troops or pioneers during the Civil War described themselves as 
farmers. What type of education did farmers receive? What type of mechanical skills did farmers 
need to do their work? Who designed new farming equipment and made new tools? Once a 
farmer, was continuing education available as there was for metallurgists, machinists, 
carpenters, gunsmiths, clock builders and railroad men? Most important, did farming, and 
consequently farming skills, differ depending on where you lived?  
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New England farming in 1820 was altered by the country’s expansion northwest.   
Steamboats, canals, and railroads transported east to expanding urban areas, enormous 
quantities of agricultural produce. Millions of bushels of wheat funneled into railroad yards in 
Chicago waiting to be transported across the country.203 To take the place of crude winnowing 
machines, which separated wheat from chaff, dirt, and weed seeds, inventors designed and built 
threshing machines.204 In the 1830s, businesses in Worchester, Massachusetts manufactured 
cast-iron plows with replaceable parts by the thousands each year. In 1847 John Deere mass 
produced stronger steel plows and Cyrus McCormick moved his reaper factory from western 
Virginia to Chicago to be closer to grain farmers in the Midwest. Commercial farmers in New 
York, Ohio, and Illinois also sold wheat, cattle, dairy, wool, and pork to eastern cities both for 
domestic consumption and export.  
New Englanders continued to practice self-sufficient farming.  Yet, the production of 
other agricultural products was essential. As a result, farmers raised beef cattle, cows, pigs, and 
lambs, grew rye and root crops (onions, carrots, turnips, potatoes), and harvested trees.205  
Farmers in the upper South grew corn, wheat, tobacco, flax, and hemp and most of the 
corn and wheat was consumed locally.206 The deep South grew rice, harvested sugar, and made 
a king’s ransom in the sale of cotton both to the mills in the North and buyers overseas. By 1860, 
cotton accounted for two-thirds of American exports. Growing cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco 
was labor intensive, and when machines were required to refine the sugar cane or remove the 
cottonseeds, the task was relegated to African American slaves. When machines jammed or 
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broke down, the mechanics that repaired them were African American. Often the large 
plantation owner operated the gristmill where local farmers brought their wheat. For the most 
part, the planter’s slaves also ran these machines. Planters invested in slave labor and also in 
steamboats and railroads to transport their goods. They did not invest in factories, or in 
institutions that could train and produce skilled white farmers and workers. 
In the North states like Massachusetts and New York took the lead in promoting 
agricultural societies and efforts to introduce basic farm studies into common schools. In New 
York State’s “Second Report of the Special Committee for Promoting the Introduction of 
Agricultural Books in Schools and Libraries,” the authors noted that the Massachusetts 
legislature passed an act in 1819 suggesting that agricultural societies should raise $1,000 for 
the improvement of agriculture and receive a subsidy from the state of between $200 and $600 
per year.207 The report went on to recommend that scientific developments in farming should 
be spread “among the mass of practical and laboring farmers…. It is believed that no more 
effectual instrument can be employed for reaching both the rising generations and the adult 
population than the school district libraries.”208 The committee also recommended that near 
every common school in the state, two acres should be set aside and cultivated, under 
supervision, “exclusively by the male children.” The young women of the school would tend to 
an “ornamental garden.”209 
The New York State Agricultural Society, officially called The American Institute of the 
City of New York, established in 1832, had begun to receive state appropriations for its work in 
the 1840s, and the Society’s business was published as documents of the New York 
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Legislature.210 The annual fair hosted by the Institute, offered handsome cash prizes (premiums) 
for practical inventions that would assist the farmer in his work and make life more comfortable 
and efficient for his wife. The fair attracted people from all over the United States, and it 
assumed the character of a competition anyone could enter, an idea factory, an outdoor 
classroom, and a gathering place—in other words a sort of nineteenth-century Home Depot. 
The list of premium winners included C. H. McCormick (Chicago) for a Virginia grain reaper, 
William Hovey (Worcester, MA) for a hay and straw cutter, and Reuben Daniels (Woodstock, VT) 
for a self-sharpening straw cutter. Others agricultural tools included an excavating scraper, new 
cradles, scythes, and snaths, and built by H. L. Emery and Company of Albany, New York, a seed 
sower.211   
Since many northern farmers spent the bleak winter months working on machinery they 
sold for cash, the 1850 fair also exposed rural communities to other technologies being 
developed to perhaps assist in winter jobs or to aid in the repair of equipment. Wood planning 
tongue and groove machines with stationary cutters, a large engine lathe, water wheels, a 
machine for salting meat, a rotary fire engine pump, and a hot and cold air furnace for making 
pig iron; all of them were on display.212 By 1856, there were 912 local and state agricultural 
organizations in the United States, of which all but 165 were in the North and West.213  
As staple crops such as wheat and cotton generated great wealth and agricultural 
technology attempted to keep pace, the work of a German chemist took on significance. Justus 
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von Liebig worked at a German university where he studied agricultural chemistry and where he 
began the organization of organic chemistry. Farm journals began to write about the need for 
American colleges to teach agricultural science.  An editorial appeared in September 1847 in 
Chicago’s Western Prairie Farmer, calling for common schools, private schools, high schools, and 
colleges to introduce the study of agriculture into their curricula. “There is no rational doubt, 
that a general introduction…of such studies as bear upon agriculture, is demanded by the 
general interests of society, and will be demanded by society itself, so soon as the case is made 
clear to its apprehension.”214 
In Connecticut, a leading pioneer in agricultural science, Samuel William Johnson, spent 
two years abroad and then returned to the Yale Scientific School where he became professor of 
analytical chemistry analyzing fertilizers for crops. By 1859 he was professor of agricultural 
chemistry.215 Johnson’s work caught the attention of politicians who hoped to establish 
agricultural colleges in their own states. Michigan and Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1855 
for the establishment of the Michigan Agricultural College and the Farmers High School later to 
be renamed Pennsylvania State College.216 New York Governor Washington Hunt, in his 1857 
Annual Message proclaimed, “It cannot be doubted that an institution of the character 
proposed (an institution for advancement of agricultural science and of knowledge in the 
mechanic arts) would promote the dissemination of agricultural knowledge and elevate the 
condition of people….” Whether the governor’s motives were economic, social, political, or 
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altruistic, he spoke about the importance of education and about how “the elevation of the 
laboring classes…is worthy of the highest ambition of the statesman and patriot.”217 
Thirty-three months later another politician spoke to the importance of agricultural 
education, both in schools and through the vehicle of the state fair. In an address to the 
Wisconsin Agricultural Society’s fair held in Milwaukee, Abraham Lincoln told an audience 
anxious to get on with the awarding of the premiums, and not necessarily interested in what the 
speaker had to say, that “the chief use of agricultural fairs is to aid in improving the great calling 
of agriculture...to make mutual exchange of agricultural discovery, information, and 
knowledge….” In general, education enabled the farmer to study soils and seeds, diseases of 
crops, implements and machinery, and a “thousand things of which these are specimens….” 
Lincoln concluded by saying, “A capacity, and taste, for reading, gives access to whatever has 
already been discovered by others. It is the key…to the already solved problem…. It gives relish, 
and facility, for successfully pursuing the unsolved ones.”218  
Reading did open up a world of information to northern and western farmers, but in the 
South, where fewer than a third of those between five and nineteen years of age attended 
school and illiteracy was common, the ability to diffuse agricultural information to yeoman and 
poor farmers was increasingly problematic. Philip St. George Cocke, president of the Virginia 
State Agricultural Society, complained, “Seventy thousand of our adult population can neither 
read nor write!”219 He implored his fellow Virginians to open their “hearts and means until every 
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child within the limits of our broad Commonwealth shall, at least, have the advantage of a Free 
School education.”220  
To improve conditions in the South for the middle and lower classes, especially small 
farmers, would require disengagement from the institution to which wealthy and powerful 
southerners were inexorably committed—slavery. Slavery had provided plantation owners with 
the labor force to plant, grow, and harvest cotton, sugar cane, rice and tobacco, making 
approximately ten percent of the population very wealthy people. The protection of slavery was 
the paramount goal of politicians yoked to the “peculiar institution.” James Goode, a Virginia 
secessionist asked rhetorically, “Are we not a people of like habits, of like institutions, and like 
religion? Are we not all deeply and vitally concerned with the preservation of the institution of 
African slavery?”221 
Plantation agriculture, John Majewski pointed out in his book Modernizing A Slave 
Economy: The Economic Vision of the Confederate Nation, had come with a high price tag. The 
acidity of the Southern soil made it difficult to supply fallow fields with the proper nutrients so 
that they could recover quickly. Hay and clover, used to fix nitrogen in northern fields, failed to 
thrive in the warm, humid climate. Cattle were fed with low nutritional grasses and peas, and 
erosion from heavy rains (cotton and corn were row crops) “created channels that carried away 
topsoil.”222 Instead of relying on crop rotation, farmers burned forests, and used the ash as 
fertilizer. But it took approximately twenty years for the forest to regenerate so it could be 
burned again. This meant that plantation owners would grow on a plot of land for five years and 
then move to another plot for the next five years. At any one time only a quarter of their 
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property was under cultivation. This meant “adding unimproved acres required larger farms and 
larger plantations without increasing the size of the workforce, thus stunting rural population 
growth.”223 Areas composed of isolated farms and plantations had a small market for 
periodicals, a small interest in agricultural fairs, and a small supply of those interested in 
attending agricultural schools and colleges.224  
By the mid-1850s southern nationalists envisioned an independent confederacy with a 
modern economy that “integrated slavery, commerce, and manufacturing. Political 
independence…would unleash the South’s economic potential” that secessionists believed was 
caused by “unfair subsides to northern industry.”225 Southerners perceived the Federal 
government’s tariff unfair, but in reality the Buchanan tariff lowered rates. The South’s attempt 
at an agricultural reform movement called for improvements in farming that would contribute 
to the growth and wealth of plantations and yeomen’s farms. Information about agricultural 
experiments was disseminated in periodicals like Edmund Ruffin’s Farmers’ Register and 
reformers in 1854 proposed the establishment of the “Southern Central Agricultural College.”226 
The reform movement, however, remained tied to the institution of slavery. For example, 
Edmund Ruffin declared at the Virginia Agricultural Society fair in 1852, “slavery was of divine 
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origin and promoted the industry, civilization, refinement and general well-being of 
mankind.”227  
The great fortunes in the South generated by slavery and cotton made it improbable 
that southern leaders might see the economic forest through the trees. As they imagined an 
independent Confederacy, they understood at a gut level the importance of establishing their 
own manufacturing and commercial capacity, but like farming it was to be carried out on the 
backs of African American slaves. This meant a continuation of social controls to buttress the 
established social hierarchy, but it would also require educational controls. Information would 
need to be gained, but disseminated carefully. The proposal for an agricultural college, open to 
the sons of the planter class, was an example of this model where the upper classes would 
remain the society’s intellectuals, acquire new knowledge and parse it out as necessary.  
The foundation of southern life was built on the intellectual defense of slavery. As 
northern abolitionists attacked the institution of slavery and called the men who practiced it 
indolent, inimical, invidious, and immoral, southern politicians and intellectuals grew more 
determined to defend and justify the institutions and themselves. Thomas R. Dew, an 
intellectual disciple of Thomas Jefferson, analyzed the proceedings of the Virginia State 
Constitutional Convention in 1829-1830, and as a result published the first systematic defense of 
slavery in a Review of the Debates of the Virginia Legislature. At the center of the debate was 
the relationship between slavery and the apportionment of political power in the state. The 
slaveholder faction won and consequently, controlled the legislature for the next thirty years. 
Dew argued that the South had inherited slavery from the colonial fathers and once introduced, 
                                                             
227 Majewski, 61. See “Address of Mr. Ruffin,” Journal of Transaction of the Virginia State 
Agricultural Society (Richmond: P. D. Bernard, 1853), 16. See also Edmund Ruffin, “Address,” 
Southern Planter 12 (February 1852): A8, for a full reprint of Ruffin’s address. 
 122 
it could not be abandoned because blacks would face unbearable misery and thus to abandon 
them would be immoral.228 
 John C. Calhoun, no doubt, read Dew’s book, because seven years later in a speech to 
the United States Senate he rebuffed abolitionists’ charges that men who practiced slavery were 
evil.  The relationship between the two races was not evil: “far otherwise; I hold it to be good, as 
it has thus far proved itself to be to both, and will continue to prove so if not disturbed by the 
fell spirit of abolition.”229  Calhoun, with a nod to Dew then said, “There never has yet existed a 
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not…live on the labor of 
the other. Broad and general as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history….”230 
A colleague of Dew’s at William & Mary College was William Barton Rogers. A 
Philadelphian by birth, Rogers went to school at William & Mary and then taught chemistry and 
natural philosophy at the college beginning in 1828. His papers on greensand and the calcareous 
marl of eastern Virginia and its value as a fertilizer grabbed the attention of the Virginia 
legislature and in 1835 the lawmakers placed him in charge of a geological survey of Virginia. 
Concurrently, he took a position on the University of Virginia faculty as professor of natural 
philosophy.231 The scholarly Rogers found the results of the geological survey to be a tale of two 
regions. Whereas the eastern part of the state provided the natural resources essential for the 
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state’s plantation owners and small farmers, the western half of the state provided a plethora of 
raw materials to meet westerners’ interests in developing a center for southern industry. 
Eastern planters, who made up the majority interest in the legislature, associated coal and other 
emerging industries with “Yankee interests.”232  Their skepticism and fear, and their 
commitment to slavery led them to cut off funding for the survey.  
Rogers discovered, by reading about it in the newspapers, that his funding had been cut. 
In correspondence between Rogers and Judge J. F. May of the Virginia House of Delegates, 
Rogers wrote, “Indeed, without the assistance of the corps in the laboratory and at the drawing-
table, and in arranging the cabinet…I should feel incompetent to perform the task of drawing up 
my Report without great additional delay.”233 May dismissed his concern and the report was not 
finished. 
During the same year, the University hired mathematician James Joseph Sylvester who 
upon his arrival was greeted by students with verbal insults and physical assault because he was 
an English Jew. The Watchman of the South, a periodical of the Presbyterian Church wrote of 
Sylvester’s hire, “This is the heaviest blow the University has ever received. The great body of 
the people of this Commonwealth are by profession Christians and not heathen, nor musselmen 
[sic], nor Jews, nor Atheists, nor Infidels.”234 Professor Sylvester was gone from the university in 
six months prompting Rogers to write to his brother Robert, “…I have been unable to shut out 
the contrast between the region in which I live and the highly cultivated nature and society of 
glorious New England…. Would you believe it, that a series of essays has been published 
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condemning the Visitors for the appointments of a Jew and a Catholic, (Kraitzer) and sweeping 
charges at the same time made against the character…of the University!”235  
Whether or not the events of 1841 had anything to do with the next crisis for Rogers at 
the university is speculative, but three years later the Committee on Schools and Colleges of the 
House of Delegates was instructed to investigate “the past history and present condition and 
influences of the University of Virginia, with a view of forming their opinion upon the question 
of repealing the Act of Assembly granting an annuity of $15,000 to that Institution.”236 Rogers 
responded with a lengthy report answering the charges of Jewish influence against the 
university and the appropriations remained but not without scaring the embattled professor.  
He had begun to imagine the model for a new type of scientific school unlike anything 
that had been attempted at universities across the country. Rogers saw relationships between 
developments in technology and developments in science, and envisioned a polytechnic 
institution that connected science to its practical applications.  He tendered his resignation at 
the university and shortly after wrote his brother Henry regarding a place to establish the school 
he imagined. “The occupations and interests of the great mass of the people (in Boston) are 
immediately connected with the applications of physical science, and their quick intelligence has 
already impressed them with just ideas of the value of scientific teaching in their daily 
pursuits.”237  
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Rogers challenged conventional wisdom by insisting that the tools of science be placed 
in students’ hands. “His plan offered a more intimate union of mind and hand.”238 He 
understood the growing desire in the United States for professional mechanics. “Who can doubt 
that the mechanical, manufacturing, and agricultural classes of the community would derive the 
highest advantages from the establishment of an institution directed by these views.”239 
In the fifteen years before the Civil War, colleges and universities in the North, following 
Harvard’s and Yale’s lead, expanded offerings in the applied sciences, yet programs received no 
financial support from the institution. The funding came from private donations. Harvard lacked 
adequate facilities, and consequently, laboratory experiments were not available for students. 
Charles W. Eliot recalled his experience at the Lawrence Scientific School: “The faculty had had 
no means of offering laboratory practice to the students except as a favor which could be 
granted to very few.”240 Francis Wayland, president of Brown University asked Rogers for 
guidance to change the curriculum to include the principles of the “useful arts,” but by 1855 the 
trustees had rejected the plan and fired Wayland. 
Other schools such as West Point “came close to Roger’s ideal,” but by 1855 the course 
of study turned away from the theoretical to just the practical.241 The Rensselaer School used 
laboratories for instruction, yet by 1848 students could complete their course of study in one 
year. Henry Tappan promoted the idea of a graduate school in science at the University of 
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Michigan—only a handful of students enrolled and the program emphasized theory over the 
practical.242 Other schools demonstrated interest in educational reform but none resembled, in 
entirety, Rogers’s goals. These schools included The Citadel (1843), the U. S. Naval Academy 
(1845), Polytechnic College of Pennsylvania (1853), Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute (1855), 
Glenmore School (1859), and Cooper Union (1859).243 
By 1860 Rogers’ opportunity came knocking. The city of Boston was looking to make 
“educational improvements” in its Back Bay development. A conservatory was formed and at a 
meeting on October 5, 1860, Rogers presented his document for a plan to establish the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The following year an act of the Massachusetts State 
Legislature incorporated MIT and Rogers was named the institute’s first president.  
So as the sun rose on April 11, 1861, planters, farmers, and slaves headed to the fields. 
Men went to work in textile mills, clock factories, iron forges, coal mines, armories, machine 
shops, and railroad yards. Apprentices learned trades, children learned to read and write, 
university students learned Latin and Greek, and some tried to learn chemistry and biology. 
George Ross was dead, Chauncey Jerome bankrupt, William Barton Rogers prepared to open 
MIT, and Edmund Ruffin prepared to fire on the Federal fort sitting in the Charleston, South 
Carolina harbor. In a short time these farmers, planters, slaves, metal workers, tool makers, 
engine builders, carpenters, engineers, laborers, factory hands, draftsmen, professors, and 
students would become soldiers, and be organized into standing armies, the size and scope of 
which not even the professionals from West Point could foresee.  The armies would need 
cannons, rifles, and ordnance. They would need infantry to fight and die, artillerymen to kill and 
maim, cavalry to scout and raid, and officers to lead and sacrifice. And, yes, they would need 
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engineers. Engineers to assist in getting at the enemy, engineers to deliver food and equipment 
through dangerous and often impassable terrain, engineers to build roads and bridges over 
distances unimaginable in April 1861. Yes, it was now time to go to war.   
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CHAPTER 4  
PROFESSIONALS AND VOLUNTEERS 
 
“If mere volunteers can wear them (engineer insignia—a metal replica of an armory with 
battlemented towers) they are no longer badges of distinction.” 
 
              Captain James C. Duane, United States Army, Corps of Engineers, 1861 
 
 Just three short months after the fall of Fort Sumter, new and untested Union and 
Confederate armies first drew blood thirty miles southwest of Washington, DC, near a railroad 
crossroads called Manassas Junction and a small river called Bull Run. Both sides believed this 
clash of arms would settle the question of an independent Confederacy.  It did not.  Instead, 
both sides came to the harsh realization that the war could be a bloody and protracted conflict, 
requiring more men and materials than first imagined, as well as the development of complex 
strategic and logistical plans.  Part of this logistical planning required some consideration for the 
role of military engineers.  At the time of the First Battle of Bull Run each side had engineering 
officers attached to army headquarters, but would this small cadre of officers be enough to 
meet the armies’ growing needs? Also, as the war began, only the Federal army had a company 
of engineer soldiers, and some questioned whether this would be enough. Both sides, therefore, 
had to decide where to invest their manpower resources.  Should men recruited as infantry be 
converted to engineer troops? Would making engineer soldiers from infantry recruits weaken 
each army’s ability to fight? Would these men need special skills?  Who would lead them?  
The formation of the 50th New York Volunteer Engineers provides insight into how the 
Union army tried to address these questions. Twenty-six days after Bull Run, a newspaper article 
headed “A New Company From Rome” appeared in the Rome [New York] Citizen on August 16, 
1861.  Captain Wesley Brainerd, a member of the New York State Militia’s Company “A” 46th 
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Regiment, the Gansevoort Light Guard, was now recruiting a company of engineers. Charles B. 
Stuart of Geneva, New York, had promised a captaincy to Brainerd if he could enlist 
approximately one hundred men. Brainerd’s father and Stuart had been in the railroad business 
together and were old acquaintances, so Wesley received a favorable response from Stuart 
regarding the attempt to raise a company of soldiers. The article stated, “The Regiment is to be 
armed and equipped as a rifle regiment….But its main labors…will be the rebuilding of railroads 
and bridges destroyed by the enemy, the running of trains, or the performance of any other kind 
of mechanical and engineering work that may be necessary.”1   
 Besides serving in the “fancy dress” militia company with “young men fond of show and 
with much leisure time on hand,” Brainerd had no military experience.2  As a young boy he 
dreamed about being a soldier and was intent on going to West Point until at the age of 
fourteen “my father ridiculed me out of the notion.”3  Yet, like many men living in Rome, New 
York, he did have engineering skills. With a common school background only and “a somewhat 
checquered life,” he learned his mechanical skills operating a business planing, sawing, and 
turning lumber for, first, the manufacturing of railroad cars, and, second, for the manufacturing 
of bedsteads and fanning mills. Eventually, he converted a building into a gristmill “making a fair 
living when the war broke upon us.”4  
 Brainerd believed Rome was the perfect place to collect volunteers for an engineer 
company. “The style of men required are able-bodied and experienced military, civil and 
mechanical engineers, mechanics, boatmen, lumbermen” and carpenters, farmers, and laborers.  
“There are a considerable number of young men in this village and the vicinity, of the classes 
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above indicated who should be glad to join the Engineer Corps of Gen. Stuart.”5  The article 
concluded by announcing “General Stuart’s” qualifications for the leadership position he was 
assuming, which included his graduation from West Point. Stuart did have extensive engineering 
experience before the war. He conceived the railway suspension bridge over the Niagara River 
two miles below the falls and supervised its completion in 1855 by John A. Roebling. He was 
state engineer for New York, engineer in charge of the Brooklyn dry docks, and had financial 
interests in building railroads in Iowa.6  
 Stuart, however, was not a graduate of West Point. He attended common schools in 
New York, graduated from Union College in Schenectady and through self-promotion managed 
to adopt the sobriquet, “the general.” It was perhaps this self-promotion and affect as martinet 
that led Brainerd to describe him as “overrated.” His stratagem was to surround himself with 
capable associates, filter and absorb their ideas, and then claim them as his own.7 When the 
regiment was finally formed as the 50th New York Volunteer Infantry (not engineers just yet) and 
marched off to camp in Washington, DC, Stuart acted the part of a commanding officer as a 
combination “Old Fuss and Feathers” (General Winfield Scott) and “Old Rough and Ready” 
(Zachary Taylor.) In actuality he was pompous and plump. 
 Brainerd would find men in the Fiftieth that he would come to greatly admire. One that 
became his constant companion was Captain Ira Spaulding. Born in Oneida County, New York, 
and also a product of common schools, Spaulding had worked for “General” Stuart as assistant 
engineer (Stuart was chief engineer) for a division of the Erie Railroad. In 1843, Spaulding was 
engineer of the newly formed Bear Mountain Railroad Company charged with building lines 
from the coal region in the upper end of Dauphin county to the Pennsylvania canal twenty-eight 
                                                             
5 Brainerd, 269. 
6 Brainerd, 342, fn. 21. 
7 Brainerd, 23. 
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miles from Harrisburg.8 He would become one of the most admired and successful officers of 
the regiment. 
 The other officer who would come to impress Brainerd was Captain Edmund O’Fling 
Beers. From Elmira, New York, Beers learned his mathematics, reading, and writing skills in 
common school, married his first cousin Mary A. Beers, and practiced dentistry.9 Beers’s father, 
Jabez Holly Beers, was a carpenter and builder and taught his son the trade. So the captain, who 
would eventually become a major during the war, had extensive knowledge of mechanics and 
technology.10 
 By mid-September 1861 Brainerd, his companions, and the entire regiment of the 50th 
New York Infantry were encamped at Camp Lesley in Elmira, New York.11 Within a month the 
unit would be converted into an engineering regiment and would see its first major action 
during General George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign. Before that happened, however, 
both Union and Confederate military and civilian leaders would need to determine how they 
wanted to structure their forces based on the high commands’ assessment and development of 
their strategic plan. Stuart’s men had a role to play. At first the role was minor in character, but 
                                                             
8 New York Commercial Advertiser, November 23, 1843. 
9 American dentists in the nineteenth-century were not trained well. Many practitioners were 
barbers, blacksmiths, and apothecaries, and pulling teeth was their primary dental function. It 
was not until 1840 that professional training began with the opening of a dental school in 
Baltimore, Maryland. The greatest progress made in dental medicine before the Civil War was 
the development of nitrous oxide as an anesthesia. Otherwise, dentures did not fit well, hand 
drills were used to excavate a tooth, pain control was in its infancy, and infection control was 
non-existent. For more on this subject see Edward Feinberg, DMD, “A Short History of Modern 
Dentistry,” www.edwardfeinbergdmd.com/history-of-dentistry.htm (accessed November 24, 
2013). 
10 Joyce M. Tice, “Tri-Counties Genealogy & History: Family History & Biography Section,” 
www.joycetice.com/Kelsey/Kjwb.htm (accessed January 26, 2013). 
11 Colonel Stuart named the camp in honor of “Mr. Lesley, chief clerk of the War Department.” 
See Brainerd, 272. Camp Lesley should not be confused with Fort Lesley A. McNair in 
Washington, DC. Fort McNair was named for Lieutenant General Lesley A. McNair who was 
killed in World War II. Thus, Colonel Stuart cannot take credit for naming the third longest 
serving army post in United States history. 
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it soon came to be major, one essential to the outcome. Engineers had served a vital part in the 
military campaigns of the past and they were about to again.  Northern war planners would 
figure out the mechanical and technical capacity of their men.  Between 1861 and 1865 the 
engineers’ role would expand and become indispensible to Northern victory.  
This transformation from a limited to a large role for the engineers needed to be 
recognized by the generals and politicians, and consequently, it took time to develop. One 
hurdle to overcome in expanding the role of engineers was to increase the number of engineers. 
This meant accepting the idea that civilian engineers could perform well as military engineers. A 
few professional soldiers had the wisdom, by the time the Civil War began, to challenge the 
well-established notion that only West Pointers made good engineers.  These same men 
understood that with the expansion of the war engineering operations required skilled laborers. 
It was not enough just to have trained officers.  It was incumbent upon the army to enlist 
personnel with the mechanical skills and ingenuity to solve problems often without adequate 
resources and in trying situations.  
 At first, the War Department and Congress saw no need to expand the Union army’s 
engineering forces. Moreover, most senior officers believed the war would be over by the 
summer of 1861, and the size of the Corps of Engineers was adequate for the great battle 
ahead. To everyone—the government, the army, the public—a clash of arms would decide the 
fate of the Union and Confederacy.  President Lincoln had called for 75,000 ninety-day 
volunteers based on the Militia Act of 1795 and then expanded the number on May 3rd to an 
additional 42,000 three year volunteers and called for an increase of 23,000 to the regular army 
of which the corps of engineers and corps of topographical engineers were attached. No 
additional engineer units, however, were authorized. The public’s expectation and the 
administration’s belief was that the Federal army would march into Richmond and crush the 
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rebellion. An undersized engineer corps did not matter as long as engineers could skillfully 
maintain harbor defenses, as they did at Fort Pickens, which guarded the ships’ pass to 
Pensacola Bay, and Union held forts along the southern Atlantic, Gulf coast, and Great Lakes 
region.  After the British invasion (military not musical) of the United States in 1813 and 1814 
the War Department, Congress, and the Executive expended limited defense dollars on river, 
harbor, and coastal fortifications in preparation for the next possible war. Skilled engineers, all 
trained at the military academy at West Point were responsible for the building and 
maintenance of these facilities and waterways.12   
 After May 23, 1861 when the people of Virginia adopted that state’s ordinance of 
secession, the corps of engineers and topographical engineers became even smaller, because 
engineers from Virginia went with their state, but no one in the Federal government or military 
appeared worried. Between May and July 1861 there were only forty engineers and thirty-seven 
topographical engineers active in the service of the Federal army. Nine engineers and seven 
topographical engineers had resigned their commissions and taken positions in the new 
Confederate army.13 These small numbers, although not initially significant, eventually revealed 
problems that both the North and South would need to address—a significant shortage of 
engineering officers and troops. This shortage especially taxed the South because there were 
just not enough civilian engineers or mechanics, artisans, and railroad workers to meet the ever-
growing demands of the Confederate army for fortifications, bridges, and roadways.   
 The expansion of both armies was staggering. On Sunday, July 21, 1861, Union general 
Irwin McDowell had approximately 28,000 men under his command from the Department of 
Northern Virginia and Washington as he prepared to attack 32,000 Confederates at Bull Run. At 
                                                             
12 Before the war army engineers William Rosecrans, George Meade, Robert E. Lee, and P. G. T. 
Beauregard, for example, all worked on harbor improvement and fortification projects. 
13 Ness, Jr., 187. 
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the time of the attack the Union army overall had approximately 187,000 soldiers spread 
throughout departments in Ohio, Kentucky, Missouri, and Florida. By January 1, 1862, the army 
had grown to 600,000, and by the 1863, 900,000 men divided into fourteen army groups 
scattered across the Mid-west, West, and South.14 Army groups ranged in size between 40,000 
and 120,000 men. In addition, to move an infantry regiment, for example, on a three day march 
of fifteen miles a day required approximately twenty wagons carrying 3,000 pounds of camp 
equipage, ordnance, quartermaster stores, and medical supplies per 1,000 men. An army of 
100,000 could march twenty-five days with approximately 19,000 wagons. This included feed for 
about 33,000 animals.15 Moving these armies over poor roads and rivers without bridges 
presented a daunting task. Forty engineers, thirty-seven topographical engineers, and one 
hundred engineer soldiers was a paltry sum to accomplish the strategic and tactical movements 
of the Union Army over the 750,000 square miles of the Confederacy.  
 The Confederate Army also grew in size and complexity. In July 1861, the South, from 
the Shenandoah Valley to central Kentucky to Pensacola, Florida scattered seven small armies 
totaling 60,000 men. By 1863, the army had expanded to approximately 465,000 men 
comprised of eighteen armies functioning as independent commands. Like their northern 
enemies at the time of the first battle of Bull Run, the South had only a handful of engineering 
                                                             
14 These army groups ranged from 40,000 to 120,000 men, operated independently from each 
other and the most famous became known as the Army of the Potomac, Army of the Tennessee, 
Army of the Ohio, Army of the Mississippi, Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the James.  
15 Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959), 
25, 26, 169 and 858. See also “Size of the Union and Confederate Armies: Comparative 
Strength,”  http://www.civilwarhome.com/armysize.htm (accessed February 9, 2013). Edward 
Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and 
Field Command (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 61. It is difficult to determine 
in Hagerman’s numbers whether he includes horses for artillery. For an excellent overview of 
artillery operations at Gettysburg, including the number of horses used, see Philip M. Cole, Civil 
War Artillery at Gettysburg: Organization, Equipment, Ammunition, and Tactics (Cambridge, MA: 
DaCapo Press, 2002).    
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officers. Unlike the North, however, the South had no engineering soldiers and little in the way 
of mechanics, carpenters, machinists, and factory workers to fill the ranks of the engineers.  
  The United States Military Academy in the spring of 1861 had a monopoly on 
producing engineers whether for the army or for civilian life. While 1802 West Point graduates 
had served in the regular army as officers in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, many cadets 
aspired to be assigned to the engineers. The Corps of Engineers was considered the most elite 
branch of the service. Beginning with the class of 1819, cadets received a class rank, and only 
the top three or four in the class qualified to enter the engineers.  Between 1819 and 1860 
eighty-seven graduates had earned the distinction of being placed immediately into the 
engineers. Sixty-eight of them came from a free state and nineteen from a slave state.16  By the 
time of the Civil War forty-eight officers were serving in the corps of engineers. Of the forty who 
remained in the Union army twenty-nine served as northern engineers during the Civil War and 
thirteen served as Union field commanders. Of the eight engineers who joined the Confederacy 
five served as field commanders.17 
      More remarkable was where these cadets were born and from what states they were 
appointed. Between 1802 to 1860 of the one hundred-eight graduates who served in the Corps 
of Engineers, seventy-five of them came from New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
                                                             
16 Two other sets of numbers draw attention to the fact that students and graduates of West 
Point who entered the engineers were from the north by a factor of 3 to 1. Between 1802 and 
1861 one hundred thirty-seven men served in the Corps of Engineers, (they did not necessarily 
begin their army careers in the engineers) and one hundred nine came from Union states and 
twenty-eight from Confederate states. Of those men between 1802 and 1861 who did begin 
their army careers in the engineers, eight-seven were from the North and twenty-four from the 
South. 
17 Cullum’s Register. I shifted through all the classes between 1802 and 1861 noting where every 
cadet was born, the state in which he was appointed, his class rank, and the branch of the 
service he entered upon graduation.  Pierre G. T. Beauregard, William Henry Whiting, Edward 
Porter Alexander, and George Washington Custis Lee all served as field commanders for the 
Confederacy. Robert E. Lee was not on the list of corps members because at the time Virginia 
seceded Lee was in command of cavalry.  
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and Vermont. Four of these states had adequate common school programs during the 
antebellum period, and one, New York, which produced twenty-seven engineers, had developed 
an exceptional common school program. Furthermore, as industry and mechanization altered 
the economic landscape in the free states, northern colleges and universities introduced more 
science into the curriculum. Northern boys of all classes, who had more access to education, 
would be exposed to the benefits of studying natural philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, and 
physics. Increasingly, northern educators and politicians would encourage and promote these 
courses in schools. It was not a coincidence that the number of northern graduates and 
southern graduates entering the engineers was different by a factor of close to four to one.18  
 Within the Corps of Topographical Engineers of the seven men who resigned their 
commissions to join the Confederate Army, only two held a rank above second lieutenant. 
Experience remained in the Federal Army.  This experience included West Point graduates who 
served initially in other branches of the service before the war. These men amassed a wealth of 
engineering knowledge as a result of being transferred into the engineers or, after resigning 
their commissions, serving as civilian engineers or teaching science and engineering at their 
alma mater. For example, Montgomery C. Meigs and Daniel P. Woodbury, class of 1836 both 
entered the artillery after graduation and were transferred to the engineers. John M. Wilson 
class of 1860 was another artillery officer transferred into the engineers. William S. Rosecrans, 
class of 1842, attended common school in Utica, New York, and then moved to Mansfield, Ohio, 
where he was appointed to the military academy. After serving as a professor of engineering he 
opened a mining business in western Virginia around the time eastern planter interests feared 
                                                             
18 Massachusetts produced nineteen engineers, Pennsylvania thirteen, Ohio nine, and Vermont 
six. Eight cadets born in Virginia served in the Corps of Engineers, four from Tennessee, four 
from North Carolina, three from Louisiana, and two each from South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, and Mississippi.  
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industrial competition and the influence of northern abolitionist ideas in the region. George 
Brinton McClellan served as an engineering officer after graduating in 1846, and he too 
eventually resigned his commission to follow civilian pursuits. In 1857, he became chief engineer 
of the Illinois Central Railroad and in 1860, president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. 
 Rosecrans and McClellan’s paths would cross immediately after the Civil War began, and 
both would have a major impact on the development of the engineering organization and 
operation during the war.  McClellan was a rising superstar.  He was a soldier of intellectual 
acumen and some distinction. He graduated number two in his class at West Point, served on 
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott’s staff during the Mexican War, was sent to the Crimean as an 
army observer, and had considerable experience surveying river systems and terrain for the 
express purpose of developing future railroads and waterways. At the request of the governor 
of Ohio, he spent time organizing the first volunteer troops in the state, and in May 1861 was 
promoted to major general in the Regular army. He was thirty-four years old.  
 Placed in command of the Federal government’s forces in western Virginia, McClellan 
was assigned several brigadiers including William Rosecrans. Rosecrans demonstrated skill as a 
tactical commander by defeating a Confederate force at the battle of Rich Mountain on July 11th 
and two days later defeated another Southern force led by Robert E. Lee at Corrick’s Ford near 
the Cheat River. McClellan, to Rosecrans’s indignation, took overall credit for both victories.  
Thus it was that McClellan, the only Union general with a victory to his name, was called to 
Washington after the North’s devastating defeat at Bull Run on July 21st, to quell the panic, 
defend the city, and assume command of the Military Division of the Potomac.19 Upon arriving 
                                                             
19 The battle was deemed devastating for two reasons: One, the Lincoln government fully 
expected to defeat the upstart Confederates in one Napoleonic crushing victory. Two, the battle 
turned into a full-blown panic with Union soldiers and civilians (who had come out from 
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in the capital he wrote his wife Ellen, “I find myself in a new and strange position here—Presdt 
[sic], Cabinet, Genl Scott & all deferring to me—by some strange operation of magic I seem to 
have become the power of the land…I almost think that were I to win some small success now I 
could become Dictator or anything else that might please me—but nothing of that kind would 
please me—therefore I won’t be Dictator. Admirable self-denial!”20  
 The Federal government could breathe a sigh of relief that General McClellan would not 
become dictator, but it did fear a southern invasion of the capital. Manassas Junction was only 
thirty miles southwest of the capital. The door was wide open. Yet in that moment the right man 
had been called to Washington. McClellan would fortify the capital, expand the Corps of 
Engineers, reorganize the army, and serendipitously introduce volunteer engineer officers and 
soldiers into the Union Army.  
 McClellan’s understanding of military science was significantly influenced by the 
writings of Simon François Gay de Vernon, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Dennis Hart Mahan, and Henry 
Wager Halleck. Mahan, a student of both Vernon and Jomini, taught both Halleck (1839) and 
McClellan (1846) at West Point. McClellan accepted, as historian Edward Hagerman pointed out 
in his book The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and 
Field Command, “the two innovations in a basically eighteenth-century view of warfare that 
responded to the realities of the mid-nineteenth century: Mahan’s rejection of the open frontal 
assault for an offensive tactical organization that emphasized the primary role of field 
fortifications; and the general awareness of the strategic potential of railroads.”21  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Washington to witness the battle) fleeing back to Washington. Morale in the days that followed 
was torturous. 
20 George B. McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, July 27, 1861, in The Civil War Papers of George 
B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & 
Fields, 1989), 70.   
21 Hagerman, 65. 
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 Mahan’s book, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, was introduced to cadets in 
1836, and although Mahan rejected Vernon’s reliance on assault tactics, he did believe that “the 
chief object of entrenchments is to enable the assailed to meet the enemy with success…and 
then, when he has been cut up, to assume the offensive and drive him back at the point of a 
bayonet.”22  Mahan spent four years in France studying Vernon and Jomini’s works and when he 
returned to West Point as a professor of engineering in 1830, he introduced both their writings 
into the curriculum. Mahan’s favorite student at West Point, Henry Halleck, published Elements 
of Military Art and Science (1846) combining field fortifications with Jomini’s concept of using 
internal lines of communication to concentrate manpower at the weakest point in the enemies’ 
lines and attack at that point.23 Halleck was building on a rich military tradition begun in 
eighteenth century France with Louis XIV’s engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban and 
continued through the ideas of Vernon, Jomini, Mahan, and Halleck. Vauban’s technical 
knowledge, love of applied science, and the esprit géométrique of the age carried great 
momentum into the nineteenth century and was reinforced by the rising industrial culture.24  
 McClellan was influenced by what he read at West Point and afterwards, and his 
experience in the Mexican War and in the Crimea only supported his predisposition for field 
fortifications and turning movements rather than frontal assaults. In Mexico, McClellan was 
assigned to Company “A”, Corps of Engineers. On May 15, 1846 Congress finally passed 
                                                             
22 Dennis Hart Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification (New York: Wiley and Long, 
1836), 14. 
23 John Shy, “Antoine-Henri Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 176-177. 
24 Henry Guerlac, “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
74. Guerlac wrote: “Science and warfare have always been intimately connected. In antiquity 
this alliance became strikingly evident in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Archimedes’ 
contribution to the defense of Syracuse immediately springs to mind as the classic illustration.” 
68. 
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legislation to create an engineer component from enlisted personnel of the Regular Army.25  
McClellan witnessed the important work of engineer soldiers, and saw the tactical effectiveness 
of turning movements especially at Cerro Gordo and Contreras. He also learned the destructive 
effects on attackers in a frontal assault on an entrenched position. He concluded that one of the 
reasons Americans succeeded was because Mexican fortifications were poorly constructed.26 
 In 1855, with Major Alfred Mordecai of the Ordnance Department and Major Richard 
Delafield of the engineers, Captain McClellan travelled to Europe and was a military observer at 
the siege of Sevastopol.27 Here McClellan noted the significance of rifled weapons on a frontal 
assault, and consequently, was able to see with crystal clarity the central principle he would 
adopt as he was handed command in Washington seven years later: Defense wins wars, solid 
entrenchments and fortifications were the elements of defense, frontal attacks upon the enemy 
are to be avoided at all costs, excellent artillery must accompany successful siege operations, 
and engineer troops are essential to the army in order to conduct the type of warfare, which 
McClellan was philosophically bound. 
 McClellan’s vision of a war dominated by field fortifications and entrenchments, 
planned and guided by professional military engineers no doubt was on his mind when he 
received word that on August 3, 1861, Congress authorized three additional engineer companies 
which brought the strength of the Corps of Engineers to forty-nine officers and 550 enlisted 
                                                             
25 Captain Alexander J. Swift had spent two years as a student at the School of Application for 
artillery and Engineers, before returning to the United States in early 1846. Congress had yet to 
establish a company of engineer soldiers. When the authorization came, Captain Swift was given 
command of the new unit.  
26 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1984), 182-187. 
27 The Crimean War was fought between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, Great 
Britain, and France. 
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men.28 As a result Company B, recruited in Portland, Maine, and Company C, recruited in 
Boston, Massachusetts became part of the provisional Engineer Battalion under the command 
of Captain James C. Duane. It was at this time that Duane began writing a Manual for Engineer 
Troops, which would be used along with extensive field training, to prepare the new battalion 
for the campaigns ahead.  Duane’s manual foreshadowed his boss’s tactical policy for the 
fighting ahead. Duane’s chapters included the following: Ponton [sic] Drill, Rules for Conducting 
a Siege, School for the Sap, Military Mining, and Construction of Batteries.29    
 Infantry commanders were skeptical of the engineers, because the infantry wanted to 
take the offensive and fight, whereas the perception was the engineers want to take the 
defensive and dig.30 The administration, Congress, and members of the press believed 
McClellan’s focus on the engineers might foreshadow a less aggressive approach to waging war 
against the South. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign in May-June 1862 did reveal that Lincoln’s 
concerns about McClellan’s recalcitrance were real and accurate. The administration and 
Congress wanted action. Anxious to take the war to the rebels and deliver a crushing victory, 
Lincoln and the Congress, therefore, were reluctant to sacrifice manpower resources for 
engineering troops. This desire to take the war to the Confederacy helped explain why Lincoln 
continuously encouraged the general to go on the offensive, and why McClellan, the 
professionally trained military engineer-soldier, considered these overtures anathema. He wrote 
to his wife on October 11, 1861, “I can’t tell you how disgusted I am becoming with these 
wretched politicians—they are a most despicable set of men & I think Seward is the meanest of 
                                                             
28 Phillip Thienel, “Engineers in the Union Army, 1861-1865: Part I. Engineer Organization,” in 
The Military Engineer, vol. XLVII, no. 315 (January-February 1955), 36. See also Hagerman, 234. 
29 Captain J. C. Duane, Manual for Engineer Troops (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862). A sap 
was an approach trench dug by soldiers when attempting to move within striking distance of the 
enemy’s fortification. The sap was dug in a criss-cross pattern to avoid enfilading (from an angle) 
fire from the defenders.   
30 Hagerman, 234. 
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them all—a meddling, officious, incompetent little puppy—he has done more than any other 
one man to bring all this misery upon the country & is one of the least competent to get us out 
of the scrape. The Presdt [sic] is nothing more than a well meaning baboon.”31  
 Although an invidious narcissist and a self styled savior of the Union if ever there was 
one, McClellan did have a cogent point about the lack of engineer officers and troops, and it was 
here that he contributed most to the outcome of the war. In September 1861 the army had lost 
fifteen officers to the Confederacy (both engineers and topographical engineers) and the 
remaining officers were assigned to various staffs, coastal defenses, or continued their prewar 
function working on civilian internal improvement projects.32 Finally, at least seven men left the 
engineers to accept line commands. So by October 1861, McClellan found he lacked engineer 
officers and men to expand the project to fortify Washington, begun in May, but made critical 
by the results of Bull Run and the belief an impending Confederate attack was coming 
(McClellan believed from at least 150,000 rebels). Eventually, a total of sixty-eight forts, ninety-
three batteries, and twenty miles of rifle entrenchments were built to protect Washington.33 
Furthermore, the army had no pontoon trains or equipment to mount an offensive even if it 
wanted to do so. 
 Major John G. Barnard, superintendent of West Point in April 1861 and an apostle of 
Dennis Hart Mahan, was given the responsibility of designing and overseeing the building of the 
first forts around Washington. The results were Fort Corcoran, which commanded the 
approaches to the Aqueduct Bridge, Fort Runyon, which guarded the approaches to the Long 
Bridge and was built at the northern end of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and a smaller Fort 
                                                             
31 McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, October 11, 1861, in The Civil War Papers of George B. 
McClellan, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 106. 
32 Hagerman, 235. 
33 Ron Field, American Civil War Fortification (2): Land and Field Fortifications (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2005), 32. 
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Albany about one mile west on the Columbia Turnpike.34 The major then began to build a chain 
of lunettes, called forts De Kalb, Woodbury, Cass, Tillinghast, and Craig. All theses forts 
established a screen of outposts known as the Arlington Line, which faced southwest and 
connected forts Corcoran and Albany.35  
 Pleased with Barnard’s work, General McClellan promoted the major to brigadier 
general of United States Volunteers and chief engineer of the newly formed Army of the 
Potomac.36 “Little Mac” (the men’s affectionate nickname for their beloved general) then 
handed Barnard an additional task beyond the continued construction of the Washington 
defenses—to build portable bridge trains. The army had no bridging equipment except for India-
rubber pontoons left over from the Mexican War, which McClellan deemed unsatisfactory.37 So 
with no bridging equipment or tools, forts under construction, and the number of engineer 
troops inadequate for the job, McClellan ordered Barnard to construct the new model French 
bateau pontoon and the wagon trains to haul them. Barnard in his turn assigned Lieutenant 
                                                             
34 Field, 26. 
35 Field, 31. A lunette was a detached fieldwork shaped like an irregular pentagon with the base 
open and the vertex facing in the direction of the enemy. Lunettes were used as advanced 
works placed in front of the main line covering the gaps between major fortifications. 
36 Being promoted in the volunteers instead of the regular army meant that the rank remained 
as well as the pay, so long as the volunteers were in service. Once the volunteers were mustered 
out of the army an individual’s rank reverted back to its pre-war grade, pay, and pension. 
37 India-rubber pontoons were made from three cylinders, each twenty feet long and twenty 
inches wide bound together by rubber straps. Each cylinder had a brass air nozzle, and the 
pontoon was inflated using a large bellows that fir over the nozzle. This type of bridge was easy 
to transport and easy to repair, but if damaged while supporting a large number of men and 
horses it could prove disastrous. The other reason McClellan may have disproved of the India-
rubber pontoon was because Captain Duane preferred the French system. In Brigadier General 
Barnard’s report of operations from May 23, 1861 to August 15, 1862 he wrote, “Captain Duane 
possessed a more extensive and thorough practical and experimental knowledge of military 
bridges than any other man in this country.” Duane was not one to hide his light under a bushel, 
and I suspect he made his ideas known to McClellan.  
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Colonel Barton Stone Alexander to prepare the necessary equipment for the Army of the 
Potomac.38  
 McClellan then wrote Secretary of War, Simon Cameron to request army funds from the 
Quartermaster’s Department to purchase and experiment with a suspension bridge designed 
and build by John W. Murphy, a civil engineer with a degree from Rensselaer. The bridge, built 
from factory-made wire ropes combined with wooden bracing, utilized abutments and piers of 
an earlier wooden bridge. The bridge constructed over the Gauley River in western Virginia was 
“built of heavy timbers, and in place of suspending rods a loosely-formed truss was hung upon 
the cable without fastening. This truss connected to the floor of the bridge”, and it permitted 
the passage of General Rosecrans’s men. Barnard was impressed with the ingenuity of Murphy’s 
system.39 
 Cameron was also informed that although Congress had authorized two additional 
companies of engineer soldiers for the Engineer Battalion, they had yet to arrive in Washington. 
They would not arrive until mid-December. McClellan needed manpower, and he boldly 
suggested to the secretary that volunteers should be assigned to the engineers.40 This 
suggestion crossed an important threshold whether at the time Little Mac knew it or not. 
Military engineers were the elite of the army because their technical skills were highly prized by 
commanding generals, such as General Scott in Mexico, but also because unlike the other 
branches of the service, engineers had performed valuable assistance to the nation working on 
critical internal improvement projects throughout the United States and the Territories. Now 
McClellan was requesting engineer troops from volunteers, which he would get, but along with 
these new soldiers he would get volunteer engineer officers as well. The army’s corps of 
                                                             
38 O. R. ser. 1, vol. 5, chapter XIV, 616-617. 
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engineers would need to “give way to the practical need for broader perspectives” in a war that 
was to demand “ad hoc improvisation.”41  
The corps had held a unique and elite role within the army with a large amount of self-
aggrandizement. When Captain Duane told his men not to wear the insignia of the engineers 
because if volunteers could wear it then they were no longer badges of distinction, he revealed 
a feeling held by many West Point engineers. Regular army engineer officers and men were 
better than any other soldiers. Duane said, “Why, President Lincoln can make a brigadier 
general in five minutes, but it has taken five years to make…an engineer soldier.”42 
Fortunately for the North, in the years before the war, new ideas in technology and 
industrialization, developed by men from all walks of life altered the notion that ideas come 
from one class of society and laborers from another. McClellan was willing, under the 
circumstances and out of necessity, to expand the engineer battalion with men who had 
enlisted as infantry, but who the general believed had developed, as civilians, the basic skills and 
intelligence necessary to perform engineering tasks. The man who would bring the value of the 
volunteer into sharper focus and establish the military doctrine the army would follow to the 
successful conclusion of the war was Lieutenant Colonel Barton Stone Alexander. One day after 
McClellan wrote to the secretary of war, Alexander sat down at his desk and penned his 
visionary letter.  
Writing to Barnard, Alexander rhetorically asked, “…we have as yet no bridge 
equipment, no engineer trains, and no instructed engineer troops…. What, then, are we to do?” 
He continued, “The answer must be, however, we must make them. Our country is full of 
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practical bridge-builders. We must secure their services.”43  Alexander was convinced that men 
who possessed mechanical talent could be found within the ranks of volunteers who had been 
originally recruited as infantry regiments. With roads and railroads to build and repair, telegraph 
lines to install, and bridges to construct and destroy, Alexander argued that men “with previous 
pursuits” that made them mechanically inclined would make excellent military engineers. The 
India rubber pontoon bridge could be used and perfected “if a proper proportion [of volunteers] 
are sailors,” and skilled carpenters could rapidly make canvas pontoon boats used by the 
Topographical Engineers on the expedition on the Colorado River.  The Quartermaster’s 
Department had 100 corrugated-iron wagons that Alexander believed could be converted into a 
bridge. Finally, the lieutenant colonel told Barnard how impressed he was with Murphy’s 
suspension bridge. Alexander suggested three or four spans of the bridge be ordered, but that 
manila rope be replaced with wire rope for all running rigging, except for suspension cables. He 
told Barnard, “We can go to New York and get 10,000 men to splice or put a thimble in a manila 
rope. By going to Mr. Roebling’s establishment in Trenton it is possible that we might find 20 
men who could do the same thing with wire rope.”44  All of this work, Alexander concluded, 
would give the engineers several types of bridges that could be used depending upon the 
circumstance.  
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The following day General McClellan wrote to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. 
Scott to say he had concluded that after considering the matter more fully, the time and 
manpower to construct bridge trains was limited. Therefore, McClellan continued, “It is 
necessary to avail ourselves at once of all the resources which the mechanical skill and ingenuity 
of the country can furnish in this matter.”45 He concluded his message to Scott with his second 
request to the War Department to secure the services of “such regiments of volunteers or such 
portions of regiments as may prove best adapted to the duty.”46 
Scott was an excellent choice as assistant secretary of war. As vice president of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad in 1860, Scott had worked along side of President J. Edgar Thomson, 
witnessed the development of Thomson’s innovative management system, and he proved to be 
a skillful administrator.  Scott responded to McClellan the following day, October 15th: “You have 
full authority to detail the whole or parts of volunteer regiments for engineer service, and will 
exercise your own discretion in relation thereto.”47 Yet, “Little Mac’s” idea for converting 
infantry regiments into engineering regiments was probably not his own. Although there was no 
evidence to conclude that McClellan had seen Alexander’s original memorandum to Barnard, 
there was no evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, as McClellan’s chief engineer, it was more 
than likely that Barnard was in daily contact with McClellan. Finally, the language McClellan used 
in his note to Scott echoes the language Alexander used in his note to Barnard.  Alexander had 
written, “Our country is full of practical bridge-builders,” and “we ought to avail ourselves of the 
mechanical skill of our soldiers…” While McClellan’s followed with,  “It is necessary to avail 
ourselves at once of all the resources which the mechanical skill and ingenuity of the country 
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can furnish…” sounded too similar not to conclude that the rationale for creating engineer 
soldiers from volunteer infantry regiments was Alexander’s idea rather than McClellan’s.  
Eleven days later the 15th and 50th New York Volunteer Infantry received orders to 
report to Washington to become the 15th and 50th New York Volunteer Engineer Regiments. 
Upon his arrival at the capital Captain Wesley Brainerd of the 50th wrote, “We crossed the Long 
Bridge for the first time and marched to our ground near the Navy Yard on the East Branch of 
the Potomac, sometimes called the Anacostia River. Here we commenced the establishment of 
our permanent camp.”48  Both of these regiments were selected because New York State had a 
considerable number of skilled mechanics, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, and civil engineers 
within their ranks. For example, in the 50th New York Private Horace Herion was a mechanic, 
Isaac J. Cox a carriage maker, James B. McGregor a blacksmith, and Francis S. Newton was a 
carpenter.49 The 50th had been originally recruited as an engineer regiment, but the War 
Department determined it would serve as volunteer infantry. The outfit was enrolled with men 
from areas which were impacted by the railroad and Erie Canal including the counties of Elmira, 
Geneva, Fulton, Oswego, Potsdam, Rochester, Albany, and Buffalo. New York also had a 
tradition of establishing engineer troops. Eight militia regiments that enlisted for ninety days in 
April 1861 all had engineer companies attached to them.50  
The 15th Volunteers were organized as sappers and miners at New York City, Long Island, 
and Newark, New Jersey under the command of Colonel John McLeod Murphy. Murphy served 
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as a midshipman during the Mexican War and then returned to civilian life where he worked as 
the chief engineer for the Brooklyn Navy Yard. At the time the war began he was also in the New 
York State Senate. In the late summer of 1861, the Federal government mustered Murphy’s 
regiment into the Army of the Potomac as an infantry regiment. The average age of these men 
was twenty-six, with the youngest being eighteen and the oldest forty-two. Many were 
teamsters, dock builders, boilermakers, masons, and mechanics.51 Both the 15th and 50th 
reported to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander under the pall of being volunteers in an organization 
that promoted itself as being elite. Brainerd recorded that until March 1863, “…those high in 
Authority would not consent to allow us to wear the Engineer button though the priviledge [sic] 
of wearing the castle on our hats [much to Captain Duane’s chagrin] could not be denied us.”52   
Before the two regiments reported to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander in Washington to 
begin their training there was another volunteer engineer regiment from the East already in the 
field.  Edward Wellman Serrell had offered to organize an engineer regiment to supplement the 
engineers in the Regular Army. Serrell had considerable political connections and the reputation 
of being a first class civil engineer. Before the war he served as assistant engineer to the 
commission on the Erie Canal. An assistant to the chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, 
                                                             
51 “Abstract of New York State Muster Rolls, Volunteers,” 13775-83 MUI, Reel 959. 
52 Brainerd, 45-46. The engineer soldier either wore a single-breasted frock coat (dark blue) with 
a stand-up collar or a shell jacket. The edge of the collar and cuffs was trimmed with a yellow 
cord, the color designation for the Corps of Engineers. Sergeants and corporals were permitted 
to wear a yellow stripe down the outer seam of their trousers, which were dark blue.  A black 
belt, tie, boots, and felt hat were also worn. The right side of the hat was folded up and held in 
place by a pin fastened to an eagle. On the left side of the hat soldiers wore an ostrich feather. A 
yellow cord circled the hat three times at the brim seam, and the turreted-castle pin was 
attached to the front of the hat. One-piece white cotton canvas overall were worn on work 
details and the castle pin was affixed above the visor on a dark blue forage cap. Officers wore a 
silver turreted castle with a gold embroidered wreath of laurel and palm on their hats. The 15th 
also wore New York State fatigue dress, and initially the 50th wore a gray trimmed jacket with 
green trim. Eventually the 15th and 50th adopted a dark blue fatigue blouse, sky-blue trousers, 
and a black slouch hat. 
 150 
he was involved with the Hoosac Tunnel project, and he had planned and supervised the 
building of a suspension bridge across the Niagara River at Lewiston, and one at St. John, New 
Brunswick. Serrell spoke with Secretary of War Cameron about recruiting an engineer regiment, 
which Cameron approved as did the Governor of New York, Edwin D. Morgan. Mustered in on 
October 11th, the newly minted Lieutenant Colonel Serrell found himself the commanding officer 
of the 1st New York Volunteer Engineers also known as “Serrell’s Engineers.” Most of the men in 
the first five companies were from New York City (the members of Company K which was 
mustered in on December 3rd were all from northern New Jersey), and they were ordered to join 
Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman’s South Carolina Expeditionary Corps and on November 
8th they began operations to capture Port Royal, South Carolina near Hilton Head Island.53 
While Serrell’s regiment sailed from Fort Monroe, Virginia to the Hilton Head Island, 
Colonel Stuart (50th) and Murphy’s (15th) soldiers and officers were learning their trade under 
the watchful eyes of regular army engineers. They built wooden, French type, and canvas, 
Russian type, pontoons, were taught how to construct wooden-plank roadways, and they 
learned with repeated practice how to build a pontoon bridge over a river, or in the jargon of 
the engineers, to “throw across the river” a bridge.54 Brainerd found the men enjoyed the 
pontoon drill because it “was interesting,” and in writing to the editor of the Roman Citizen on 
January 17, 1862 he explained, “You must know that there is considerable science displayed in 
the construction of this bridge, as simple as it may appear when reduced to military order and 
precision.”55 In building the bridge each company formed squads, and each squad had its own 
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duty to perform. The cablemen board the first boat, “and pay out the cable; the balkmen march 
forward with the balks, place one end on the boat; the lashers lash them, and the boat is shoved 
off the length of the balk, when the other end is fastened; on come the chessmen with the 
flooring; the boatmen pass back and take another boat…” and the process was repeated. 
Brainerd concluded, “More boats, more balks, more chess, and more side rails, and so the 
bridge seems to push itself out like a huge telescope, and before we are hardly aware of it is 
across the stream.”56 
Officers recited from Mahan’s treatise on fortifications and learned how to give the 
proper combat commands to the regiment when the engineers need to fight as infantry.  Finally, 
the engineers practiced the art of making fascines and gabions for siege operations.57 For the 
remaining months of 1861 the New York men trained hard in anticipation for General 
McClellan’s great campaign expected to commence in the early spring 1862. Many members of 
Congress demanded action. In late December 1861 when Barnard asked for an additional 
$150,000 to complete the fortifications surrounding the capital several politicians rebuked him. 
Senator Preston King said, “I would not expend an additional cent on the fortifications of 
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Washington. In my opinion, the best defense for Washington is the destruction of our enemies 
where they can be found—at a distance from Washington.”58 
Missouri and Kentucky were a distance from Washington and the enemy was in both 
places. As the country unraveled right before his eyes, Lincoln understood that any military 
effort to defeat the Confederacy was not possible unless Missouri and Kentucky remained in the 
Union. His strategic thinking, with tutoring from Scott, McClellan, and books he borrowed from 
the Library of Congress, was at an embryonic stage in the fall of 1861, yet he recognized four 
important objectives: 1. Concentrate troops from Ohio and Kentucky for a movement on East 
Tennessee (a pro-Union area). 2. Consider simultaneous advances on the South making it 
difficult for the Confederacy to defend two places at once. 3. Seek to operate from areas where 
men and supplies could be moved quickly to an extended battlefront and prevent the 
Confederacy from doing the same. 4. Pacify Missouri.59 To move the distances Lincoln’s general 
strategy proposed, and with which, in theory, generals Scott and McClellan concurred, would 
require railroad and water transportation, and therefore, would require engineers to build 
bridges, repair roads, tracks, rolling stock, and engines. McClellan had adopted the regular 
army’s four engineer companies and converted two volunteer infantry regiments into volunteer 
engineering regiments. For the armies in the West the engineer soldiers would all be volunteers, 
as would many of their officers, and when these men were not enough to complete the tasks 
assigned them, infantry regiments would be drafted for the work and formed into detached 
companies known as pioneers.   
                                                             
58 Benjamin F. Cooling, Symbol, Sword, and Shield: Defending Washington During the Civil War 
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975), 79-80. See also U. S. Congress, Congressional Globe, 37th 
Congress, 2nd sess., 13 January 1862, 286. 
59 Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 56-57. 
 153 
To strike at the Confederate heartland west of the Appalachian Mountains required the 
consideration of four possible routes of invasion. Three of these approaches, the Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers provided the North with lengthy supply lines protected from 
partisan raiders and cavalry. The fourth potential access point was along the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad, where in Nashville another line connected to Chattanooga, and from there 
the army could advance northeast toward Virginia, southwest into Alabama, and 
south/southeast into Georgia.60 
To prevent the Yankees from punching through the South’s imaginary defensive line, 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis assigned the task to General Albert Sidney Johnston. 
Johnston was the quintessential soldier—handsome, brave, intelligent, and experienced. He had 
served in the Black Hawk War, the war for Texan independence, and led the Utah invasion 
against the Mormons.61 He was the highest-ranking officer in the United States Army to resign 
his commission and join the Confederacy. He became the second ranked full general in the new 
southern army.62  
Johnston’s strategic defensive line included building forts along the major rivers—at 
Columbus, Kentucky on the Mississippi 175 miles south of St. Louis, Ft. Henry on the Tennessee, 
and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. Finally, the general placed Brigadier General Simon 
Bolivar Buckner and approximately 25,000 men at Bowling Green where the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad met the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.  Johnston’s plan to cover the entire 
Kentucky and Tennessee border with an undersized army was textbook Jomini. Johnston 
operated on interior lines of supply and communication, which meant that from Bowling Green 
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he could quickly shift resources and manpower along the Memphis and Ohio to Forts Henry and 
Donelson, and using two additional lines he could send men and material to Columbus. All the 
critical points that blocked an invasion force were linked with each other by the railroads over a 
distance of 163 miles.63   
Missouri was not among the four fingers the North could use to reach into the center of 
the Confederacy, yet it was crucial the state remained in the Federal government’s hands. The 
Union controlled the Missouri River and the important railway hub of St. Louis. The lines 
extended west, east, and southwest. In the spring of 1861, however, Missouri Governor 
Claiborne Jackson offered assistance to the newly formed Davis government, as Confederate 
soldiers pressed along the Arkansas and Missouri border and occupied most of the southeastern 
portion of “The Show Me State.” Francis Preston Blair, Jr., brother of Lincoln cabinet member 
Montgomery Blair, worked closely with Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon to maintain control of 
St. Louis and stall for time as Blair asked Washington for help. Help arrived in the presence of 
John C. Frémont, the new military leader of the Department of the West.64 
Frémont had no engineer troops to repair railroad tracks, cut new roads, or build 
fortifications. In July, Colonel Josiah Wolcott Bissell proposed to Frémont the establishment of 
an engineering regiment with men, “either mechanics, artisans, or persons accustomed to work 
as laborers under mechanics,” recruited from Missouri, Iowa, and Illinois. Before the war Bissell 
was employed as an engineer working on several projects designed to improve roadways in the 
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West.65  He suggested to Frémont that to induce men to join the engineers the men should be 
promised regular army soldiers’ pay and for mechanics forty cents and laborers twenty-five 
cents extra per day. The general agreed. This decision on Frémont’s part was one of several that 
would get him in trouble with the War Department. A considerable amount of money passed 
through the Western Department’s hands, and Washington called into question the 
department’s expenses including pay and contracts. In 1861 the three New York volunteer 
engineer regiments were paid as infantry so naturally the army questioned Frémont’s motives.  
The general, like McClellan in the East, did have extraordinary respect for and 
appreciation of the work of engineers. As a member of the Corps of Topographical Engineers he 
had spent seven years (1838 to 1845) exploring and mapping the Rockies and California. It was 
during this time that he gained national prominence for his great adventures and was 
affectionately called “The Pathfinder.” His chief-of-staff in 1861 was an engineer—Alexander 
Asboth.66 General Frémont also understood the complex military situation he faced in the 
summer of 1861. St. Louis was threatened from the south and west by secessionists. Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Unorganized Territory (present day Oklahoma), and Arkansas all bordered Missouri. 
St. Louis enjoyed railroad connections with Jefferson City and St. Joseph, located in the 
northwest corner of the state, but those lines dead-ended and supplies coming from Kansas 
could arrive only by wagon trains. A direct line connected St. Louis to Cincinnati, but moving 
                                                             
65 W. A. Neal, An Illustrated History of the Missouri Engineer and the 25th Infantry Regiments 
(Chicago: Donhue and Henneberry, 1889), 9. Neal suggested that Bissell was colonel of the 10th 
Missouri Volunteer Infantry before he approached Frémont regarding an engineering regiment, 
yet there is no corroborating evidence. The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United 
States (MOLLUS), Missouri Commandery listed Bissell as only belonging to the volunteer 
engineers, not the infantry. See “Index to the Officers of Missouri Volunteers and Missouri State 
Militia,” home.usmo.com/~momollus/MOofficersB1.htm (accessed March 1, 2013). 
66 Stephen Beszedits, “Hungarians with General John C. Frémont in the American Civil War,” 
http://www.skszeged.hu/statikus_html/vasvary/newsletter/03dec/beszedits.html (accessed 
March 1, 2013). 
 156 
through lower Illinois might be problematic considering many pro-slavery sympathizers 
occupied the southern region of Lincoln’s home state.  Men who could build roads, construct 
fortifications, and repair bridges were essential to maintain the flow of men and material into St. 
Louis, and provide “the Pathfinder” with the resources needed to hold onto Missouri.  
Bissell’s Engineers or the Engineer Regiment of the West was composed of ten 
companies with only three companies, “A,” “D,” and “G” from St. Louis or Cape Girardeau 
County, Missouri. Three were from central Illinois, three from Iowa, and one from Michigan. By 
August, several companies made up of iron molders, railroad engineers, mechanics, and 
laborers were scattered principally in East St. Louis working on fortifications there or 115 miles 
south at Cape Girardeau along the Mississippi, building another fort to protect St. Louis from a 
land or water invasion by the Confederacy.67 While the engineers were busy with their duties of 
cutting trees, building saw mills, leveling decrepit roads, and moving dirt, their commanding 
general was indecisive, which expanded and intensified the workload of Bissell’s men, and 
eventually led to “the Pathfinder’s” dismissal. 
Historian T. Harry Williams described Frémont as a boy doing a man’s job. “His every 
action was dramatic…” and “soon he imagined himself surrounded on all sides by dangers and 
difficulties…Frémont was a sincere and attractive person, but a giddy and fumbling general.”68 
For the entire summer the general took no action to drive Rebels in southern Missouri out of the 
state. Unhappy with this inaction Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon took matters into his own 
hands and attacked Confederates at Wilson’s Creek on August 10, 1861. A fierce battle ensued 
that cost General Lyon his life along with 223 Federals soldiers and 257 Confederates. Facing 
                                                             
67 Neal, 9-15. 
68 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals in Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary 
(New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959), 314-315. 
 157 
overwhelming numbers, the Yankees withdrew to Rolla where the southwest branch of the 
Pacific Railroad ended.  
Orders now directed the Engineer Regiment of the West to operate at a frenetic pace. 
Company B recorded that they “had been engaged very nearly the whole time for the past two 
months [September and October] in working upon fortifications at this post [Cape Girardeau].69 
The engineers mounted guns, built blockhouses, welded iron in order to rim wheels, and keep 
the railroads operating. Bissell wrote, “The regiment had just completed a railroad bridge across 
La Mine River opening the Pacific Railroad to Sedalia…. A detachment of two companies was at 
Jefferson City for ten days, building extra track and extra storehouses for facilitating military 
operations.”70 For the remainder of the year the men of Bissell’s Engineers helped prepare for a 
Confederate attack led by General Sterling Price, but none came. The forts were built and the 
railroads operated bringing supplies and manpower to Missouri. In December 1861 Missouri 
was in Union control and the engineers had received hands-on training, which prepared them 
well for the campaigns and demands to come.71 
Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union in 1861 was also under siege, and if a relatively strong 
cord held Missouri, a gossamer thread held Kentucky. On September 3rd Confederate Brigadier 
General Gideon J. Pillow seized Columbus and violated the state’s neutrality. U. S. Grant 
responded by occupying Paducah. Both sides now began to recruit volunteers, and General 
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Johnston established his extensive, and thin, defensive line in an attempt to prevent Northern 
incursions into Tennessee.  The eastern portion of the Confederate line was anchored at 
Bowling Green but Major General George B. Crittenden with his 4,000 men from the Military 
District of East Tennessee was ordered to guard the Cumberland Gap, the entrance into pro-
Union east Tennessee.  
Three major transportation hubs ran almost due east of Bowling Green—Glasgow, 
Columbia, and Somerset, Kentucky. A road network at the latter connected the town to 
Lexington to the north, London to the east, Columbia to the west, and the Cumberland Gap to 
the south. London also connected with Lexington to the northwest and the Cumberland Gap to 
the south. Lexington was tied to the state capital at Frankfort, to Louisville and to Cincinnati. A 
supply line central to any Union operation in eastern Tennessee was only made possible by 
control of Somerset and London.  
With rumors flying of impending doom, panic settled into Union controlled Kentucky. 
Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter fame, now promoted to brigadier general and commander of 
the Department of the Cumberland headquartered in Louisville, wrote desperately on 
September 19th to an independent battalion of riflemen in Cincinnati, to come quick because, 
“Kentucky has no armed men whose services I can command.”72  Anderson believed he was in 
great peril from Confederate forces prepared to strike Louisville, Frankfort, and Lexington, and 
lay waste to the area around the Cumberland Gap. A calculated assessment of the situation was 
quickly needed to determine how a limited number of men should be deployed to do three 
things: First, halt any Confederate attempt to capture three critical Union supply depots: Next, 
Federal forces needed to prevent the enemy from establishing a base of operations for a 
movement into Ohio; finally, to maintain some initiative by occupying areas closer to the 
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Cumberland Gap which might support a movement into eastern Tennessee and pose a threat 
from the east to Confederate occupied Bowling Green. It was a tall order so the War 
Department sent an engineer. 
On the day Anderson sent his message to Cincinnati, the War Department assigned 
Brigadier General Ormsby M. Mitchell to command the Department of the Ohio. Mitchell, an 
1825 graduate of West Point, had already enjoyed a remarkable career before being called 
upon, once again, to render service to his country. Notwithstanding his time as an infantry 
officer, he was assistant professor of mathematics at West Point and later became assistant 
professor of mathematics and philosophy, and professor of astronomy at Cincinnati College. As 
a civil engineer before the war he worked on the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, and he raised 
the money to build an observatory that held the second largest refracting telescope in the 
world.73  
Mitchell’s keen-witted grasp of the situation was just the tonic needed to bring pro-
Union forces to action. Within six days of his arrival he wrote to the assistant adjutant-general of 
the army, “I deem the immediate occupancy of Kentucky as a matter of the greatest importance 
and the fall of Louisville as a disaster the consequences of which cannot be overestimated.”74 He 
immediately sent the few regiments he had to secure lines of communication by rail to Louisville 
and Cincinnati. Some were hurried to Lexington and Frankfort, and others were used to begin 
building fortifications around Cincinnati. Once secure, Mitchell operated toward the 
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Cumberland Gap, threaten Nashville, and “commence active and immediate operations to drive 
Zollicoffer and Breckinridge out of the State or to capture them.”75  
As Kentucky volunteers poured into the camps, one outfit was Captain William F. 
Patterson’s company of engineer soldiers. Known as Patterson’s Independent Company of 
Volunteer Kentucky Engineers, this unit might well have been folded into a volunteer infantry 
regiment, where men were needed, without   the intervention of Mitchell. The general 
understood the critical role communication links would play when the army went on the 
offensive. Engineer troops would be necessary to repair roads and build defenses around 
potential advance supply depots. The army had to build these depots if they had any thoughts of 
moving through the Cumberland Gap and occupying eastern Tennessee. Most likely Patterson’s 
engineers trained at Camp Dick Robinson seven miles north of Lancaster and astride the 
Wilderness Turnpike sixty-five miles north of the Cumberland Gap.76  
In October, southern forces occupied Barbourville, a town sitting on the Wilderness 
Turnpike just ten miles from the gap. Lincoln was concerned that with the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad south of the gap, open to Confederate operations as a vital supply line, 
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Kentucky remained vulnerable to Rebel attacks from the southeastern part of Kentucky. Lincoln 
and Mitchell both wanted Zollicoffer driven from Barbourville and eventually from the state. In 
November, Union forces were successful in pushing the Confederates away from the turnpike, 
west, toward Somerset, where Patterson’s men were ordered to build defenses at Camp 
Hoskins and Somerset in preparation for another Union strike at Zollicoffer. Patterson’s 
engineers would remain at Somerset for the remainder of the year. 
Meanwhile, Mitchell had secured the services of another engineer to plan the defenses 
of Cincinnati. Colonel Charles Whittlesey, born in Southington, Connecticut, was common school 
educated until attending, and graduating from, West Point in 1831. He was a lawyer, geologist, 
and archeologist in Cleveland, Ohio, when he joined the Union Army. Before the war he had 
done widespread surveying and mapping of the copper mines of northern Michigan, and he had 
begun geological researched in Ohio.  Now in Cincinnati, he began his army work.  
If Kentucky’s start to the Civil War in 1861 appeared confusing, disorganized, and 
inchoate, and many of its leaders appeared nonplussed (Mitchell and Thomas were welcome 
exceptions), other states also experienced muddled situations that autumn. This was certainly 
true in Michigan where men rushed to the recruiting stations to sign on as volunteers to teach 
the secessionists a hard lesson. The chaotic nature of northern mobilization was exacerbated 
when it came to recruiting volunteer engineers. By January 1, 1862 Michigan’s governor had 
sanctioned, and the U. S. War Department mustered into service, a unit that could claim great 
notoriety by the end of the war—the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics. Yet the five 
month journey the engineers experienced—from the first recruitment announcement to the 
first assignment—was another example of how difficult a task it was to build the Union Army, 
and how equally fortunate the army was in choosing to form volunteer engineer companies and 
regiments. 
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In the summer of 1861 James W. Wilson of Chicago began recruiting a regiment of 
engineers, and because the state of Michigan had organized more infantry companies than the 
War Department authorized, men of mechanical ability joined Wilson’s regiment. By September 
companies for the Chicago regiment were being raised in Ionia, Marshall, Albion, and Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. In addition, Edwin P. Howland of Battle Creek had organized a company of 
engineers called the Battle Creek Corps who proceeded to St. Louis, Missouri, and were 
mustered into the army October 9, 1861.77  
Two men recruiting the Grand Rapids company, one a surveyor and one a master 
carpenter, met in mid-September with others to decide if it “would not be better to raise an 
entire engineer regiment within the state….”78 They agreed to ask a prominent civil engineer, 
William Power Innes, to organize and expand the efforts and as a result become the regiment’s 
colonel. He agreed.  
 Innes sent telegrams to Secretary of War Cameron asking permission to form the 
regiment, and to Michigan Governor Austin Blair requesting that he send an endorsement to 
Cameron. Austin told Cameron that Innes was the general superintendent of the Grand Rapids 
Railroad, and this probably sealed the deal. Cameron, before the war, was involved in creating 
the Northern Central Railroad in Pennsylvania, and his assistant secretary, Thomas Scott, was 
vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, at the time the largest corporation in the world.79 
In fact, Innes was not the superintendent of the Grand Rapids Railroad, but he did have 
a wealth of experience in the railroad business, not all of it, however, celebratory.  His 
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engineering skills were learned as a laborer on the Erie Railroad and as a civil engineer for the 
Oakland and Ottawa Railroad, and he was responsible for a line running from Ada to Lake 
Michigan completed in 1858. During this time he also served as chief engineer for the 
“prospective Grand Rapids and Northern Railroad Company.”80 Finally, the ambitious engineer 
had contracted the Amboy, Lansing, and Traverse Bay Railroad to build a line from Owossa to 
Lansing.  
As Innes surveyed the road, he discovered that a massive sinkhole blocked the route. To 
address the problem he convinced the owners of the company to sink considerable capital into 
the effort to span the obstacle, but the project was suspended in 1860 and instead, Innes built a 
wagon road to carry passengers from the track that did operate the remaining few miles to 
Lansing.81 The company was furious with Innes for the money wasted trying to cross the 
sinkhole, and he was fired. 
Controversy aside, Innes had considerable engineering skills, as did the officers and men 
under him. Of his three senior officers, two were originally from New England and one from 
New York. One was a master mechanic, one a manufacturer, and one a railroad engineer. His 
company officers included civil engineers, carpenters, surveyors, a millwright, a joiner, and two 
farmers.82  In Mark Hoffman’s “My Brave Mechanics”: The First Michigan Engineers and Their 
Civil War, the author provided a superb statistical summary of the regiment. In 1861, fifty-eight 
percent of the recruits were originally from New England or New York while approximately 
twenty percent were from Michigan and fifteen percent were foreign born. Fifty-two percent of 
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men enrolled in the regiment were mechanics or artisans, and about thirty-five percent were 
either farmers or laborers.83  
During the fall of 1861, the officers of the First Michigan continued to recruit soldiers to 
fill out company rosters, and the men continued their training as engineer soldiers. By 
Christmas, General Halleck told the Battle Creek Engineers in St. Louis that they did not conform 
to Federal standards and, therefore, the men voted to disband, and an undersized unit calling 
itself Chadwick’s Engineers from Marshall, Michigan also disbanded. All that remained was the 
First Michigan, and finally the regiment received its first assignment. Kentucky was regarded as 
the state where the Union Army in the West would launch its early 1862 offensive. So the 
Michigan men, anxious to begin their work, were sent to the Blue Grass State and deployed to 
several locations including to join Brigadier General George H. Thomas’s division in Somerset.  
As the Union Army groped it’s way through the fall and early winter of 1861-1862, it 
sought a plan to drive Confederate forces out of Kentucky and begin offensives against 
Tennessee and Virginia. The nascent Confederate Army was also trying to build a defense 
perimeter along the border of northern Virginia and the state’s coastline, and out west from 
Columbus, Kentucky to the Cumberland Gap. Similar to commanders in the North, southern 
commanders were in urgent need of skilled engineers, so the government in Richmond along 
with the governor of Tennessee and General Johnston could begin to construct permanent 
fortifications. Unfortunately, the pre-war shortage of southern trained engineers combined with 
the few West Point engineers who resigned their commissions to join the Confederacy were not 
enough to meet the southern need.  For example, in November 1861 the Secretary of War 
wrote General Joseph E. Johnston requesting an engineer be sent to General Thomas J. 
(Stonewall) Jackson in western Virginia. “General Jackson is urging me to send him an engineer, 
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and I have not one at my command. Have you one that you can possibly spare him?” Johnston 
responded the following day, “We have but one engineer officer, who is sick. We require 
more.”84   
The Confederate Congress had confirmed President Jefferson Davis’s first appointments 
to engineer officers on March 16, 1861, and all of them were West Pointers. No orders or 
accommodations were made for engineer troops. Furthermore, these initial appointments 
included only two majors and five captains leaving the role of chief engineer (a colonelcy) 
vacant.85  There was also no Engineer Department established. Major Josiah Gorgas, the chief of 
the Confederate Ordnance Bureau served as “Acting Chief Engineer.”86  
Gorgas found managing two major responsibilities very trying. Demands for engineers 
came from Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, and armies in the field. On April 19, 1861 North 
Carolina Governor J. W. Ellis telegraphed President Davis, “I am greatly in need of an engineer 
and artillery officers.”87 With virtually no assistance from Montgomery, Alabama (the first 
Confederate capital) and eventually Richmond, governors turned to state engineers and local 
civil engineers, many of whom were incompetent. Gorgas complained to the Confederacy’s first 
Secretary of War, Leroy P. Walker that he could not effectively perform both jobs.  An engineer 
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officer was needed to command the Engineer Bureau. Major Danville Leadbetter was finally 
ordered to Richmond in August to take control of the bureau as “acting chief.”88   
Immediately after Virginia seceded from the Union in May, the governor, John Letcher, 
did take steps to build a defensive system using state engineers. Andrew Talcott staked out his 
chosen locations for batteries along the James River, Thomas H. Williamson marked defenses for 
Aquia Creek, the terminus for the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, and Alfred L. 
Rives and Richard K. Meade designed a defensive line on the peninsula southeast of Richmond. 
Simultaneously, Talcott began to map out and construct the defenses of Richmond.89 The city 
council’s “Committee on Defense” was responsible for providing the work force, and the 
Provisional Confederate Army was assigned the task of providing engineers to supervise the 
redoubts and entrenchments.  Unfortunately, there were just not enough engineers available to 
manage the construction. An Engineer Department memorandum dated October 28, 1861 listed 
just five officers supervising the defensive works in Richmond while thirty-one others were 
assigned to other projects throughout the state.90 Furthermore, there was a shortage of laborers 
to build the fortifications. 
On July 23rd Governor Letcher asked an officer to discharge a Private George P. Hughes 
from his current duty station so “that he may be employed as overseer on the Richmond 
defenses.”91 The following day engineers requested two balls and chains “for the benefit of 
runaway negroes,” and the Engineer Department’s “Slave Rolls” for July through October 
indicated the vast majority of men who worked on the Richmond defense to be slaves. Men 
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named Buck Woods, Willie, Jack, Charles, and Bird worked twelve to fourteen hours a day for 
fifty cents.92 (Slaves working on the Richmond fortifications had to pay for their own shoes, 
clothing, and food. The slave’s owner decided if the slave could keep whatever money was left 
over.) There were anywhere between forty to seventy slaves working on the defenses at one 
time. Fewer than ten white laborers worked on the fortifications earning one dollar per day. 
There were usually an equal number of white and black carpenters, the former earning two 
dollars per day and the latter earning one-dollar per day. Slaves who had no shoes were 
provided with a pair and then had $2.50 taken from their pay. Finally, the Engineer Department 
listed six overseers on their rolls each paid forty dollars per month.93  
By December 1861, the Engineer Department appeared more concerned about 
reimbursing owners of slaves “at the rate of 70 cents per diem—50 cents only allowed when 
rations are furnished,” than completing the defenses around the capital. 94 As the war began to 
heat up, Confederate organizers formed infantry regiments, artillery batteries, and cavalry 
battalions, but there were only a small number of engineer officers of skill to work on the 
various fortifications along the coastline, to construct defensives in cities, and to serve in the 
field with the army.  There were no pontoon trains being built and no engineering companies 
formed.  Moving dirt was to be the job of African American slaves. In the antebellum South, as 
we have seen, education was reserved for the elite of society, and those men with technical 
knowledge educated as engineers, especially at West Point, were considered even more 
                                                             
92 Pay Roll of sundry persons employed by the Commonwealth of Virginia for Coast, Harbor, and 
River defenses, and on the defensive works at Richmond, Index to Material Book of Engineer 
Department of Virginia 1861, The Library of Virginia, Richmond (hereafter cited as Pay Roll, The 
Library of Virginia). Engineer Department, Slave Rolls, July, August, September 1861 for 
Richmond, accession number 36887, folder 9, box 8, The Library of Virginia, Richmond 
(hereafter cited as Slave Rolls, The Library of Virginia). 
93 Pay Roll, The Library of Virginia and Slave Rolls, The Library of Virginia.    
94 Letters Received and Sent, The Library of Virginia, number 387.  
 168 
uniquely educated than most. The paradox here was that most of society’s wealthy made their 
fortune from the land, and watched carefully that engineering and manufacturing did not 
interfere with the enormous wealth generated by plantation farming.  Engineers were valued, 
yet there was limited incentive to become one.   In Robert E. L. Krick’s book Staff Officers in 
Gray: A Biographical Register of the Staff Officers in the Army of Northern Virginia, the author 
pointed out that of the 1,149 men that served as staff officers under Joseph E. Johnston and 
Robert E. Lee (both West Point trained engineers) only eighty-seven were engineers before the 
war. Of those eighty-seven men, three were machinists, three were ironworkers, and four were 
carpenters.95 
Out West in 1861 Confederate engineering operations were as problematic as they were 
in the East. General Albert Sidney Johnston’s Army of Tennessee was not just establishing a 
defensive line to prevent Federal forces from invading the South west of the Appalachian 
Mountains, but the army was also protecting the Confederacy’s largest producer of pig iron, and 
bar, sheet, and railroad iron in the region.96 There were more than seventy-five furnaces and 
forges between the “fifty-mile-wide belt” of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, where 
several hundred white laborers and thousands of slaves manned the operations.97 Yet, 
interference from the Tennessee governor, poor engineering decisions, and a lack of interest in 
white laborers to build defenses would cost the Confederacy the entire region, and help make 
the first northern hero of the war, Ulysses S. Grant. His reputation established, he would go on 
to defeat Confederate armies both in the West and East, and in doing so would put his own 
engineers and manpower to brilliant use. 
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The governor of Tennessee, Isham Harris, was both a remarkable help and hindrance to 
the Confederacy in the summer and fall of 1861. The governor worked endlessly and with 
considerable success to raise a fighting force, which boasted of twenty-four infantry regiments, 
ten artillery batteries, and Engineer Corps, Quartermaster and Ordnance departments, and an 
Ordnance Bureau.98  He turned all of this over to the Confederacy and General Johnston. Like 
many politicians especially in the South, Harris also believed in his unfeigned ability to 
understand and execute military strategy, and it was this characteristic of his that unlocked the 
monster within. Alexis de Tocqueville said of southerners, “The citizen of the Southern states 
becomes a sort of domestic dictator from infancy; the first notion he acquires in life is that he 
was born to command, and the first habit he contracts is that of ruling without resistance.”99  
Harris believed in his ability to command, and he believed his efforts in recruiting 
soldiers earned him that right. Placing great trust in General Gideon Pillow’s assessment that 
because of Kentucky neutrality, Union forces would strike south from western Tennessee, Harris 
concentrated forces along the Mississippi at forts under construction, leaving middle and 
eastern Tennessee vulnerable, and defenses along the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers 
neglected. This was a serious blunder.100 
In the spring, before Tennessee adopted its Ordinance of Secession, Harris had 
requested two civil engineers, Adna Anderson and Wilbur R. Foster, to identify sites for 
fortifications along the rivers. Anderson had served as an engineer for railroads in Connecticut, 
and New Hampshire, was chief engineer of the Tennessee & Alabama, and superintendent of 
the Edgefield & Kentucky. Eventually, when the State of Tennessee voted to approve secession 
on June 8, 1861, Anderson offered his services to the Federal government and would soon 
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become assistant engineer and chief of the Military Railroad Bureau’s construction corps in 
Virginia. He would serve the United States government with distinction throughout the war. 
Foster would go on to serve in the Confederacy’s corps of engineers.  
So when working for the state of Tennessee before secession, Anderson selected a site 
on a steep hillside near the town of Dover. The fort, protected by deep gullies, was started 
immediately with earthworks dug by slaves from the Cumberland Rolling Mills. Foster wrote 
that after a “careful examination and study of all the topographical details, the first, or water 
battery at Fort Donelson was located by Mr. Anderson.”101Anderson and his party then crossed 
the river, and moving west, paid studious attention to the flatlands between the Cumberland 
and Tennessee. Accessing the high-water mark along the flood plain was crucial to identifying 
the most feasible location for the second fort.102  
Anderson selected a site “shortly below the mouth of Standing Stone [Rock] Creek and 
nearly opposite the mouth of the Sandy [river].”103 The engineer lacked a labor force so he 
returned to Nashville and presented his recommendations to Governor Harris. As it turned out it 
was an excellent location for a fort, but perhaps the governor started to question Anderson’s 
loyalty. Harris wanted a second opinion so he sent a West Pointer (class of 1825 who resigned 
his commission in 1826) Brigadier General Daniel S. Donelson, to investigate the situation and 
report back to the governor. Donelson’s qualifications for this mission included several years in 
the state legislature, running a large plantation, and serving as brigadier general in the state 
militia. A comedy of errors ensued. Donelson disliked Anderson’s choice and instead found an 
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alternative site—Kirkman’s Old Landing, twelve miles due west of the fort being built at Dover. A 
third site also attracted Donelson’s attention across the river at Pine Bluff, Kentucky.104  
The final position for what was to become Fort Henry was determined in June 1861 
when Colonel Bushrod Rust Johnson, a recently commissioned Confederate engineer, confirmed 
that Donelson’s site at Kirkman’s Old Landing was the spot to construct the fort. Johnson was a 
1840 graduate of West Point, had served in the army during the Seminole War and in the 
Mexican War as an infantry officer before he was dismissed on charges that he was operating an 
illegal contraband business through the commissary department. He then taught at the Western 
Military Institute in Kentucky as a chemistry professor, and when it merged with the University 
of Nashville, he became the superintendent of the school as well as a professor of civil 
engineering. There was no evidence suggesting he had any practical civil engineering 
experience. Whether or not he had engineering experience, Johnson selected a bad location to 
build a fort. 
There were several problems. First, because of Kentucky’s neutrality the fort was built 
on the east bank of the Tennessee River. This meant that the fort was vulnerable to attack from 
the north and west bank of the river. Furthermore, construction was in its early stages when 
bishop turned Confederate Major General Leonidas Polk, moved into Columbus, Kentucky, 
violating the state’s neutrality. If Confederate strategists had paid close attention and had 
understood the basic topography, the fort could have been shifted to the west bank or Kentucky 
side of the river. This would mean the river would block land forces coming from the east. 
Next, a range of hills sat on the west bank, which would allow enemy guns to command 
the fort’s parapet. In addition, the guns of the fort all faced downstream.  Johnson reported that 
Fort Henry comprised a “good, inclosed [sic] work, with Bastion fronts, mounting six 32-
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pounders and two 12-pounders.”105 Once Federal gunboats ran under the guns, the fort was 
helpless.106Colonel Adolphus Heiman of the 10th Tennessee Infantry, who was to garrison the 
fort, sounded the alarm about the problems at Fort Henry. Attached to his garrison troops was 
Captain Jesse Taylor’s Company H, Fixed Artillery from the state artillery corps. Taylor 
discovered the final and most disturbing fact about the fort.107 
He discovered that in the ordinary February rise of the Tennessee River “the highest 
point in the fort would be under two feet of water and the lower river batteries nine feet of 
water.”108 Taylor expressed his concerns up the chain of command, which at the time was 
confusing. General Johnston, in overall command, asked his staff engineer, Lieutenant Joseph 
Dixon to report on the progress of the two forts. The construction was moving at a snail’s pace 
because there were not enough laborers to complete the defenses along the river. “None of the 
slave owners wished to lose harvests by renting slaves to the government…and an additional 
2,000 were required for the twin river forts.”109 
Dixon reported that neither fort was in an ideal location, but the work should continue. 
Heimen, in the meantime wrote to state provisional army engineer, Lieutenant F. R. R. Smith. 
Smith suggested obstructing the navigable streams and the two rivers with cable chains and 
anchors, which Heiman considered useless. He wrote regarding the obstructions, “This will be a 
fruitless operation in a river which rises from low-water mark at least 57 feet, and which I myself 
have often known to rise at least 10 feet in 24 hours.”110 Polk, the district commander, paid little 
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attention to Heiman’s complaints. The bishop was focused on his defenses at Columbus so he 
wrote Heiman a dismissive note, “Your report of dispositions for defense of Forts Donelson and 
Henry are satisfactory and I hope you will not relax your vigilance.”111 
On October 17th Johnston told Polk to “hasten the armament of the works at Fort 
Donelson and the obstructions below the place at which a post was intended.”112 Coinciding 
with the order came the arrival of Major Jeremy Gilmer, a former engineer in the United States 
Army, who was now responsible for the twin forts, superseding Dixon as chief engineer, and for 
establishing a second line of defense on the Cumberland River near Clarksville. Gilmer 
specialized in map making, surveying, and constructing fortifications including a fort in San 
Francisco, California.  
Inspecting the twin forts with Dixon, Gilmer made five critical decisions. First, he agreed 
with Senator Gustavus Henry (the fort’s namesake) that with Heiman’s garrison at Fort Henry, it 
was “in fine condition for defense.” 113 Next Gilmer agreed with Dixon that Fort Donelson would 
have been better located at Lineport, fifteen miles north, but ““as the works at Fort Donelson 
were “partly built”…he advised Dixon to complete the position.”114 Third, Gilmer believed the 
guns at Fort Donelson inadequate, and he ordered two naval guns, four additional 32-pounders 
and “two 8-inch Colombiads or long range Parrott guns, all with garrison charges,” to defend 
against Union gunboats.115 Fourth, he planned for river obstructions placed beneath the 
batteries at Fort Donelson. Finally, he moved south to Clarksville where he laid out plans to build 
a second line of defense as General Johnston requested, but whether he wanted to take in 
planter hospitality in Nashville, or he had supreme confidence in his assistants, Gilmer did not 
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personally supervise the construction at the forts so he was unaware that a lack of slave labor,  
“the reluctance of troop commanders to employ their soldiers on such work,” and illness among 
the men already on garrison duty slowed the construction to a crawl.116 
Manpower was a problem at the forts so Johnston asked Polk if he could send 5,000 
from his command at Columbus, but the latter responded that he could not because it would 
weaken his defenses. Johnston, who also had never inspected the twin forts and was operating 
in the dark decided in mid-November to send Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman to supervise the 
construction efforts on the two rivers. Graduating near the bottom of his West Point class of 
1836, Tilghman had entered the dragoons and after resigning from the army he had worked as a 
civil engineer on several railroad developments. Johnston was delighted to have Tilghman on 
board, and the first thing he did was to stop the construction of the timber obstructions Gilmer 
had ordered built under the guns at Fort Donelson. Gilmer was enraged about Tilghman’s 
meddling, and so Gilmer told the local civil engineer in charge of building the obstructions to 
ignore Tilghman’s order, which the civilian engineer did.  
Then on November 20th Gideon Pillow, who had temporarily replaced the injured Polk at 
Columbus, ordered Dixon to move from Fort Donelson to Fort Henry, and supervise the 
construction of a fort on the west bank of the Tennessee River.117 When Gilmer learned this and 
that Alabama slaves and whites “would work together on construction gangs,” he issued a 
formal complaint to Johnston, and Dixon was returned to Donelson.118 When the year finally 
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ended, the forts remained vulnerable and incomplete. Confusion was ubiquitous. The chain of 
command was broken. Johnston, Polk, Pillow, Tilghman, Harris, and Gilmer all worked at cross-
purposes. There were no laborers available to work on building the fortifications because, for 
the most part, slaves were the only southerners who dug and moved dirt. White men joined the 
army to handle a rifle, not a shovel. Finally, the engineers had made several unfortunate 
decisions. 
December 31, 1861 marked the final day of the war’s first year. Since April two battles 
had been fought, one at Manassas Junction, Virginia and the other at Wilson’s Creek, Missouri. 
Considering what was about to come, the death toll at both battles was low. Nonetheless, wives 
had lost their husbands, children their fathers, parents their sons. Now, the new year would 
bring unmerciful suffering as the fighting, killing, and dying started in earnest. Both armies had 
spent the fall and early winter of 1861 preparing, mustering, training, and organizing the men 
who would fight the war. The engineers, North and South, had played a supporting role in each 
side’s mobilization efforts. Their limited activities did demonstrate a difference in how Union 
and Confederate leaders anticipated the use and need for engineers, and these early months 
revealed how the combatants would build an army that reflected different cultures and 
emphasis. 
In the North the army had formed an Engineer Battalion, four volunteer engineer 
regiments, and two volunteer engineer companies.119 These engineer officers and troops had 
started building pontoon trains, they had worked at making repairs to railroads and bridges, and 
they built fortification, some as small as in Somerset, Kentucky, and some large as the 
                                                             
119 Other engineer units were formed and served anywhere from three to thirteen months. 
These were the following: Chadwick’s Engineers (August-October, 1861); Howland’s Battle Creek 
Engineers (October-December, 1861); Wolster’s Independent Company of Sappers and Miners 
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Gerster’s Independent Company of Pioneers (August 1861-September 1862). 
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fortifications, which encircled Washington, DC. The officers of the volunteer regiments and 
companies were not West Pointers. These men were civil engineers, mechanics, railroad 
builders, and surveyors. The troops they led were made up of men from a variety of trades—
mechanics, boat builders, carpenters, millwrights, masons, and farmers. Some were unskilled 
laborers, but none were averse to working with their hands, getting dirty, digging holes, and 
hauling equipment. 
The Confederate Army had also organized an Engineer Bureau and a Corps of Engineers, 
although President Davis had yet to assign a permanent head to the department. The president 
required that all the officers be from West Point, but states enlisted the service of their own 
civilian engineers to help build coastal fortifications. There were no engineer troops. The labor 
being used to construct the fortification along the Virginia coast, at Richmond, Columbus, 
Kentucky, Forts Henry and Donelson, and along the Mississippi was predominantly African 
American slaves. Finally, because a West Point engineer was not available when it was time to 
consider laying out plans to construct forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, a civilian 
was first sent. Adna Anderson was concerned about the flood plain in the region, and he 
reported this to the governor. The governor should have listened to him. Because Anderson was 
not a West Pointer, however, Major Bushrod Johnson was sent.  He had little engineering 
experience to corroborate Anderson’s work. He sited the fort in the flood plain. 
Now with battles such as Forts Henry and Donelson, Island Number 10, Seven Days, 
Corinth, and Fredericksburg on the horizon and with railroad bridges to build and repair, and 
maps to make, the engineers prepared to march. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Trial and Error 
 
That man Haupt has built a bridge across Potomac Creek, about 400 feet long and nearly 100 
feet high, over which loaded trains are running every hour, and, upon my word, gentlemen, 
there is nothing in it but beanpoles and corn stalks. 
                                                   Abraham Lincoln as told to Herman Haupt, May 1862 
 
Our canal has been a gigantic work…. Six miles, through a great forest of immense trees, 
which had to be sawed off 4 feet under water, and then through cypress swamp thickly 
studded with cypress knees, have furnished us with an amount of labor surpassing any one’s 
belief who has not seen it. We have now a canal 50 feet wide, 4 feet deep, and 6 miles long, 
through which large steamers can pass and all our supplies be delivered to us. 
 
              Major General John Pope, commanding Union forces at New Madrid to Major General 
Henry Halleck, April 2, 1862 
 
 Beginning in 1862 with the Union campaign to capture Island No. 10 and the 
development of the United States Military Railroad, the Federal army used ingenuity and 
innovation to move and supply a massive number of men, horses, and equipment into the 
Confederate heartland. These logistical efforts struck hard at the Confederacy and weakened 
the South’s ability to take advantage of her major strengths—internal lines of communication, 
and a complex geography, which should have made it extremely difficult for Union armies to 
operate inside the Confederacy.  
 It is equally critical to understand the Confederacy’s inability to sustain a strong 
engineering presence during the war, and this also began early in 1862. Fort Henry, Fort 
Donelson, and Island No. 10 guarded the all important Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi 
Rivers and Union army control of these vital arteries into the South. The extraordinary story of 
the site selection and subsequent loss of Fort Henry in February 1862 served as foreshadowing 
of what was, with some exceptions, to come for Confederate engineering operations.  In 
addition, the inability of the Confederate government to nationalize the railroads or even to 
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develop policies to manage and keep them in repair demonstrated a lack of understanding of 
the management effort it would take to win a protracted war.  
The first year of significant fighting began with the Battle of Mill Springs fought in 
southeastern Kentucky on January 19, 1862.120 By Civil War standards, the battle itself was no 
more than a skirmish. Union and Confederate casualties combined were estimated at six 
hundred soldiers, including the death of Confederate general Felix Zollicoffer. The minor Union 
victory, however, had major implications for each side’s strategic objectives, tactical maneuvers, 
and naval operations on the rivers.  These objectives, maneuvers, and operations in turn, would 
be successful only if Northern and Southern engineers could do their jobs with skill and 
imagination. Eighty-four years after Mill Springs, British Field Marshal Archibald Wavell wrote, 
“The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and 
transportation…. It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be 
and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces 
and whether you can maintain them there.”121 
  Mill Springs left the Union Army in control of the Cumberland River to Carthage, 
Tennessee (about sixty miles from Nashville) and on the flank of Southern forces in Bowling 
Green.  As a result of the Union army’s position, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston 
shifted his western line of defense abandoning all of southeastern Kentucky. He anchored his 
right flank at Bowling Green and his left flank at Columbus, Kentucky, with the center of his line 
at Forts Henry and Donelson. Johnston’s ability to “know where he could place his forces and 
whether he could maintain them there,” required four elements: solid intelligence of enemy 
                                                             
120 The battle was also known as Logan’s Cross Roads, Fishing Creek, Somerset, and Beech 
Grove.  
121 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 231-232. 
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movements, maintenance of the railroad so he could move men and supplies quickly to the 
point of the Union attack, strong fortifications, and nerves of steel. His engineers were 
responsible for the forts and railroads. Unfortunately for the Confederacy all four elements 
would fail Johnston, and the warning signs after Mill Springs turned into a tidal wave of defeat 
that swept Southern forces out of Kentucky and away from the vital manufacturing center of 
Nashville, Tennessee. 
 It was true that the lack of intelligence reports from spies and partisans in Paducah 
prevented Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman and his Confederate defenders at Fort Henry from 
catching Grant’s men unawares as they disembarked from their river boats at Bailey’s Ferry on 
the west bank of the Tennessee River approximately three miles north of the fort.  Three days 
before Grant’s attack on Fort Henry, Tilghman and Major Gilmer of the engineers left the fort to 
inspect the defenses of Donelson and only returned to Fort Henry after receiving word from a 
courier that Fort Henry was under attack. Tilghman wrote that upon his arrival, “I soon became 
satisfied that the enemy were really in strong force at Bailey’s Ferry, with every indication of re-
enforcements arriving constantly.”122   
 Tilghman was in trouble. The fort was poorly sited, poorly planned, and poorly made. 
And he knew it.  With this in mind, did he stay and fight buying time so that further preparations 
could be made to strengthen Fort Donelson? Or did he evacuate immediately and march his 
small garrison to Donelson? A third possibility was to move to Clarksville, eighteen miles east of 
Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River and re-enforce this critical supply depot which was also 
the final fort along the Cumberland before Nashville. With Federal gunboats within range of his 
position, he decided to stay and fight. It was an honorable choice … and a bad one. 
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 In his book, Unconditional Surrender: The Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, historian 
Spencer C. Tucker wrote: “The fort covered three acres of ground with a five-sided earthwork 
parapet about eight feet high. Rifle pits extended to the river and along the water and from 
outside of Fort Henry’s perimeter some two miles east toward Dover and Fort Donelson.”123  
When Tilghman arrived in January 1862, one of his responsibilities was to finish building an 
additional fortification directly across the river opposite Fort Henry on the high ground 
overlooking the surrounding area. This was never accomplished. Yet, according to the chief 
engineer of the Western Department, Jeremy Gilmer, his boss was not to blame. When Gilmer 
arrived on January 31st “by the exertions of the commanding general, aided by Lieutenant 
Joseph Dixon, his engineer officer, the main fort…had been put in a good condition for defense, 
and seventeen guns mounted on substantial platforms, twelve of which were so placed as to 
bear well on the river.”124 Furthermore, it was Dixon who had been assigned the task back in 
late November of building the additional fort on the west bank of the river, and he was 
promised that a large force of slaves from Alabama, with the troops to guard them, would arrive 
soon to work. This was not what white soldiers were paid to do. Yet, “by some unforeseen cause 
the negroes were not sent until after the 1st of January last. Much valuable time was lost…. “125 
Gilmer finally reported that on February 1st the new works, Fort Heiman, was only a few days 
away from completion. 
 When Grant and Foote’s attack came on February 6th the fort, contrary to Gilmer’s 
report, was not in good condition. The Federals opened fire at 11:45am and the battle was over 
just two hours later. The upper Tennessee River was lost to the Confederacy for the remainder 
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of the war and Tilghman, Gilmer, Colonel Heiman, and Lieutenant Colonel Milton A. Hayes, 
commander of Fort Henry’s artillery all agreed as to why. “The fault was in its location, not in its 
defenders.”126  
 The predictions made by some engineers in the late autumn of 1861 that a rising river 
would doom the fort were prescient. In fact, as the Tennessee River crested thirty feet above 
normal, Union ironclads, whose cannon elevation was limited, now found they were at eye level 
with the fort, making their fire very accurate. The ships moved in rapidly, floating over the 
mines, which had been anchored to the bottom of the river when it was at a normal level. 
Confederate engineers had not considered adjusting the anchor cables as the river rose.127 
Tilghman made it perfectly clear when he filed his official report of the bombardment of 
Fort Henry that “the wretched military position of Fort Henry and the small force at my disposal 
did not permit me to avail myself of the advantages to be derived from the system of outwork 
built with the hope of being re-enforced…. The entire fort…is enfiladed from three or four points 
on the opposite shore, while three points on the eastern bank completely command them both, 
all at easy cannon range.”128  
 The general made little notice, however, in his reports to Adjutant General Samuel 
Cooper of the rising river water, which threatened to “eat away the earth and mud walls of the 
fort,” although he did declare with hubris that, “The history of military engineering records no 
parallel case,” to match what he had to endure in trying to defend such a poorly sited fort.129  
Colonel Heiman was less bashful. He wrote that additional torpedoes were sunk in the river, but 
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“were rendered utterly useless by the heavy rise of water.”130 In addition a “large force” tried to 
keep the water out of the fort. “The lower magazine had already 2 feet of water in it, and the 
ammunition had been removed to a temporary magazine above ground, which had but very 
little protection, but we had been at work day and night for the last week to cover it with sand 
bags and to protect it by a traverse.”131 
  So with Fort Henry in Federal hands Grant and Foote moved in a combined 
operation to capture Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River.  Donelson was constructed on the 
west bank of the river near the town of Dover on high formidable ground. This citadel was 
strong and had none of Fort Henry’s flaws. It would take a two-day siege to capture the fort and 
most of its garrison opening the Cumberland for a Union advance on the undefended Nashville.  
The fall of Henry and Donelson was a serious blow to the Confederacy. Historian Richard 
D. Goff wrote, “The consequences that followed the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson may well 
have been the greatest single disaster of the war.”132  A. S. Johnston had formed his western 
defensive corridor based on Jomini’s principle of operating forces on internal lines of 
communication. The theory was simple: place your soldiers in geographic locations where men 
and supplies could be quickly moved from one point on the line to another, in order that the 
commanding general may at once concentrate his forces to exploit a weakness in the enemy’s 
line or concentrate forces to withstand an enemy attack. Johnston’s defensive position, from 
Bowling Green to Columbus, was on just such a line linked by three railroads.133 
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 The effective use of the railroads might have allowed Johnston to shift men from one 
point along his defensive line to another, matching Grant’s attacking army in manpower, 
maneuverability, and supply. Unfortunately, the railroad lines were severely taxed, and although 
some men recognized the management challenge in moving men and materials, no one took 
charge of the situation. This only exacerbated the problem. The superintendent of the Louisville 
& Nashville, George B. Fleece, told Johnston’s quartermaster on 2 January 1862 “at every station 
there is a large accumulation of freight, consisting of hogs, corn, flour, &c. The passenger travel 
(civilian) is also large. In addition to all, troops move in great numbers. In a word, the entire road 
is crowded with business to an extent unprecedented in the history of any branch of it.”134 In 
addition, with only ten engines, 120 box cars, and 55 flat cars in operation, this was less than 
half the number needed, Fleece estimated, to cover the entire 225 miles of rail lines. Under 
these circumstances the maximum capacity of the road from Paris to Bowling Green each day 
was twelve freight cars.135  
 Fleece, hoping to do “justice to the army, the stockholders, or myself” proposed he be 
granted permission to establish a new schedule “best adapted for the speedy, safe, and certain 
final accomplishment of all work,” and that he be allowed to requisition engines and rolling 
stock from other roads with the promise that the Confederate government would pay for the 
inconvenience and the use of the “…machinery required.”136  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
south of this footpath, Bottom Road. There was no direct road from Paris to Fort Heiman. All the 
railroads were on five-foot gauges. From Bowling Green running due south was the Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad. From Bowling Green moving southwest was the Memphis, Clarksville & 
Louisville, which actually ended at Paris, Tennessee. This line then became the Memphis & Ohio, 
which connected Memphis, Humboldt, and Johnsonville, Tennessee, to Paris. The Mobile & Ohio 
Railroad, in its northern section, connected General Polk’s army in Columbus, Kentucky, with 
Union City and Humboldt on a north/south axis 
134 O. R. ser. 1, vol. 7, 818-819. 
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 Yet, any attempt to alter train schedules or procure additional engines would require 
voluntary cooperation from the civilian railroad superintendents, the general public, merchants, 
and army commanders. All these groups had different expectations and selfish needs. 
Superintendents were responsible for operating the railroads efficiently and for making money. 
Money in the winter of 1862 was a problem. All railroads were disinclined to take Confederate 
currency because it was difficult to determine the papers’ value. In January the value of the 
currency fell as a result of discounting by Confederate purchasing agents, and consequently, the 
railroads were reluctant to substitute government business for private business. Next, the 
general public expected it would move freely and in a timely fashion along the lines, just as 
merchants expected their freight to be delivered to the place the railroad promised to deliver it, 
and not left rotting on a station platform because the army commandeered the trains. Army 
commanders would also argue over whose re-enforcements and supplies should take 
precedence over what trains.137 
 This situation was a nightmare. All Johnston did, or perhaps all he could do was to write 
Adjutant General Cooper January 8th requesting Cooper send him “a full corps of competent 
Engineers and Machinists” from Captain John S. Butler’s “Railroad Boys” with the 1st Tennessee 
Infantry stationed in Winchester, Virginia.138 Richmond did not answer Johnston’s request, 
which left Johnston no choice but to ask for re-enforcements from all quarters.  Prepared for the 
Union offensive, Polk at Columbus, Tilghman at Fort Henry, and Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow at 
Fort Donelson sent no one to Johnston.  
Robert C. Black, III, in his book The Railroads of the Confederacy, argued the 
Confederate military and government faced a major obstacle in fixing the dismal state of 
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railroad transportation characterized by General Johnston’s dilemma during the winter of 1862.  
How was the government to manage the task of creating a network of transportation links 
essential to moving supplies and men efficiently to counter Federal incursions into the South? 
How could they support Confederate armies in the field, and at the same time allow individual 
railroad companies their “rights” to operate freely, moving private freight and the general public 
along the same lines?   
Black wrote that the Southern attempt to solve this problem was “hesitant, spasmodic, 
and largely ineffective.”139 The Provisional Congress did offer a radical solution: nationalize the 
railroads that ran through Richmond, Nashville, Memphis, and Atlanta.140  The committee 
assigned to investigate railroad transportation continued, “Great delay, inconvenience, and 
expense is caused by the numerous unconnected track, which, if joined by links, short in 
distance, would not only increase the facilities for transportation and the capacity of the roads, 
but would save much time, labor, and expense in transferring troops and freight.”141  
 The committee’s recommendation was both outside the comfort zone of the states’ 
rights Confederacy and it was farsighted.  Two questions remained: First, would the Confederate 
congress and president actually embrace the committee’s idea, as it represented the antithesis 
of the South’s founding principles?  Second, would the Confederacy actually have the men with 
management skills to execute such a plan? Most Southern lines seldom exceeded 200 miles in 
length, which meant that superintendents managed a centralized operation including ticketing 
locations, repair facilities, refueling and water stations, and track maintenance. The chain of 
command was compact with the man at the top able to watch over every facet of the business. 
Now the Provisional Congress (soon to give way to a permanent one) was asking for “proper 
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management” to oversee the increase in the number of trains run each day and to increase the 
speed which they travelled.142  
 To nationalize the railroad required a management team with the ability to establish a 
decentralized chain of command because track and engine repairs, civilian and military 
schedules, and emergency operational adjustments, would be spread over great distances and 
need a structure similar to the one developed by the Pennsylvania Railroad before the war. The 
president, secretary of war, quartermaster, ordnance, medical, and commissary departments, 
along with general officers in the field, would have to accept the central authority of the railroad 
head in order for the system to work. Finally, engineers and laborers would be needed to repair 
engines, build rolling stock, and properly maintain the track. The South had too few of these 
men, except African American slave laborers, before the war to meet the rising demand during 
the war.  
 The railroads did not serve General Johnston well as he attempted to defend, in early 
1862, his extensive western front. More serious still were the disastrous results of the 
evacuation of Nashville. A manufacturing center and supply hub for Johnston’s Confederate 
forces, the city began to move war material south to the interior of the country at the time of 
Fort Henry’s capture. Johnston whose direct contact with Polk’s 17,000 men in Columbus, 
Kentucky, was now broken had abandoned Bowling Green and ordered 15,000 men of Major 
General William Hardee’s command to Fort Donelson, marching the remaining 7,000 men and 
supplies to Nashville.143 If Fort Donelson was captured, Johnston believed he could not 
withstand a Union attack on the Tennessee capital. This was his reason for quietly shifting his 
major supply base from Nashville south. 
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 The governor of Georgia, Joseph E. Brown, understood the importance of keeping 
precious Confederate supplies out of Union hands, and consequently, he loaned a number of 
locomotives and rolling stock from the Western & Atlantic Railroad to the Nashville & 
Chattanooga Railroad.144 Unfortunately the Nashville track “contained no less than 1,200 broken 
rails,” so when Fort Donelson fell on February 16th, Nashville citizens panicked. People pushed 
their neighbors off passenger cars, merchants demanded to load their goods onto freight cars, 
and quartermasters tried to move massive amounts of ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, 
and food from army warehouses to the trains. Wealthy citizens and high- ranking military 
officers demanded to board trains with personal belongings and their slaves. No one saw the 
president of the Nashville & Chattanooga and the person responsible for the military stores in 
the city, Major V. K. Stevenson, during the eight-day evacuation.145  The lack of proper 
management and the failure to plan for the army’s mass departure from Nashville cost the 
Confederacy vital war material that became increasingly difficult to procure or replace.  
 With a dysfunctional railroad system in place that injured Confederate western 
operations early in the war, Texas Congressman Peter W. Gray, introduced a resolution that the 
House Committee on Military Affairs “inquire whether further legislation is necessary to give 
increased efficiency to our interior lines of railroads.”146  Finally, on March 27, 1862, members of 
the committee presented a railroad bill to the House. The bill offered an effective organizational 
scheme to manage Southern railroads. The president would appoint a “military chief of railroad 
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transportation.”147 District superintendents reported to the transportation chief, and these 
district managers had complete control of their own sections. In most ways the House bill was 
modeled on the management systems developed by a number of Northern railroad companies 
before the war. The bill, however, proscribed that everyone involved in military transportation 
be given “military rank and military responsibilities.”148  This was designed to provide gravitas to 
railroad personnel especially when wrangling with civilian operators. The bill was a positive first 
step toward nationalizing the Confederacy’s railroads and addressing critical strategic, tactical, 
and logistic needs of the Southern high command. For some politicians, especially the fireaters, 
placing such control in the hands of the central government was an ideological abomination. 
Their goal was to prevent the bill from becoming law.  They succeeded.149 
 Forthcoming was a storm of obstructions and amendments ultimately drowning the bill 
so by April 21st when the Senate Committee on Military Affairs “reported it without 
amendment” the lack of interest in the bill’s outcome resulted in its death.150 The House struck 
out all the provisions of the original bill and then drafted a measure that required the Secretary 
of War to consult with civilian railroad officials regarding military operations. Yet, even at that 
Augustus R. Wright of Georgia, and Thomas J. Foster, filed a protest: “We believe that this 
act…would be subversive of, and in direct contravention to, the great and fundamental 
principles of State sovereignty….”151 The authors went on to claim that railroad superintendents 
were most cooperative with military officials in moving materials and these same local 
managers were “more conversant with all the minute and complicated details of their 
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roads…than the Executive or his military subordinates could possibly be.”152 The army’s 
experience in defending their western defensive line in the winter of 1862 suggested otherwise.  
 President Jefferson Davis displayed little leadership when it came to the railroads, 
vacillating between the suggestion that Congress provide the capital to construct government 
facilities for re-rolling rails, building locomotives, and leaving everything status quo. In a 
message printed in the Wilmington Journal written just after the fall of Fort Donelson, Davis said 
that Congress could appropriate the money to create government railroad facilities, but it is 
“equally clear, that when the military necessity ceases, the right to make such appropriations no 
longer exists. To exercise this power when it exists, and to confine it within the proper limits, is a 
matter for the just discretion of Congress….”153  
 The legacy of the Kentucky and Tennessee campaigns during the winter of 1862 
revealed the problems to come for the Confederacy over the next three years of war. Few 
soldiers embraced the tedium of staff work that included the careful planning of logistics to 
support armies in the field. The Confederate Congress and the President believed that civilian 
railroad managers would place patriotic duty ahead of company profits, and that the army 
would not have to waste valuable manpower resources operating the railroads. Furthermore, 
even if local railroad agents placed patriotism ahead of profits, most had only managed small 
companies and had no training or experience in operating in a larger system. 
 Finally, the Confederacy lacked competent engineers. Certainly some men in this 
capacity would serve the South well, but efforts such as the shoddy work done at Fort Henry or 
the lack of follow through in Clarksville would persist throughout the war and it would be costly. 
The lack of mechanics, machinists, carpenters, ship builders, and railroad workers in the ranks 
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harmed engineering operations. Southern engineers relied chiefly on slaves to make up their 
labor force, and white soldiers carried with them the Southern cultural attitude that it was 
beneath them to dig ditches.  
 Union engineering efforts and the creation of efficient railroad operations in the 
western theater of operations stood in stark contrast to that of the Confederacy’s difficulties. In 
the aftermath of Forts Henry and Donelson, and Federal control of the Cumberland and 
Tennessee Rivers, Union General Henry Halleck’s western army now set its sights on the 
Mississippi River and one of the Confederacy’s major river blocks, Island No. 10.154 
 At the start of the war Confederate construction began on a series of forts along the 
Mississippi covering approximately twenty-two miles and running from just east of Osceola, 
Arkansas, (Fort Pillow) to Fort Pickering at Memphis.155 Moving north, Brigadier General Gideon 
Pillow had devised an invasion plan to march an army to New Madrid, Missouri, where he would 
continue overland on the old King’s Highway to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, link up with another 
Confederate force and then swiftly attack and capture St. Louis. Events moved quickly. Rumors 
spread that Federal gunboats were arriving at Cairo, Illinois, and Cape Girardeau, and so Pillow 
pressed his commanding officer, Major General Polk, to consider an alternate plan. Polk made 
two decisions.  At Pillow’s urging, Polk would march to Columbus, Kentucky, and fortify the area. 
This had several advantages. First, Columbus perched comfortably above the flood plain of the 
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Bluffs). Also, the forts were built in these locations because Confederate strategic planner, 
General Pillow and Governor Harris believed that as a result of Kentucky neutrality in 1861, the 
Union offensive along the Mississippi would come through southern Missouri.  
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Mississippi. Second, a fort at Columbus could prevent a Northern water invasion into western 
Tennessee. Third, Columbus was on the Memphis & Ohio Railroad. The one problem with the 
Polk/Pillow plan was that Confederate occupation of Columbus violated Kentucky neutrality.156 
 The second decision was to send topographical engineer, Asa Gray, to New Madrid to 
ascertain if the area had merit for establishing a line of defense below Columbus along the 
Mississippi. Gray discovered that just ten miles south of New Madrid, at the base of a “U” bend 
in the river, sat Island No. 10. As the river extended up the left arm of the “U” it bent again left 
“Ω” and then continued south. New Madrid was located at the top of the upside down “U.” Gray 
reported that the island had “no superior, in my judgment, above Memphis.”157  The island was 
the tenth one south of where the Ohio River met the Mississippi, and it was one mile long and 
450 yards wide. It was positioned in the middle of the channel near the borders of Kentucky to 
the northeast, Missouri to the north, and Tennessee to the east.158  The batteries on the island 
and on the eastern Tennessee shore presented a vexing problem for Union gunboats attempting 
to pass. At New Madrid two forts, Thompson west of the city and Bankhead east of it also 
commanded the river. The Mississippi would be also at flood stage in February and March, 
inundating the land due north of the island, and consequently serving as a barrier to prevent 
Union soldiers from placing artillery near the island. The flooded area leaked into bayous and 
swamps.  Four feet of water covered the base of tall trees and decayed stumps with jagged tops. 
The Yankees might consider floating barges through this mess to surround the island, but it was 
not going to happen. 
                                                             
156 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
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 192 
 Island No. 10 was secure. General Polk’s garrison in Columbus, Kentucky, was not. After 
the Confederate evacuation of upper Tennessee, General Halleck saw an opportunity to capture 
all of Polk’s men by cutting off the Bishop’s only escape route. Halleck’s goal then was to occupy 
New Madrid. The man Halleck assigned to lead the operation was forty-year-old Brigadier 
General John Pope. A West Point graduate, class of 1842, Pope had served as a topographical 
engineer in the Regular Army and fought in Mexico.  Hiding his movements from Polk, Pope 
began his operation from Commerce, Missouri, northwest of Cairo and eventually would move 
along the Sikeston Road south to New Madrid. Speed would win the campaign, which meant 
that a wagon train of two hundred teams filled with supplies had to keep pace with the 
advancing army.159 
 Colonel Josiah Bissell and his Missouri engineers were responsible for repairing the 
Sikeston road, and from the onset of the army’s march weather conditions and geographical 
features forced the engineers to work at an incessant pace. The banks of the Mississippi were 
overflowed, and the river spread out on both sides for miles. To make matters worse, the area 
the army moved through was known as the Great Mingo Swamp. Pope wrote, it was “dismal 
and almost impassable….”160 In some places the water was ten feet deep, and it was never less 
than one foot deep. Walking through the swampy backwater was like attempting to pass 
through quicksand. A correspondent with the troops said the men “waded in mud, ate mud, 
slept in it, were surrounded by it.”161  
 The weather was cold and wet, and drizzling rain and snow was the soldier’s constant 
companion. Pope reported, “An old embankment upon which a corduroy road had been built, 
extended part of the way to New Madrid, but the road had not been repaired for years, and was 
                                                             
159 Daniel and Bock, 43. 
160 O. R. ser. 1, vol. VIII, 80. The swamp was approximately thirty miles wide. 
161 Daniel and Bock, 43. See Cincinnati Commercial, March 10 and March 17, 1862.  
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in a very bad condition, and in many places entirely impassable.”162 Bissell and his men gathered 
every piece of scrap wood they could find and every fence rail for almost eighteen miles.163 The 
engineers built bridges out of fallen trees, ropes and vines, and in some cases before they could 
rebuild roads and bridges they had to remove debris placed in their way by retreating 
Confederates.  At one point along the march route, felled trees and burned bridges forced the 
entire column to halt. Close to dusk, the men bivouacked for the night, and the engineers went 
to work by torchlight to open the road. Fifteen hours later the work was finished, and the march 
resumed with the engineers in tow.164  
 Bissell’s Engineers were detached by companies and assigned other tasks throughout 
Pope’s campaign on New Madrid. After removing “the obstructions thrown in the way by Rebel 
guerrilla chief [Meriwether] Jefferson Thompson,” companies A and B, under Major Montague 
S. Hasie, proceeded to Point Pleasant, ten miles south of New Madrid, on the western bank of 
the Mississippi, and constructed earthworks on the river bank.165 Company C, D, and K worked 
on repairing the Cairo and Fulton Railroad running east to west from Bird’s Point, just south of 
Cairo to Sikeston.  Company G worked on the same railroad doing bridge repair. It was joined by 
Company H, which built a depot platform in Sikeston with lumber produced by Company F, 
which spent all of November and December 1861, operating a lumber mill.166 
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 On March 14th, the day Confederate forces evacuated New Madrid, Pope reported his 
operations to the War Department. He included reports of division and brigade commanders, 
but of the engineers he wrote, “Col. J. W. Bissell, Engineers, has been too incessantly occupied 
to make a written report, but desires to mention the following officers of his regiment who 
displayed unusual gallantry: Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Captains Dean, Hill, and Tweeddale, and 
Lieutenants Odenbaugh, Randolph, and Besier.”167  
 Pope’s plan to cut off any escape route for 17,000 Confederate soldiers garrisoned in 
Columbus, Kentucky, did not come to fruition. General Polk sensed the trap and starting on 
February 26th he pulled his men out from the city’s fortification and moved south along the 
Mississippi to link up with Brigadier General John P. McCown’s 2,000 men in New Madrid. When 
Pope’s men attacked New Madrid, McCown determined his position untenable, and he 
evacuated across the river. This was a costly mistake, but not a mortal blow. Supplies for Island 
No. 10 would “now have to be hauled overland from Tiptonville,” but the island remained 
unassailable from everywhere except on the river south of Island No. 8.168 The Federal Army at 
New Madrid had no means of crossing the river, and if they attempted to build small barges an 
eight ship Confederate flotilla under the command of George N. Hollins would make quick work 
of any Union effort. Island No. Ten commanded all river traffic south, and with a supply line 
open, the men operating the island’s fifteen guns could hold out for a considerable length of 
time.  
 Pope had two options, and both required naval cooperation. First, he could order Flag 
Officer Andrew H. Foote’s squadron of gunboats, steamboats, and mortars to bombard the 
island and shore batteries making it possible for an amphibious assault. Second, Foote could run 
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several ships past the Rebel stronghold and transport soldiers from New Madrid across the river 
and then attack the island from both sides.  
 There was a third option—or at least a suggestion—but it was not entirely clear how this 
suggestion came about. In Pope’s report of the operations which led to the capture of Island No. 
10 dated May 2, 1862, the general wrote that on March 16th he received a dispatch from 
General Halleck “directing me (Pope) if possible to construct a road through the swamps to a 
point on the Missouri shore opposite Island No. 10.”169 Although no record of the conversation 
exists, it was possible that at the same time Halleck was encouraging Pope to find an opening 
through the wetlands, one of Pope’s division commanders, Brigadier General Schuyler proposed 
the idea of cutting a canal across the peninsula in order to attack Island No. 10 from the rear.170 
In Pope’s report to Halleck on April 9th Pope wrote, “The canal across the peninsula opposite 
Island No. 10, and for the idea of which I am indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton, was 
completed by Colonel Bissell’s Engineer Regiment….” Then on May 2nd Pope wrote, “The idea of 
the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler Hamilton.”171  
Between Halleck’s suggestion of attempting to cut a road south from New Madrid to the 
northern bank of the Mississippi opposite Island No. 10, to Hamilton’s rudimentary idea of a 
canal, to Pope’s plan to run Foote’s gunboats between the island and shore batteries, it made 
perfect sense to send Colonel Bissell across the peninsula. He could assist Foote in preparing the 
gunboats with additional protection to run the Confederate batteries, and he could reconnoiter 
the area to determine if it was practicable to cut a road or dig a canal.   
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Pope was confidant Foote’s gunboats would succeed in passing the island.172 Foote was 
not. For days his squadron had opened a ferocious cannonade that had little effect on the 
island, yet Confederate return fire damaged several of his ships and killed or wounded at least a 
dozen of his sailors.  Foote was, therefore, prepared for a long siege because he feared sending 
any of his gunboats to run the gauntlet between the island and the shore batteries. A gunboat 
might be sunk or worse, fall into the hands of the Confederates and be used against the Union 
flotilla.173  
 General Pope was furious to learn that Foote would not run his gunboats past Island No. 
10. Bissell, for his part, was also frustrated because on March 19th he figured out that both a 
road and canal were not possible. Regarding the latter, he had explored the possibility that St. 
James Bayou, which entered the Mississippi River seven miles north of Island No. 8, was 
connected to St. John’s Bayou, which emptied into the Mississippi at New Madrid. It did not. 
Consequently, Bissell would return to Pope’s headquarters the following day with disappointing 
news.174  
 The following morning, while standing on the levee along side the Mississippi waiting for 
the dug-out (canoe) and guide to arrive, which would take him back to Pope’s headquarters, 
Bissell noticed that opposite him and directly across the submerged peninsula, stood an opening 
between large trees which appeared like a path through the woods. Bissell wrote: “This proved 
to be an old wagon road extending half a mile into the woods; beyond and around was a dense 
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174 J. W. Bissell, “Sawing Out the Channel Above Island Number Ten,” in Battles and Leaders of 
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forest of heavy timber.”175 The guide determined that it was approximately two miles from the 
end of the old wagon road to the nearest bayou. The guide made a sketch of the area in Bissell’s 
memorandum book, and the two men examined the wetlands until nightfall then returned to 
Pope’s headquarters.   
 What happened next remains a mystery. Bissell claimed that General Pope and his staff 
had just finished supper when “someone said something about a canal.” According to Bissell, 
Pope joked about the idea stating that the entire countryside was under ten feet of water. 
Bissell then pulled out the map and announced that he “would have the boats through in 
fourteen days.”176 Pope was not impressed by Bissell’s bravado, so the general took him aside 
and asked the engineer if he meant what he said. The answer was an unequivocal, yes.  After 
this briefing, Pope approved the project. General Schuyler Hamilton challenged Bissell’s account 
of what happened, and there was considerable post war bickering between the two men each 
claiming responsibility for the idea of a canal.177 
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 Regardless of who came up with the idea, the canal itself was an incredible feat of Civil 
War engineering and recognized as such by General Pope. He wrote to Halleck on April 9th, “Of 
Colonel Bissell, Engineer Regiment, I can hardly say too much. Full resources, untiring and 
determined, he labored night and day, and completed work which will be a monument of 
enterprise and skill.”178 The assembly point for the canal operation was Island No. 8 where six 
hundred men, four steamboats, six coal barges, four pieces of heavy artillery, axes, saws, rope, 
carpenter tools and tackle, and two million feet of lumber were gathered on March 23rd to begin 
work.179  
 Bissell’s men cut a break in the Mississippi River levee at Phillip’s plantation to access 
the cornfield. Although the barges could get through, the four stern-wheel steamboats drew 
thirty-six inches of water, and consequently, the break proved too shallow for them to pass. So 
Bissell’s men cut thirty more feet of levee and jumping into the cold waist deep water also 
removed stumps and logs while battling a swift current with a dangerous undertow. Within 
twenty-four hours one steamboat, the W. B. Terry, and two barges made it through the 
cornfield and the one-half mile long submerged wagon road, to the flooded forest where the 
channel narrowed making further passage impossible.180 The task now assigned to Captain 
William Tweeddale was to widen the channel and remove the stumps so the Union’s vessels 
could pass.  
 Tweeddale’s process for carrying out his orders combined the delegation of tasks in the 
Northern mill system and the future assembly line. First, men on small rafts would wedge 
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springboards on which to stand, into trees and proceed to cut them about eight feet above the 
water. Another set of soldiers on rafts tied a line around the downed tree, and hauled it away 
with the use of a snatch block and a steam capstan aboard the W. B. Terry.181  Next a trailing raft 
was lashed to the stump and an upright plank was also fastened to the stump. The upright plank 
had a frame shaped like an isosceles trapezoid attached to it with a pivot pin so the frame could 
swing like a pendulum.  A saw blade was connected to the legs of the trapezoid and with two 
men pulling on ropes, the blade could move back and forth cutting through the stump below the 
surface of the water leaving a stump four and one half feet below the surface. Trees stumps less 
than two feet in diameter offered no problems, but larger trees such as elms “which spread out 
so much at the bottom” proved to be a challenge.182 In addition, since the water was muddy and 
murky, it was often difficult to determine what was interfering with the saw. 
The thicker trunks often pinched the saw and then it required tackle to be attached to 
the top of the trunk and pulled so as to relieve the trapped saw. It could take as long as three 
hours to remove some trunks and working twenty-four hours a day it took the engineers eight 
days to clear a channel fifty feet wide and two miles long.183 This channel entered the first of 
three bayous, all of which were narrow and overgrown with trees.  Now as the engineers started 
through the bayou, Bissell spoke solemnly of the new danger awaiting the engineers: “The river 
had begun to fall, and the water was running rapidly.”184  As a result, men wore lifelines 
attached to their waists as they climbed out onto slippery logs to secure cables so these downed 
obstructions could be pulled away. Some trees had to be sawed and axed into sections before 
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they were moved, underbrush had to be cut and pulled to the embankments, and as the water 
dropped, stumps originally four feet under the water had to be re-cut.185  
The exhausting work continued until April 6th when the six mile long channel opened to 
traffic. Once the engineers entered Wilson’s Bayou, they eventually linked up with East Bayou 
and finally St. John’s Bayou, which emptied into the Mississippi at New Madrid. As the water 
continued to recede only flat-bottom transports could navigate the canal, but some of Bissell’s 
men had installed these vessels with heavy artillery to create improvised gunboats.  
General Pope had attempted to keep the canal a secret, but Confederate scouts 
detected the break in the levee opposite Island No. 8 as early as March 29th. With a rapid drop in 
the water level, however, the Southern command did not believe the canal would be 
successfully completed. Some officers reported to a journalist that it “is believed utterly 
impracticable for the enemy to cut a canal from New Madrid across the bend to a point above 
the island.” Another officer continued, “The trees in the Mississippi bottoms…are very large and 
grow together, and sent their roots deep into the soil. This growth of our swamps and bayous 
presents an impenetrable barrier to any such undertaking as that spoken of.”186 In Confederate 
commander Brigadier General William W. Mackall’s final report of the operations around Island 
No. 10, he noted that he was told the enemy “were endeavoring to cut a canal across the 
opposite peninsula for the passage of transports, in order to land below the bend; that they 
would fail, and that the position was safe until the river fell and no longer.”187  
The canal itself did not prove to be the decisive factor in the capture of Island No. 10. 
Yet, what Pope was able to do was to transport men and material to the eastern bank of the 
Mississippi where he was able to block the only escape route the Confederates had—the road to 
                                                             
185 Powles, 36; Daniel and Bock, 108; Bissell, 461. 
186 Daniel and Bock, 114.  
187 O. R. ser. 1, vol. VIII, 132. 
 201 
Tiptonville. On April 4th the ironclad gunboat Carondelet ran past the Confederate batteries, and 
two nights later the Pittsburgh successfully did the same.  Now, with gunboats attacking the 
island from front and rear, and the major road to and from the island blocked, Mackall’s only 
recourse was to surrender. He did so on April 7th and the Mississippi was now open to Fort 
Pillow.  
The canal and channel Bissell and the Missouri engineers cut and dredged represented 
the ingenuity, confidence, and culture of Pope’s army. When Bissell stood atop the Mississippi 
levee and spotted a flooded cornfield and old wagon road carved between the trees, he saw 
possibility not impossibility. When trees sprang up from six feet below the waterline, a system 
was developed with the help of makeshift saw, to cut them away. All the men in Bissell’s 
Engineers were carpenters, mechanics, or builders and in a former life, had had to improvise to 
solve problems as they worked on machines, steamboats, or the railroads. Finally, both Pope 
and Hamilton had engineering backgrounds and consequently were open to the possibility of 
opening a canal. Although never discussed in histories of the New Madrid campaign, Pope could 
have said “no” to Bissell’s plan. Although we can only speculate as to why Pope said, “yes” to 
the plan, two factors had to include his own background, and his belief that Bissell’s plan would 
work. Chances were that in his twenty years before the war as a surveyor in Florida, New 
Mexico, and Minnesota, and as the surveyor for possible southern routes for the first 
transcontinental railroad, he considered creative possibilities to conquer challenging geography.  
The canal and channel to by-pass Island No. 10 would turn out to be one of the most 
demanding engineering feats of the war. There was no doubt the canal scored psychological 
points for the North, as well. The Northern press celebrated the victory with headlines such as 
“How Colonel Bissell’s Engineers Fores [Force] Their Way to General Pope,” and “The Great 
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Western Stump Cutter.”188  Even Southern newspapers marveled at the accomplishment. An 
article appeared in the Macon Telegraph that reported on the Yankee engineers’ work: “The 
exploit is unparalleled, at least in this country, and is one of the most novel and marvelous 
which has been performed during the War.”189  
Bissell’s regiment, however, was not the only group of volunteer engineers engaged in a 
critical assignment in the spring of 1862. The First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, 
encamped with Buell’s army in Nashville, would be assigned the herculean task of repairing 
turnpike and railroad bridges destroyed by retreating Confederates south of the city as far as 
Murfreesboro. The Union Army had to take the war into the deep South, but could only do so if 
critical supply lines could remain open and maintained. Every time several hundred partisans, or 
Confederate cavalry, burned a railroad bridge, or destroyed rolling stock, thirty to fifty thousand 
Union soldiers on the march would stumble to a halt. No supplies meant no movement. 
Moreover, Civil War armies, because of their size, needed to divide into smaller units (15,000 to 
20,000 men, artillery, and wagons) and move on parallel roads to reduce congestion. A line of 
soldiers composed of 50,000 men, horses, artillery, and wagons long, from head to tail, would 
take seventy-two hours to pass one spot. To adjust from columns of march to lines of battle 
(going on line) would be a nightmare. For the engineers this meant keeping multiple roads open 
so the entire army arrived at the same place at the same time. If one group arrived and the 
others were stalled, the lone unit in advance of the others could be destroyed by a larger enemy 
                                                             
188 “How Colonel Bissell’s Engineers Fores [Force] Their Way to General Pope,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, April 11, 1862. “The Great Western Stump Cutter,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 16, 
1862. 
189 “Great Exploit of the Engineers,” Macon Telegraph, April 24, 1862. 
 203 
force. Generals knew this to be a real fear, and it added additional pressure to the work of the 
engineers.190   
In the early spring of 1862 Halleck’s Department of the Mississippi was divided into 
three major components: Pope’s army on the Mississippi, Buell’s army in Nashville, and Grant’s 
in Savannah, Tennessee, northeast of Corinth, Mississippi, on the eastern bank of the Tennessee 
River.  Halleck’s slowly evolving plan was to have Pope’s forces continue to slug their way south 
along the Mississippi toward Memphis, while Buell and Grant, under Grant’s command, were to 
rendezvous at a place called Pittsburgh Landing and then strike Sydney Johnston’s army at the 
important railroad junction at Corinth.   
Johnston’s forces were spread out over four states, and the general had to decide 
where to concentrate his armies. He could not defend both middle Tennessee and the line along 
the Mississippi River. Johnston chose the Mississippi defense and selected Corinth as the 
concentration point because of the railroads. The war was less than one year old and the 
fighting in the western theater three months old, yet both Union and Confederate armies 
understood the critical importance of the railroads. The quick concentration of troops, the 
movement of supplies and reinforcements over great distances, the ability to flank an enemy or 
block their retreat, and the ability to block an advance or better yet, cut-off an advancing an 
army from its supply base, made the iron horse a new factor in American warfare. The degree to 
which the railroads would play in strategic and tactical decision-making was unanticipated. 
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There was no reason to believe it should have been otherwise. Therefore, since armies did not 
carry with them trained experts on railroad warfare, both sides had to improvise. Ill-trained and 
ill-prepared generals and their staffs would be required to manage and support operations over 
vast areas. 
When Halleck ordered Buell to join forces with Grant in Savannah, Buell decided to 
move southwest from Nashville to Columbia along the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, and 
from there move over a dismal road southwest to Savannah. On March 15th Buell sent multiple 
orders to the Michigan engineers. Colonel Innes was to take three companies north to Paducah, 
Kentucky, then travel south on the Tennessee River to a spot called Lucas Landing where they 
were to take possession of an abandoned railroad engine, six platform cars, and one boxcar. 
Innes and his men were to load these on barges and bring them back to Nashville.191 Captain 
John B. Yates was ordered southeast from Nashville, along the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad, to repair both the turnpike and railroad bridge at Stones River just north of 
Murfreesboro.192  Finally, Captain Perrin V. Fox, marching with Buell’s army to the southwest, 
was called upon to repair a major railroad crossing at Franklin, Tennessee. Retreating 
Confederate cavalry destroyed the bridge, which was a vital link in Buell’s supply chain. 
Buell and his staff were not ready to manage the multiple tasks assigned to the 
engineers, and consequently the work was helter-skelter. Slow to repair the bridges, the 
engineers completed the work, but their operations were not well coordinated. As historian 
Mark Hoffman author of “My Brave Mechanics”: The First Michigan Engineers and Their Civil 
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War assiduously noted, “The conquering Union commanders were forced to operate the 
railroad as best they could, detailing officers with railroad backgrounds to provide the day-to-
day management.”193 Buell had appointed John Byers Anderson, a civilian and former 
Superintendent of Transportation for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, to manage 
operations north of Nashville. By March 1862, the Federal government had established the 
United States Military Railroad Bureau, yet this embryonic organization focused most of its 
attention in the eastern theater, and consequently Anderson received little guidance from the 
new bureau.194 Buell preferred it this way.  
South of Nashville, Confederate forces destroyed the two major lines from the city, both 
of which tied into the east-west running Memphis & Charleston Railroad. For repair to these 
railroads, Buell tapped the colonel of the Thirteenth Ohio Infantry, William Sooy Smith. Smith 
was an 1853 graduate of West Point, worked for the Illinois Central Railroad and in 1857 opened 
his own civil engineering company, Parkinson & Smith. In addition to repairing track and bridges, 
Smith had to acquire locomotives and cars.195  
Now as Buell marched his men toward Pittsburg Landing, he left behind Brigadier 
General Ormsby M. Mitchell to guard Middle Tennessee. Mitchell had been a surveyor and 
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astronomer before the war. For three months in the fall of 1861 he had command of the 
Department of the Ohio, and was aggressive and ambitious. Without orders from Buell, Mitchell 
moved south to Murfreesboro where with three companies of Michigan engineers and several 
infantry regiments he supervised the re-building of “three bridges totaling some 920 feet in 
length…two railroad bridges and one on the pike.”196 North of Mitchell’s efforts, engineers were 
building a railroad bridge that had been washed out by high water at Mill Creek No. 2 southwest 
of Nashville at Franklin.  Michigan engineers, with the help of a civilian work crew from the 
McCallum Bridge Company of Cincinnati, the Thirty-Eighth Indiana Infantry, and an engineer 
company who operated a sawmill, built a temporary truss 110 feet long over the Big Harpeth 
River.197 
Buell’s major detachment heading for Pittsburg Landing also met up with a bridge 
problem. In Columbia his columns came to an abrupt halt when it was discovered that the Duck 
River Bridge was destroyed and the river at flood stage. Their problem was exacerbated by the 
fact that there were no more engineer troops available to work on the crossing. The engineers 
were scattered to the four winds, and all functioning under a confusing command structure. 
Anderson, with no military rank, had no military authority. Colonel Smith, responsible for bridge 
repair and finding locomotives, had sent Colonel Innes, commander of the Michigan Engineers, 
north to bring engines and cars back to Nashville.  Smith also assigned Captain Yates to rebuild 
the bridge at Mill Creek, but some of Yates’s men were taking orders from General Mitchell at 
Murfreesboro.  
Colonel Jacob Ammen’s March 20th entry in his “diary of the march to and battle at 
Pittsburg Landing” read, “Bridge over the Duck River at Columbia burned by rebels; river high; 
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no boats. General McCook’s division in advance, repairing bridge.”198 Alexander McCook’s 
infantry actually worked on the bridge until the 27th when second division commander, Brigadier 
General William Nelson, told one of his brigade commanders, Ammen, that the river was falling 
and Ammens’s needed to find a “damn ford” before the 29th, because Nelson wanted his 
division to cross first and then have the honor of being the lead unit on the march to Pittsburg 
Landing. On March 29th Ammen wrote, “At 3am men wade [sic] stream. Cavalry in river to point 
out ford, break force of current, and protect infantry. Cold and disagreeable day. Bridge not 
completed.”199 Among all the confusion Buell finally ordered some engineers, who were working 
on the bridge at Big Harpeth forward to the Duck River. When they arrived on April 1st, the 
bridge was near completion.  
Buell’s arrival at Pittsburg Landing came none too soon. After the first day of fighting at 
Shiloh, Confederate forces had surged forward almost driving Grant’s army into the Tennessee 
River. Buell’s arrival and Grant’s audacity reversed Yankee fortunes on April 7th with a Northern 
victory. Now the Union Army set its sights on the critical railroad junction at Corinth. The 
defending Southerners evacuated the city on May 30th because they feared being trapped by a 
much larger Union force.  
In his still highly regarded, classic study of railroads in the Civil War, George Edgar 
Turner described the end of May 1862 as a significant time early in the war when Union forces 
held “a vital part of the Confederates’ one line of railroad between Virginia and the Mississippi 
River.”200 They held the Nashville & Chattanooga as far as Stevenson, the three lines from 
Nashville to Decatur, the Mobile & Ohio from Columbus, Kentucky to Corinth, and a direct line 
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from Louisville to Memphis. On May 31st Halleck instructed the First Michigan to begin the all 
important repair work along the Memphis & Charleston, between Corinth to Decatur, Alabama. 
Turner no doubt agreed with historian Russell F. Weigley’s later assessment of the railroad’s 
importance in bringing about Union victory. He argued that the Union’s war-making capacity at 
the start of the war only existed on paper. Converting those potential assets into superior 
resources was one of the major roles of the railroads.201 Historian John E. Clark, Jr. also 
emphasized the value of the railroads: “The Union’s successful use of the railroads neutralized a 
determined Confederacy’s vast land mass. They changed the nature of warfare by enabling the 
Union to shrink the Confederacy to a manageable—and vulnerable—size.”202 Clark continued, 
“The modern management principles and procedures developed by antebellum northern 
railroads produced outstanding managers whose ability and experience proved invaluable to the 
Union war effort.”203 
Turner, Weigley, and Clark were correct in their views about the virtues of the railroad 
during the war. Yet, Buell’s difficulty in finding solutions to problems, finding the right managers, 
establishing a proper chain of command, recognizing the value of the work force, creating an 
effective and an authoritative civilian organization, and curbing the massive egos of many a 
general, were not givens in June 1862. The Civil War was to require a new type of manager and 
new type of management system, one where both boss and employee had to overcome 
unforeseen, challenging, and changing circumstances. In June 1862, in the western theater, 
there were at least two problems festering.  
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The first one was a management issue. There was no system in place to control the 
resources of Buell’s newly organized Army of the Ohio, and no railroad/engineer/management 
expert who had the authority to synchronize logistical operations at both the strategic and 
tactical level. Buell, his corps, and his division commander all had a chief engineer on staff. Most 
were West Pointers. These engineers reported to both their commanding officers and the 
Engineer Bureau in Washington, D. C. Then there were civilian railroad men such as John Byers 
Anderson, and civilian workers. The First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics and Bissell’s 
Engineers each had their own commanding officer. What if a corps commander wanted to order 
a detail of engineers working on bridge repair, to work on a different project that suited the 
general, but not the army’s overall efforts?  Could they disobey the order?  The answer was yes, 
but only if they were prepared to be called up on charges. Civil War historian Phillip Shiman 
wrote: “Buell’s troops scattered across Middle Tennessee, engaged in either repairing the 
railroad or defending it against the raids of Confederate cavalry, partisans, and guerrillas…. Most 
of Buell’s failure had been attributable to the army’s inadequate engineer organization and 
preparations.”204 By June 1862, Buell’s engineers were sprinkled about Middle Tennessee, and 
northern Mississippi and Alabama. Two companies of engineers were with General Mitchell in 
Decatur building bridges while Halleck ordered Buell to move his 50,000 soldiers and their 
supplies east from Corinth along the railroad toward Chattanooga. Preparations for the move 
were fair at best, and the Army of the Ohio would soon find itself, and its supply line, 
dangerously extended. 
The second problem was a potential mutiny. At the time of their enlistments the 
soldiers of the Michigan engineers had been promised the pay rate of regular army engineer 
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troops, seventeen dollars a month, as opposed to the standard thirteen dollars a month for 
infantry. Engineers’ pay was not forthcoming. Since January, Colonel Innes had petitioned the 
War Department, Missouri congressman Francis P. Blair, Jr and congressman Francis W. Kellogg 
of Grand Rapids, requesting back pay at the seventeen-dollar rate. In February 1862, Blair 
introduced legislation that would retroactively pay the volunteer engineers the regular army 
rate. The bill was finally voted down sixty-six to fifty-seven.205 Regular army engineer officers 
also did not support the bill, believing volunteer engineers were not as professionally trained, 
skillful or disciplined as the regulars. The snob factor ran high. 
Discontent among the soldiers of the 1st Michigan continued to swell. At the time of 
Buell’s movement toward Pittsburg Landing a number of men refused to march. Innes 
threatened arrest. Thirty noncommissioned officers were reduced in rank for their role in 
encouraging the men to stop working. The reduction was temporary for most.206 Innes was 
finally able to quell the bad feelings and the men marched. Yet, by June pay for volunteer 
engineers was still the elephant in the room. 
In the eastern theater during the first five months of 1862, the engineer organization, 
and the operation of the railroads, was taking on a more cohesive shape than that in the west. 
Four things accounted for this development. First, the War Department identified two pre-war 
railroad managers with business acumen and organization genius. Second, the theater of 
operation covered the Washington, DC, northern Virginia corridor that allowed for a more 
hands-on approach and direct supervision than did the vast expanse of the western theater. 
Third, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton took an active interest in railroad operation and his 
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assistant secretary, Thomas Scott, was general superintendent of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
Fourth, General George B. McClellan, a former railroad president and army engineer, 
understood the value of logistics and he had the ability to organize. Despite being jaundiced and 
mean spirited toward President Lincoln and his cabinet, despite his inability to take risks or 
command with strength in battle, and despite his habit of moving his army at a sluggish pace, 
McClellan valued his men and especially his engineers. 
General McClellan spent considerable time trying to build an engineering organization 
that could meet the challenges of the army’s logistical demands. These burdens required the 
coordination of troop movements and complex supply functions. As daunting a task as this was, 
McClellan faced several obstacles that made his efforts even more difficult. First, several West 
Point trained engineers opted, like McClellan himself, to accept field commissions in the 
volunteer army. Prestige, promotion, and pay, all limited in the antebellum army, were now 
waiting for the men who would lead the charge. Second, the advent of the railroad and 
telegraph in warfare siphoned engineers away from the field army and placed them in roles 
usually assigned to civilians. Third, regular army engineers balked at embracing volunteer 
engineers as equals, which created tension between the two groups. Fourth, the politicians in 
Washington saw war as a clash of arms, and consequently any attempt to raise troops for 
anything but infantry was viewed with suspicion.207  
Historian Edward Hagerman wrote that ”the Union army sent some engineer officers to 
maintain its extended system of fixed, mostly coastal, fortifications, while others continued their 
prewar civilian function in building bridges, running surveys, and other internal improvements.” 
He continued: “Despite the increasing need for engineering personnel in the field, as many as 
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one-third of the officers in the Corps of Engineers remained assigned until the end of the war to 
coastal defense or to internal improvements.”208  
Under the circumstances McClellan opted to continue to demand rigorous bridge-
building training and on February 26th regular army engineers waded into a frigid Potomac River 
across from Harpers Ferry and began construction on an 840-foot long pontoon bridge. The 
water was 15 feet higher than at normal summer levels and the day was raw and windy. The 
engineers used ship anchors and chain cables to lash together sixty pontoons, and the bridge 
was completed in eight hours. McClellan was delighted with the successful operation. “The 
bridge was splendidly thrown by Captain Duane…. It was one of the most difficult operations of 
the kind ever performed.”209  
Captain Duane, who literally wrote the book on“Ponton Drill” in a Manual for Engineer 
Troops, continued to express doubts about the usefulness of volunteer engineers, and especially 
the officers who lacked a West Point education.210 It seems probable that Duane was caught in 
an unavoidable paradox: the recognition that West Point trained engineers were critical in the 
emerging modern war, but there were not enough of them to respond to the growing needs. 
For Duane, his doubts about the value of volunteer engineer officers were also personal. He had 
trained, studied, and earned his way into the most elite intellectual organization in the army, 
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and perhaps, in the United States. The idea that men with no formal training could break the 
glass ceiling was both puzzling and threatening.  
Even Brigadier General Joseph G. Totten, West Point class of 1805 and head of the Corps 
of Engineers since 1838, did not grasp the magnitude of change coming to the engineers, nor did 
he understand their expanding role in mobile warfare. In a letter he sent to Stanton just one day 
before Duane’s engineers built their bridge from Sandy Hook, Maryland, to Harpers Ferry, the 
head of engineers insisted that twelve of his officers stationed in places like New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, Oswego, New York, the Kennebec River, Maine, and Alcatraz Island, San 
Francisco harbor, should not be pulled from the forts to serve in the field with the armies. 
“Officers of some experience are required for duty of this kind which involves large 
disbursements and business practice, control of men and acquired knowledge of construction, 
as well as theoretical attainments as Engineers of fortifications.”211   
In mid-March 1862 Totten wrote to McClellan requesting two engineers from 
McClellan’s Army of the Potomac to be assigned to coastal fortification in the North. McClellan 
politely declined the request. With the Peninsula Campaign underway, McClellan reminded 
Totten that Little Mac’s operations “will require the services of a number of Engineer officers…. 
If I can even keep them [engineers] until the question of Yorktown [a siege] is disposed of I shall 
feel better satisfied.”212 
McClellan kept his engineers and restructured the department within the Army of the 
Potomac, adding to the Engineer Battalion the Volunteer Engineer Brigade made up of the 15th 
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and 50th New York Volunteer Engineers. Congress did not, however, officially recognize these 
two regiments until July 17, 1862.  The act accomplished what the mutinous Michigan engineers 
had hoped, the same “pay and emoluments, as the corps of engineers in the regular army.”213 
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander would continue to instruct the volunteers and serve on 
McClellan’s staff. Colonel Stewart was the regimental commander of the 50th New York and 
Colonel McLeod Murphy, former chief of the Brooklyn Naval Yard, commanded the 15th New 
York. Their commanding officer was Brigadier General Daniel Phineas Woodbury, West Point 
class of 1836. Both Woodbury and Duane reported to McClellan’s Chief Engineer John G. 
Barnard.214  
The regular army engineers’ skepticism remained keen as the Army of the Potomac set 
sail for Fort Monroe and the opening of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign. On April 4th the 
engineers arrived and began their march in fine spring weather toward Yorktown, situated on 
the York River. By mid-afternoon the rain began to fall and before the day ended torrents of rain 
had soaked soldiers, and their spirits waned.  Roads turned to mud making the march difficult.  
During the siege of Yorktown the volunteer engineers began to earn the respect, albeit 
tempered, of the regular engineers. There were still signs of ambivalence. In Brigadier General 
Barnard’s report on engineer operations during the siege he wrote: “Captain Duane, with his 
command, and Lieutenants Comstock and McAlester, have superintended the siege works. All of 
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these officers have exhibited great energy, industry, and courage….”215 Conversely, he wrote this 
about the volunteers: “During the siege operations, General Woodbury, with his brigade, has 
been mainly engaged on the construction of roads and bridges, making gabions and fascines, 
and constructing Battery No. 4 (13-inch mortar).”216 This was the proverbial understatement. 
Barnard’s journal of the siege was somewhat more specific. For April 24th he noted, “The 
northern approach to the upper pontoon bridge, 1,200 feet in length, is nearly finished, and will 
be completed probably tomorrow. Crib bridge, floating bridge, and middle pontoon bridge are 
all in working order…. The roads in the two branch ravines above dam, with the secondary roads 
leading up to the plateau, will…be completed to-day.”217 The brigade corduroyed 5,000 yards of 
road and built two engineering depots while at Yorktown.218  
Duane’s battalion deserved credit from Barnard for the monumental work they did, and 
would continue to do, throughout the campaign. Yet, so did Woodbury’s 
men. The siege ended on May 3rd when Confederate General Joseph Johnston’s army slipped 
out quietly and moved northwest toward Richmond. McClellan, excessively cautious, spent the 
entire month of April preparing the siege and accomplishing little. Johnston, on the other hand, 
had bought more time to prepare his army and the defenses around the Confederate capital for 
the coming fight, and he placed burgeoning demands on McClellan’s expanding supply lines.  
 With Yorktown abandoned, McClellan reneged on his promise to Secretary of War 
Stanton to keep General Irwin McDowell’s corps in Washington, and instead ordered 
McDowell’s men to move south toward Richmond. This forced President Lincoln to intervene. 
Demanding that a sizable force be left to defend the city, the President compromised with 
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McClellan and sent Major General William B. Franklin’s division of 11,000 soldiers to West Point, 
Virginia, a place where the Mattapony and Pamunkey Rivers join to form the York River at its 
northwestern end. From there McClellan would move his giant army west along the Pamunkey 
to White House.  The Richmond & York Railroad connected West Point at the head of the York 
River to White House, as well. From this new base Little Mac would orchestrate his operation 
against Richmond, which was approximately seventeen miles away.  
 A detachment of the 15th New York was assigned to assist in Franklin’s landing 
operation. The challenge was to prevent the artillery pieces from getting weighed down on the 
muddy beach sand. To prevent this the engineers placed the guns on two canal barges lashed 
together, and floated them to shore where the barges were connected to boardwalks and then 
wheeled ashore. Pontoons were used to bring the men to the beach, and finally some barges 
were grounded into the beach while others were strung together to extend 220 feet into the 
river. The floating wharf preceded the one called Mulberry Harbor, used by the Allies during the 
Normandy invasion 81 years later.219 In addition, the 50th New York was divided into four 
detachments to assist with the barges, prepare a pontoon train, construct trestle bridges, and 
repair a railroad bridge and a portion of track. Woodbury summarized the work done from May 
19 to May 29: “One bridge, single span, 26 feet, at Black Creek; one bridge, two spans, 18 and 20 
feet, respectively, roadway 12 feet, at Mill Creek…three bridges…beyond the White Church over 
streams 8 feet in width and 15 inches in depth, built with stringers laid on crib abutments; two 
trestle bridges 120 feet in length across the Chickahominy at Bottom’s Bridge….220  
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 On May 31st the Union Army fought the first major battle of the Peninsula Campaign at 
Fair Oaks (Seven Pines), Virginia. Since April 4th the engineers had worked ceaselessly to 
accomplish two tasks. First, they opened avenues of transportation through a scarcely 
populated southeast Virginia with many culverts and swamps, and few roads on which a city of 
men could move. Second, they maintained roads and bridges in order to meet logistical 
demands. Depots were needed to create from nothing an operational supply base. The 
engineers had to build roads, bridges, harbors, and warehouses to sustain over 100,000 soldiers 
and 30,000 horses and mules.221 Most roads had to be widened. Until this happened two 
wagons travelling in opposite directions could not pass each other. “Some of the roads required 
three or four layers of corduroying before logs would stay above the surface of the mud.”222 The 
quartermasters complained that the log surfaces of the roads were, “exceedingly rough, and the 
consequence is that the wear and tear of our transportation has been very great,” but with so 
many roads to attend to what else could be done.223  
 The traffic on the roads, the length of the supply line, and the rain and mud with which 
to contend, provided the engineers with remarkable on the job training. On May 28th Brigadier 
General Silas Casey’s division of the IV corps alone reported 194 wagons in use, 84 of which 
were used by the 14 regiments of the division, 30 for infantry ammunition, 13 for forage for 
artillery animals, and 10 for artillery ammunition.224 Supplies originated in New York, 
Philadelphia, and Baltimore, travelled by steamers to West Point, “then about another 45 miles 
up the tortuous Pamunkey. Once at White House, the supply line stretched inland 15 miles to 
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the Chicahominy and, eventually, across that stream to within six miles of Richmond.”225  The 
month of April witnessed eighteen days of precipitation in the Tidewater Region, and in May, 
fifteen days.226 
 The Engineer Brigade and Battalion were not alone in facing considerable, and 
sometimes overwhelming, challenges in the spring of 1862. With supply lines critical to 
McClellan’s potential success, the railroads would be pressed into service. To operate efficiently, 
they would require sound management drawing on the resources available. Northern railroad 
operations would not be the problem, but the Union Army’s ability to use railroads abandoned 
by Virginia, and to cope with those forces that would militate that use was a challenge. In the 
prewar years the rapid expansion of the railroad produced men with skill sets necessary to build 
locomotives, construct bridges, manage men and material, and adapt to circumstances and 
problems. The decision was made by the Federal government early in the war to tap their 
manpower resources and to use the railroad as a war tool. Fortunately, for McClellan’s army on 
the peninsula and for the Union’s war effort in general the idea of nationalizing the railroads 
and establishing a bureau to coordinate civilian and military use developed just two weeks after 
the war started. 
 With the fall of Fort Sumter panic struck Washington. The Lincoln administration feared 
that with pro slave states Maryland and Virginia on Washington’s borders, the city was 
vulnerable to an invasion by Confederate forces. Furthermore, any attempt to send Northern 
troops to the capital by railroad meant they had to pass through Baltimore and thus could be 
blocked by fireeating Marylanders. This worry soon appeared prescient. As Brigadier General 
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Benjamin Butler’s soldiers arrived in Baltimore by train from Massachusetts and New York, mobs 
greeted them with rocks, garbage, and musket balls. The soldiers returned fire and at least a 
dozen locals were killed. The soldiers managed to work their way to the west end of the city 
where they boarded a train for Washington. Lincoln had some troops, but the pro southern 
faction in Baltimore held the city.227 
 Maryland’s Governor Thomas Hicks wanted no trouble and suggested to Lincoln that 
troops from the North by-pass Baltimore and instead travel by boat to the capital. That option 
was too slow for Lincoln to even consider. Governor Hicks, therefore, in an effort to avoid a 
likely confrontation between Federal soldiers and southern sympathizers, blocked all the 
railroad bridges into the city. For Union troops there were two choices: force their way into the 
city (and loose Maryland to the Confederacy) or take regiments by steamer to Annapolis, take 
the train to Elkridge, Maryland, just south of Baltimore, and then reconnect with the Baltimore 
& Ohio. The problem was that pro-southern Marylanders had torn up the track and destroyed 
several locomotives.  
 What happened next was one of those points of contingency that Civil War historian 
James McPherson described as changing the course of the war.  Congressman David Wilmot of 
Pennsylvania and Major General Robert Patterson, commanding Pennsylvania volunteer troops, 
suggested that the railroad between Baltimore and Havre de Grace be taken over by the Federal 
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government. Instead, General Butler took the initiative and took possession of the Annapolis & 
Elkridge Railroad.228 
 Just a short time later Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott took charge of the 
Annapolis & Elkridge Railroad and ostensibly inaugurated the United States Military Railroad 
Service, if in practice if not in name. As the former first vice president of all operations of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, Scott was a triple threat: he had engineering skills, business acumen, and 
management capability. He saw the potential in rail transportation for the army, and he 
anticipated the problems the military would face if the government did not nationalize the 
railroads. In early January 1862, he prepared a report on the military’s transportation needs 
anticipating an act of Congress passed on January 31, 1862 authorizing the President to take 
possession “of any and all the railroad lines in the United States,” as well as all the telegraph 
lines in the country until “the suppression of this rebellion.”229  
 Scott argued that although technically subject to military control, Northern railroads 
needed to remain under civilian management. Nonetheless, he made it clear to them that they 
were to act as “direct adjuncts” of the War Department or he would force them into doing so. 
He promised them that the latter was not in their best interests.230 Scott, like his boss Secretary 
of War Edwin M. Stanton, made thoughtful and decisive decisions. This decisiveness would 
become the expectation among those in the military railroad service. For example, while visiting 
a Pittsburg foundry in 1862, Scott learned that a city ordinance required the foundry to haul 
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finished work to the Allegheny River by horse drawn wagons. “Citing wartime necessity Scott 
ordered a railroad siding built directly from the foundry to the river. The one thousand dollar 
expense saved the government drayage costs by ninety percent.”231 
 The next step for the War Department’s newborn authority to take over railroads, as 
necessary, was to appoint a central administrator. Stanton wasted no time. On February 11th, he 
appointed Daniel C. McCallum military director and superintendent of railroads in the United 
States. McCallum would be responsible to the War Department and report directly to Stanton.  
 McCallum was an excellent choice for the position. As superintendent of the Erie 
Railroad before the war, he designed a new management system to adjust to the increasing 
length of company railroads. It was virtually impossible for one person to travel and inspect the 
entire 340 miles of track, the equipment, repairs, and ticket operations of the railroad. 
Recognizing the limitations, McCallum developed a decentralized “but highly integrated 
management structure.”232 This meant three radical changes to the way a company did 
business. First, local managers had to resolve problems as they arose. “Subordinates not only 
had to make correct decisions on complicated and critical issues, but they had to make them 
fast.”233 Second, McCallum’s new system demanded “personal accountability through every 
grade of service.”234 Third, frequent written reports were required, with considerable data, to 
keep upper management informed on each section’s work. These reports included “on-time 
percentages, passenger and freight manifests, speed, tonnage, traffic volume to and from 
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specific destinations, rail life, and fuel efficiency.”235 For military railroads there were additional 
burdens: replacing destroyed locomotives, bridges, and track; conflict between civilian 
passenger and freight demands and the War Department’s demands; general’s individual needs 
against the greater needs of the army; and sorting out army priorities to determine what should 
be shipped first; men, artillery, supplies, or the wounded.  
 It took time for McCallum to organize his new department, but an unanticipated crisis 
that his department had to learn to address, became apparent when General McClellan asked 
Irwin McDowell’s corps to join him and threaten Richmond from the north. McDowell assured 
the War Department that he would not move until he established a supply line. This required 
opening the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad from Aquia Creek to Fredericksburg. 
Track was not only destroyed, but for a three mile stretch “not a vestige of track remained.”236 
The need to rebuild quickly or in some cases build the railroad and some wharfs at Aquia Creek, 
left Stanton and McDowell nonplussed.  The Secretary of War sought advice, so whether on 
McCallum’s or Scott’s recommendation, he called first to Washington, Daniel Harris, and then 
Herman Haupt. 
 Daniel Harris was the former mayor of Springfield, Massachusetts, and president of the 
Connecticut River Railroad. A highly skilled engineer, he was known for supervising the 
construction of twenty-seven bridges along the Hartford, Providence & Fishkill Railroad, his 
cautious business style, and his strong opposition to one of Herman Haupt’s major investments, 
the Hoosac Tunnel project.237 Stanton explained the work required, and Harris asked for time to 
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consider a decision. Stanton need an immediate answer so he called Haupt to Washington, 
offered the same assignment, and Haupt accepted.238  
 The work force was initially made up of soldiers detailed from infantry regiments, many 
who were disinclined to spend time as laborers. Some of these men had skills Haupt put to good 
use, but others needed simple and careful instructions about what they were supposed to do. 
For example, Haupt devised a simple instrument made of sticks to level the rail bed. In three 
days, working around the clock, his work crews re-laid three miles of rails, and then prepared to 
rebuild two bridges—one over Accokeek Creek, and the other over Potomac Creek.239 
 The Accokeek Creek trestle bridge was 150 feet long, and built over a 30-foot deep 
chasm. Fifteen hours after the construction began General McDowell rode over the finished 
bridge in a locomotive.240 It was a remarkable achievement and congratulations came in from 
the War Department. The most incredible work, however, was yet to come as Haupt moved 
immediately to Potomac Creek and started plans for a bridge “that would span a gorge almost 
four hundred feet wide with a maximum height of ninety feet over the water, “”a frightful 
looking chasm.””241 
 Taking soldiers from the 6th and 7th Wisconsin Infantry, and the 19th Indiana Infantry 
regiments, Haupt asked the officers to make a list of each soldier’s pre-war occupation. From 
the list Haupt organized the men “into teamsters, choppers, carpenters, mechanics, and 
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laborers, and formed them into squads, each under a non-commissioned officer.”242 As the 
crews went about their business, Haupt began to formulate the idea of a civilian construction 
corps. Operating with untrained and in some cases noncompliant soldiers, he had already asked 
General Halleck if the general would be open to the idea. Halleck, a West Point trained engineer 
and scholar, believed experienced military engineer soldiers like those from Captain Duane’s 
Engineer Battalion eventually should be assigned the work. Haupt deferred to the general for 
the time being even as he continued to ruminate on his plan. Now as he organized his work 
gangs, a nascent structure for a construction corps now formed. 
 To speed up construction on the Potomac Creek bridge, he “hastened transportation of 
the logs from the woods to the bridge site by building a wooden tramway, for which he 
procured several sets of rollers.”243 Instead of building the lower section of the bridge with 
trestlework, he had the soldiers lay crib work because, “many of the men were accustomed to 
building log houses and were not carpenters, I put them at work [with] which I supposed they 
were familiar.”244 It rained for nine days straight, but the bridge was completed and the first 
locomotive crossed. Lincoln and various cabinet members came out to see this wonderful 
accomplishment. The President said: “I have seen the most remarkable structure that human 
eyes ever rested upon. That man Haupt has built a bridge across the Potomac Creek 400 feet 
long, nearly 100 feet high and running trains over it. There is nothing in it but bean poles and 
cornstalks.”245 
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 A third bridge over the Rappahannock River, its construction supervised by Daniel Stone, 
a respected railroad contractor, was completed at the same time as Haupt finished the Potomac 
Bridge. Stone’ s was also an impressive achievement. The War Department had succeeded in 
finding a handful of brilliant railroad men, especially Haupt, who had worked miracles during the 
month of May 1862, yet the organizational component of military railroad operations was just in 
its infancy. The question of how to develop and where to find skilled work crews was 
unresolved. Furthermore, Stanton’s management of this fledgling railroad bureau was 
perplexing and impulsive. As the Peninsula Campaign entered June, Confederate General 
“Stonewall” Jackson began his advance up the Shenandoah Valley forcing Lincoln to withhold 
McDowell from moving on Richmond, and instead move him to Front Royal on the Manassas 
Gap Railroad.246 To supply McDowell’s army, the Orange and Alexandria Railroad had to be 
repaired from Alexandria to Manassas, and the Manassas Gap Railroad rebuilt west to Front 
Royal.247 The problem was that Haupt, Stone, and McCallum had overlapping authority.  
With a Confederate threat to Washington and a Union threat to Richmond developing 
simultaneously, open supply lines was a significant element both for McDowell and McClellan. 
Fourteen months after Fort Sumter’s capture the war in the eastern theater was finally about to 
erupt. As in the western theater, the Federal armies needed to maximize its engineering 
advantage, which included efficient and skillful use of the railroad. Southern generals had the 
advantage of advancing along familiar roads, selecting the most advantageous terrain on which 
to fight, and using great natural barriers like mountains, rivers, swamps, and woodlands to 
defend against and harass Yankee invaders. Yet, within the Northern command structure there 
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was an emerging, albeit vague, understanding by May 1862, that if they expected to defeat the 
South, the Union would have to engineer the victory.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ENGINEERS, PIONEERS, AND RAILROAD MEN 
 
Out of the whole [one hundred officers], we have thus far gotten not more than a dozen good 
men—men who can lay any claim to be called engineers. 
 
                   Confederate Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer to his wife, October 12, 1862 
 
I was obliged to stand straddle of his body while I lifted the balk, shoved it out to the boat 
which Dunlap & Kinney were in and the two Corporals, in spite of their wounded condition, 
fastened their end while I fastened mine. 
 
Captain Wesley Brainerd, 50th New York Volunteers, December 11, 1862 at Fredericksburg, 
Virginia 
 
 
 By the spring of 1862 a sharp contrast had started to emerge between the operation of 
northern railroads and those of the South, and in the role played by volunteer troops in keeping 
them in good repair. These troops had no prior military engineering experience, and therefore 
their innovation and improvisation was matched only by the remarkable speed with which they 
accomplished their work.  For the North 1862 would bring about improvements in pontoon 
bridge design, the development of prefabricated bridges, better railroad management, and 
innovations to map making. Conversely, southern railroad management and engineering 
operations continued to struggle, and when General Joseph Johnston had an opportunity to 
severely damage George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in southeastern Virginia (the 
Peninsula) he failed to do so because he lacked a basic tool of any military operation—adequate 
maps—and enough skilled topographical engineers to make them.  
The battle of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, May 31, 1862, was a pyrrhic victory for the 
Confederates. Of the 60,000 men General Johnston had on hand to fight, the right wing of his 
army under General James Longstreet attacked the Union position with only six of thirteen 
brigades available, and no more than four of the six brigades were engaged at any one time.  
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The reason for this, according to historian Thomas B. Buell, was that because the Confederate 
army on the peninsula lacked an understanding of the roads and terrain making it impossible to 
get troops into position in a timely fashion.  Buell wrote that a coordinated attack was 
impossible.1 When Stonewall Jackson broke off his Shenandoah Valley Campaign to reinforce 
the southern army defending Richmond, then Brigadier General Richard Taylor observed, “The 
Confederates knew no more about the topography of the country than they did about Central 
Africa.” He continued, “Here was a limited district, the whole of it within a day’s march of the 
city of Richmond…and yet we were profoundly ignorant of the country, were without maps, 
sketches or proper guides, and nearly as helpless as if we had been transferred to the banks of 
the [Congo].”2 Taylor’s comments pointed out a major flaw in southern military operations 
throughout the war. The general understanding that fighting in the south gave the mapping 
advantage to the Confederacy was inaccurate. Southern commanders could rely on local citizens 
to provide information about roads, but this knowledge was inadequate when it came to 
campaign planning or moving thousands of men and material. What was determined passable 
by a local farmer was not necessary adequate for an army corps of twenty-five thousand men.  
 General Johnston and General Robert E. Lee, who replaced him after the former 
suffered a wound on June 1st, did not have a blatant disregard for maps. What they did have 
instead was a lack of mapmakers and a formal military bureau to establish, catalogue, and 
distribute maps. Before the war the United States Army had an established and functioning 
organization prepared to adapt to wartime conditions, this was the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers. The Confederate War Department was never able to match the Union’s 
topographical bureau. 
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 When the war began there were forty-five topographical engineering officers in the 
United States Army and only seven decided to join the Confederacy. Of those only four, Charles 
Read Collins, William Holding Echols, Joseph Dixon, and Joseph Christmas Ives served as 
southern topographical engineers during the war.3  Jed Hotchkiss, a civilian before 1861, would 
become the most famous Confederate topographer of the Civil War.4 A schoolteacher and self-
taught mapmaker and surveyor during the antebellum period, he joined General Jackson’s staff 
and provided the eccentric and aggressive general with a map of the Shenandoah Valley in 
March 1862, and after the Valley Campaign continued to work on the map for at least another 
eighteen months. Hotchkiss continued his service with the Army of Northern Virginia after 
Jackson’s death, but never received a military rank from the Confederate government. 
 After the fiasco at Seven Pines, the new commanding general, Robert E. Lee, an 
engineer himself, initiated a plan to make sure all engineering officers in the field army, 
including topographers, reported to one man, the army’s chief engineer at Lee’s headquarters.5 
This organization prevented engineers assigned with army corps and divisions from acting on 
different sets of orders. Lee appointed Lieutenant Colonel Walter Stevens of the engineers as 
head of the Department of Richmond, responsible for the city’s defenses. Then on June 6, 1862, 
Lee commissioned Albert H. Campbell captain of engineers and asked him to report directly to 
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Stevens.6 By December, Campbell’s office in Richmond became the map bureau of the 
engineering department.7 Hotchkiss, for his part, placed little faith in Campbell remembering 
him for the “large amount of bad work he had done and for the long time he took to do it in.”8 
Yet, regardless of Hotchkiss’s censure of Campbell, the few well-trained mapmakers of the 
Confederacy including William Willis Blackford and James Keith Boswell, experienced great 
difficulty procuring the proper equipment. Besides pencils, tracing paper, and field notebooks, 
topographical engineers needed telescopes, prismatic compasses, odometers, barometers, T-
squares, and boxes of colors.9  Other priorities and the Union blockade made these items hard 
to get. 
 Maps of various areas of the country were available in Richmond. These county maps 
made in peacetime, however, were worthless for wartime armies. Most of these maps identified 
towns, were small scale, and “showed no terrain features short of a mountain range.”10  Military 
maps not only needed to include accurate distances of roads and intricate terrain features 
including culverts, woodlands, and swamps, but they also needed to identify potable streams, 
springs, cultivated fields, pastures, and orchards.11 Effective military maps had to distinguish a 
road from a footpath or a trail through a swamp and bridge symbols on a map had to 
differentiate between a stone structure and a footbridge.12  
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 All topographical engineers used ingeniously simple ways to measure distances. The 
length of a horse (between seven and ten feet) to gauge the width of a road, keeping track of 
how many paces it took a horse to cover 500 yards, and the length of the engineer’s steps all 
were employed in determining distance. Engineers used frames of reference, and consequently, 
taught themselves what a church steeple looked like from ten miles away or what a house 
looked like five miles away.13 This spatial acuity helped engineers estimate the distance between 
infantry units on a battlefield, or determine the distance enemy forces were from their own 
positions.   
 Just like the skilled civilians who could be called upon to enhance and operate the 
North’s military railroads, Union topographical engineers had the advantage of a fully formed 
organization and the resources of civilian organizations including the United States Coast Survey, 
the Smithsonian Institution, the Naval Hydrographic Office, and the Pacific Wagon Road Office, 
an agency within the Interior Department.14  
 The United States Coast Survey was the oldest scientific organization in the United 
States. Its superintendent at the time of the Civil War, Alexander Dallas Bache, was a West Point 
graduate class of 1825, and he had served as the first president of the National Academy of 
Sciences. Bache had established the first magnetic observatory in the U. S. and by 1861 he 
agency had mapped the entire coast of the United States and had posted numerous observing 
stations along the coastline. Throughout the war Professor Bache furnished the armies in the 
field with civilian mapmakers to augment the work done by topographical engineers on 
headquarter staffs.15  
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Throughout the Peninsula Campaign McClellan’s chief topographer, Brigadier General 
Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, five lieutenants, Coast Survey assistants, and civil engineers 
working under arduous conditions, skillfully mapped out the complex landscape over which 
McClellan was attempting to move 115,000 men. Humphreys’s men made six maps to assist 
commanding generals in negotiating territory as well as Coast Survey maps of the James and 
York Rivers and the state map of Henrico County, Virginia.16  
 During the campaign, McClellan noticed that there was considerable overlap between 
Humphreys’s work and that of the army’s chief engineer Brigadier General John G. Barnard. 
Reconnaissance of roads, positions of the enemy, and the construction of siege and defensive 
works were tasks McClellan wrote, “habitually performed by detail from either corps as the 
convenience of the service demanded.”17 Since both topographical engineers and engineers 
performed overlapping jobs, eventually, as an experiment, McClellan would unite the two corps 
under Captain Duane of the engineers. 
 Poor maps had proved problematic for the southern army at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. 
Yet, for the Army of the Potomac, skilled engineering from an unlikely source, the First 
Minnesota Infantry, proved to be the reason McClellan’s army avoided disaster.  Five bridges 
were constructed over the Chickahominy River west of McClellan’s base of operation at White 
House, one by the First Minnesota. The Chickahominy flowed through an area of heavily 
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timbered swamp, which was generally 300 to 400 yards wide.18 When the battle began on May 
31st Union forces were deployed on a northwestern line along the river with the exception of 
Brigadier General Erasmus Darwin Keyes’s Fourth Corps, which had crossed to the Richmond 
side of the river and advanced as far as Fair Oaks Station on the Confederates’ right flank and 
Seven Pines on their left flank. Keyes’s men were isolated, and Confederate General Johnston 
decided to take advantage of the situation in the hopes of encircling Keyes and destroying his 
entire corps. McClellan was frantic. The general ordered Brigadier General Edwin Vose Sumner’s 
Second Corps to cross the river immediately and reinforce the retreating Keyes, but Sumner 
faced a disaster waiting to happen. Three days of heavy rains had turned the river into swollen 
rapids, and the flooring of the bridge the Minnesotans built was rising, soon to tear apart under 
the pressure of the water.   
 Longstreet’s corps was to envelop the Union right by taking the Nine Mile Road.  D. H. 
Hill was to make a secondary attack along the Williamsburg Road, and Benjamin Huger was to 
protect the Confederate right flank along Charles City Road. Without good maps, Longstreet’s 
corps managed to get on the wrong roads, the ones assigned to Hill and Huger. As a result, 
approximately 30,000 men were congested along a five-mile stretch of road and were unable to 
move. Johnston ordered the attack for 6:00am, but it took Longstreet seven hours to sort out 
the confusion and bring six of his brigades on line. The critical time lost and a sturdy bridge built 
by two companies from the First Minnesota under the command of Captain Mark W. Downie 
and second lieutenant Christopher Heffelfinger saved Keyes’s corps from destruction and the 
Army of the Potomac from humiliation.  James A. Wright of Company F described the 
construction process. “The whole structure was a simple one, and just such a one as I had seen 
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built on the Cannon River when the first stage road was made to St. Paul. ‘Cribs’—or pens of 
logs were built at proper distances apart, to the desired height. On these cribs, long stringers 
were laid; and on these, the flooring of the bridge. The logs of these cribs were notched 
together at the corners and were fastened with pins and withes, until the weight—as they were 
built up—forced them to the bottom. These cribs had to be held in position until they found a 
resting place in the mud.”19  
 Instead of withes, which were willow branches or long flexible twigs from a tree or 
shrub, Captain Downie suggested the use of grapevines because he felt that with swift running 
water in the river the grapevines would provide more stability. McClellan had ordered General 
Edwin Sumner’s II Corps forward to reinforce Keyes isolated force and when Sumner reached 
the bridge, as Downie predicted, high water was affecting the stability of the structure, Colonel 
Alexander of the engineers implored Sumner not to cross. 
 “General Sumner, you cannot cross this bridge.” 
 “Can’t cross the bridge? I can, sir. I will, sir!” 
 “Don’t you see the approaches are breaking up and the logs displaced? It is impossible.” 
 “Impossible? Sir, I tell you I can cross. I am ordered.”20 
 The approaches at both ends of the bridge were a morass. Colonel Alexander observed, 
once on the bridge, “it swayed to and fro to the angry flood below or the living freight above, 
settling down and grasping the solid stumps by which it was made secure as the line 
advanced.”21 Led by Sumner, Brigadier General John Sedgwick’s division and Brigadier General 
Israel Richardson’s division crossed throughout the night and arrived in time to save Keyes left 
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wing from collapse. Just as the last soldier walked off the bridge, soldiers later recalled, the 
strength and tension binding the bridge materials together broke apart and the bridge collapsed 
with a deafening sound into the turgid river.22 
 After Lee took command of the army he ordered a general withdrawal from the Fair 
Oaks area. This gave both armies time to reorganize and for McClellan time to repair and build 
more bridges. Again the volunteer engineers would demonstrate ingenuity and innovation, but 
their efforts who also reveal a problem within the command structure. One of the most 
remarkable bridges constructed by men from both the 15th and 50th New York Engineers was 
called Woodbury Bridge. In six days of rain the engineers constructed a causeway 15 feet wide, 
to the bridge through a swamp. The causeway and bridge covered a distance of one mile, and an 
earth embankment on each side protected the bridge against rising water.23  
The Engineer Brigade, with the assistance of the Third Vermont Regiment also built a 
bridge opposite Dr. Peterfield Trent’s home (McClellan’s Headquarters) that was 1,080 feet long 
and constructed with 40 cribs and 6 trestles.24 Another officer from the 15th New York, Captain 
William A. Ketchum, almost lost a bridge to rising water, but after removing a damaged trestle 
and skillfully replacing it, finished his project in nineteen hours. Yet, he issued a complaint in his 
report to Major General Daniel Phineas Woodbury commander of the Engineer Brigade, which 
would reveal early problems with the Union army’s command structure. Ketchum wrote, “I 
would also beg leave respectfully to report that I was very much annoyed by the constant 
interference of officers higher in rank than myself, who came to me ordering me to hurry up the 
work, and representing that they had the authority of the general commanding.”25 
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 The restoration and refitting of both armies finally came to an end on June 25th at Oak 
Grove. In an attempt to drive Confederate units from his front and begin a progressive assault 
on Richmond, McClellan ordered an attack that was repulsed by a larger Rebel force. There were 
626 Northern and 441 Southern casualties. The next day Lee seized the initiative in what later 
would be called the Seven Days’ Battles. The ferocity of the Confederate attacks at 
Mechanicsville on June 26th and Gaines’s Mill on June 27th demonstrated two things: McClellan 
did not have the stomach to fight, and Lee and his men did.  On the same day the fighting began 
at Oak Grove, McClellan considered moving his base of operation from White House to 
somewhere along the James River near the navy’s gunboats. Barnard sent Woodbury to White 
Oak Swamp Creek to build three bridges and to corduroy a road through the swamp itself. The 
latter was approximately five miles southeast of the Grapevine Bridge. The creek was narrow 
and not difficult to bridge, but it was bound on each side by approximately 200 yards of swamp. 
Cutting trees, building a raised corduroy road, and doing it all in twenty-four hours was the 
challenge.  On the 27th McClellan ordered the, army to “change the base of operation” to the 
James River and Lee’s intention was to cut them off.  
 Fighting continued at Savage’s Station on the 29th, but the dénouement was to be at 
White Oak Swamp. If Stonewall Jackson could crossover to the left or south bank of the 
Chickahominy River and then strike the retreating Federals from the flank or rear he would 
destroy McClellan’s army. Jackson, however, had one major obstacle in his path. To carry out 
Lee’s orders he had to rebuild a bridge across the river. Union engineers had destroyed all the 
structures they had worked so hard to construct and maintain. From New Bridge near Gaines’s 
Mill to Bottom Bridge east of Savage’s Station everything was destroyed. On June 29th Jackson 
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ordered Major Robert Lewis Dabney, former schoolteacher and pastor, to rebuild the Grapevine 
Bridge.26 
 Dabney served as Jackson’s assistant adjutant general, and in that role he was the 
general’s advisor, confidante, and spiritual director, but as an engineer, Dabney incompetent. 
The only logical explanation for the reason why Jackson selected the major was because there 
were no engineers available. To compound Jackson’s two problems, a bridge had to be built and 
he had an unskilled engineer to build it, the men Dabney chose as laborers knew nothing of 
carpentry and construction, and these men were not pleased to be used as work gangs. This 
became a common theme throughout the rest of the war—southern soldiers did not sign up to 
dig ditches and labor at menial tasks, they signed up to kill Yankees.27  
 Help arrived around mid-morning. Captain Claiborne Rice Mason, a road builder before 
the war and self-taught engineer, arrived with his slaves and took over the work on the bridge. A 
martinet, Mason was confident his slaves would do exactly as told, and the bridge would be 
finished before noon. Unfortunately for Mason the Chickahominy River remained high and 
rebuilding it required some improvisation on behalf of the workers who were not allowed to 
think for themselves. The problem was with the center section. 
 Union engineers had also had problems with the center section. After the first 
Grapevine Bridge tore apart due to the high and swift current, McClellan immediately ordered it 
rebuilt, and the assignment went to Captain Ira Spaulding of the 50th New York Volunteer 
Engineers. After his men had been in the cold water for at least nine hours, frequently diving 
beneath the surface to place the legs of the trestles, Spaulding realized the rapid current was 
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shifting the legs of the center portion of the bridge. It would only be a matter of time before the 
trestle section in question would be carried down the river. Spaulding’s solution was to 
dismantle the center section and then anchor and tie off a pontoon in the middle of the bridge.  
The floating pontoons could now ride the current provided they were lashed to the anchored 
trestle sections. So the new center was connected to the side rails of the trestle sections; one 
coming from the south bank and the one coming from the north bank. After twelve hours the 
bridge was completed.28 
 Now Confederate Captain Mason had to rebuild the Grapevine Bridge, and it was not 
clear how he did it. Then twenty-four hours after Dabney started construction it Mason finished 
the rebuilding on the morning of June 30th. Meanwhile, the main body of the Confederate Army 
was attacking McClellan’s forces at Frayser’s Farm. The Union line formed a right angle along 
White Oak Swamp Creek and was waiting when Jackson’s men struck around noon. Jackson’s 
tardiness eliminated any hope of a pincer movement and cutting off the retiring army from its 
supply base. Jackson was faulted for arriving late and making a poor showing during the Seven 
Days Battles. Some historians blamed it on his fatigue after fighting a brilliant Valley Campaign.  
Others argued that personality conflicts with subordinates slowed him down, while some 
described it as a mystery, citing the man’s reflective mind, and his observable eccentricities. 
Now a lack of army engineers and soldiers who were willing to labor all day in waist high cold 
water should be added to the list of reasons why Jackson arrived too late to cut McClellan’s 
army off from its supply base, and perhaps alter the course of the war.   
 The final battle of the Peninsula Campaign was fought on July 1st at a place called 
Malvern Hill. Lee continued to pound away at McClellan’s army, but at a high price—5,355 killed 
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or wounded. A combined total of 8,569 casualties at Malvern Hill forced both armies to break 
off the fighting, and Lee moved back toward his Richmond defenses and McClellan toward his 
new base at Harrison’s Landing on the James River. The Union Army would not move back to the 
Washington, D. C. area until August, but the Peninsula Campaign was over. The manpower cost 
to the Army of Northern Virginia was staggering, but Richmond was saved and the Union Army 
beaten. Lee had replaced Johnston on June 1st, and from then on Lee’s reputation as an 
aggressive and audacious general soared.  
Conversely, the Army of the Potomac was slow and poorly led. McClellan’s hubris 
prevented him learning from his mistakes and moving forward. Instead, he blamed others, 
especially Lincoln and Stanton. The administration believed he had wasted a golden opportunity 
to end the war, and although he would chase Lee through southern Maryland and stop him at 
Antietam in September 1862, his reputation for inertia, earned in southeastern Virginia, stuck 
with him. It was well deserved.  Little Mac’s inactivity allowed Lee to maintain the initiative and 
fight on Confederate terms, and it raised questions in Lincoln’s mind as to whether McClellan 
was capable of regaining the initiative, taking risks, and overcoming setbacks without retreating. 
 Another thing that was not clear in July 1862 was whether the Union’s significant 
advantage in engineering, technology, and logistics, would really matter. For the Confederacy, 
there were just enough trained army engineers to mark out and supervise the construction of 
major defenses around key geographic points in the South, making it difficult for Union armies 
to invade the southern heartland and making it possible to prolong the war and force the war 
weary Northern public to demand peace and recognition of the Confederacy. Yet, a lack of 
engineers and poor skills in those within the army had already hampered the South. The disaster 
at Fort Henry, the inability to establish a management protocol for the railroads, the lack of 
attention paid to the barebones engineering bureau in Richmond, poor maps, few soldiers 
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willing to labor on engineering projects, and no engineer battalion or regiment in any of the 
armies in the field, foretold future logistical problems and raised concerns about how creative 
and aggressive southern commanders could be with their forces. 
 It was apparent in July 1862, although perhaps taken for granted by generals such as 
McClellan, that engineers were essential to northern logistical operations, the army’s 
movements, and finally to victory. Bridge building, military railroad management, road making, 
extended supply lines, mapmaking, and technological improvisations had all been attempted 
with a fair amount of success. A better management system for the railroads and a clear chain 
of command in the army between field and staff officers needed to be worked out but the 
foundation was laid.  Haupt was on the verge of creating the railroad Construction Corps, and 
McCallum was building the United States Military Railroad Bureau. There were three regiments 
and one battalion of engineer soldiers in the eastern theater, and there were two regiments and 
one company of engineer soldiers in the western theater. The United States Coast Survey was 
assisting the topographical engineers, and a Military Telegraph Corps was established.   
 The creation of the United States Military Railroad Bureau began in an inconspicuous 
fashion in the spring of 1861 then Secretary of War Simon Cameron had seized all the 
commercial telegraph lines around Washington. He then asked Thomas Scott to help him 
manage the telegraph and railroads lines around the capital.29  
 Scott asked Andrew Carnegie, superintendent of the Pittsburg division of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, to assist him and under Carnegie’s guidance the first government 
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telegraph line was built connecting the War Office with the Navy Yard.30 Scott then called on 
four telegraph operators from the Pennsylvania Railroad to report to Washington to form the 
nucleus of the Signal Telegraph Corps. The corps functioned independently except for 
supervisors who received a nominal military rank because these men had to draw funds from 
the Quartermaster Department. All the operators received orders directly from the secretary of 
war. The corps employed more than 1500 civilian operators and construction workers.31 After 
the Peninsula Campaign the telegraph corps started to build more permanent lines hung from 
poles and protected by Union cavalry patrols. Eventually, copper wire insulated by vulcanized 
rubber was used to protect the lines from the elements, and by the end of the war the 
construction corps had laid 15,000 miles of wire.32 
 From the standpoint of the engineers, the Peninsula Campaign demonstrated their 
mettle. Their last bridge at Barrett’s Ferry was built under the direction of Spaulding from the 
50th New York and Lieutenants Cross and Comstock of the Engineer Battalion, and was made up 
of five spans of trestle and ninety-six pontoons. The bridge was 1,980 feet long, and despite the 
deep water and strong tidal currents, it was completed in less than twenty-four hours. 
Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs reported 5,899 horses and 8,708 mules drawing 
2,578 wagons and 415 ambulances, and 12,378 artillery and cavalry horses moved over the 
bridge.33In General Barnard’s report, it was clear he had finally come around to appreciating the 
skill and commitment of the volunteers. He wrote, “On the Chickahominy and on retreat to the 
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James the duties of the brigade were arduous, as have been described, and I found in its chief 
throughout the campaign an officer prompt and fertile in expedients, daring and assiduous in 
execution, and always exhibiting a wise foresight.”34  
 Barnard’s commentary was also unique among the thousands filed by commanding 
officers throughout the war. It was a polemic as much as it was a report. Not only did it recap 
the operations of his men, but it also reflected on the challenges ahead.  The report asked two 
major questions: what went wrong during the campaign and what needed to change in order to 
best maximize the contribution the engineers would surely make to bringing about the defeat of 
the Confederacy? 
 Barnard was candid. The campaign failed because the army lost the initiative from the 
moment it landed at Fort Monroe. Morale and power rested with the army, but the siege of 
Yorktown and the fact that the “troops toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the 
swamps…took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement 
of combat, impaired morale.”35 The disasters of the campaign were self-inflicted, deprived the 
army of élan, diminished manpower and materials. 
 In order to improve the engineering function within the army, Barnard made four 
recommendations: (1) promote engineers to adequate rank, (2) provide proper recognition for 
the distinguished service of engineers, (3) recruit more engineer forces and properly organize 
them, and (4) provide the engineers with the authority to deliver and maintain the proper tools.  
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 The general argued that engineers carried with them great responsibility. The efforts to 
get ordnance, ammunition, food, and medical assistance to the front lines most often depended 
on temporary bridges and roadways built under dangerous conditions and over inhospitable 
ground. Engineers fixed defensive positions and indicated the “points of attack of fortified 
positions.”36 Accurate maps had to be prepared to prevent commanders from taking the wrong 
road and getting lost at a crucial time during a battle. “Adequate rank,” Barnard wrote, “is 
almost as necessary to an officer for the efficient discharge of his duties as professional 
knowledge…. To give him the proper weight with those with whom he is associated he should 
have, as they have, adequate rank.”37 
 This lack of rank Barnard equated with a lack of recognition, distinction, and respect. 
Field commanders seldom wrote about engineering operations in their reports, and George 
McClellan, once an army engineer himself, took the work of the engineers for granted. Barnard 
argued that this lack of recognition was unfair. He also believed that by limiting promotions for 
engineers the corps had lost good men like George Meade, George Thomas, James McPherson, 
and William Rosecrans to field commands.38 
More engineer soldiers were needed and a better chain of command had to be 
implemented. Each army corps had to have their own engineer troops, a pontoon train, and 
tools. Under the current system the commanding general detailed engineering soldiers, yet 
corps and division commanders also demanded work from the same soldiers. For example, the 
Grapevine Bridge was being rebuilt when General Sumner was ordered to cross it. The engineers 
did not know he was coming and had not determined the safety of the bridge. Sumner did not 
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care. He planned to cross the river. An engineering party from Sumner’s Corps could have 
arrived at the bridge and focused on its construction. As it was, the actual engineers working on 
the bridge were undermanned, and as a result, infantry soldiers from the First Minnesota were 
helping to build the bridge. In addition, the tools used on the bridges were scattered 
everywhere. Because the tools were distributed by the Quartermaster Department it was 
difficult to maintain any system of responsibility for the tools. In some cases engineers had 
problems constructing causeways and bridges because they had no tools or very few of them.  
 The soldiers, say with the First Minnesota, the Ninth and Twenty-second 
Massachusetts, or the Third Vermont, infantry regiments who built bridges during the campaign, 
found an axe or a shovel “a very convenient thing to have at his camp, and carried one off with 
him. When the army moved he found it inconvenient to carry it and threw it away.”39  
More engineering soldiers were needed as well.  Barnard in his report lamented the 
shortage of engineer troops and tools, yet astute infantry commanders soon recognized that 
there were men within volunteer infantry regiments who had the skills to build bridges. The 
antebellum labor force in the North had produced a vast quantity of men who had mechanical 
or construction skills. They had worked with their hands in clock factories, ship yards, armories, 
mills, locomotive plants, and they had learned how to fix things sometimes just by improvising. 
These men would prove to be the Union Army’s greatest advantage. 
 Finally, Barnard evaluated the pontoon equipage used during the campaign to 
determine what the army should adopt in future offensives. In the fall 1861 Duane had 
recommended the use of French pontoons and now the general finally agreed. He wrote, “The 
Birago trestle, of which I had formed so high an opinion, proved itself dangerous and 
unreliable—useful for an advance guard or detachment, unfit in general for a military bridge.” 
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He also ruled out American India-rubber and Russian canvas pontoons.40 The advantage to the 
Birago trestle was its light weight. The problem was its strength. On the other hand the engineer 
soldiers had trouble maneuvering the French pontoons into position but they had what Barnard 
described as “floatation power.” The pontoon was designed to carry a significant amount of 
traffic. “No make-shift expedient, no ingenious inventions not tested by severe experiment, nor 
light affair, of which the chief merit alleged is that it is light, will be likely to do what is required, 
and what the French pontoon has so often done.”41  
 General Barnard was also partially correct when he wrote to Chief Engineer of the 
United States Army, Brigadier General Joseph Totten in January 1863 that the “movements of 
the whole army were determined by the engineers.”42  Because besides bridge and road building 
the railroads had played a critical role in the Army of the Potomac’s and the newly formed Army 
of Virginia’s actions in the late summer and fall of 1862.  
 When General McDowell was ordered to break off his movement toward Richmond on 
May 26, 1862 and move west into the Shenandoah Valley through Front Royal to trap 
“Stonewall” Jackson the necessity of developing a transportation plan was critical. The Orange & 
Alexandria and Manassas Gap railroads would become the central characters in his army’s rapid 
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shift of position. Haupt and his civilian construction crew repaired the lines so quickly that 
supplies were flowing into Front Royal by June 1st. It was an apocryphal comment, but runaway 
slaves remarked, “The Yankees can build bridges faster than the Rebs can burn them down.”43  
When McDowell’s was ordered to the Shenandoah Valley, the move exposed a major 
flaw in the young military railroad department’s command structure. Stanton had given 
McCallum the same authority to “enter upon, take possession of, hold and use all railroads…that 
may be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition and military supplies.”44 These 
same instructions had been given to Haupt and Daniel Stone, and now the former was to 
operate in Stone’s territory. The result was that Stone vehemently objected to Haupt’s orders. 
Haupt, puzzled by the management confusion and conflicting authority took his concerns to 
McDowell. Notified by McDowell about the predicament, without hesitation, Stanton wired 
Haupt giving him supreme authority over the railroads “within the geographical limits of the 
Department of the Rappahannock.”45 This management decision still left a problem because 
theoretically Stanton gave Haupt authority over Stone and over McCallum who was the head of 
military railroads.  
Fortunately, serendipity brought together McCallum and Haupt.  Both understood each 
other’s gifts and talents. McCallum was a skilled engineer with considerable administrative skills, 
and he understood the magnitude of the work ahead and the need for overall control of his 
department. Northern Virginia was his immediate focus, but soon the army’s western theater of 
operation would require his attention as well. Conversely, Haupt wanted to be working in the 
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field, engaged in the construction of railroads and the transportation problems that frequently 
arose. Both men tacitly accepted each others role and this turned into a boon for the North.46 
 Haupt, now as chief of construction and transportation for the Department of the 
Rappahannock started an organization process that revealed his true genius.  First, he analyzed 
the number of deficiencies in railroad operations up to that point in the war. He discovered that 
there was significant military interference in running the trains, equipment was insufficient, and 
supply depots refused to unload cars in a timely fashion and never returned them.  Operators 
were not always at their posts, and there were no timetables. Trains used for military personnel 
and equipment did not run on a schedule. Consequently, he issued his first set of general orders 
on June 2nd outlining expectations of his personnel, and establishing operating standards for 
army commanders. No military officers, except McDowell, were to interfere in the running of 
the trains. The trains would run on a schedule, to which everyone was to adhere. All trains 
would depart on time, fully loaded or not. Conductors and agents were to report to Haupt on a 
daily basis, noting exact arrival and departure times of the trains.47 Before Haupt’s regulations, 
trains had operated by telegraph and when the wires were cut the trains stood still.48 
 Of course Haupt’s general orders did not eliminate his headaches. Just two days after he 
published his regulations, he received an order from Quartermaster General Meigs directing him 
to report to a quartermaster officer at a depot in order to expedite a shipment of supplies to 
Union cavalry units who had been without for several days.  Haupt turned the telegram over to 
McDowell.  McDowell then made a decision that no doubt altered the course of the war. He 
telegraphed Stanton the following: “I beg that the Quartermaster-General’s telegram, directing 
Colonel Haupt to report to Colonel Rucker, may be revoked…. With the broken-down road, and 
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weak, worn-out locomotives, bridges going down with the freshet, and insufficient assistance, 
he has difficulty enough without adding to them by placing him under an officer who has had no 
experience in the business of railroad management, of which Haupt is the head.” Understanding 
Haupt would not tolerate serving under someone with fewer skills than himself, McDowell 
added this final sentence, “I shall lose [him] to all intents and purposes if he is placed under an 
officer who is not under my command, and who knows comparatively nothing of the business 
he is to superintend.”49 Stanton rescinded the order. This was, without exaggeration, one of 
Stanton’s most important decisions of the war.  
 With the support of McDowell and Stanton, Haupt continued to provide structure to 
railroad operations. As he supervised various construction crews mending track, building 
bridges, and repairing locomotives, an inchoate concept of a permanent Construction Corps 
began to seep into in his business-like mind. Just one week after McDowell’s telegram to 
Stanton, Haupt issued his blueprint for a Construction Corps. Laborers recruited from civilian life 
and from regiments within his department would be paid extra for their services in exchange for 
working hard. The expectations were not ambiguous: “Men who are not willing to work, even 
for sixteen hours continuously, when required, are not wanted in the Construction Corps of the 
Rappahannock and are requested to leave it and return to their regiments at once.”50 Men were 
formed into squads of ten men commanded by a non-commissioned officer, and either a civilian 
foreman or an army lieutenant commanded two squads. Multiple squads were lead by a 
superintendent or army captain. 
 Haupt kept up a furious pace and did not care whom he offended. He was confident in 
his ability to deliver a superb railroad system to the army and took whatever actions necessary 
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to accomplish the task. New regulations came out from his office at the end of June. 
Quartermaster and commissary officers were forbidden to load cars without proper authority. 
The common practice of shipping materials used by officers for their own private use was no 
longer permitted. Haupt made many an officer angry and unhappy, but he remained impervious 
to their demands.  
  McCallum and Haupt continued to implement the military railroad system as Major 
General John Pope was given command of the newly reorganized Department of the 
Rappahannock now known as the Army of Virginia, Fresh from his western theater victories, 
Pope arrived in Virginia ready to go on the offensive. Although aggressive, Pope possessed a 
McClellan complex. The hero of Island No. 10 believed he was called east to regain the initiative 
lost by Army of the Potomac’s efforts on the Peninsula. He believed the President and War 
Department selected him because he proved himself to be the top general in the army. Pope 
would crush Lee’s army and end the Civil War. 
 Unlike McDowell, who was made a corps commander under Pope, the major general 
refused to recognize Haupt as part of the army organization and made clear that “a separate 
and independent department for the construction and operation of the railroads was 
unnecessary.”51 Since the railroads were used to transport supplies Pope placed his 
quartermaster department in charge of them. Haupt then went to Washington, explained his 
displeasure with the arrangement and asked to be relieved. Stanton granted his request and the 
railroad man went back to his home in Massachusetts just as the Army of Virginia started its 
summer offensive.  
 If Pope hoped to destroy Lee’s army somewhere in Virginia, he would need the control 
of the railroads to accomplish it. His major supply line from Washington extended twenty-five 
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miles to Manassas Junction along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, where warehouses and 
railroad cars stored a wealth of food, clothing, shoes, and ammunition. His forward base of 
operation was another thirty miles south to Rappahannock Station. The Army of Virginia 
continued south until August 9th when it clashed with 24,000 men under “Stonewall” Jackson at 
Cedar Mountain.  
 After General John Pope became the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and had 
dismissed Herman Haupt’s value to the army, he soon realized the error of his ways, as did the 
War Department for accepting the railroad man’s resignation. Assistant Secretary of War P. H. 
Watson telegraphed Haut after the Battle of Cedar Mountain: “Come back immediately; cannot 
get along without you; not a wheel moving on any of the roads.”52  
In Haupt’s absence confusion reigned. Generals interfered with timetables, 
quartermasters neglected to unload and return cars, and large supply stores sat untouched. 
During this period of chaos and confusion, Haupt decided to return. Within weeks he brought 
back some semblance of order, but the meddling conduct of generals and staff officers did not 
cease. For example, on August 23rd Brigadier General Samuel Davis Sturgis announced to Haupt 
that the general was to assume military control of the railroads for the benefit of his division.  In 
October, a Confederate freight conductor working for the South Side Railroad refused to pick up 
a rush shipment of ammunition over a four-day period that was needed in Knoxville to supply 
General Kirby Smith’s campaign in Kentucky. Complaints came to the secretary of war who took 
the matter up with quartermaster Myers. Myers told Secretary of War Randolph “he had no 
control over the railroads.” Randolph knew this and let the matter drop.53 
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Haupt immediately contacted the War Department and sent a telegram to the Sturgis: 
“You have now detained 5 trains 2 ½ hours. You kept the sick from coming to Alexandria where 
the Medical Director has long been waiting with ambulances. Some of the sick have died in the 
cars. The engines may be ruined by standing so long fired without the ability to move.” Enclosing 
a copy of Pope’s general order dated August 18, 1862 giving Haupt complete control over the 
railroads, the colonel then told Sturgis that unless ordered by Stanton, Halleck, or Pope, the 
general’s men were not to board the train that evening.54 Halleck then telegraphed Haupt and 
Sturgis to say that no one was to give orders to the colonel’s subordinates except through 
Haupt, and no one was to interfere in the running of the trains.55 
When Sturgis received Haupt’s message countermanding the general’s order to take 
control of the train his anger was heard and felt by everyone. “God damned son of a bitch,” he 
bellowed and then threatened to shoot the colonel if he continued to cause problems.  He 
would have Haupt arrested and disgraced. How dare he embarrass a superior officer. “I want to 
see how the damn son of a bitch looks in the face,”56 Sturgis sent provost marshal guards to 
bring Haupt to the general’s headquarters. By the time Haupt arrived under guard Sturgis was 
drunk. At the same time Halleck’s dispatch arrived giving complete authority over the railroads 
to Haupt. He then had a difficult time convincing the intoxicated general that the note was from 
Halleck not Pope. Throughout the next few hours Sturgis just kept repeating, “I don’t care for 
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John Pope a pinch of owl dung.”57 Sturgis finally blew himself out and Colonel Haupt went back 
to work only to deal with the next crisis.   
Five days after the Sturgis incident the Army of Virginia met disaster at Second Bull Run.  
The railroads, under Haupt’s direction, however, continued to establish some noteworthy 
accomplishments. On the single tracked Orange & Alexandria railroad operators managed to 
maintain a steady flow of supplies and men to the battlefield and to evacuate the wounded and 
support the army’s withdrawal. The construction corps made repairs to the lines, corrected 
derailments, and built bridges. In a twenty-four period the effective management of the rails 
allowed the army to transport 15,000 soldiers, ammunition, food, forage, and wounded.58 Haupt 
worked for days without sleep and Stanton, Lincoln, and the cabinet were most grateful for his 
efforts. On September 5th he was promoted to brigadier general. Haupt, however, did not sign 
the commission because he never wanted to be under binding military orders.59 Stanton would 
only tolerate this arrangement for a short time longer. 
Meanwhile, Haupt continued to suggest to Stanton ways in which the military railroad 
bureau could be improved, especially in the western theater. Haupt did not see McCallum as the 
head of all military railroads, and instead saw him as just the chief administrator. Now Haupt 
suggested McCallum be promoted to brigadier general and placed in charge, and Haupt who 
saw himself as the current director of military railroads and head of the construction bureau, 
would remain chief of construction and transportation and would report to McCallum “all 
matters appertaining to the office details.”60 Stanton, who was upset with Haupt for not signing 
his commission, filed the latter’s recommendations and did nothing to revamp the railroad 
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bureau. It would continue to operate as it did throughout the summer of 1862 with men 
assigned as repair engineers and superintendents to specific railroads and all reporting to Haupt. 
The Construction Corps by December 1862 was made up of 1,700 to 2,000 men and were used 
as the situation dictated.61  
Construction squads were augmented by numbers of runaway slaves that first trickled 
and then started to flood into Union camps. McClellan insisted the runaways be returned to 
their owners and many field commanders complied with the general’s order.  Evidence 
suggested that railroad superintendents were less willing to dismiss the impoverished blacks, 
and instead put them to work on railroad construction. In early October, the engineer in charge 
of railroad repairs, Erasmus L. Wentz, wrote McCallum imploring him to send shoes so the 
contraband could continue to work. “The negro force that I have on the Norfolk and Petersburg 
Railroad in Government employ, are so poorly shod that I find it impossible to work them any 
longer without furnishing them with shoes.” He continued, “I find it impossible to procure the 
necessary permission from Military Authority here.”62  
In the summer and fall of 1862, under Haupt’s leadership, the United States Military 
Railroad remained in its adolescent phase but accomplished two things that would guide the 
service throughout the rest of the war. Military personnel would not interfere with railroad 
operations. Civilian experts, some now in uniform, recruited by McCallum and Haupt, would 
control the United States Military Railroad. Officers were prevented from commandeering cars 
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for their own use, and soldiers, for example were stopped from stealing wood intended for 
locomotive fuel.63 Strict schedules and protocols were maintained moving men and material, 
loading and unloading cars, and in following shipping priorities: subsistence, forage, 
ammunition, hospital supplies, veteran troops, and then new recruits.64  
 Unlike the Federal army, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia did not have skilled 
manpower, or support from the Confederate government regarding the control of the railroads, 
yet both Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson understood the railroad’s value. Lee had 
disengaged from actions around Richmond in the summer of 1862 and utilized the railroad to 
operate against Pope’s army. During the Second Bull Run campaign Jackson managed to capture 
seven locomotives of the United States Military Railroad.65 What happened to the locomotives, 
however, was a sad commentary on Confederate railroad management and this would 
beleaguer the South for the remainder of the war. 
 A brief background is in order. Shortly before First Bull Run, President Davis appointed 
William Shepperd Ashe, major and assistant quartermaster, to be in charge of Confederate 
railroad transportation in Virginia. He was the president of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad 
and just before the outbreak of hostilities he discussed plans for the creation of a Southern rail 
system.66 His problems in the fall of 1861 and winter of 1862 were monumental. Many of the 
major railways were only single-track, like the Orange & Alexandria, rolling stock and engines 
were limited, freight was backed up at stations in Tennessee with cargo headed for Richmond, 
railroad presidents focused on making a profit, and governors protected their sovereign status 
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under the principles of states’ rights.67 Under these conditions any attempt by military officers 
to interfere in the operation of the railroad, or in the repair of locomotives and track, often was 
met with a scathing letter from the lines president.  
 Encouraged by Secretary of War George W. Randolph, just a week before the Second 
Battle of Bull Run, President Davis recommended the appointment of someone to coordinate 
railway operations throughout the South, but Quartermaster General Abraham C. Meyers 
opposed the idea. Government control, he argued, would anger railroad personnel, cost too 
much money, and confuse public and private accounts. Further discussion on the matter went 
silent when on September 1, 1862 Generals Jackson and Lee presented seven locomotives to 
the quartermaster’s department in Richmond.68 
 It was decided that the seven engines would be divided by lots and the results were that 
the Orange & Alexandria secured three and the Virginia Central and Richmond & Danville two 
each. This infuriated the president of the B & O, but the new railroad manager, Captain Mason 
Morfit, countered that the B & O had less need of additional locomotives to rent to the 
government.69 President of the railroad, John S. Barbour, Jr., and a number of his employees, 
had taken the captured equipment across the Rappahannock to safety so Barbour felt entitled 
to his choice of engines. The unfolding dispute over how they were distributed was a microcosm 
of the Confederacy’s transportation squabbles.  
Theoretically, the captured locomotives belonged to the army since Lee and Jackson 
confiscated them. Yet, there was no transportation sage within the War Department to dictate 
the terms of their use because private companies operated all the railroad lines. The 
management problem was even more cumbersome when supplies came from outside the state. 
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For example, Morfit’s sphere of influence did not extend south beyond Roanoke. North Carolina 
had their own coordinator of military railroad traffic, as did the other states in the 
Confederacy.70  
 Also, it was torturously difficult to construct new lines. During the 1850s the South 
witnessed an expansion of lines primarily designed to move agricultural goods, not freight or 
passengers, to coastal centers for export overseas. This meant that when the war broke out 
serious gaps existed between important supply areas, especially connecting the heartland with 
the outer rim of the Confederacy, which would see the heaviest fighting and largest 
concentration of troops. One such gap was between Danville, Virginia and Greensboro, North 
Carolina. Greensboro was connected to Wilmington, Charleston, and Atlanta by rail, and 
although there was a line 130 miles east of the city that connected central and eastern North 
Carolina with Petersburg and Richmond, a western link running along the edge of the 
Appalachian Mountains did not exist.  
 It made sense to build the line but powerful business interests in North Carolina had 
initial doubts because it would divert western commerce to Virginia and not the North Carolina 
coast. All parties finally agreed to build the line after months of haggling between the 
Confederate government and Richmond and North Carolina businessmen and politicians. The 
Piedmont Railroad Company, subsidized by the government, selected Captain Edmund T. D. 
Myers, son of the quartermaster general to supervise the construction. Young Myers was a 
capable engineer and a good choice. The 28-mile line was successfully completed by late 1863, 
but not without major frustrations.71  
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 The first problem was labor. Funds from the Richmond & Danville were used to 
purchase slave labor. When that effort failed to produce enough workers the War Department 
cited a Virginia state law allowing them to impress slaves from owners in order to work on the 
line, but the governor of North Carolina, Zebulon Vance, refused to assist in contributing to the 
labor pool. He made it clear that he was not in favor of the road, and when Secretary of War 
James A. Seddon suggested a change of gauge for the road to match the Richmond & Danville, 
the governor responded in his inexorable and cynical style. “In regards to the gauge of the roads 
I have to say that the proposition to make it conform with the Virginia road had been disposed 
of in the negative before yours [telegram] was received.”72  
 Second, Myers could not get supplies and iron fast enough because private companies, 
including the long disused Roanoke Valley Railroad, blocked his attempts to secure the tracks. 
Myer wrote to Jeremy Gilmer in July 1863 advocating a complete takeover of the project by the 
Engineer Bureau, and Gilmer agreed. Gilmer for his part endorsed Myers’s suggestion and 
presented it to Secretary of War Seddon. The secretary, who understood the political climate in 
the capital and among the governors, just acknowledged the receipt of the idea and then 
ignored it.73 
 In the summer of 1862 the South did enjoy one bright moment of success in its railroad 
operations. After the Union capture of Corinth, Mississippi and began moving slowly east 
through northern Alabama, Confederate General Kirby Smith realized that with considerable 
reinforcements, he could mount a surprise offensive from Knoxville and Chattanooga into 
northern Kentucky striking at the Union army’s critical western supply area. Yet for General 
Braxton Bragg to join Smith on this potentially decisive campaign, he would have to travel a 
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circuitous route to avoid Richard Buell’s eastbound forces. Bragg would move 30,000 men over 
770 miles using six different railroads to Chattanooga and then launch a fall offensive with 
Smith, which would come to a sorry close for Bragg at the Battle of Perryville.74  
 Confederate railroad management was not the only decentralized operation in the 
summer and fall of 1862. It was not until September that Jeremy Gilmer was promoted to 
colonel to become chief of the engineer bureau in Richmond. Before that he was “acting head.” 
One of the first things he tried to do was persuade General Lee to form bridge building 
companies within each field army. Men with mechanical skills recruited from regiments would 
make up these companies and their organization would be permanent.75 When roadways and 
bridges had needed repair, field commanders had taken men from the ranks and formed them 
into pioneer details.  The army defined pioneers as units that cut roads through forests or built 
bridges much like engineer troops did. In 1862 the term “pioneers” usually referenced 
temporary groups of soldiers who would return to their infantry regiments once the assigned 
task was completed.   
Lee thought Gilmer’s idea an intriguing one, but many of Lee’s field commanders balked 
because, they argued, a permanent organization would remove too many men from the infantry 
or artillery.  The commanding general let the idea rest for six months before he revisited it in the 
spring of 1863. Meanwhile, Gilmer continued to work at supporting the Army of Northern 
Virginia and improving the general quality of engineering operations. In September as Lee began 
his Maryland campaign he had no pontoon train, so the Engineer Bureau provided the army 
with captured equipment.76  In addition, Gilmer began to supervise the manufacturing of a 
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pontoon train in Virginia, and he sent engineering officer Major James Nocquet to Chattanooga 
to start constructing pontoons for the Army of Tennessee. Gilmer managed to build about six 
hundred feet of bridging by the winter of 1863 and stored it at Gordonsville, Virginia, sixty-seven 
miles northwest of Richmond.77   
The Southern Confederacy’s military struggle for independence was always in conflict 
with each states’ struggle for political and economic independence. When it came to moving 
vital supplies and men over the railroads this conflict was never more evident. Furthermore, the 
cultural construct established over five decades before the war was so ingrained in southern 
citizens that it was almost impossible to challenge even as the war demanded change. Slavery in 
the South had created an entire culture dedicated to the proposition that manual labor was 
beneath most whites. The wealthy were in charge and expected to get their way. When the war 
started there were soon too many chiefs. Generals, plantation owners, businessmen, governors, 
cabinet members, politicians, bureau chiefs, and the president, all crossed paths and all 
practiced a management style among each other that wavered between obstinate and 
detrimental on the one hand to deferential on the other.  
For the Union army the late summer and fall of 1862 would bring about in the western 
theater some organizational changes to the management of the railroads and engineers, along 
with technological innovations to assist in engineering operations. In the eastern theater, 
however, poor communications between field and staff engineers would contribute to one of 
greatest disasters the Army of the Potomac experienced during the war.  
The situation in the western theater in the late summer and fall of 1862 demanded the 
same attention to organizational detail that existed for the Union’s eastern armies and the task 
was more challenging given the size and scope of operations. Whereas McClellan and Pope had 
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the Engineer Battalion and Brigade to build bridges and roads, supplemented by Wrigley’s 
Independent Company of Engineers formed in Philadelphia and assigned to the defense of 
Washington, General Buell’s Army of the Ohio, had the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, 
the Missouri Engineers, and a company of engineer troops from Kentucky, covering five states 
and over twenty-five different railroads. It was 345 miles from Memphis to Chattanooga and 
300 miles from Chattanooga to Louisville. All of this territory had to be covered and tracks and 
bridges had to be repaired and built without the assistance of a General Haupt or a civilian 
Construction Corps. Improvisation and the skilled management of resources was required to 
develop the organizational model to support further strategic initiatives necessary to tighten the 
grip on Confederate resources. These strategic initiatives had to be accomplished without the 
Federal army suffering serious setbacks, reversals, or a major defeat.  
Yet setbacks occurred on a regular basis as Confederate cavalry, led by Nathan Bedford 
Forrest and John Hunt Morgan, raided isolated Union outposts, destroyed bridges, mangled 
track, cut telegraph wires, and sliced through vital supply lines preventing General Buell from 
controlling eastern Tennessee. By mid-September 1862, Buell’s Army of the Ohio moved on a 
west to east axis along the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. The First Michigan Engineers 
worked all summer maintaining and repairing this railroad as well as the Nashville & 
Chattanooga Railroad as far as Stevenson, Alabama. Before Buell’s army could finally enter 
Chattanooga a 2,000-foot pontoon bridge had to be thrown across the Tennessee River, but his 
engineers did not have a pontoon train. Instead, operating two local saw mills, Colonel Innes 
and his engineer soldiers first had to build it.  
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It was difficult to do because his men had no nails and the oakum and pitch used as 
caulking had yet to arrive from Louisville and Cincinnati.78 There was more bad news. 
Confederate raiders had captured several engineers and runaway slaves who were working with 
these men. North of Nashville, Morgan’s men had destroyed a railroad tunnel bringing supplies 
from Kentucky to a halt, and Bragg who skillfully had used the railroad to move his force of 
30,000 around Buell, arrived in Chattanooga ahead of the Army of the Ohio. Now Bragg and 
Kirby Smith using the Cumberland Mountains as a screen raced north toward Louisville and 
Lexington. Buell had no choice but to follow abandoning northern Alabama and middle 
Tennessee to Nashville. The engineers were forced to destroy machinery in the railroad machine 
shop and the partially built pontoons. The Michigan engineers, only 550 men in ten companies, 
had to march on the double quick north to the rendezvous point at Bowling Green. Companies 
A, B, D, G, and H were working on a large railroad bridge north of Nashville, Company E was in 
Huntsville, Alabama, and companies C, F, I, and K were in Stevenson.79  
Buell caught up with Bragg and Smith on October 8th at the battle of Perryville and 
stopped the Confederate attempt to capture the wealth of army stores in Louisville and 
humiliate the North. Buell did not pursue the retreating Southerners, and this cost him his job. 
His replacement was William S. Rosecrans, recent victor of a fierce fight at Corinth, Mississippi 
driving off 23,000 Confederates under the command of General Earl Van Dorn. Now Rosecrans, 
a West Point graduate and army engineer before the war, sharp and ambitious, prepared to 
reorganize the army, which included a stronger and more efficient engineer service. Rosecrans 
would enjoy some success and one major failure before being laid in the tomb of the mostly 
forgotten generals. Yet, to his great credit, he did bring about changes to the structure and 
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operation of army engineers that would reverberate throughout the entire Union army for the 
remainder of the war. 
 So now as head of Buell’s former command, renamed the Army of the Cumberland, 
Rosecrans evaluated his engineering needs. To Rosecrans, engineer soldiers were essential, and 
he had too few of them. The First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics had done well but were 
spread too thin during the summer and early fall.  They had no pontoon train and no experience 
throwing one across a river, and the regiment stubbornly refused to drill.80 Furthermore, the 
men were still not paid for engineer duty and rumors spread that a mutiny was possible. 
Members of Rosecrans staff did not trust the Michigan regiment, including Innes and the other 
officers. Next, the 70th Indiana known as the “Railroad Regiment” had worked at repairing tracks 
and bridges, but Rosecrans wanted a more permanent unit.81 
The Army of the Cumberland had only one officer from the Corps of Engineers, Captain 
James St. Clair Morton.82 Morton was an iconoclast of the first order. As historian Philip L 
Shiman, in his essay “Engineering and Command: The Case of General William S. Rosecrans 
1862-1863,” pointed out, Morton was not afraid to challenge conventional wisdom. Before the 
war he publicly criticized the use of masonry fortifications along the coast, and instead, 
advocated the use of earthwork fortifications, “a heresy to a corps whose prime mission was the 
construction of great forts of stone and brick.”83 Rosecrans, raised a Methodist and while 
attending West Point, a bastion of Episcopalism, converted to Catholicism as a cadet, was an 
iconoclast himself, so there was no doubt he had a soft spot for Morton. 
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The Army of the Cumberland also had just one topographical engineer, Captain 
Nathaniel Michler, who was responsible for mapping Middle Tennessee and central Kentucky. 
Morton, Michler, and John B. Anderson, a civilian railroad engineer Rosecrans inherited from 
Buell to serve as superintendent of railroads, were not enough to satisfy Rosecrans’s needs over 
a large geographical area.  All three men were highly skilled professionals. Anderson had hired a 
civilian construction crew made up of carpenters and laborers who worked from a special 
construction train to repair railroad bridges, but the overwhelming amount of work required 
hindered the army’s movement.84 Rosecrans asked the War Department for more engineering 
officers, and he told the new General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, that he would not launch an 
offensive to regain control of the Nashville to Chattanooga corridor until he was satisfied that 
the army’s supply link from Nashville to central Kentucky was repaired and secured. “The Army 
of the Potomac cannot possibly be as much in need of engineers as I am,” he wrote the War 
Department, and within a month two more engineers arrived.85  
Rosecrans energetically set about addressing his engineering problems. First, he ordered 
every brigade and division commander to assign an officer to topographical duty. It was a stroke 
of brilliance. Rosecrans was aware that these officers would not have the technical ability to 
produce detailed maps, but they could be taught what to look for when in the field. Thus, these 
officers recorded information about roads, bridges, and geographic phenomena like culverts, 
wooded areas, streams, wetlands, and open fields. This data was forwarded to Michler who with 
several assistants following his careful instructions, made and reproduced maps. Michler did not 
like the idea of untrained officers collecting data for the mapmakers.  Topographical engineers 
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required a keen sense of observation and the ability to measure distance.  Officers assigned to 
this task from infantry brigades and divisions would make costly mistakes, Michler argued. 
Rosecrans did not like or appreciate his objections and Michler was forced to work within this 
unorthodox system. 
Next, the commanding general assigned Morton the task of training and commanding a 
Pioneer Brigade. Engineer soldiers were paid more than infantrymen, but infantry occasionally 
detailed to serve as road builders or on bridge repair were not. An army commander, therefore, 
did not need permission from the War Department to organize pioneer units. Rosecrans ordered 
that twenty men from each regiment, half mechanics and half laborers, be detailed as pioneers.  
“The most intelligent and energetic lieutenants in the regiment, with the best knowledge of civil 
engineering will be detailed to command, assisted by 2 non- commissioned officers.”86 Most 
regimental colonels were pleased to comply with Rosecrans’s order believing that their best 
men detached to the pioneers would serve only temporarily, and for the most part would 
remain with their infantry regiments. This proved not to be the case.87 Approximately 2,000 men 
were organized into three pioneer battalions and although at some point they were expected to 
return to their infantry regiments, became permanent units. Unlike the First Michigan whose 
men refused to drill, the Pioneer Battalions would not only train as engineer troops, but also as 
infantry and were brigaded together with an attached battery, the Chicago Board of Trade 
Battery.88  
To Rosecrans’s satisfaction, Morton created a command structure for the Pioneer 
Brigade even though it was designated as a temporary organization. He assigned someone to 
the role of quartermaster and another officer to adjutant, and he made acting majors and 
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captains out of men who were still officially lieutenants.89 The soldiers in the brigade, such as 
William Wesley Perkins, III, found the work hard, yet better than having “the cannon boll [sic] 
flying over a fellow [sic] head.” Private Perkins described the duties in a letter to his brother 
Rice: “We are ordered to hull all the wood we can in camp [;] some goes every day from this 
company. There is someone from every regiment for pioneers and macanic [sic].”90  
Morton also continued the practice of forcing free African Americans and runaway 
slaves to work on the fortifications around Nashville. Union conduct toward blacks in the South 
often was as cruel and callous as that of the plantation owners from whom they fled. President 
Lincoln’s Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued after the battle of Antietam, had no 
effect on racial attitudes, especially among army generals, most of whom, like Rosecrans were 
Democrats. Despite this malicious treatment and the deplorable conduct of northern soldiers’ 
towards blacks, many African Americans did believe that in laboring for the Union Army they 
were actively contributing to their emancipation and freedom.91   
Pioneers could not be paid as engineers, but they did receive extra pay authorized for 
fatigue duty: twenty-five cents extra per day for soldiers working with common tools such as an 
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axe or shovel and forty cents extra per day for those who worked with carpenter tools such as 
augers.92 Members of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics were also promised extra pay 
but not a cent had been forthcoming. Since the passage of legislation on July 17, 1862 
retroactively recognizing volunteer engineer troops and placing them on the same pay scale as 
regular army engineer troops, the men of the First were anxiously awaiting their back pay. The 
money arrived in camp in September but Paymaster Major Charles T. Larned refused to pay the 
men without specific orders from the War Department because he was not certain when the 
regiment’s status officially changed.93 Fractious soldiers began to talk of mutiny. Ezra Stearns 
recorded in his diary, “Excitement is increasing…the men talk of making a strike,” and on 
November 10th they did. Many of the men blamed Colonel Innes for not working hard enough 
on their behalf and others were just tired of serving for almost over a year without pay.94 Given 
the circumstances it was surprising that only one quarter of the regiment actually refused to 
work. Many feared arrest and others were talked out of striking by their officers. Finally, a 
telegram arrived from the War Department in late November ordering Rosecrans to pay the 
regiment engineer wages under General Orders No. 177 and one week later the men were paid. 
Most of the mutineers served thirty days of hard labor without pay and then returned to the 
regiment.95 
As the problems of pay, manpower, and mapping were sorted out and Rosecrans 
continued to gather supplies in Nashville for an eventual attempt at moving the army forward 
toward Chattanooga, as far as his engineers were concerned he still had one major problem. He 
had no pontoon train. On November 22nd he wrote the United States Army’s chief engineer 
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Brigadier General Totten requesting iron pontoons 700 yards long. Perhaps displaying his 
knowledge of military equipment or perhaps being a contrarian, Rosecrans insisted on the iron 
instead of the wooden bateaux or frame of the pontoon. The wooden ones leaked and the iron 
ones were better, Rosecrans said, and he wanted them at once.96 Iron pontoons, developed by 
the Prussian and Austrian armies, were non-existent in the United States.97  
Totten responded by saying it would take the Engineer Department six weeks to build 
wooden bateaux and at least ten weeks to build the iron pontoons, and furthermore, the 
Engineer Department had no model for an iron bateaux, and no one had experience in building 
them. Rosecrans was not pleased with Totten’s response.98 Fifteen days after the initial request 
was submitted, Totten’s chief assistant, Brigadier General George W. Cullum, finally convinced 
Rosecrans that wooden bateaux, built in Cincinnati under the supervision of the Department of 
the Ohio’s chief engineer, Lieutenant Miles Daniel McAlester was the best alternative.99 Unlike 
the pontoons Rosecrans described as leaky, built by the First Michigan and later destroyed by 
the First Michigan because of the army’s sudden retreat north, the new wooden bateaux would 
be built with seasoned wood. Unfortunately, Rosecrans did not provide a sufficient number of 
wagons to move the entire train over roads. Instead, the railroads transported a number of the 
pontoons when needed, especially during the Murfreesboro campaign.100   
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In the eastern theater there were plenty of pontoons available for use by the Army of 
the Potomac, yet similar to Rosecrans’s Murfreesboro offensive, there was a lack of 
transportation to move them. In addition, poor coordination between field commanders and 
department heads in the eastern theater would lead to a military disaster for the army in 
December 1862. President Lincoln had finally relieved McClellan from command and replaced 
him with Rhode Island native Major General Ambrose Burnside. Known for his loyalty, honesty, 
and sideburns, Burnside understood that Washington was looking for a decisive battle, and he 
immediately set to designing a plan to bring about just such a battle.  
Lee’ s forces were stationed around Culpeper and Gordonsville, Virginia both on the 
Orange & Alexandria Railroad. At Gordonsville, approximately thirty miles south of Culpeper, the 
Orange & Alexandria connected with the Virginia Central Railroad, which was the southern 
army’s critical supply link with their depots both in Richmond on the eastern end of the line and 
Staunton on the western end. Burnside proposed to feint an attack on Lee’s lead elements in 
Culpeper and slip west to Fredericksburg, cross the Rappahannock River, and then moving east 
again along the turnpike through Chancellorsville, eventually striking at Lee and cutting off his 
supply line. On paper it was an interesting plan, but the execution of it required shifting 120,000 
men without tipping off the enemy as to the northern army’s intentions. Crossing the 
Rappahannock quickly required that the engineers arrive at the river with the pontoon trains at 
the same time the army arrived. A delay would give Lee’s cavalry time to report the 
whereabouts of the Burnside’s forces so Lee could prepare a formidable defensive position. 
By the end of 1862 the Union Army had worked out some command and control issues 
that plagued them earlier in the year, but the battle of Fredericksburg was about to reveal that 
the engineers still functioned under an inchoate command system.  
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A brief introduction to the dramatis personæ during the Army of the Potomac’s 
offensive in December 1862 helps explain the blunders. At the head of the army was General 
Burnside, and he was coordinating his efforts with General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. Halleck was 
not the commanding general of all the Union armies in the field, but rather served Lincoln and 
Stanton as a chief of staff. He could make suggestions to Burnside, and he would convey the 
President’s concerns and wishes to army commanders in the field, yet he had no command 
responsibility. It was a confusing arrangement. General Meigs, head of the Quartermaster 
bureau and General Totten of the Engineering bureau reported to Stanton, but quartermasters 
and engineers attached to various field armies did not necessarily report to the bureaus chiefs 
but rather to their commanding generals. Haupt operated on his own informing General 
McCallum of his supply needs, and both men reported to Stanton. 
Here was where it got complicated. After taking command, Burnside appointed 
Lieutenant Cyrus Ballou Comstock to his staff as chief engineer Army of the Potomac. Comstock 
graduated first in his West Point class of 1855 and was seven years younger than Captain Duane 
who commanded the Engineer Battalion. General Daniel Woodbury commanded the Engineer 
Brigade and both Duane and Woodbury had reported to General Barnard, but Barnard was now 
chief engineer in the Department of Washington, DC. Now both General Woodbury and Captain 
Duane reported to Lieutenant Comstock!  
During the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns Comstock served as chief engineer for 
General Edwin Sumner’s II Corps.  Now as chief engineer for the entire Army of the Potomac and 
anticipating a late fall offensive, he ordered the Engineer Battalion to move to Falmouth, 
Virginia, just northwest of Fredericksburg, to await the arrival of the pontoons. On November 
12th Burnside met with Halleck, Meigs, and Haupt to discuss the best possible supply line for the 
upcoming campaign, and Haupt suggested to the generals that using the Potomac River landings 
 270 
at Aquia Creek and Belle Plain afforded the army a more secure route than the turnpike from 
Alexandria to Falmouth. Warehouses and wharfs could be rebuilt, and the Richmond, 
Fredericksburg & Potomac railroad that ran from Aquia Creek to Falmouth was in good 
condition.101  
Lincoln approved the change of base from Falmouth to Aquia Creek and Belle Plain on 
the fourteenth.  Haupt reported to Burnside at 11:00am November 17th that in addition to 800 
feet of wharves to be built, small railroad cars would be pushed to a damaged bridge and civilian 
carpenters would repair the damage. When the larger cars and engines arrived they would be 
unloaded and placed on the track to start delivering supplies to Falmouth. Smith shops and 
machine shops complete with lathes, planers, portable engines, and small tools were also 
built.102 In eleven days the rail line was opened and Haupt started to think ahead about repairing 
the track and bridges beyond Fredericksburg. He wrote Burnside that he tried to procure more 
civilians to continue work on the wharves and bridges but that Halleck did not favor “my idea of 
forming a construction and transportation corps…for our work.” Haupt continued, “He [Halleck] 
thinks that the engineer troops, who have been enlisted, and receive double pay for this 
particular duty, should attend to it.”103 Haupt then suggested that several engineering 
companies be turned over to his control for his labor force that he would train. Burnside did not 
respond to this request.  
Ignoring the axiom, “the devil is in the details,” after his meeting with Halleck on 
November 12th, Burnside made two costly assumptions. First, when Halleck told him that he 
would inform General Woodbury to move the pontoons to Falmouth, Burnside assumed Halleck 
would give specific instructions regarding the urgency of the movement. He did not. Second, 
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Burnside assumed that the other pontoon train with Captain Duane had moved from 
McClellan’s former headquarters to Washington. It had not.104  
Finally on the 14th Comstock contacted Woodbury and asked about the location of the 
pontoon train. Surprised the pontoons were needed so quickly, Woodbury recommended to 
Halleck that the entire operation be delayed at least five days. When Halleck refused to listen to 
anything about a delay, Woodbury then told Halleck that he would leave immediately provided 
the quartermasters furnished him with the 270 horses or mules he needed to move the train to 
Falmouth. The horses arrived five days latter and the first set of pontoons rolled into Falmouth 
on the 25th. As originally scheduled, Burnside’s army began their march and arrived in Falmouth 
on the 20th where they waited five days for the pontoons.  
The second train began its movement south under the command of Major Ira Spaulding. 
Woodbury did not provide the major with a sense of urgency so as his train became bogged 
down in molasses like mud along the turnpike road from Alexandria to Falmouth, he moved his 
pontoon boats to the Potomac and floated them to Belle Plain. His wagons carrying the chess, 
balk, and tools continued to slog through the mud toward Falmouth. Comstock was not aware 
Spaulding’s pontoons were destined for Belle Plain so no wagons greeted them there, prepared 
to move the boats to Falmouth. Burnside could not understand why it took so long to the deliver 
the pontoons, and he was furious with Woodbury. The delay in Burnside’s entire movement 
gave Lee’s army ample opportunity to prepare defensive positions on the southern bank of the 
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and to wait and see what the Union general would do next. 
The fifteen-day delay between when the first pontoons arrived in Falmouth and the day 
Burnside started his attack at Fredericksburg was the result of a lack of pontoons and the 
weather. Burnside met with Lincoln on November 27th to discuss his plan, which Burnside 
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revised since the Army of Northern Virginia occupied the city of Fredericksburg and the hills 
beyond it.  Although the President remained skeptical, he admired Burnside’s unquestioned 
determination. Lincoln wrote Halleck stating that the commanding general believed he could 
cross “the river in the face of the enemy and drive him away, but that, to use his own 
expression, it is somewhat risky.”105 With chronic pressure from the Northern press about the 
army’s inactivity, and living with the torturous idleness of the army under McClellan, Lincoln was 
emotionally ready for a fight. Intellectually, he was not so sure of Burnside’s initiative, but it was 
probably refreshing to work with a general who wanted to engage the enemy rather than a 
cautious one who wanted endlessly to maneuver. 
Burnside’s revised plan called for six bridges to be thrown across the Rappahannock by 
the engineers. Two pontoon trains had arrived with approximately seventy-six bateaux, yet each 
bridge would require between eighteen to twenty pontoons to build.106 Once Lincoln gave tacit 
approval to Burnside’s plan, the general’s assistant adjutant general H. W. Bowers telegraphed 
Captain O. E. Hine of the 50th New York ordering him to send an additional forty-three pontoons, 
thirty-eight wagons, and sixteen sets of trestles, to Belle Plain.107 Hine was in charge of the 
engineer’s workshop near the Washington navy yard, and after he sent the extra pontoons on 
December 3rd Bowers requisitioned up to eighty more bateaux, some with chess and balk.108 
Then on December 5th winter came to northern Virginia like a lion as rain, sleet, and 
three inches of snow covered the ground. For the next three days bitter cold arrived with 
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temperatures dropping to as low as sixteen degrees as men huddled around camp fires to keep 
warm. The fear now was that the river would freeze.109 Yet, by December 10th temperatures 
turned somewhat milder and Burnside decided to launch his attack. The next day at 3:00am, 
screened by the fog floating atop the Rappahannock, the Engineer Battalion, ordered to build a 
bridge for General Franklin’s Left Grand Division, started moving away from the center of the 
Union line east. A steep embankment at the river’s edge prevented the engineers from bringing 
the wagons to the rivers edge, and instead, they had to haul the 1,600-pound pontoons 200 
yards to the water.110 The bridge, along with the two next to it built by the 15th New York 
Volunteer Engineers and led by Lieutenant H. V. Slosson, took the entire day as ice on the river 
had to be broken, men suffering from exposure had to be pulled from the icy cold water, and 
Confederate skirmishers harassed the bridge builders wounding two men.  
Those engineers building the center and western bridges were less fortunate than 
Lieutenant Slosson’s men.111 The 50th New York began construction on the center bridge but 
under constant enemy fire the entire day they could not complete the work. By late afternoon 
men from the 15th New York were called upon to finish the bridge. Using several of the 
pontoons as boats the engineers rowed men from the 89th New York Infantry to the western 
bank of the river, and these soldiers were able to drive off Confederate sharpshooters, and the 
bridge was finished by dusk.112 
The two western bridges now remained to be built directly across from the town of 
Fredericksburg, and this meant that Confederate soldiers could use buildings and cellars to hide 
from Union artillery and infantry who tried to drive them away from shooting at the engineers. 
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At 4:00am on December 12th pandemonium broke out at the bridge. Captain Wesley Brainerd 
wrote of the chaos: “At the signal we started on a double-quick, ten men besides myself…. 
When I reached the end of the bridge but five of my men were with me, the other five had 
either been killed or were wounded and were crawling off.”113 Within minutes Brainerd was the 
only man left on the bridge and then his left arm jerked over his head and he thought he “had 
been hit with a bar of hot iron,” collapsing onto the bridge. Somehow he managed to get to the 
river’s edge and with the help of his comrades made it to an aid station before bleeding to 
death.114  
Finally men of the 7th Michigan, 89th New York, and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts 
Regiments crossed the river in pontoons “and carried handsomely the houses and shelters 
occupied by the Confederates…” and this allowed the engineers the freedom to complete the 
bridges. The next day Burnside’s army crossed all six pontoon bridges and attacked the 
entrenched enemy. The wanton killing that went on at Marye’s Heights was devastating to the 
Army of the Potomac and Burnside lost his command. General Woodbury was exonerated for 
his role in the transportation of the pontoons in the weeks leading up to the battle, but was 
dismissed as commander of the Engineer Brigade and sent to Fort Tortugas in the Florida Keys 
where he contacted yellow fever and died the following year.115 The Engineer Brigade’s loses at 
Fredericksburg were nine killed, fifty wounded, and two captured.116 
The year ended and the Army of the Potomac was no closer to capturing Richmond or 
defeating Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia than they were when the year began. Out 
west the Army of the Cumberland gained back some territory along the Nashville to 
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Chattanooga corridor and now attention would turn to the Mississippi River and the city of 
Vicksburg. Nonetheless, the Confederacy still held the critical coastal ports of Charleston, 
Wilmington, and Mobile and held the entire lower South. Confederate and Union soldiers were 
fighting with skill and determination, and both sides had officers who led well and others who 
led less well. The most significant difference between the two sides was in their ability to 
manage an emerging modern war. The size of the armies, dictated new untried methods of 
moving men and material over complex terrain.  There was no book on how to do this, but as 
historian Bruce Catton pointed, “The volunteer army [Union] was teeming with men quite 
capable of playing the part of military engineers if some capable officer directed them.”117 Some 
officers had recognized mechanical skills in their men and had started to utilize these assets. 
McClellan had formed two volunteer engineering regiments, Rosecrans established a Pioneer 
Brigade, and the War Department turned over the operation of the military railroads to Herman 
Haupt. Now as the war entered its third year, Union officers started to recognize that by tapping 
into their soldiers’ mechanical skills and ingenuity anything was possible tried and a great deal 
could be accomplished.  
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CHAPTER 7  
VICKSBURG 
 
While work [was] underway General Rawlins, Dana, and I spent time together passing from 
bridge site to bridge site encouraging officers and men in their novel and necessary work and 
with admiration for the volunteer soldier and his unequaled capacity for practical bridge 
building. 
                                   Lieutenant Colonel James H. Wilson, Corps of Engineers, USA 
 
I learned that General McPherson was using mortars made of trunks of trees (gum trees being 
the best) to throw 6 and 12-pound shells…. 
                                                                     First Lieutenant P. C. Hains, USA 
 
 
 The strategic significance of Vicksburg has been a topic of debate among historians for 
several decades. In the epic narratives of the war by Douglas Southall Freeman, Bruce Catton, 
and Shelby Foote the capture of Vicksburg torn the Confederacy in two, making it impossible for 
those southerners living in the eastern half of the country to reap the benefits of important 
supplies that, with Vicksburg in Confederate hands, would have flowed from the west and 
sustained the war effort. This thesis held sway for many years until the work of historians such 
as Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and most recently Albert Castel, proved that the amount of 
material goods coming from the western half of the Confederacy did not contribute measurably 
to supplies in the east. Of course, this revelation then raised another challenging question. Was 
the capture of Vicksburg as important as we had come to believe it was?  
The answer is it was.  The capture of Vicksburg accomplished four critical strategic 
objectives. First, it gained control of the Mississippi River for the Union Navy. This was important 
because both the Union Army of the Gulf and the navy’s Mississippi River squadron needed to 
work against Confederate forces including guerrilla’s operating in Louisiana. In addition, the 
navy was able to move large quantities of supplies along the river to points where these supplies 
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would be unloaded and then transported overland to Union armies operating deep within the 
heartland of the Confederacy. 
Second, the capture of Vicksburg was a great boost for Union morale, and conversely, a 
significance setback for southern soldiers and civilians. Third, the victory at Vicksburg eliminated 
an entire Confederate army from the war, and finally, it elevated the status of General Grant in 
the eyes of the northern public, and especially in the eyes of President Lincoln. Lincoln would 
select Grant to rescue the beleaguered Union forces inside Chattanooga, which the general 
would accomplish, and after that Grant would be promoted to lieutenant general and placed in 
charge of all Union armies. That decision also turned out quite well.  
Vicksburg was the most important campaign of the war, and Grant’s determination to 
capture the “Gibraltar of the Confederacy” and the risks he took to do so also made the 
campaign the most remarkable of the war and perhaps even in American military history. 
Vicksburg’s capture, however, would not have been accomplished without an extraordinary 
engineering effort, made even more incredible by the fact that when the campaign began Grant 
had at his disposal only three army engineers, and a company and regiment of volunteer 
engineer soldiers. The story of what happened to bring about the Union army’s success at 
Vicksburg captures the essence of how the North engineered victory during the war. 
  Operations around Vicksburg did not begin well for the Union army and navy. Yet, the 
willingness to try different approaches to get at Vicksburg, spoke to the army’s increasing 
confidence and faith in volunteer soldiers’ ingenuity, proficiency, and versatility. If an idea could 
be imagined then it could be attempted even though there was no guarantee of success. This 
was true in the early summer of 1862 Admiral David G. Farragut, Commodore David D. Porter, 
and General Benjamin Butler hatched a plan to conqueror Vicksburg.   
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Porter’s mortar schooners and 3,000 soldiers sent by Butler under the command of 
Brigadier General Thomas Williams would ascend the river and once below the town the 
mortars would lob their 200-pound shells in a bombardment that would destroy the city and 
knock out all the Confederate batteries. Williams’s men would then occupy Vicksburg. If this 
attack failed Williams would attempt to dig a canal across De Soto Peninsula, a narrow neck of 
land about 5,000 feet wide on a sharp bend in the Mississippi River. Peering down from the 
heights of Vicksburg the Mississippi looked like an inverted C. This bend in the river provided an 
opportunity for Union engineers to dig a cutoff and permanently alter the course of the river. In 
civil engineer David F. Bastian’s carefully researched, Grant’s Canal, he wrote of the canal 
project: “The slope of the projected waterway would be much greater than the natural course 
and, once completed, gravity would propel the water across the peninsula rather than around 
it.”1 The goal was to change the course of the Mississippi and to turn Vicksburg into an inland 
town. 
 The idea of changing the course of the Mississippi was not new. In the 1850s the U. S. 
government hired civil engineer Charles Ellet, Jr. to study and recommend how flood prevention 
and navigation improvements could be made along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. One of 
Ellet’s suggestions was a cutoff over the De Soto Peninsula, opposite Vicksburg.2 The 
consequence of just such a cutoff was irreparable damage to Vicksburg’s economy, and as a 
result of extensive lobbying efforts by the city fathers, the state legislature passed a bill in 1858 
outlawing efforts, which would have resulted in a cutoff.3 
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 Now, as Porter’s flotilla steamed toward Vicksburg, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Ellet’s 
ram fleet started up river from Memphis to block a possible Confederate escape from Vicksburg 
by the river. There was some sad irony here. Charles Ellet, Jr., initiator, designer, and head of the 
U. S. Ram Fleet in 1862 was mortally wounded and died on June 21st standing aboard Queen of 
the West during a combined army-navy operation to capture Memphis. His brother, Alfred, now 
ram fleet commander was headed toward Vicksburg to support a possible canal operation that 
his brother had worked on and proposed in the 1850s.  
 Farragut and Porter’s force did manage to slip eight ships past the relentless cannonade 
from the city’s guns, but sixteen sailors were killed and another twelve were wounded. Running 
warships past Vicksburg could be done, but nothing was accomplished by doing so. Confederate 
guns would continue to rain down terror on any Union gunboat attempting to pass the heights, 
and supplies to the city would continue to arrive overland from as far away as Mobile, Alabama. 
Confederate quartermasters could ship goods from Mobile north along the Mobile & Ohio 
Railroad as far as Meridian, Mississippi.  Supplies were then shipped west on the Southern 
Railroad of Mississippi to Jackson and then onto Vicksburg. Confederate forces under General 
Sterling Price also controlled the Mobile & Ohio from Meridian as far north as Tupelo. Under 
these circumstances moving the mighty Mississippi seemed like the best option. 
 Williams set about surveying the site and selecting the path the canal was to take.  With 
the help of his 3,000-man force and slaves from surrounding plantations the excavating began 
with initial success. The work itself was brutal. Men moved dirt in excessive heat and humidity, 
had very little in the way of clean drinking water, and fought constantly with mosquitoes.4 The 
ditch was fifteen feet wide and approximately three feet deep. An embankment or levee on 
either end blocked the river from entering the ditch, and the idea was that when ready, the 
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levees would be broken and millions of gallons of water from the river would rush into the canal 
flooding the entire area and forcing the river to form a new channel. Unfortunately, as men 
were doing the thankless and back breaking work of cutting trees, removing stumps, and 
shoveling dirt the river began to fall at a rate of a foot per day.5  A correspondent for the 
Chicago Tribune wrote, “… when the levee at each end of it [canal] was cut through, it was 
found to be above the level of the water.”6 To rectify the problem the center of the ditch was 
dug five feet deeper and the earth was thrown on three-foot deep sections actually raising them 
closer to the surface.  
 By late July the river had fallen twenty-five feet, the summer heat remained oppressive, 
half of Williams’ work force was sick and disabled, and Farragut was anxious to leave the area. 
The project resulted in failure, and the men were evacuated from the peninsula. Vicksburg 
continued to stand as the South’s Rock of Gibraltar. The Union Army had no further plans to 
solve the military problem of how to capture Vicksburg until October when General Halleck 
turned the Department of Tennessee over to General Grant. Within one week Grant was ready 
to move on Vicksburg in the most direct way possible.  
 Any map revealed that Grant’s operational directives made perfect sense, and if 
successful, would have allow Grant to besiege the city.  He would move south to Holly Springs, 
Mississippi, approximately 150 miles from his primary supply base located in Columbus, 
Kentucky. The railroads carried the necessary war materials for his 40,000 men on a direct 
north/south axis and from Holly Springs continued south along the Mississippi Central Railroad 
to Jackson, Mississippi. From Jackson, Grant planned to move due west and assault the city of 
Vicksburg by the back door, its most vulnerable defensive position. To place additional pressure 
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on Confederate commander General John C. Pemberton, Grant would send 32,000 men under 
General William T. Sherman from Memphis up the Yazoo River to the heights north of Vicksburg 
known as Chickasaw Bluffs. This plan would force Pemberton to divide his force of 32,000 men 
hence giving the advantage to the Federal attackers. The major flaw in this strategy, and the 
reason why it failed, was because Grant failed to protect his own extended supply lines. 
 The overland advance came to an abrupt halt in the last week of December 1862. 
Confederate cavalry under Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forest raised havoc with Grant’s 
plan. Van Dorn’s horse soldiers captured Grant’s critical advance base at Holly Springs, and 
Forest destroyed sixty miles of railroad track along the 180 miles of roadway between Holly 
Springs and Jackson. This disaster forced Grant to return to Grand Junction, Tennessee and 
reconsider his options. These Confederate initiatives also left Sherman’s force exposed to an 
onslaught. Grant was unable to get word to Sherman that his advance had been stopped, but 
Pemberton knew this and met Sherman at Chickasaw Bluffs with almost his entire force in solid, 
entrenched positions. Hacking through dense cockle berry hedgerows on the river’s bank, 
crossing a bayou, and coping with cold wet weather, Sherman’s command assaulted the bluffs 
and within three days determined the enemy’s fortifications were impregnable. Sherman 
gathered his wounded, buried his dead and retreated back to Memphis.7   
 The operation against Vicksburg was carefully monitored back east in the halls of 
Congress, in the White House, and by the press. Early in the new year a New York Times 
correspondent wrote: “With the best disposition in the world to be satisfied with Western war 
movement, in view of their general gratifying success, we confess we find it impossible to regard 
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the result of our operations against Vicksburg without strong disfavor…. We were promised a 
speedy success, and had a right to expect it.”8  In the same article the author harshly criticized 
the confusion in authority that marked the early stages of the Vicksburg campaign. General John 
A. McClernand, before the war a prominent Illinois politician and member of Congress had been 
authorized by Halleck and Lincoln to raise a force for a river expedition against Vicksburg. This 
completed, McClernand expected to command the Chickasaw Bluffs’ movement. Granted 
wanted Sherman to lead the offensive. McClernand was a close political ally of the president, 
and he complained vehemently to the White House that some of those he recruited were men 
Grant assigned to Sherman for the Yazoo River movement.  These complaints did not go over 
well with Grant, and the dispute between the generals was well known and considered an 
impediment to the entire operation.9  
 After the battle of Chickasaw Bluffs, McClernand reasserted himself and regained 
control of his recruits.  He named them the Army of the Mississippi, and launched a successful 
attack on Fort Hindman, or Arkansas Post, at the same time the New York Times article 
appeared in the papers. The capture of Fort Hindman proved to be a crucial factor in the months 
ahead because Confederate forces were now prevented from operating on Union supply lines 
and on the Union Army’s flank. Rebel raiders and partisans used Arkansas Post as a safe haven 
to resupply, strike at Union supply lines and then retreat to the safety of the fort. Despite the 
capture, however, Grant was furious. He believed, correctly, that two armies acting 
independently from one another would bring repeated failures in efforts to capture Vicksburg. 
He wrote to Halleck pleading his case for a unified command and this was approved. Now 
moving to Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana on January 29, 1863, Grant took personal command of 
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Vicksburg operations. He reorganized the Army of the Tennessee into four corps, and he 
appointed McClernand senior corps commander.10  
 In War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy wrote: “If in the accounts given by historians…we find 
that wars and battles appear to follow a definite plan laid down beforehand, the only deduction 
we can make…is that these accounts are not true.”11 During the Vicksburg Campaign anyone 
who believed that Grant was following a distinct plan was only kidding himself. He had once 
remarked to a staff officer, “In war anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am 
wrong, we shall soon find out, and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time 
and money, and may ruin everything.”12 Grant took to heart his own advice. After his initial plan 
to capture Vicksburg had died at Holly Springs and Chickasaw Bluffs, he would operate under 
the notion that trial and error was the only feasible method of capturing the city. Improvisation 
would highlight the next six months of campaigning.  
 Vicksburg’s location and the geography of the surrounding area was the obstacle 
preventing Grant from having any opportunity to capture the South’s most important bastion 
along the Mississippi. Without cutting the central supply artery from Jackson to Vicksburg, the 
latter could be defended indefinitely. Getting to Jackson and then moving his army west to 
besiege Vicksburg was the all-consuming problem.  The bluffs along the eastern riverbank ran 
north and south for approximately 100 miles. North of the town the Yazoo River and its swampy 
bottomland delta stretched for 175 miles north and south and another 60 miles east and west. 
South of Vicksburg the bluffs were fortified as far as Grand Gulf, 40 miles below the city at the 
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junction of the Big Black River and the Mississippi.13 Finally, on the Louisiana side of the river a 
maze of bayous, swamps, and lakes, all part of the Mississippi flood plain, made passage all but 
impossible. The difficult geography to overcome did not include Confederate cavalry and 
saboteurs prepared to build man made obstructions to an area already deemed impassable.  
 Grant, however, had confidence in his engineers’ ability to improvise and move his 
army and their supplies where he imagined moving them, or at least making the attempt. This 
was truly remarkable, first because the terrain was treacherous, second because he had only 
three engineer officers and two engineer units present when he began operating against 
Vicksburg in January 1863, and third because he would need to rely on infantry as engineer and 
pioneer soldiers.14 
 One group of engineer soldiers was that of Captain William F. Patterson’s Kentucky 
Company of Mechanics and Engineers, and the other was Colonel Josiah Bissell’s 1st Missouri 
Engineer Regiment. Both were undersized units, which alone were not capable of building the 
causeways and bridges required to move the army where Grant wanted to move it. 
Nonetheless, Grant and his corps commanders soon found the additional skills they sought 
among the men serving in the infantry. To augment the engineer troops he had the army would 
form pioneer companies, draft infantry regiments, and use runaway slaves under the 
supervision and guidance of officers and non-commissioned officers actually serving as 
engineers. The men in the ranks who had developed mechanical skills before the war would now 
be ordered to apply those skills, although unknown to them at the time, to the most important 
campaign of the war.   
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14 Grant’s staff engineer was Captain Frederick Prime and his staff topographical engineer was 
Lieutenant James H. Wilson. The third engineer was on Sherman’s staff, Captain William L. B. 
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 For two months in the late winter and early spring of 1863 Grant ordered four 
simultaneous attempts to get his men and supplies on terra firma east of Vicksburg. Using 
Milliken’s Bend, 20 miles northwest of Vicksburg on the Mississippi, as the advance supply base, 
the following four expeditions were launched. First, there was an effort to re-open Williams’s 
original canal and then to dig one at Duckport, Louisiana. The second effort was to connect Lake 
Providence, 60 miles north of Vicksburg with the Tensas, Black, and Red Rivers, by-passing a 
series of forts and batteries guarding approaches to the city from the Mississippi River. Next, an 
attempt would be made to blast a hole in the levee to open the Yazoo Pass, 200 miles north of 
Vicksburg, to access the Tallahatchie River and then approach the city from the northeast. 
Finally, the engineers and navy would endeavor to enter Steele’s Bayou, forty miles north of 
Lake Providence, and strike at the city from the north. All four of these expeditions would keep 
the army’s supply lines connected and protected. All four of these expeditions would require 
ingenuity and innovation, and all four of these expeditions would fail.  
 Grant placed little faith in the Yazoo Pass option. The failed Chickasaw Bayou venture 
taught several important lessons. Confederates had mined the river, which resulted in the 
sinking of the ironclad Cairo, and they had chained together floating logs, which blocked the 
navigable channel leading to Yazoo City forty miles north of Vicksburg.15 Grant was also aware 
that Confederate guns along the bluffs commanded any potential landing spot for a move on 
Vicksburg. Further, the winter rains had elevated the river’s water level and the run-off flooded 
small streams and swamps. Yet the flooding could work as a Union advantage.  
 The Yazoo Pass was a former ship passage that had enabled transports from the 
Mississippi into Moon Lake just on the east bank of the Mississippi River, 305 miles north of 
Vicksburg.  From Moon Lake ships could access Coldwater River, which ran into the Tallahatchee 
                                                             
15 Bastian, 25. The Cairo is now on display at Vicksburg National Military Park. 
 286 
River and eventually dumped into the Yazoo. By using this route Grant’s army might get to dry 
land just north of Haynes’ Bluff and attack the stronghold from its flank. It was a long shot. The 
pass had become a mosquito infested, stagnant place overgrown with vegetation.16 The levee 
was 18-feet high and there was a difference in height of eight and one-half feet between the 
water in Moon Lake and the pass. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of Grant’s staff reported that if a 
small crevasse could be cut the force of water would enlarge the gap and within days ships 
would be able to pass through.  
 On February 3rd Wilson placed a mine in what would become the mouth of the cut, and 
then two crevasses were dug about twenty feet apart. The mine was detonated sending debris 
everywhere and widening the gap in the levee as torrents of water powered through. The next 
day Wilson wrote: “The Pass is open, and a river 75 or 80 yards wide is running through it with 
the greatest velocity…. By 11pm the opening was 40 yards wide, and the water pouring through 
like nothing else I ever saw except Niagara Falls. Logs, trees, and great masses of earth were 
torn away with the greatest of ease.” Within a few days the powerful flow of water would 
subside, and the navy would send shallow draft vessels through the new channel to explore the 
region to determine the next move. Wilson wrote Grant’s Chief of Staff John A. Rawlins, “The 
work is a perfect success.”17  
 For ten grueling days steamboats slugged their way through the pass as the men on 
board cut cottonwoods and sycamores that reached completely over the stream. Some were 
four feet wide at the base and weighed thirty-five tons. Because of the flooding, there was also 
no more than a three-foot wide strip of dry land along the bank on which to work. Wilson 
reported, “Our greatest difficulty so far has been to obtain tackle strong enough to resist 
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strain…to lift the heaviest logs.”18 It was six miles from the Mississippi to the levee, cut by 
Wilson, on the west side of Moon Lake, and from there through the pass to Coldwater River 
another fourteen miles.  
 Grant wrote to Halleck on March 7th that Commander Watson Smith had travelled the 
thirty miles of the Coldwater and entered the Tallahatchee with “2 ironclads, (Chillicothe and 
Baron De Kalb), 2 rams, and 6 light draught gunboats, under the command of Commander 
Smith, and … 14 transports with 6,000 soldiers.”19 Commander Smith, Wilson, and Grant 
remained optimistic as steady movement continued, yet from the moment the levee was cut in 
early February there was no disguising the Federal’s intentions and Confederate General 
Pemberton had time to respond. Partisans felled sycamore, oak, elm, and pecan trees into the 
streams, and with driftwood, formed taxing obstacles to remove. Using slaves from surrounding 
plantations, Confederates also hastily built a fortification at the confluence of the Tallahatchee, 
Greenwood, and Yazoo Rivers, Fort Pemberton. High water, as a result of flooding the pass and 
fourteen days of rain since February 1st, eliminated any hope of landing troops on dry ground to 
flank the batteries. The Confederates quietly waited for Smith’s small fleet to arrive.20 
 The naval assault began on March 11th and continued until the 13th with no appreciable 
damage to the fort. The gunboats approached to within 800 yards and no further.21 Wilson 
blamed Smith and the navy. “I can see a disposition on the part of the Navy to keep from a close 
and desperate engagement. I tried to give them backbone but they are not confident. Smith not 
the equal of Lord Nelson.”22 In fairness to Smith, the tight channel, the obstacles in the water, 
the lack of repair facilities, and no pressure on the fortification’s flank by Union infantry, allowed 
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the Confederate guns to focus on the small river fleet. Wilson devoted considerable attention to 
the Yazoo Pass operation, but it was at a dead end.  The flotilla reversed course and started back 
to the Mississippi. Grant though was not ready to give up on the idea of attacking Vicksburg 
from the north. Reconnaissance confirmed the efficacy of a route through Steele’s Bayou to 
Black Bayou and Deer Creek.  Entering the Yazoo River there, an attempt could be made to land 
troops between Yazoo City and Haynes’ Bluff, where the army could attack the Confederate 
army’s right flank at Vicksburg.23 
 From the outset, Admiral Porter’s vessels had problems navigating Steele’s Bayou. 
Shallow water, smokestacks ripped off by overhanging trees, overgrown channels just wide 
enough for gunboats to pass, and eerie sounds frightened superstitious sailors. When 
Confederates felled trees, mice, rats, and snakes hit the deck of the gunboats adding to the 
deplorable and scary conditions in the bayou. Porter forged ahead, travelling one half mile an 
hour until he finally reached Deer Creek. Behind Porter’s boats was General Sherman’s detached 
force made up of his army’s Second Division pioneer corps, the 8th Missouri Infantry, and two 
companies of the First Missouri Engineers. Sherman wrote: “Deer Creek is a narrow, sluggish 
stream, full of willow bushes and overhanging tree limbs inhabited by animals…. Porter’s 
ironclads move like snails….”24  
 At Rolling Fork, Deer Creek turned 180 degrees, emptied into Sunflower River and 
eventually the Yazoo River. Porter and Sherman had successfully by-passed Haynes’ Bluff, and 
they were approaching Yazoo City. Then a disaster struck that almost cost Porter his entire fleet 
in the expedition. As the admiral moved about one mile from Rolling Fork his boats became 
trapped. With Confederate obstacles in the bayou, and sharpshooters along the banks, Sherman 
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reported, “an avalanche of water from Rolling Rock,” created a logjam for Porter’s ships.  
Sherman pointed out that the floodwater “actually came from Colonel Wilson’s act to cut the 
levee on the Mississippi….”25  
 When Sherman learned Porter’s fleet was in trouble, he sent infantry through the 
bayous to rescue the navy. Once the soldiers secured the area and the pioneers, engineers, and 
infantry cleared the obstacles from the narrow channel, sailors disconnected the tiller ropes and 
tackles to the boats’ rudders and backed down the bayous to the safety of the Mississippi.26  The 
Steele’s Bayou affair was over, and Grant learned that he could not get at the enemy from the 
north. The confusion of the expedition was reflected in one commanding officer’s attempt to 
write his after action report. Under normal campaign conditions officers’ wrote their own 
reports without assistance, but in this case one of Sherman’s staff officers was asked to assist. 
The commander said to the staffer in a vexatious tone, “I want you to tell me where I have been, 
how I went there, what I did, and if I came back the same way I went, or if not, how did I get 
back.”27 The break in the Yazoo Pass levee did serve the purpose of flooding the entire area 
north of Vicksburg and limited the defenders supply lines to just along the roads and railway due 
east to Jackson. Otherwise, Wilson’s venture and Steele’s Bayou had been confusing and failed 
operations, but while Grant was trying to get his army north of Vicksburg, he also schemed to 
move his army south and attack from dry land south and east of the city. Three attempts were 
made and the first one was to rebuild the De Soto canal.  
 In January, Grant ordered Colonel Josiah W. Bissell, the intrepid officer responsible for 
constructing the Island No. 10 canal, to survey Williams’s cutoff and report on the feasibility of 
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reopening the project. Bissell found the canal between nine and twelve feet wide, no more than 
six feet deep hosting two feet of standing water, and with slack water on both ends outside the 
levee.28 After Bissell reported back to Grant, the general sent his chief engineer, Captain 
Frederick Prime to investigate other places where canals might be cut. Prime determined that a 
route could be cut from the Mississippi through Lake Providence, forty-five miles north of 
Milliken’s Bend, into the Tensas, Black, and Red Rivers to again join the Mississippi fifty miles 
above Port Hudson. This would serve several purposes.  It would allow the army to by-pass 
Vicksburg, and it would block the Red River supply route to the Confederates in Vicksburg.  It 
would also position Grant’s army in such a way that he could move on Vicksburg and transport 
troops south to Port Hudson to assist General Nathaniel Banks’ Army of the Gulf in capturing the 
Confederate stronghold there. Grant ordered General McPherson to construct the 400-mile 
Lake Providence route, a task described by historian Phillip Thienel as being “of significant 
magnitude.”29  
 Both canal efforts began in late January and haphazard leadership at the De Soto canal 
forced Grant to place Prime in charge of that project. When the captain arrived he counted a 
number of problems, The Mississippi rose five to six inches daily but the water entering the 
canal was not forceful enough to scour the sides of the ditch changing the course of the river. 
Instead, water oozed into the low-lying areas spreading for several miles. Deepening and 
widening the canal to increase the channel flow was difficult because there was already two to 
three feet of water in the ditch, and Prime lacked heavy equipment to dredge the channel. 
Levees built one and a half miles northeast of the actual canal and designed to keep the area 
around the canal as dry as possible, started to leak as did the railroad embankment three miles 
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northeast of the canal limiting the space where the men working on the project could pitch their 
tents.30 Thirty-nine infantry regiments called the dreary swamps home. A Vicksburg National 
Military Park historian wrote, “Sanitary facilities were wretched…. Many men sickened and large 
numbers died…burial parties were seen ‘’’almost every hour on the levees—the only possible 
place for a grave.’’’31 Finally, steamboat captains complained about the entrance to the canal 
because it was adjacent to an eddy, which they claimed would prevent the cutoff from 
succeeding.32  
 What was critical for the success of the canal was not the depth, although it needed to 
be deep enough to allow heavy vessels through, but the width. The canal needed to be sixty feet 
wide in order for transports, rams, and ironclads to pass through. As the sides of the ditch were 
dug away the stagnant water in the canal spread making it difficult to dig deeper than three or 
four feet. Constant rains raised the level of water in the canal, saturated the ground, and left 
soldiers in a dismal state. Captain Henry G. Ankeny, Company H, 4th Iowa Infantry, wrote to his 
wife: “At camp near Vicksburg raining constantly, terrific thunder, camp overflowed. What we 
suffer will never be known outside these precincts. Work on the canal going on…. Great deal of 
sickness prevailing in the army. Some new regiments have 300 sick. Many die. 72 left in my 
company.”33  
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 Colonel Bissell’s regiment arrived on the scene in mid-February and Prime put them to 
work extracting stumps in the present canal and in digging a channel 200 feet long to draw off 
the water between the canal and a plantation on the peninsula. Prime ordered work parties to 
dam both the entrance and exit to the canal and he ordered the raising of the canal levees. 
Wooden frames were built to support the dams, and 500 contrabands from surrounding 
plantations were assigned to the new entrance. The black laborers only dug four feet before 
hitting water, and the soldiers worked twenty-four hours a day to strengthen the levees 
protecting their campgrounds. As men frantically worked the water in the canal rose to within 
seven feet of the water level in the Mississippi.34  
 To lower the water level around the new entrance to the canal the engineers built a 
steam powered sump pump, which drew down the water level as the black laborers completed 
digging a sixty foot wide entrance that was four feet deep. Incessant rain in late February 
continued to hamper activity even though two steam dredges arrived from Memphis and 
started to clear an approach channel for the new entrance.35  Then the weather broke. Now 
with dredging operations underway, Bissell’s engineer troops cutting out stumps from the 
expanding canal, and soldiers working around the clock, a sense of optimism began to spread as 
the water appeared to recede. Henri Lovie, a correspondent-illustrator for Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper, predicted to his readership “we will…be able to run our largest boats 
through the cut-off in less that two weeks.”36  
 Confederate General Pemberton and his staff observed the canal project with great 
interest and they moved batteries to positions opposite the canal’s exit. Pemberton, a 
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Pennsylvanian who joined the Southern cause as a result of his marriage to a Virginian woman, 
was cognizant of Yankee determination and ingenuity. He informed the southern War 
Department of the canal work, and reported that if successful, he would need to fortify Grand 
Gulf forty-six river miles south of Vicksburg and only twenty-three miles over roads. Anticipating 
Federal success, Pemberton ordered two regiments under General John S. Bowen to Grand Gulf 
where the river changed course from northeast to west and eddies made navigation 
problematic. Bluffs extending for six miles also afforded Bowen the opportunity to deliver 
plunging fire and extend his line so additional guns would cover the entrance to the Big Black 
River seven miles south of Grand Gulf.37 
 Meanwhile, Captain Prime had begun work on a battery position to defend the exit of 
the canal. With most of the Missouri engineers employed on the canal removing stumps and 
operating the dredges, and Company D building pontoons used for transporting soldiers and 
supplies through the bayous, Prime assigned Company I, 35th Missouri Infantry, the task of 
building the casemates, gabions, and fascines to strengthen the canal’s gun positions. 
Lieutenant Christian Lochbiler and his company, skilled with hand tools, prepared thirty gabions 
and 120 fascines.38 
 The better weather instilled in all the men working on the batteries and canal a false 
sense of security. The Mississippi continued to rise and on the night of March 6th the mighty 
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river broke through the upper dam and cascaded through the channel. The force of the water 
did not blow out the lower dam, but as the water pooled in the channel the levee built parallel 
to the canal from excavation started to leak. This was the same levee purposely cut to expel 
water during the heavy rains in February. Within hours of the initial breach the crevasse in the 
levee started to vomit water so forcefully a 150-foot wide opening emptied four to five feet of 
water over the campsites near the canal.39 
 To relieve pressure the downstream dam was blasted out and then attention turned to 
closing the gap. Men laid sandbags in the gap while one of the dredges was guided into the 
canal.40 Water pressure knocked soldiers down into the mud, made visibility poor, raised 
adrenalin levels, and drenched clothing. Sticks and large branches cut arms, legs, and faces and 
some men lost their breath as gallons of river water flew into mouths and noses. Once the 
dredge arrived it attempted to scoop earth to dump onto the sandbags, but all it was able to 
gather was mud that oozed from the iron bucket. Prime then ordered foraging parties to 
dismantle buildings on plantations, and he called upriver for a pile driver. In eight days the 
wooden planks collected reinforced the levee and the dredge managed to place enough dirt and 
mud to close the breach. All this frenetic work left a gap to the east of the canal entrance and 
perpendicular to the levee.41 
 When the pile driver arrived, the engineers drove a post into this final gap and then 
planned to attach an earthen-filled barge to the post. The latter, acting as a bollard and 
anchored in mud gave way against the weight of the barge almost capsizing the dredge. Prime 
decided to cut the mooring lines and let the current take the barge away. He then asked the 
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engineers to alter the course of the water streaming into the gap by opening a run-off near the 
new entrance. This finally stopped the water from flowing into the canal, although water 
continued to leak out through crevasses in the levee.  It had been ten days since the initial 
breach.  
 Now Prime was ready for the final push. The dredges began moving through the canal 
widening the channel to the proper width as they closed to within one half mile of the exit. 
Prime believed the steam-powered machines would accomplish the remaining work in the canal 
and felt operations along the Yazoo River needed his attention, so he turned the command over 
to Colonel George F. Pride, Grant’s chief engineer of military railroads. Perhaps Prime 
determined the canal was a forlorn hope. Confederate guns opposite the canal’s exit began to 
shell the dredges as they came within range. Prime’s suggestion to Grant was to consider 
altering the course of the canal. Pride for his part was more than capable of seeing the canal 
project to a successful conclusion, but he could not prevent Southern batteries from the nightly 
cannonades directed at the dredges. On March 22nd Grant determined the canal was a failure, 
and although work continued for two more days the dredges and soldiers were quietly 
withdrawn. He wrote to General Banks: “…I have prosecuted that work [the canal], and would 
before this have had it completed to the width of 60 feet but for the heavy rise in the river 
breaking down the dam across the upper end. It is exceedingly doubtful if this canal can be 
made of any practical use, even if completed. The enemy have established a battery of heavy 
guns opposite the mouth of the canal, completely commanding it for one-half its length.”42 It 
would not be until 1877 that the river naturally broke through the De Soto peninsula, and today 
a section of Grant’s Canal can be seen off Interstate 20 in Madison Parish, Louisiana. In 1863 the 
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canal was over five miles south from the bend in the river, which was opposite the city. Today 
the remains of the canal are only a mile and a half south of the river. The channel at this point is 
a mile wide, 100 feet deep during high water, and this portion of the mighty Mississippi passes 
one mile south of the city.  
 Grant was never convinced the De Soto canal operation would succeed. He agreed with 
Sherman’s assessment that the efforts there were “labor lost,” but Grant did hold out hope that 
an avenue cut in the Lake Providence region, seventy-five miles north of the city “bids fair to be 
the most practicable route for turning Vicksburg.”43 If a canal could be opened from the 
Mississippi into Lake Providence, then a channel made between Bayou Baxter and Bayou 
Macon, the Union army and navy would access 200-miles of waterway leading to the mouth of 
the Red River 150-miles south of Vicksburg.44 General McPherson was given command of the 
operation, and by the time one of his division commanders, General John McArthur, reached 
Lake Providence, Grant’s chief of artillery, Lieutenant W. L. Duff, had nearly completed the canal 
connecting the Mississippi and the lake.  
 When McPherson arrived he immediately investigated Bayou Baxter south, seven miles 
beyond the lake, looking for a spot where his men could clear a watercourse between the two 
bayous.  McPherson was a West Point trained engineer having graduated first in his class in 
1853 he worked on river and harbor improvements before the war. He was Grant’s chief 
engineer for the Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh campaigns, and promoted to major 
general, United States Volunteers, when he was given command of the XVII Corps in December 
1862.  Now he had a decision to make. Option one was to send soldiers to dig a canal between 
Bayou Baxter and Bayou Macon, clear trees and debris from the passage, and build the proper 
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levees. This task would prove arduous work because heavy rains had left area lowlands covered 
in two to three feet of water. If the water level in the lake continued to rise the work of digging 
a canal, albeit a two-mile one, would become more torturous and frustrating.  
 Option two was to open the levee at the entrance to the Mississippi allowing water to 
overflow the lake, the bayou, and the surrounding area. Then, using Bissell’s Island No. 10 
technique, McPherson would order steamboats and barges into the proposed bayou connecting 
waterway, using the steamboats’ capstans to haul out the trees and logs felled by the men on 
the barges. Finally, the trees would be sawed off below the surface of the water.45 
 Before McPherson made his decision he considered one more possibility. On March 1st 
the general travelled north just over the Louisiana and Arkansas border to discover that the 
town of Ashton, Arkansas on the Mississippi was just six-miles east of Bayou Macon. This might 
prove the best option because blowing out the levee in Ashton would flood the countryside 
beyond with water deep enough for boats to reach the bayou. He asked Colonel Bissell if the 
plan seemed feasible to him, and when Bissell reported back in the affirmative, McPherson 
ordered Bissell to open the levee in Ashton.46 Furthermore, McPherson decided not to open the 
Lake Providence levee, but instead to lift the steam tug J. A. Rawlins over the dam into the lake, 
and from there move her into the water course being opened between Baxter and Macon to 
assist in hauling out snags and logs. A detail from the 15th Iowa Infantry used ropes, tackle, and 
rollers to move the 3500-ton vessel over the levee, through the Village of Lake Providence, and 
into the lake.47  
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 When Bissell opened the levee at Ashton so much water poured through that a ten to 
fifteen mile area was flooded except it did not pool deep enough in the area between Ashton 
and Bayou Macon to navigate a large ship or ironclad. Now McPherson was ready to open the 
levee at Lake Providence. Breached on March 17th, one day later the opening had been scoured 
from thirty feet to 200 feet wide and the entrance was estimated to be twenty feet deep. In five 
days the level of the lake and the Mississippi were equal.48  By this time, however, Grant was 
frustrated. Multiple attempts to safely extend his supply lines and move his army south of 
Vicksburg had washed out. The Mississippi River would not do the army’s bidding. It would not 
be controlled. High water dampened efforts to open waterways, and the eventual drop in the 
water level would surely ground vessels trying to pass through the backwater, bayous, and 
swamps of Louisiana. He wrote to Halleck: “The work of getting through Lake Providence and 
Bayou Macon, there is but little possibility of proving successful. The land from Lake Providence 
and also from Bayou Macon recedes until the lowest interval between the two widens out into a 
cypress swamp, where Bayou Baxter, which connects the two, is lost. This flat is now filled to the 
depth of several feet of water, making the work of clearing out the timber exceedingly slow, and 
rendering it impracticable to make an artificial channel.”49 
 With four attempts to get at Vicksburg all ending in failure, Grant needed to find a more 
reliable way to by-pass the city, if one existed. He would soon discover that perhaps an overland 
passage would work marching his forces and supplies approximately 90-miles along the western 
side of the great river, while at the same time disguising his movements from the enemy. Also, 
he understood that his engineers and infantrymen would have to build that route.  
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 When Grant decided to march south General McClernand’s XIII Corps was camped at 
Milliken’s Bend and in the best location to conduct a reconnaissance of the region. Sherman’s 
XV Corps was at Young’s Point, McPherson’s XVII Corps was at Lake Providence, and Hurlbut’s 
XVI Corps was in Corinth.  Grant was aware of a single wagon road resting on the natural levee 
bordering two bayous to the town of New Carthage twenty-miles below Vicksburg. The road 
was through a cypress swamp so Grant needed McClernand to determine if an alternate method 
of moving supplies to New Carthage could be found.50  McClernand selected Brigadier General 
Peter J. Osterhaus, commander of the Ninth Division to oversee the operation. Osterhaus, born 
in Koblenz, Rhenish Prussia, learned the building trade under his father’s tutelage, and at the 
age of twenty, entered the Prussian Army. He joined the revolutionaries in 1848 and then fled to 
the United States. His dream was to become an historian but now he found himself in the role of 
pathfinder.51 
 The men chosen for the assignment were the 69th Indiana Infantry under the command 
of Colonel Thomas W. Bennett. Bennett, a product of antebellum common school education, 
had become a professor of mathematics and natural sciences and a lawyer before the war.52 
Bennett’s reconnaissance force would include two companies of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, two 
mountain howitzers manned by a detachment from the 6th Missouri Cavalry, and Patterson’s 
Kentucky Company of Engineers and Mechanics.  
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 Forcing a passage south along Roundaway Bayou to New Carthage was a dangerous 
proposition. Everything was underwater except the levees along the bayou and there were 
ample opportunities for the Confederates to stage an ambush or place rifle pits across the road 
in advance of a Union force. The route selected had to guarantee the safe passage of supplies, 
and the roadway had to guarantee it could handle heavy, continuous traffic.53 A military wagon 
generally carried three to four thousand pounds of cargo that included about twenty pounds of 
fodder and grain per day for the six horses.  Each infantry division of approximately 6,000 men 
required a minimum of 18,000 pounds of food per day, which meant each division needed over 
twenty wagons of food for a three day march. This did not include ammunition wagons, 
ambulances, a portable forge, fuel for the forge, and when they were available, a pontoon train. 
In addition, 100 to 130 horses were required to move a six-gun battery, ammunition, and 
supplies, consuming 3,600 pounds of fodder each day. Therefore, identifying the proper road 
was not as simple as finding a path through the woods.54 
 On the first day from Milliken’s Bend, Bennett’s command marched southwest toward 
the little village of Richmond. Patterson’s engineers built a 200 foot-long bridge across 
Roundaway Bayou to Richmond using boards salvaged from a nearby plantation. Patterson then 
moved south toward New Carthage. With this first leg of the supply line opened at Richmond, 
Osterhaus sent his division forward, and he personally led Bennett’s vanguard toward Pointe 
Clear plantation where Roundaway Bayou and Bayou Vidal joined. This was only two-miles north 
of New Carthage, but the area was entirely underwater including the houses in the village, all 
but their roofs. Water rushed through porous levees, which prevented the engineers from 
building a bridge. That evening contraband slaves told Osterhaus that there was a large scow 
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hidden on Bayou Vidal several miles from their position.55 The scow was retrieved and Patterson 
and his men converted it into a small gunship. They boarded the sides up with planks to a height 
of about five to six feet cutting holes for oars and gun ports. As geographer Warren Grabau 
wrote, they “mounted the mountain howitzer in the bow. She was named Opossum, probably 
because she was a denizen of the swamp.”56  
 The Opossum chased away the small Confederate force at New Carthage so Osterhaus 
continued another mile and a half south to Joshua James’s plantation, Ione, surrounded by 
twenty acres of dry ground. From this position the Mississippi levee ran unbroken forty-one 
river miles south to St. Joseph. Osterhaus was told that Confederate cavalry under Major Isaac F. 
Harrison was in the immediate area along with two infantry regiments and a six-gun battery. It 
was imperative for the Union advance guard to hold the plantation so it could become the 
staging area for a Mississippi River crossing.  
 On April 6th Grant ordered McClernand to move his remaining divisions to the vicinity of 
New Carthage. This opened the Milliken’s Bend area for McPherson’s corps moving from Lake 
Providence. Developments were dictating commanders’ act with alacrity. Problems that 
required immediate solutions were confronting officers by the hour. There was no time to send 
a request up the chain of command only to await a response. General Osterhaus appointed 
Major John W. Beekman of the 12th Ohio Infantry to be the acting engineer on all work within 
the Ninth Division.57  Beekman would organize the runaway slaves flooding the Union lines into 
working parties. Patterson was to gather as many soldiers as possible with mechanical skills to 
join him at the sawmill on Ione plantation to build pontoons and boats. Men and equipment 
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were ferried from Pointe Clear to New Carthage and Ione plantation as fast as boats could be 
assembled.  
Meanwhile, Grant decided the southern passage along the Louisiana side of the 
Mississippi was his final option to move his forces south. Crossing over the river onto dry land, 
he would lay siege to Vicksburg. Unlike the previous attempts to by-pass Vicksburg, to abandon 
this new plan was to end the campaign. There were no options left to Grant, and because 
Admiral Porter had agreed to run his ironclads and transports past the city’s guns to meet 
Grant’s army somewhere south of Vicksburg, the stakes were exceptionally high. Moving 
downstream, the warships would have the current with them, and Porter was confident his 
ships would make it by the Confederate guns guarding the river. Porter then warned the general 
that his plan better work because it would be impossible to return the 5,000-ton ships back 
upstream. Porter said: “I am ready to cooperate with you in the matter of landing troops on the 
other side, but you must recollect that, when those gunboats once go below, we give up all 
hopes of getting them up again.”58  
Gunships, transports, and barges ran the batteries on April 16th and 18th so Grant rode to 
McClernand’s headquarters at Pointe Clear to prepare for the crossing. When he arrived he did 
not like what he saw. First, he observed that he supply line from Milliken’s Bend was hampered 
by narrow roadways and bayous. Next, the staging area around Pointe Clear, New Carthage, and 
Ione was too small to bivouac more than five divisions and his entire army consisting of ten 
divisions was necessary for a successful amphibious landing. Finally, the navy transports would 
need to move twenty-miles upstream to Warrenton where the men, artillery, and horses would 
disembark, and then the transports would return to New Carthage for the next trip. By this time 
General Pemberton, alerted to the enemy’s landing, would rush men to Warrenton, only eight 
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miles south of Vicksburg, and destroy those Union soldiers on the east bank of the Mississippi 
before they could be reinforced by sufficient numbers. No, Grant would move his army farther 
south and strike at the Confederate fortifications at Grand Gulf.  
Osterhaus reported that twenty-five miles to the south of Ione was Hard Times. The 
roads and extended area around Hard Times were dry and it was only five miles from Grand 
Gulf. This sounded promising, but Grant remained skeptical. He asked his chief engineer, Colonel 
Wilson, to scout the area and assess the Osterhaus plan to determine if an alternate route might 
be more feasible.  The problem was that for Osterhaus’s division, already on dry ground beyond 
New Carthage, a movement overland to Mrs. Perkins plantation and then following the levee 
around Lake St. Joseph to Hard Times, made perfect sense. Moving seven more divisions and 
enormous amounts of supplies between Pointe Clear and New Carthage, where deep running 
water made bridging difficult, was a significant concern. Barges had managed to move material 
through Roundaway Bayou to Richmond and Pointe Clear, and there was a channel between 
Pointe Clear and New Carthage. Yet, Grant was also worried that the barges would eventually 
get stuck in the bayou because the Mississippi River had finally begun to fall at a rate of six 
inches per day.59 After the war Grant recalled, “I visited New Carthage in person, and saw that 
the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better 
method must be devised. The water was falling, and in a few days, there would not be depth 
enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over.”60 
After his reconnaissance, Wilson confirmed McClernand’s report that a possible route 
existed along a road that arched northwest, then southeast, along Bayou Vidal to Perkins 
plantation. Sections of the road, however, needed serious bridging. Grant ordered acting chief 
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engineer of the XIII Corps, Lieutenant Peter Conover Hains to move forward the India rubber 
pontoon train, but the pontoons were never used on the western side of the Mississippi. The 
cylinders were subject to puncture by tree stumps and debris in the bayous.61  
Brigadier General Alvin P. Hovey’s 12th Division was assigned the task of opening the 
causeway along Bayou Vidal with the assistance of his own pioneer corps under Captain George 
W. Jackson and Patterson’s Kentucky engineers. Jackson was from Huntington, Indiana where 
the Wabash and Erie Canal passed, and so Jackson was familiar with bridging and watercourses.  
On April 22nd the work began. Under Captain Jackson’s direction, soldiers were first assigned the 
task of cutting and hauling timber for the corduroyed roads and bridges. Patterson with his men 
and additional infantrymen started work on the first bridge.  
The bridge was constructed of a 100-foot long flatboat anchored across the main 
channel bayou by a cable and chain on the south end, and a brace against a tree on the north 
end.  Timber ties six or eight inches in thickness were laid over the gunwales of the flatboat, 
upon which rested 8 by 12 stringers (frames) supporting the floor planks.  Now men standing 
neck high in water began building four more sections toward each shore. The first section 
beyond the flatboat was made of 12- inch by 12-inch timber notched halfway into existing tree 
trunks with additional planks attached from the flatboat to the notches. The remaining spans 
were trestle sections formed of four uprights secured at the top and bottom by square logs. The 
roadway was fixed in place by heavy beams pinned to the floor planks. The bridge was 362 feet 
long but only 240 feet of it rested on trestles and was immoveable. Patterson feared that if the 
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bayou rose or fell more than 18 inches the connection between the floating sections and the 
stationary ones might render the bridge impassable.62 
Upon completing the first bridge, Patterson’s engineers marched south along the bayou 
and began work on a curved 550-foot bridge using newly built 40-foot long flatboats with piers 
and trestles on each end. The boats were anchored to a 2 ½ -inch line, stretched from shore to 
shore and supported in the center by a tree. Some of the boats were fastened directly to the 
cable passing over their bows, and short ropes connected others.63  
A third bridge, 150-feet long was constructed across a slough. It rested on a center pier, 
formed of logs placed crosswise, and on trestles on either side of the pier. Men slogged through 
mud, stood in mosquito infested water, and developed trench foot and blisters, yet by April 25th 
the work was completed. Three bridges over a combined 1,000-feet in length, and two miles of 
corduroyed road, through woods and lowlands, were open for traffic. General Hovey described 
it as “the great military route through the overflowed lands from Milliken’s Bend to the 
Mississippi River below Vicksburg.”64 Colonel Wilson wrote that the men assigned the task 
“opened a practicable road, threading one of the most difficult regions that ever tested the 
resources of an army. The bridges were built by green volunteers who had never seen a bridge 
train nor had an hour’s drill in bridge building. The same may be said of the quality of the men 
and officers who carried through that remarkable work.”65 It was true that the army had not 
trained most of the men who worked on the bridge and road construction around Bayou Vidal 
as engineer soldiers, but they had considerable experience as carpenters, mechanics, boat 
builders, and lumbermen before the war. The West Point educated Wilson displayed some of his 
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arrogance developed as a proud member of the Corps of Engineers. He clearly thought how 
extraordinary it was to see ordinary soldiers perform such skilled engineering work.  Grant was 
more lucid in his praise writing, “the ingenuity of the Yankee soldier was equal to any 
emergency.”66 
As incredible as Northern engineering efforts were to provide Grant’s army with a route 
south more was about to be asked of them. With passage through Bayou Vidal completed, 
General Osterhaus ordered Colonel James Keigwin of the 49th Indiana Infantry to organize a 
combat patrol from Mrs. Perkins’s plantation to Hard Times.  This patrol’s primary purpose was 
to drive off a Confederate cavalry unit known to be operating in the region. Moreover, Grant 
issued two orders: first Colonel Wilson was to ferry across the Mississippi under the cover of 
darkness to reconnoiter all roads leading from the river to the bluffs, and second, General 
McClernand was to ready his corps for an amphibious assault on Grand Gulf.67  
Wilson’s patrol confirmed Grant’s fears. The area north of the Big Black River and west 
was inundated with water, and there were no practicable roads leading to the highlands.  South 
of the Big Black the hills were swarming with gray coats.68 Keigwin, with the 49th Indiana, 114th 
Ohio, a detachment from the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, and a section of the 7th Michigan Battery were 
also not having much luck. Four miles from Mrs. Perkins’s plantation the Confederate cavalry 
they were looking for burned the bridge over Holt’s Bayou.69  
Keigwin detailed 100 soldiers from each regiment, and under the direction Colonel John 
Beekman, who had demonstrated bridge-building skills, rebuilt the structure over the 80-foot 
wide bayou in three hours. The patrol resumed the march for approximately one mile when 
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they came to another roadblock. The 120-foot bridge over Du Rossett Bayou was destroyed and 
the current in the stream lapped over the banks.  The current was swift, and the riverbed was 
quicksand.70  Lieutenant James Fullyard led a fatigue party of men selected from the 49th 
Indiana, and with Lieutenant Francis Tunica of the Corps of Engineers they began work on the 
bridge. Fullyard was another example of a citizen soldier who could perform engineering duties 
in the field and whose improvisational ability was not limited, to any degree, by a particular 
methodology taught and practiced by West Point trained engineers. He was from New Albany, 
Indiana, the wealthiest area of the state before the war. Located on the Ohio River, the city’s 
fortune was derived from steamboat manufacturing and ancillary industries such as machine 
shops, foundries, furniture makers, and silversmiths. The American Plate Glass Works was the 
second largest business in the town. New Albany opened the first public high school in the state 
in 1853, and by 1859 they hosted the Indiana State Fair.  Fullyard was exposed to the perfect 
storm of change sweeping the North before the war: educational reform, industrial 
development, and mechanized farming.71  
Fullyard and Tunica decided to solve the problem of the quicksand by stripping one-half 
inch weatherboarding from nearby plantation buildings then layering them crosswise and 
lengthwise at the base of their trestle structure. Once there was enough buoyancy established, 
working throughout the night, they converted a trestle bridge into a floating bridge. Early the 
following morning, with a detachment of soldiers left behind to guard the new bridge, Colonel 
Keigwin’s patrol continued on its march toward Hard Times.72 
                                                             
70 O. R., ser. 1, Vol. XXIV, part 1, 571. 
71 W. H. H. Terrell, 49th Indiana Infantry Officers Roster: Report of the Adjutant General of the 
State of Indiana, vol. 2 (Indiana, 1865), 483.  
72 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXIV, part 1, 186. Bearss, 286. Thienel, Seven Story Mountain, 157-158. 
 308 
Early on the 26th the combat patrol found Major Harrison’s 400-man Confederate 
cavalry force deployed behind Clark Bayou a quarter of a mile away. Keigwin’s men on the 
northern bank of Phelps Bayou eyeballed the Rebels and the two bridges they had burned to the 
ground. Not to be denied the roadway to Hard Times, Keigwin opened fire with his artillery and 
then had his infantry ford the bayous to attack Harrison. The numbers favored Keigwin so 
Harrison’s men mounted and hurriedly left the vicinity.73 Now Captain William H. Peckinpaugh 
would have the honor of supervising the construction of the next two bridges. 
Peckinpaugh was from Leavenworth, Indiana, the second county east of New Albany 
and next to Jeffersonville, Colonel Keigwin’s home. Although there was no record of 
Peckinpaugh’s occupation before the war, Leavenworth was also on the Ohio River, and the 
town made its reputation as an important boatbuilding and brick manufacturing center. Around 
1845 the town opened a stagecoach line primarily for students who wanted to attend the new 
state college in Bloomington.74   
All the construction material for the two bridges was taken from neighboring barns. 
Large, dry beams 50-feet long were used to support the flooring, which was kept in place by 
using 6 inch by 6 inch timbers. Several of the banks were steep so the engineers and pioneers 
dug an approach road by cutting down and tapering the embankments then corduroying the 
area excavated. This was to prevent the road from becoming a quagmire anticipated with the 
heavy traffic. Once the bridges were completed, Keigwin reported to Osterhaus that a practical 
road was opened from Mrs. Perkins’s plantation to Hard Times. In his official report, Keigwin 
was effusive in his praise of his small command. He could not “speak in too high terms of all the 
officers and men in the detachment. They were ever ready to assist in all the labors of building 
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bridges and to obey any command.”75 Finally, the men of the 49th Indiana and 114th Ohio 
returned to their brigades and now prepared for the amphibious attack on Grand Gulf.  
The bombardment of Grand Gulf began on April 29, 1863 as Admiral Porter’s Mississippi 
Squadron attempted to soften the Confederate defenses on the eastern bank of the river. 
Instead, each member of the fleet took direct hits, damaging the vessels and suffering seventy-
five casualties. The defenders had three killed and nineteen wounded, and the infantry waiting 
in the rear area for the Union infantry assault was untouched. Captain Shirk of the U. S. S. 
Tuscumbia invited two army officers to see the damage to his ship firsthand. A Colonel Warmoth 
wrote: “The boat was completely riddled. Torn to smash. Hog chains broken and a good many 
other things broken.”76  
Understanding Clausewitz’s axiom that generals had to anticipate things going wrong on 
the battlefield, Grant, the quintessential Clausewitzian (even though he never read a word the 
Prussian wrote), had developed a contingency plan.  His scouts had determined the way was 
clear to march the army farther south toward Disharoon, and they learned from a runaway slave 
that there was a good road connecting Bruinsburg with Port Gibson on the east bank of the 
Mississippi. After a fitful night’s sleep, infantrymen from the 24th Iowa and 46th Indiana marched 
south to Disharoon where they were ferried across the river and touched the eastern shore of 
Mississippi in the mid-morning hours of April 30th. Grant’s army was now on dry land.77 
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The first contact Grant had with a sizeable Confederate army was on May 1st at Port 
Gibson, ten miles due east of Bruinsburg. Out numbered three to one the Southern forces under 
General Bowen fought a remarkable delaying action.  They retreated north burning two bridges 
behind them, one over the south fork of Pierre Bayou and the other over the north fork. A 
railroad bridge linking Port Gibson to Grand Gulf was also burned, but the Federals determined 
it was not necessary to cross. Grant had accompanied General McPherson into Port Gibson and 
he was in a hurry to pursue the retreating Confederates north so he immediately ordered 
Colonel Wilson, Captain Patterson’s engineer company, and Captain Stewart R. Tresilian, 
commander of McPherson’s pioneer corps, to begin work at once. The roadway of the 
suspension bridge over the south fork of Bayou Pierre was completely destroyed so the decision 
was made to construct a floating bridge about twenty yards north of the old bridge. Plenty of 
buoyant materials were found by tearing down barns and cotton gins in the neighborhood.78 
Under time constraints, the pioneers and engineers completed the bridge by noon on May 2nd, 
but infantry officers did not think much of the structure, so they tried it out on an artillery piece 
drawn by a team of mules. Half way across the span started to rock and then it flipped over 
dumping the gun and mules into the river. One infantryman said, “It was rather an expensive 
trial, but better than a column of infantry.”79 The next effort proved more successful. The bridge 
was a continuous raft 166 feet long with three rows of large mill-beams lying across the current 
in the bayou, and the intervals between the beams were filled by buoyant timber. The entire 
bridge firmly tied together by a cross-floor or deck. The approaches to the bridge were over 
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quicksand so the men laid layers of logs and then covered them with earth to prevent the 
animal teams from losing their footing on the logs.80 
Eight miles northeast of the bridge just finished was Grindstone Ferry and a suspension 
bridge over the north fork of Bayou Pierre. When the engineers arrived the bridge was in flames, 
so the men in the vanguard and runaways from local plantations quickly extinguished the fire. A 
section of the bridge’s roadway, side-truss, and string-pieces were destroyed. Leaving the 
charred cross ties in place, the engineers lashed timber planks with wires cut from the telegraph 
line to the suspension rods that hung down from the chain that spanned the river. New timber 
was then placed at intervals of three feet and fastened to the vertical planks the engineers had 
tied to the suspension rods. Wedges were placed between the old burned ties and the new ones 
in the middle of the roadway. The road covering, obtained from farmhouses, was secured by 
side rails, spiked and lashed into place. To strengthen the causeway, a rope loop was placed on 
the suspension cable and then around the end of the cross tie that extended out beyond the 
rail. A stick was placed inside the loop rope and twisted until the rope was tight and bore the 
weight of the roadway. The new road was ten inches above the old road. It was a brilliant 
improvised design.  As Phillip Thienel observed, the engineers and pioneers built a “suspension 
bridge within a suspension bridge.”81   
Captain Andrew Hickenlooper, chief engineer of McPherson’s XVII Corps offered sublime 
praise to the resolute engineers. “The bridging of the South Fork of Bayou Pierre in four hours 
by Captain Tresillian [sic], a detailed engineer of the Third Division, and the complete 
reconstruction of the suspension bridge—nearly three hundred feet in length, and forty feet 
above the bed of North Fork—in a single dark and stormy night by a pioneer corps command by 
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Captain Patterson, assisted by troops worn out by two days and nights of continuous marching 
and fighting…will ever remain as examples of what may be accomplished by intelligent direction 
of American soldiers.”82 Like Tresilian and Patterson, Hickenlooper was one of those men, 
becoming more frequent as the war continued, who initially served as an artillery or infantry 
officer, but soon found himself in the engineers. Fighting at Shiloh as captain of the 5th Ohio 
Battery, he was promoted by McPherson chief of artillery and then chief of engineers. A civil 
engineer before the war, Hickenlooper observed that it was not probable “that in any other 
army ever organized could such bodies of men have been so quickly selected, efficiently 
organized, and rapidly qualified for the duties assigned as were the Volunteer Engineer Corps of 
the Union army, because in no other army of similar magnitude was there ever to be found such 
a versatility of first class talent subject to command at a moment’s notice.”83  
In fifteen days, Captain Hickenlooper and his fellow engineers would be called upon to 
carry out another incredible engineering feat crossing the Big Black River. Before that, however, 
Grant’s army would break from their supply base, and to the surprise and confusion of General 
Pemberton, march east to the Mississippi capital of Jackson. There the army would block any 
attempt by Confederate Joseph Johnston to rescue Pemberton at Vicksburg. Grant would then 
turn west, defeat the Southern army at Champion’s Hill and continue to pursue the retreating 
Confederates toward the Big Black River. Once the Big Black was crossed, the city of Vicksburg 
was next.84  
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The Battle of Champion’s Hill and the Big Black River were decisive victories for the 
Army of the Tennessee. General Pemberton’s Confederates retreated into the eight-miles of 
fortifications surrounding the north, east, and south of the city. Grant’s soldiers began the 
campaign in late February, struggling under deplorable conditions. Rain, hail, mud, and cold was 
their lot for several months as they tried to dig canals, move through swamps, and avoid falling 
prey to typhoid, typhus, and acute diarrhea. In April, as the weather warmed and the flooding 
abated, the enemy became mosquitoes and snakes. In May, for a period of seventeen days, they 
fought five successful battles and marched about eighty-two miles and now were at the last 
obstacle before Vicksburg.85 Grant demanded no delay, but his concern was that his three corps 
of 44,000 men were all packed within ten miles of each other. Located like points on an 
isosceles triangle, McClernand’s corps was at the railroad bridge over the Big Black River, 
McPherson was five miles southeast of McClernand’s position. Sherman was five miles 
northeast of McPherson, and Sherman was nine miles east of McClernand.  
Grant imagined a massive logjam as the entire army tried to cross the only bridge over 
the river, a permanent wooden railroad bridge built on a masonry foundation.86 Of course, the 
retreating Southerners burned the entire bridge leaving just the foundation standing.  The Big 
Black River was between forty and seventy yards wide, and at low water stages the banks could 
be as high as twenty feet. The bed of the river was mostly silt, sand, and soft clay, which meant 
that, unlike railroad bridges with foundations, road bridges with wooden trestle footings were 
unstable, and flash flooding would easily wash out these structures.87 To cope with this unique 
geographic condition the eight crossing points the locals used from Bridgeport and Grand Gulf 
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were by ferry. Ferrying 44,000 men, 38 artillery batteries, and all the wagons would take too 
long. Grant, therefore, ordered the railroad bridge rebuilt and three other floating bridges 
constructed.88 
Captain Christian Lochbiher, Company I, 35th Missouri Infantry had hauled the India 
rubber pontoon from Milliken’s Bend to the Big Black.  Now his regiment, along with the 127th 
Illinois, and four companies of Bissell’s Missouri engineers, built the bridge on the army’s right 
flank at Bridgeport to facilitate the crossing of Sherman’s corps. Bridgeport was located two 
miles north of the town of Amsterdam. At Amsterdam the river turned west for six miles, then 
turned south. One mile from this bend was the burned out railroad bridge.89 
McPherson discovered two roads around the Amsterdam area leading to the river. One 
was at Coaker’s Ferry a quarter of a mile north of Amsterdam, and one at Hooker’s Ferry two 
miles west of the town. Brigadier General Thomas Edward Greenfield Ransom, a civil engineer 
before the war, supervised the work on the bridge at Hooker’s Ferry and completed it in ten 
hours.90 Soldiers cut tall pine trees from the riverbank, stripped them of their limbs, and then 
they were floated to the opposite shore. The trees were anchored on shore by placing them on 
wooden tripods that raised the bridge two feet higher than the embankment. Planks collected 
from houses and barns were used as the roadbed.91 
The second bridge at Coaker’s Ferry, supervised by Captains Hickenlooper and Tresilian 
required even more imagination than the Kentucky engineers used at Hooker’s Ferry. After 
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brush fires were lighted so the men could work all night, soldiers from the 48th Indiana, 59th 
Indiana, 4th Minnesota, and 18th Wisconsin torn down several warehouses and hauled the planks 
and bales of cotton found in the building to the river bank. Nails were recovered from the wood 
and a guy wire was made from the horses’ bridles.  A raft was built and with two men aboard 
ferried to the western bank of the river where they tied a sheer line to a tree that was fastened 
to a tree on the eastern bank, as well. The river was 102 feet wide. Soldiers took two beams 34 
feet long and laid them side by side ten feet apart. The beams were joined together with 1-inch 
strips nailed two and a half feet apart. Uprights were nailed to the ends of each strip. Two 
cotton bales were placed on each cross piece and pressed against the end uprights. The bales 
were kept in place by nailing strips crisscross in front of them. Additional bales of cotton were 
placed the same way until they filled the entire thirty-four by ten foot frame.92 
The three sections were floated into the river, fastened together, and tied to the sheer 
line. The flooring was nailed in place, and at dawn Tresilian watched a 20-pounder Parrot gun 
sink the bridge only fourteen inches, leaving an excess of buoyancy of sixteen inches.93  
At the railroad bridge more drama unfolded. Under cover of darkness, Lieutenants 
Tunica and Hains stealthily moved to the riverbank to determine the extent of the damage to 
the railroad bridge and to site a location for a new structure. Working with quiet resolve 
members of the Kentucky engineers stripped the unburned sections of the railroad bridge, 
dismantled several farmhouses, and under galling sniper fire, constructed a 200-foot long 
floating raft bridge about 150 yards northwest of the ruined railroad bridge.94 Colonel Wilson of 
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Grant’s staff wrote, “Counting these improvised bridges on the Big Black River and those at 
Milliken’s Bend and Bruinsburg, there were five to six thousand feet of such bridges.”95  
On May 18th the Army of the Tennessee crossed the Big Black and formed on the 
outskirts of Vicksburg. The final phase of the Federal army’s campaign to capture the Gibraltar 
of the Confederacy began. It was not an exaggeration to say that Grant’s engineers, pioneers, 
and infantry regiments had built their way to Vicksburg.  
The Confederate defenses surrounding Vicksburg ran in an approximate half-moon 
north to south for over eight miles. Impressed slaves from neighboring plantations had built a 
series of redoubts, redans, and lunettes connected by rifle pits.96 Captain David B. Harris of the 
Provisional Engineer Corps was responsible in early 1862 for locating and supervising the 
construction of the first batteries at Vicksburg. The Confederate engineer most responsible for 
the defenses on the eastern side of the city, however, was Major Samuel Henry Lockett. Lockett 
graduated second in his class at West Point in 1859 and entered the Corps of Engineers. Born in 
Virginia, he grew up in Marion, Alabama, and joined the Confederacy at the start of the war. 
After serving with Braxton Bragg in Tennessee, he was ordered to Vicksburg in June 1862. On his 
arrival, he set to work surveying and mapping what he described as the “topographical puzzle” 
of the land formations around the city.97  
The ridges along the high ground, the deep ravines and gullies, were forested with 
magnificent magnolia trees and dense undergrowth of cane. Lockett, a skilled engineer, 
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eventually found a general line of commanding ground surrounding the city, and he determined 
to focus particular attention on the five major roadways entering Vicksburg. The defenses at 
their closest point to the city were three quarters of a mile, and the farthest point from the city 
to the defenses was two miles.98 Ten earthworks were built one example of which was the 26th 
Louisiana Redoubt. The structure had a six-foot high parapet that was twenty feet wide. On the 
exterior of the parapet was a ditch that served as a trench ten feet wide and six feet deep, and 
in front of the trench was a rough palisade and glacis.  Beyond the parapet was a two-foot high 
firestep and a twenty-foot wide terreplein, or horizontal surface, in the rear of the parapet.99 
In November, Lockett was promoted to chief engineer of the Department of Mississippi 
and East Louisiana, which meant that he was responsible for the fortifications from Holly Springs 
to Port Hudson. He would no longer supervise the day-to-day construction of the Vicksburg 
defenses, and until April 1863, the responsibility for finishing the work was done by committee.  
Unfortunately, attention to detail lapsed so when Grant’s army crossed the Big Black River and 
Pemberton’s forces occupied their fortifications, Lockett noticed a series of problems that he 
had failed to anticipate.  
The redans and redoubts had not been occupied since the construction, and 
consequently, areas were washed out and weakened by the winter’s rains. Along parts of the 
line rifle pits were never finished, obstructions had not been laid, traverses were incomplete, 
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and covered ways non-existent. Finally, there were only approximately 500 picks and shovels to 
be disbursed among 18,500 effectives spread out through eight miles of earthworks.100 Lockett 
wrote, “They [the tools] were distributed to the different brigades according to the amount of 
work required, and being much scattered along our lines were considered so precious by both 
men and officers that when not in actual use they were hidden for fear that they would be 
stolen by other troops, or ordered to some other part of the line by the chief engineer. They 
were entirely inadequate for the work, and the men soon improvised wooden shovels, using 
their bayonets as picks.”101  
Lockett’s work force consisted of twenty-six sappers and miners, eight detailed 
mechanics and firemen, four overseers for slaves, seventy-two slaves (twenty were sick), three 
four-mule teams, and twenty-five yoke of draught oxen. In addition, eleven engineer officers 
were under Lockett’s command.102 Although these officers’ names appear in the Official Record 
little else is known about them. Captain Powhatan Robinson graduated from William and Mary, 
Lieutenant Arthur W. Gloster was a railroad engineer, and Captain D. Wintter, First Lieutenant E. 
McMahon, and Second Lieutenant F. Gillooly each commanded a company of sappers and 
miners.  
The under-manned engineer force continued to rely on slave labor to dig new sections 
of the fortifications and repair existing ones, and although the attackers marveled at the 
Confederate earthworks there was nothing unique or novel about them. Brigadier General 
Francis A. Shoup, who commanded troops at the 26th Louisiana Redoubt recalled, “The 
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fortifications about Vicksburg were a poorly run and poorly constructed set of earthworks. But 
there was no point of the whole line which could not have been carried by a simple assault 
without ladders or any sort of machines.”103   
On May 25th, Pemberton under a flag of truce, sent a note to Grant proposing a 
ceasefire, so dead and wounded Federal soldiers in front of Confederate lines could be buried or 
receive medical assistance. Grant agreed. During the lull in the killing General Sherman 
introduced himself to Lockett and soon the two were sitting on a log enjoying a pleasant 
conversation.  At one point Sherman said, “You have an admirable position for defense here, 
and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground.”  
“Yes General,” Lockett replied, “but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations 
and your engineers have not been slow to discover it.” To this Sherman agreed.104  
Union engineers and pioneer detachments did adapt to siege operations with aplomb. 
Since only a handful of army trained engineers were present in the siege lines, soldiers received 
little instruction in building approach trenches, saps, and mines, but they took what little 
information they were given and combined it with their own ingenuity to successfully tighten 
the noose around Vicksburg.105  
Captain Prime was the army’s chief engineer officer responsible for the entire siege 
operation. He made it clear the engineering organization to conduct the siege works was 
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deficient. No doubt believing that trained military engineers familiar with the principles of 
Sebastien Vauban, considered the father of siege operations for the brilliance he displayed at 
the siege of Maastricht, Netherlands, June 13 to 26, 1673, were the only ones capable of 
supervising the complex business around Vicksburg.106 Prime estimated he needed at least thirty 
officers for the task and acknowledged those detailed from staffs of corps, with some 
engineering experience would help. In his official report after the siege he did not, however, 
mention the three dozen volunteer officers in the Army of the Tennessee who performed 
engineer officer duties constructing canals, roads, bridges, and clearing swamps and bayous.107 
He also never mentioned Colonel Bissell’s Missouri Engineer Regiment, which remained on the 
west side of the Mississippi maintaining and repairing roads and bridges for the supply wagons, 
and Captain Patterson’s Kentucky Company of Mechanics and Engineers attached to 
McClernand’s XIII Corps.  
The plan devised to cross no-man’s-land between the two lines, and bring Union 
soldiers to within close range of the Confederate fortifications was to dig fourteen approach 
trenches, known as saps, from different locations along the line. Soldiers detached from their 
units to act as engineer-pioneers were to dig trenches jutting from the Union lines like tentacles 
to the Confederate lines. Ingenuity and imagination was required as expedients arose.108   
Soldiers and runaway slaves paid ten dollars a month, were instructed by division 
engineers and pioneer officers on the techniques of digging saps, constructing sap rollers, 
fabricating gabions and fascines, building batteries, parallels, magazines, and platforms for 30-
pound Parrott guns. Several field guns were obtained from the navy so pioneer soldiers had to 
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haul these pieces from the river thirty miles away.109 Captain Tresilian built wooden mortars by 
shrinking iron bands on cylinders of sweet gum trees and boring out the center to set off six or 
twelve pound shells. These innovative devices could throw a projectile 150 yards. Tresilian also 
guided soldiers in building twenty-two foot long scaling ladders. A rope was attached to the 
ladder so men approaching fortifications on their bellies could pull the ladder behind and not be 
detected by enemy soldiers.110  
The workhorse of the siege, nonetheless, was the sap roller. As the approach trenches 
were dug in a zigzagged pattern using the contours of the geography to protect the excavators 
from enfilading fire, men remained vulnerable to enemy sharpshooters. To defend against this 
fire sap rollers were pushed along in front of the workers to afford protection. The sap roller 
was a woven cylinder made from grape vines or cane, open at the top and bottom with braces 
built on the inside of the cylinder so the roller would maintain its shape, and pushed in front of 
the men in the trench for protection.111 The solid cane offered excellent protection, but was too 
heavy to maneuver over such difficult ground. Some men tried stuffing the rollers with cotton 
bales to provide more support, but weight remained a problem. 
Lieutenant Hains devised an innovative solution to the weight problem of the sap roller. 
He placed two empty barrels head to head with fascines secured around their exteriors. Hains 
then tied smaller cane bundles between the fascines, and telegraph wire was wrapped around 
the exterior to hold everything together.112  
By the end of June, Prime reported that 1,200 fascines, 1,000 gabions, and six sap rollers 
had been constructed. In addition, pioneers had built 89 batteries, three magazines, dug twelve 
                                                             
109 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXIV, part 2, 176. 
110 Thienel, Seven Story Mountain, 216. 
111 J. C. Duane, Manual for Engineer Troops, (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862), 67 and 78. 
112 Fascines were long sticks bundled together to protect earthworks.  
 322 
miles of trenches, hauled 370 wagon loads of lumber, and placed 220 field and siege guns.113 
The approaches, deriving their names from the brigade or division commander who furnished 
the working parties, were built with unique characteristics to conform to the terrain in front of 
them.114 For example, Thayer’s Approach began near the crest of a ridge, ran down the slope, 
which was toward the Confederate’s 26th Louisiana Redoubt and then back up the ridge on 
which the redoubt was positioned. Under the supervision of Captain Herman Klostermann, who 
commanded the pioneer company of Major General Frederick Steele’s First Division, a tunnel 
was dug from the north side of the first ridge, which placed the pioneers at the base of the 
second ridge. From this ravine a trench was dug to the foot of the second spur and then two 
traverse trenches were started up the slope. The trenches were six-feet wide and six-feet deep 
and were covered by a blinding of bundles of cane laid across the top affording protection 
against enemy rifle fire.115 
Logan’s Approach was begun on May 26th starting one hundred fifty feet southeast of 
Shirley House and 400 yards east of it objective, the 3rd Louisiana Redan. Captain Hickenlooper 
was in command of the operation and the sap roller used was a railroad flatcar with wooden 
wheels, stacked with twenty cotton bales. Loopholes in the cotton bales allowed men to use the 
flatcar as a rolling firing platform. On June 3rd the sap reached a knoll so two trenches, one left 
and one right, were extended from the original sap and a Union battery was positioned there.116 
                                                             
113 Thienel, Seven Story Mountain, 228.  
114 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXIV, part 2, 171. 
115 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXIV, part 2, 172. Thayer’s Approach was named after Brigadier General 
John M. Thayer, Third Brigade, First Division, XV Army Corps. 
116 Richard Billies, “Union Siege Operations at Vicksburg,” The North Against South: 
Understanding the American Civil War on its 150th Anniversary Blog, entry posted April 18, 2012, 
http://northagainstsouth.com/union-siege-operations-at-vicksburg/ (accessed July 8, 2013). 
Logan’s Approach was named for Major General John A. Logan, Third Division, XVII Army Corps.  
 323 
At seventy-five yards from the redan Confederate infantry were able to shot directly 
into the approach trench bringing work to an abrupt halt. Men from the 23rd Indiana Infantry 
then suggested building a tower behind the Union battery from which a Union sniper could 
harass the enemy so work on the sap could continue. Hickenlooper agreed to the plan, the 
tower was built, and “Coonskin’s Tower,” named after Lieutenant Henry C. Foster, the tower’s 
occupant, effectively shut down Louisiana sharpshooters and the work on the sap continued.117 
By June 16th Federal soldiers were within twenty-five yards of the redan. Now with hand 
grenades being thrown into the Union trench and with Union soldiers attempting to throw them 
back, a mining operation was begun under the immediate command of Lieutenant Russell of the 
7th Missouri and Sergeant Morris of the 32nd Ohio.118 
With drills, short-handled picks, and shovels a gallery, four feet wide and five feet in 
height was driven at right angles to the face of the parapet of the fort. The main gallery was dug 
45 feet, while from the end of the main gallery two others were dug out on either side at 45 
degrees for a distance of fifteen feet. The reddish clay soil was easy to dig and required very 
little bracing. Eight hundred pounds of power was placed in the main shaft and 700 pounds at 
the end of each of the lateral galleries. From each powder charge two strands of safety fuse was 
laid to cover the possibility that one might fail to burn. The earth, which had been removed in 
grain-sacks, was carried back, deposited in a compact manner and well braced by heavy timber, 
beyond the junction point of the three galleries. The rest of the entrance to the gallery was also 
packed with dirt.119 
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At 3:00pm on June 25th the mine exploded leaving a crater thirty feet wide and fifteen 
feet deep.  Hickenlooper wrote, “At the appointed moment it appeared as though the whole 
fort and connecting outworks commenced an upward movement, gradually breaking into 
fragments and growing less bulky in appearance, until it looked like an immense fountain of 
finely pulverized earth, mingled with flashes of fire and clouds of smoke, through which could 
occasionally be caught a glimpse of some dark objects—men, gun-carriages, shelters, etc.”120 
Volunteers from the 31st and 45th Illinois Infantry ran into the crater only to be met with a 
withering fire from Confederates who had pulled back from the area because their commanding 
general sensed imminent danger. The falling debris also formed an artificial parapet 
commanded from a distance by Confederate artillery. Realizing the Union assault was a forlorn 
hope, troops were withdrawn to a new line beyond the range of artillery shells.121 
The Yankees exploded another mine at Logan’s Approach on July 1st, and a gallery at 
Ewing’s Approach was completed but never used. Southerners made a couple of attempts at 
mining and counter-mining, for example at A. J. Smith’s Approach they tried to blow up a sap 
roller but underestimated the distance and used a weak charge.122  
The Army of the Tennessee finally had a choke hold on Vicksburg. Citizens of the town 
and the soldiers defending it were all suffering. Water was contaminated, disease and 
malnourishment were ubiquitous, the dead went unburied, and the wounded went unattended. 
Men, women, and children lived on a diet of mule meat and boiled peas, the smell of human 
waste filled the air, and there was no hope of relief. There was no choice; on July 4, 1863 
Pemberton surrendered to Grant. With sarcasm and exhaustion, Captain Patterson wrote to his 
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wife, “What shall I say of today? I have had headache. You will see by the paper we have the 
place. Taking Vicksburg July 4 calculated to make one happy. They were reduced to mule meat. 
Poor fellows were glad to be captured.”123  
Some historians have argued that the Confederate loss of Vicksburg proved to be a 
white elephant. Albert Castel, Herman Hattaway, and Archer Jones all agreed that the loss of 
Vicksburg did not deprive Southern forces of supplies from the trans-Mississippi because little 
was coming from that region before the loss.124 Northern commerce along the river did not 
revive to prewar levels, Southern partisans threatened the safety of Northern river traffic south 
of the city after it surrendered, and the North just gained more territory to guard, siphoning 
resources from other operations.125 These interpretations challenge President Lincoln’s notion 
that after the victory, “The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea.”126 
Lincoln’s point, however, was not to suggest after the collapse of Vicksburg that 
commerce was freely flowing along the Mississippi. The purpose of his letter written to James C. 
Conkling on August 26, 1863 was to remind Democrats and Republicans alike that he was 
determined to emancipate the slaves, whether either party agreed with him or not, and to save 
the Union. Regarding slaves Lincoln wrote, “Why should they [blacks] do any thing for us, if we 
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do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest 
motive—even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made, must be kept.”127  
To save the Union, Lincoln believed the war had to be won. “The strength of the 
rebellion, is its military—its army,” he wrote. “That army dominates all the country, and all the 
people, within its range.”128 Destroy the army and the Union destroys the Confederacy and 
slavery. At Vicksburg, Grant had captured an entire Confederate army. Twenty-nine thousand 
soldiers surrendered in addition to 172 pieces of artillery, 38,000 projectiles, 58,000 pounds of 
black pounder, 4,800 artillery cartridges, 50,000 shoulder weapons, 600,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and 350,000 percussion caps.129  
Union commerce was limited along the Mississippi during the remainder of the war, but 
that was not the point.  A Confederate army was captured and strategically the victory at 
Vicksburg forced the South to operate its other army groups in a dwindling territory. If Vicksburg 
had remained in Southern control the North’s ability to destroy the rebellion would be that 
more difficult. It would continue to delay other major actions including operations along the 
critical Nashville and Atlanta corridor. With a presidential election coming in 1864, a stalemate 
favored the peace democrats in the North and threatened President’s Lincoln’s second term. 
Lincoln’s letter to Conkling in August 1863 was political commentary not strategic analysis. He 
told his constituencies, “The signs look better.”130 The signs were much needed victories, and 
Grant had delivered a huge one. 
The capture of the city and 29,000 men was not the only important outcome of Grant’s 
campaign. The Confederate defeat contributed to the surrender of Port Hudson, south of 
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Vicksburg, and it demoralized Southern citizens. Georgia governor Joseph Brown, omitting any 
mention of Gettysburg, on July 17th urged his citizens not to despair over “the late serious 
disasters to our arms” in Mississippi and Tennessee. A Confederate congressman wrote, “The 
disastrous movement of Lee into Pennsylvania and the fall of Vicksburg, the later especially, will 
end in the ruin of the South….”131 A Texas sergeant in General Johnston’s army wrote after 
Vicksburg, “I have little hope in the future.”132 Across the Confederacy the fall of Vicksburg 
struck like a death knell. In Richmond, chief of the Confederate Ordnance Department, Colonel 
Josiah Gorgas, wrote in his diary, “…Vicksburg and Port Hudson capitulated, surrendering thirty-
five thousand men and forty-five thousand arms. It seems incredible that human power could 
effect such a change in so brief a space. Yesterday we rode on the pinnacle of success—today 
absolute ruin seems to be our position. The Confederacy totters to its destruction.”133  
Vicksburg ensconced Grant as Lincoln’s number one commander. The political 
machinations were over. The calls from other generals and the press to sack Grant because of 
his drinking abruptly ended. Soon to become a lieutenant general and commander of all the 
Union armies, Grant’s brilliance and tenacity would bring about the collapse of the Confederate 
armies. In hindsight, Grant was the greatest American general of the nineteenth century, and 
one could argue, the greatest general in American history. Success at Vicksburg gave Grant the 
chance to prove his greatness. 
Finally, Vicksburg tested the mettle of the Union soldier, not just as a warrior but also as 
an innovator and builder. The campaign proved that defeating the Confederacy on their own 
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territory required moving supplies and conquering terrain over vast distances. Control of 
railroads, roads, and bridges were the fundamental elements needed to take the war to the 
South.  By contrast, Southerners were unable to bring supplies to Vicksburg because of their 
inability to build additional light draft boats to haul food from the productive plantations of the 
Yazoo River Delta. Additional food rotted on the Vicksburg wharves because of a lack of public 
storage facilities.134 
With a limited number of trained military engineers available to cope with the size and 
scope of campaigns and armies, northern volunteer soldiers were called upon to assume the 
role of engineers and pioneers. A Federal infantryman recalled, “Every man in the investing line 
became an army engineer day and night.”135 Other generals besides Grant now understood the 
power they had in the volunteer soldier’s ability to perform engineering tasks to help move the 
army into positions generals previously though inaccessible.   
Captain Prime, not always effusive in his praise of volunteer engineers, in his final report 
of the campaign had to admit his amazement and admiration for what these men accomplished. 
He conceded, “Over a line so extended and ground so rough as that which surrounds Vicksburg, 
only a general supervision was possible, and this gave to the siege one of its peculiar 
characteristics, namely, that many times, at different places, the work that should be 
done…depended on officers, or even on men, without either theoretical or practical knowledge 
of siege operations, and who had to rely upon their native good sense and ingenuity.”136  
Vicksburg was a critical victory for the Union. General Grant was a risk taker, and he had 
vision, determination, and moxie. He also had the men, who in previous lives built ships, labored 
on railroads, served as mechanics, and worked in business environments that placed a high 
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value on innovation and problem solving.  Grant had the men who engineered and built the 
Army of the Tennessee’s victory at Vicksburg.
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CHAPTER 8 
GETTYSBURG AND CHATTANOOGA 
 
 
Meade declined the challenge, and Lee resuming the retreat, crossed on the bridge of boats 
that had been thrown over the river at Falling Waters by the engineers—and a crazy affair it 
was, too. 
                                                                                 Lieutenant Colonel Moxey Sorrel, CSA 
 
Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. 
                                                    General Grant to General Thomas, October 19, 1863 
 
 
During the third year of the war the difference between Union and Confederate railroad 
management, engineering, and the use of infantry as effective engineers or pioneers grew 
increasingly more apparent. As operations became more complex and the logistical support for 
those operations became more critical these differences highlighted one of the central reasons 
for Union success and Confederate setbacks.  
In the spring of 1863 while the Army of the Tennessee drew closer to Vicksburg and 
operated with an unorthodox yet highly effective engineering organization, one thousand miles 
northeast in Washington, DC, Major General Henry W. Halleck suggested to Congress the 
establishment of a more orthodox engineer corps suitable to the responsibilities carried out by 
regular army engineering officers. Halleck found it almost incomprehensible that a first 
lieutenant, Cyrus B. Comstock, served as chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac. Halleck 
understood that more army engineers were needed in all theaters of operations. From 
Vicksburg each week, corps and division commanders requested that the War Department send 
them additional engineers. In his report on the siege, Captain Prime wrote, “The engineer 
organization here, as in all our armies, was very deficient, if we judge either from the practice of 
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nations wiser in the art of war than ourselves or from results. Thirty officers of engineers would 
have found full employment.”1  
 In the southeast the First New York Volunteer Engineers had built large flat boats 
provided with hinged aprons at the bow to facilitate the landing of both artillery and troops just 
north of the Savannah River to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. Detachments of the 
First New York served at Beaufort, South Carolina, and at Fort Clinch and Fort Old Town, 
Florida.2  In all of these places a handful of regular army engineers were assigned to supervise 
Colonel Edward W. Serrell’s volunteer engineers. In middle Tennessee General Rosecrans used 
the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics to repair railroads and bridges, but the engineers 
reported to and were supervised by regular army engineers. A significant part of the military 
culture was the understanding that engineering required the best-trained and most 
technologically skilled officers in the army.  Halleck’s proposal was now to give those skilled 
officers the recognition and ranks they deserved.  The chief engineer of a field army, Halleck 
proposed, would hold the rank of a colonel, and of an army corps the rank of a lieutenant 
colonel or major. These promotions were overdue.  Furthermore, Halleck argued, at the start of 
the war skilled engineering officers like Rosecrans and Meade offered to lead volunteers and 
were promoted to brigadier general. It was better for their careers to become field commanders 
than remain as chief engineers of army groups with the rank of a lieutenant or captain.  
 Halleck was still not willing to concede, however, that volunteer engineers be placed on 
the same level as West Point trained regular army engineers.  Nonetheless, this professional 
ethos had started to wear down. Grant discovered that citizen soldiers, together with a small 
professional cadre of engineers, were capable of improvised solutions to the many logistical 
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challenges faced by the army. Historian Edward Hagerman wrote, “The Civil War forced the 
regular officer…to reconsider his professionalism from a broader intellectual and organizational 
perspective. The changes in warfare that he had to bring under control required that he adopt a 
more open, flexible, and historical, and less static, mechanistic, and absolutist military world 
view.”3  For Halleck, before he could reconsider his professionalism from a broader perspective, 
the first step was to seek proper professional recognition for the role engineers had played in 
the first two years of the war, and for the role they would surely play as the war continued.   
 Senator Henry Wilson took up Halleck’s suggestion to provide proper promotions for 
engineers and to expand the corps of engineers without imposing excessive costs to the already 
bloated wartime budget. Wilson introduced a bill out of the Committee on Military Affairs to 
merge the corps of topographical engineers with the corps of engineers and to raise the 
authorized strength of the latter to 107 officers. At the time there were forty-eight officers in 
the corps of engineers and another forty in the topographical corps. The bill also included 
creating five colonels, ten lieutenant colonels, twenty majors, and thirty captains.4   
Some senators and congressmen felt it was shortsighted to spend money on an 
expanded corps of engineers and not on additional infantry. Others like General Sherman’s 
younger brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, saw Wilson’s efforts as a mendacious way of 
expanding the regular army after the war. To Sherman, like most Americans at the time, a 
standing army was an anathema to the principles of liberty and freedom. Furthermore, Sherman 
believed that a regular army officer from the corps of engineers promoted to command 
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volunteer armies was still an officer in the corps of engineers.5 In the senate debate over 
Wilson’s bill Sherman said, “This bill, then, is not for the present purpose, because all the 
officers who deserve promotion have been promoted and now hold high rank in the volunteer 
army.”6  
 Wilson convinced his colleagues that he would revise the measure, and as a result, the 
bill passed in both the House and Senate March 3rd, 1863. Three key changes to the bill were 
made to assuage the worries of Senator Sherman and his faction. First, no engineer officer could 
be promoted to a field grade rank without passing an examination given by three senior 
engineering officers. If the officer failed he would be suspended for a year and then allowed to 
take the exam again. If he failed a second time he would be asked to leave the army. Since 
suspension in wartime was too a great a risk for ambitious engineers, Sherman hoped most 
engineering officers would remain captains and lieutenants. Second, the bill was only in effect 
during the rebellion, after which the number of engineers would be reduced by the president to 
the number authorized by law before the new act went into effect. The number would go from 
one hundred seven to fifty-five. Third, engineer officers promoted during the war would revert 
back to their prewar rank, or in the case of West Point graduates in the classes 1862-1865, to 
the rank of second lieutenant.7  
 With the act operational in early April, newly appointed commander of the Army of the 
Potomac, Major General Joseph Hooker, prepared for his spring offensive in northern Virginia. 
Hooker was ambitious, confident, and personable, although he had a political dark side. Lincoln 
had heard that when the army was under Burnside’s command, Hooker was rather disingenuous 
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toward his fellow general, often trying to thwart him. Now Lincoln placed Hooker in charge, and 
in a letter to the general, the president was both sharp and direct. “I have heard, in such a way 
as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and Government needed a dictator. 
Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you command. Only those 
generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I 
will risk the dictatorship.”8 
 Military success was not forthcoming. After launching an excellent plan to envelope 
Lee’s army in the Fredericksburg area, Hooker lost his nerve. He held to a defensive position 
centered on Chancellorsville when “Stonewall” Jackson made his famous march onto the Union 
flanks and rolled up a portion of Hooker’s army at the cost of Jackson’s own life. The Army of the 
Potomac’s engineers under new leadership did perform well building sixteen bridges over the 
Rappahannock River between April 28 and May 28 and then dismantling all of them. The two 
most difficult were at United States Ford, thirteen miles above Fredericksburg, and at Kelly’s 
Ford, twenty-two miles above the same city.9 
 Brigadier General Henry Benham from Cheshire, Connecticut, was now commander of 
the Engineer Brigade. An 1837 graduate of the Military Academy, Benham had been in charge of 
superintending the fortifications in Boston and Plymouth harbor before being assigned to the 
Engineer Brigade. He was a skilled pontoon bridge builder, and part of his responsibilities 
included command of the engineer’s depot in Washington, DC.   
There were an estimated two hundred pontoons at the depot, some required repairs, 
and all of them needed to be arranged into bridge trains and made ready for delivery to places 
the commanding general designated.  The new commander of the 15th New York was Major 
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Walter L. Cassin.  Captain George H. Mendell, a former member of the topographical engineers, 
was now commanding the Army of the Potomac’s Engineer Battalion having replaced Captain 
Duane who was re-assigned to the Department of the South after General McClellan’s dismissal 
in November 1862.10  
 The chain of command among the engineers in the Army of the Potomac was awkward 
and confusing. The chief engineer for the army was Brigadier General of Volunteers Gouverneur 
Warren.11  He had received his promotion in September 1862 and still retained the rank of 
captain of engineers. Benham technically reported to Warren. Benham, however, was promoted 
brigadier general of volunteers in August 1861 and retained the rank of major of engineers. On 
paper Benham outranked Warren. It was also made more confusing by the fact that both 
Colonel William H. Pettes, commander of the 50th New York, and Cassin outranked Mendell. Yet, 
the latter was a West Point graduate and a member of the prestigious corps of engineers: Pettes 
and Cassin were not.  
Fortunately, as the army moved toward Gettysburg, the engineers’ orders were direct: 
on June 17th the Engineer battalion and 250 men from the 50th New York were to place a 
pontoon bridge train in the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal at Georgetown and proceed to the area 
around Edwards Ferry on the Potomac River, thirty-two miles northwest of the capital.  By the 
morning of June 21st the engineers built a 1,340-foot pontoon bridge with sixty-four boats, and 
three crib trestles.12 By June 27th a second bridge was built and that evening the entire army of 
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90,000 soldiers, horses, artillery, cavalry, and supply wagons crossed the river in search of Lee’s 
army. 
 The lead elements of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia were in 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania before General Hooker’s army had started over their pontoon 
bridges. Using the South Mountains as a screen, Lee’s three corps were separated by thirty-two 
miles and the army was operating fifty-five miles from it supply base in Winchester, Virginia. 
Historians, and perhaps even General Lee, were not sure of a specific geographical objective. 
Nevertheless, if his army continued into Union territory and turned toward Philadelphia or 
Baltimore, Lee would have to require his engineers to maintain, repair, or build bridges across 
several major rivers.  
There were several reasons why Lee was invading the North in the summer of 1863 and 
one of them was because the Confederate railroad system had failed the army in the winter of 
1862-1863.  That winter Lee was certain the Army of the Potomac was preparing to cross the 
Rappahannock and begin a major spring offensive toward Richmond. As he contemplated his 
own strategic options at Fredericksburg in January and February, his men and horses were 
starving. Supplies carried by trains on the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad 
provided little food and forage. The reason for this was no central control of the railroads.13 The 
Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, a single-track road, ran due north and connected at Weldon 
with the Petersburg Railroad. This railroad directly connected to the Richmond line and the R, F 
& P. The east coast of North Carolina constituted a critical wealth of corn, bacon, grain, and fish 
more than enough for Lee’s army, but the wretched condition of the tracks and no cooperation 
or coordination between lines left the Army of Northern Virginia cold and hungry.  
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 Colonel William Wadley, Confederate coordinator of transportation, complained to 
James A. Seddon, the new Secretary of War, about the problems on the Wilmington & Weldon. 
The State of North Carolina owned a controlling interest in the road, so Seddon made known to 
Governor Zebulon Vance that Lee’s army was starving and depended on supplies from his state. 
Seddon asked Vance if more could be done to assure a more efficient management of the 
railroad.14 Wadley for his part recommended that mechanics be released from military service 
to work for the railroads, and that the government pass an act making it “obligatory upon the 
railroads of the country to perform promptly Government transportation. The law, without 
allowing men and supplies, will be of no use, for without these the roads cannot exist.”15 
Wadley’s frustration was palpable. To the highest ranking general in the Confederacy, Adjutant 
and Inspector General Samuel Cooper, he wrote, “In every direction there is an accumulation of 
freight that is being wasted or damaged for want of protection, and a number of Government 
agents and messengers accompanying it in the character of protectors and forwarders would, I 
have not the least doubt, form a full regiment.”16 Nothing resulted from his sarcasm or his 
appeal. 
 In March, Seddon admitted to Lee that the lack of supplies for the Army of Northern 
Virginia was due to railroads, which were “daily growing less efficient and serviceable.”17 In 
Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War, historian George 
Edgar Turner summarized the Southern army’s dilemma in the early spring of 1863: “They were 
within fifty miles of Richmond with a railroad actually within their lines. Richmond lay at the 
upper end of a railroad running the length of one of the most productive agricultural areas in 
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the South, and was served by two other roads, which tapped country by no means short of 
supplies.”18  
 Desperate for food, in April, Lee sent General John Imboden’s cavalry on an expedition 
to destroy the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in western Virginia and to bring in beef cattle for the 
army. Imboden was successful, but the sustenance was too late for Lee to launch an offensive 
before Hooker’s army struck him. The resulting battle of Chancellorsville led Lee to believe that 
a Union summer campaign in Virginia would place his army on the defensive, but a move north 
over the Potomac River might lure Hooker out of Virginia and present Lee with an opportunity 
to destroy the Army of the Potomac. A move north would pose a threat to Baltimore, 
Washington, and Philadelphia, provide much needed subsistence and forage, and allow farmers 
in the Shenandoah Valley a chance to harvest their crops free from interruption by military 
operations.19 Finally, Lee believed the Peace Democrats in the North were gaining strength 
especially because the Emancipation Proclamation had uncorked racist emotions among 
Northern politicians and an invading army might agitate the malcontents, like Ohio congressman 
Clement Vallandigham, to further action.20   
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It was alleged that Vallandigham had encouraged Confederate President Davis and his 
cabinet to back Lee’s plan to invade the North. In a New York Times editorial September 4, 1863, 
Henery Reinish stated that, according to reliable sources “Vallendigham…assured [Davis and his 
cabinet] that the North was ripe for revolution.” He continued, “Mr. Vallendigham’s 
representations were corroborated by the tone of the majority of the Northern journals, who 
surely would not denounce the Administration so boldly except by assurance of having the 
masses strongly in their favor.”21 These comments of Vallendigham might have reinforced Lee’s 
belief that when his army marched through Maryland the countryside would greet him with 
open arms. Yet, to the general’s surprise, they did not. 
 Confederate railroad management and transportation issues played a major role in Lee’s 
decision to invade the North in the summer of 1863. The Confederate Congress and president 
finally attempted to address the transportation problem with a railroad regulation act in May 
giving the government authority to set through freight schedules and enforce them at the 
government’s discretion.22 In 1863 the law was never invoked perhaps because Congress 
adjourned until December and because individual rights and private enterprise trumped 
southern nationalism and military logistics.23 President Davis did try to preserve a Railroad 
Bureau, however, by appointing Wadley’s protégé, Frederick W. Sims.  
 Sims inherited from his retired predecessor little more than the framework for an 
organization. The Bureau had no control over quartermasters in the field, and both General 
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee and General Joseph E. Johnston’s army in Mississippi had their own 
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railroad bureau. The officer responsible for railroad traffic through Richmond, Major D. H. 
Wood, reported to the quartermaster general, and Sims and his bureau had no representative in 
the major railway hub of Atlanta.24 The quartermaster bureau had eighty-eight clerks, the 
subsistence bureau thirty-six and ordnance had twenty-four, whereas the engineer bureau had 
three clerks and the railroad bureau had two.25  Sims worked the bureaucratic system well, first, 
by getting his bureau transferred to the Quartermaster Department where he could better 
manage competition among staff officers for supplies.  He could use the department to assist 
him in moving engines and rolling stock to the east from sections of Mississippi abandoned by 
the Confederate military. Yet even in his efforts to salvage this abandoned equipment, private 
railroad superintendents demanded the rescued trains. The Alabama & Florida secured a court 
injunction blocking any attempt by quartermasters to move three locomotives from their track. 
Eventually, the engines were released, but the delay only diminished the movement of supplies 
to Southern armies in the field.26  
 Sims continued to lobby for a more centralized bureau as his administrative skill and 
energy brought about some improvements to the railroad transportation system. Nonetheless, 
individual interests continued to work against him and damaged the Confederacy as much as 
Yankee guns and bullets. Army officers often seized rolling stock for their own purposes. In 
November 1863 at a major railroad convention held in Macon, Georgia, owners made clear that 
“the object of the meeting [was] for the purpose of considering the propriety of advancing the 
present rates paid by the Government for transportation.” Finally General Lucius B. Northrop, 
head of the Commissary Department, maintained his own railroad representatives in critical 
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areas of the Confederacy, and in August 1863 named the president of the Georgia Central 
Railroad as “independent transportation czar” over all southern Georgia.27 
 The question must be asked: If Lee’s army had been well fed in the winter of 1862-1863 
would he have embarked on a move north to risk all in the spring?28 Perhaps he would. We can 
only speculate, but we know for certain one of Lee’s major reasons for going on the offensive 
was to feed his starving men and animals. The Army of Northern Virginia’s march into Maryland 
and Pennsylvania in June 1863, therefore, uncovered a significant logistical problem faced by 
the Confederacy.  This supply problem, however, was not the only one Southern armies 
confronted. Gettysburg revealed two other weaknesses operating against Lee’s army as it 
marched north: poor maps and poor engineering.  
 In February, Stonewall Jackson had asked his topographical engineer, Jedediah 
Hotchkiss, to prepare a small-scale map of northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-
central Pennsylvania. The map was also to include Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC. 
When finished the map would encompass over 1,000 square miles of territory.29 Yet because the 
scope of the project was so vast with Union territory the most significant portion, and time was 
limited, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps and a process of taking a 38-by-42 
inch sheet of heavy watercolor paper and pencil in a grid consisting of thousands of square 
centimeters. He would then superimpose a similar pencil grid on the county map then transcribe 
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it on a smaller scale onto his own pencil-grid sheet. It was a long process and the project was 
incomplete at the time Jackson was mortally wounded at Chancellorsville.30  
 This incomplete map was the one General Lee used during the Gettysburg Campaign. 
The map itself was a work of art. On cream-colored paper, red pencil lines identified roadways, 
blue marked rivers and streams, and black, in impeccable handwriting, listed towns, mills, 
blacksmith shops, major topographical features, and every rural resident’s name. More nuanced 
features such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites did not 
appear. The salient and eventually famous landmarks of the battle—Seminary Ridge, Culp’s Hill, 
Cemetery Hill, Little Round Top, also did not appear on the map.31 
 These omissions, as cartographer and map historian Earl McElfresh pointed out, were 
not a decisive factor in the outcome of the battle. He wrote, ““It was probably more like 
“windage”—the effects of wind that is just one of the factors a marksman has to take into 
account when aiming a rifle.””32 These omissions, nonetheless, were a costly factor to Lee and 
his army. On July 1st two regiments were lost from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. 
Davis’s brigade when his men jumped into an unknown twenty-foot deep railroad cut and were 
captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes’s 6th Wisconsin Regiment.33 As Lee planned to envelope 
Meade’s left flank on July 2nd, his engineer Captain Samuel R. Johnston insisted that he had 
ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. In fact, the area was swarming with General 
John Buford’s Union cavalry, so it was probable Johnston actually discovered Warfield or 
Houck’s Ridge empty.  
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When Johnston was ordered to guide Hood and McLaws’s divisions to the southern end 
of the battlefield in preparation for the early afternoon attack on the Union left he had to 
backtrack and countermarch because he had no map and misunderstood the areas 
topographical features. Finally, the map of Gettysburg Hotchkiss made that accompanied 
Generals Lee and Ewell’s written reports of the battle indicated a keen awareness of the ground 
north of the town, but to the south the map does not include accurate illustrations of the round 
tops or the undulating and wooded areas east from the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain 
around Weikert and Trestle’s farms, Rose’s Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between 
Houck’s Ridge and Little Round Top.34  
 The lack of adequate maps placed the Army of Northern Virginia at a distinct 
disadvantage especially when knowledge of local geographical features was so crucial to a 
movement’s outcome.  Perhaps Lee expected he would receive local intelligence to fill in 
whatever gaps there were in his maps. He had received this type of information in the past, but 
he had always fought in friendly territory. Gettysburg highlighted the need for an invading army 
to have technically skilled men and materials at a general’s disposal. This explains why Lee’s 
artillery chief said after the battle: “Not only was the selection of ground about as bad as 
possible, but there does not seem to have been any special thought given to the matter. It 
seems to have been allowed to select itself as if it were a matter of no consequence.”35 
 The major boondoggle during the campaign, however, came when Lee’s army, after the 
three-day battle, attempted to escape across the Potomac and back into Virginia. Complete 
failure in the river crossing would have cost Lee his entire army and the war. Disaster was barely 
averted, and the episode revealed the Confederacy’s vulnerability when it came to engineering. 
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 Conflicting testimony made it difficult to determine exactly what happened at 
Williamsport and Falling Waters between July 4th and July 14th, yet evidence suggests that the 
operation to build a pontoon bridge over the Potomac River did not go well and left Lee 
frustrated with his engineers. On the night of July 6th General Lee learned from General 
Imboden, who was leading the army’s wagon train and ambulances, and from General Stuart, 
whose cavalry was acting as a rear guard for the train, that Federal cavalry had partially 
destroyed the Confederate’s unguarded pontoon bridge at Falling Waters.  Moreover, the river 
at Williamsport had risen because of the unremitting downpours of the past several days, and 
was now unfordable.   
There were about twenty engineer officers with Lee’s army including members of his 
own staff, his corps commanders’ staffs, and some divisional staffs. There were no engineer 
soldiers, and instead, men were detached as pioneers from brigades and regiments. 
Consequently, no one was responsible for the pontoon train once the Army of Northern Virginia 
had crossed the Potomac in June. When the bridge was disassembled it was left behind. Many 
of Lee’s men had forded the river in June when it was only about three feet high in certain 
sections, and he fully expected his army would do the same on the return trip. The lack of 
concern about the pontoons also suggested that Lee believed his army could ford any river if 
and when they turned east toward Baltimore or Philadelphia.36  
 On the morning of the 7th Lee allegedly ordered Major John Harman, General Ewell’s 
quartermaster, to begin work on the bridge. General Imboden, however, wrote that “General 
Lee expressed great impatience at the tardiness in building rude pontoons at the river,” and 
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frustrated, called in Major Harman to supervise the construction. That was July 9th. 37 Perhaps 
construction went so poorly on the 7th and 8th that General Lee decided to send Harman to the 
rescue. History does not record who might have been responsible for any blunders in the first 
attempt to build the bridge.  
 We know that one day after Harman arrived at Williamsport, Major John G. Clarke, 
Longstreet’s chief engineer, a Captain Summerfield Smith assigned to Clarke, and his pioneers, 
Lieutenant Henry Herbert Harris and his pioneers, and Captain Justus Scheibert, a former 
engineer in the Prussian Army and a recent immigrant to America, were all ordered to 
Williamsport to work on the bridge.38 Harris recorded in his diary that Major Clarke, Lieutenant 
Colonel William Proctor Smith, Lee’s chief engineer, Captain Samuel Johnston, and Captain 
Henry T. Douglas of A. P. Hill’s staff, consumed some time drawing the dimensions of the 
pontoons necessary to support the bridge. The effort was becoming a bridge by committee.39 
 Harris wrote that the work on the pontoons began in earnest on July 11th. Five days had 
passed since Lee ordered work begun on the bridge. The pioneers tore down warehouses along 
the canal in Williamsport, and a local sawmill and lumberyard were used to construct the boats. 
Finally, oakum picked from old ropes and forced into the seems of the pontoons, and hot tar 
from the quartermaster wagons used to caulk the boats, made them ready to float 6 miles to 
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Falling Waters, the selected site of the bridge. Meanwhile, Harman supervised the operation of 
a flatboat guided by a wire stung across the river, to ferry the wounded and prisoners.40 
 By the 13th the twenty-six pontoons, at least fifteen new boats, and the others from the 
old train, were strapped together using trestlework. Heavy cables anchored the bridge on each 
shore, and wooden boxes filled with stones acted as anchors. The latter did not work well, as 
some were not heavy or stable enough to prevent the bridge from swaying.41 Fortunately for 
Lee’s army, the river level had begun to drop at Williamsport, from eleven feet to just over four 
feet, which made fording the river possible. The pioneers dug the approaches to the pontoon 
bridge and early on the morning of July 14th, the Army of Northern Virginia began its trek across 
the river to home.  Longstreet’s chief of staff, Colonel Moxley Sorrel wrote, “… Lee resuming the 
retreat, crossed on the bridge of boats that had been thrown over the river at Falling Waters by 
the engineers—and a crazy affair it was, too.”42  Colonel Alexander, Lee’s artillery chief 
remembered, “At last, not long after sunrise, we came to the pontoon bridge. It had a very bad 
approach and on a curve—a bad location and several wagons, caissons, etc., had gone into the 
river during the night….”43 Captain Smith was ordered to stay behind and breakdown the bridge, 
saving those sections that were serviceable and destroying the rest. Most of the bridge was 
destroyed.44 
 The need for well-trained engineer troops was evident to Lee both before and after the 
battle. Yet, Army regulations had made it clear that officers of engineers would not assume “nor 
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be ordered on any duty beyond the line of their immediate profession, except by special order 
of the president.” Adjutant General Samuel Cooper’s General Orders No. 60 dated June 26, 1863 
went so far as to state the following: “Officers of engineers will not be required to give other 
supervision to the fatigue parties or laborers employed in the construction of works than is 
necessary to indicate, in a clear and distinct manner to those directing the labor, their plans and 
the character of the work to be done.”45 The officers communicated their plans to the 
supervisors and then the officers could walk away. There was no room for improvisation and 
ingenuity unless the ideas came from the top. Engineering regulations in the Confederate Army 
stood in stark contrast to the Manual for Engineer Troops written by Captain Duane of the Union 
Army. Whereas Duane’s 265 page manual included sections on pontoon drill, rules for 
conducting a siege, school of the sap, military mining, and construction of batteries, 
Confederate regulations provided three pages on the construction of fortifications, a section on 
siege operations, and fifteen pages of report formats. In the section on fortifications 
commanders learned that dragging cannons across sidewalks was forbidden, and keeping grass 
mowed, wooden floors swept, and drawbridges cleaned and oiled was required.46 
 Before Gettysburg, Lee had received a directive from the War Department on May 22, 
1863 that proposed uniting pioneer companies from various divisions and to form a permanent 
engineer regiment. After the Gettysburg Campaign, the army commander wrote to Secretary of 
War James A. Seddon that a “regiment of engineer troops would be very desirable to serve this 
army, but, from my experience of the past campaigns, I do not think that the duties specially 
assigned to such troops would authorize the withdrawal of so large a body of the best men from 
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the ranks of the army at this time.” Chancellorsville and Gettysburg had cost Lee 40,884 and 
engineer troops, he believed, would diminish the army’s fighting power. Unlike the First 
Michigan Engineers and Mechanics who fought at Murfreesboro, Lee believed it was 
impracticable to get an engineer regiment into combat.47  
 The thesis that limited manpower resources explained why the southern high command 
could ill afford to take men away from the front and assign them logistical support roles, 
however, did not take into account other factors. General officers had large personal staffs, Lee 
was an exception, the quartermaster and commissary departments were well staffed, and the 
government could have nationalized the railroads but chose not to do this. The corps of 
engineers was understaffed, first, because President Davis had the elitist notion that only West 
Point graduates could fill the role, second, because their were just not enough men who had 
developed engineering or mechanical skills before the war, and third, because it was not a 
priority. Fighting would determine the outcome of the war not logistics.   
 By the end of the summer, the 1st Regiment of Engineers did begin to take shape. Men 
conscripted into the army who possessed basic mechanical or trade skills were trained as 
pontoon bridge builders or instructed in making gabions and cheaux-de-frise. It was not, 
however, until March 1864 that the regiment was filled out because it was difficult to find men 
with mechanical ability and the construction of pontoon trains took time.48 Therefore, Lee’s 
army continued to depend on pioneers carved from divisions, and on impressed slave labor. 
Virginia had passed impressment legislation in October 1862 and only then out of respect for 
states’ rights did the Confederate government develop an impressment policy in the spring of 
1863. By November, backed by General Lee’s support, engineer officers could impress slaves to 
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work on engineering projects.49 In spring 1864 the Engineer Bureau asked that the Conscription 
Bureau be made responsible for drafting into service a force of 20,000 slaves, which the 
Engineer Bureau organize into “gangs” of one hundred, “groups” of eight gangs, and 
“directorates” of three groups. The plan was implemented allocating quotas by states.50 
 The attempt to establish an engineer regiment, the difficulty of building a pontoon 
bridge at Falling Waters, poor maps, and the chaos and obstructions faced by the Railroad 
Bureau in moving vital supplies to the front, contrasted significantly with Union railroad and 
engineering operations in the spring, summer, and fall of 1863.  
 When Union General George G. Meade replaced General Hooker as commander of the 
Army of the Potomac on June 28th. Union supply lines supporting his 90,000 men were in a 
precarious state. Ewell’s corps had torn up track from Harrisburg to Carlisle and Stuart’s cavalry 
had destroyed bridges and rails along the north and south running Northern Central Railroad, 
the Baltimore & Ohio to Frederick, Maryland, the Columbia-Wrightsville railroad bridge over the 
Susquehanna River, and track west of York and east of Hanover Junction, Pennsylvania. Now in 
order for Meade’s army to avoid delay in pursuing Lee, before the Army of Northern Virginia 
crossed the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, leaving Meade trapped behind the river and Lee free to 
move on Philadelphia, a steady flow of supplies had to continue to reach the Army of the 
Potomac from Baltimore.  
 Herman Haupt with authority extended by the War Department to manage all railroads 
in Maryland and Pennsylvania, determined to use the twenty-nine mile long Western Maryland 
Railroad running from Baltimore to Westminster, Maryland. The decision by the War 
Department to allow Haupt complete control of the operation was a critical one. Railroad 
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presidents, generals, quartermasters, and ordnance officers all answered to Haupt. Even if the 
South had a man with Haupt’s abilities that person never would have been given the authority 
to conduct such an operation.  
Haupt analyzed the problem, studied the maps, and determined that from the terminus 
of the railroad in Westminster, wagon roads would connect with Union troop locations in 
Taneytown, Uniontown, Union Mills, Littletown, and Manchester.51 Yet, the single track was 
abraded and without sidings, water stations and turntables. It had no telegraph lines and could 
only run three or four trains a day. Haupt would need to run thirty trains a day.52  
 Haupt who had already built railroad bridges, designed ferries to carry rolling stock and 
engines from Washington to the docks at Aquia Creek, Virginia near the mouth of the Potomac 
River, and organized the Construction Corps, was asked to open a vital supply line for Meade’s 
army in its desperate struggle with the invading Confederates. First, from Baltimore, Haupt 
wired Adna Anderson, chief of railroads in Virginia, who arrived within a day of receiving the 
telegram with 400 members of the Railroad Construction Corps. Anderson was one of Haupt’s 
protégés, and he did not hesitate to call upon Anderson for assistance. Second, Haupt ordered 
essential supplies. Trains to Baltimore brought tools, equipment, lanterns, water buckets, and 
split wood.  
Anderson dispatched repair teams to open the North Central to Hanover Junction as the 
fighting began at Gettysburg.  Haupt ran trains in convoys to Westminster and by July 3rd the 
Western Maryland was moving 1,500 tons of supplies daily, and returning trains were bringing 
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out thousands of wounded to Baltimore hospitals. By late in the afternoon of July 4th the 
Northern Central from Baltimore was opened to Hanover Junction.53  
The 50th New York Engineers and Engineer Battalion had been detailed to build pontoon 
bridges over the Potomac during the army’s initial entry into Maryland. They had dismantled the 
bridges and sent two of them back to Washington while the other pontoon bridge followed the 
army north near Gettysburg. During the battle the engineers were used to guard the railhead at 
Westminster, escort the wagons to and from Gettysburg, and march prisoners to the provost 
guard’s collection point.  
The Union army’s effort in general, and Haupt and Anderson’s in particular, to establish 
a supply line during the battle of Gettysburg proved vital to the success of the campaign. The 
greatest logistical challenges, however, for the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the 
Tennessee, and Army of the Cumberland, were ahead. 
 After Gettysburg, southern strategy shifted to the defensive: hold on for as long as 
possible, and do the most damage possible. If major transportation and commercial hubs, like 
Petersburg, Atlanta, Charleston, and Wilmington could remain in Confederate hands until 
November 1864, then a war weary northern public might give the White House to a Democrat, 
who would recognize the Confederacy. Confederate independence could still be won. President 
Lincoln was aware of this possibility as early as the summer of 1863, and for the President and 
his commanders, the only strategic solution was now to take the war to the South and destroy 
the southern people’s will to fight. To execute this strategy engineers would be required to open 
roads and build bridges deep in enemy territory, and others would need to repair and keep the 
railroads in operation over extended supply lines. After Gettysburg while two great armies 
recovered from the devastation and slaughter that would be hereafter known as the slaughter 
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pen, the peach orchard, and the valley of death, Union hopes would turn west to General 
William Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland. 
After the battle of Stones River in late December 1862, which pushed the Confederates 
south out of Tennessee, and fired northern hope that victory could be won in the western 
theater, Major General William Rosecrans’s began organizing for a major offensive into northern 
Alabama and Georgia. Rosecrans, however, would prepare very slowly and deliberately 
frustrating everyone in Washington.  
Rosecrans’s major fault was that he lacked political acumen. The occasional sarcastic 
remark that appeared in his correspondence with General Halleck was not appreciated by the 
chief-of-staff. Rosecrans, a former engineering officer who much like General McClellan, did 
have a keen mind and considerable skill when it came to organizing his army and thinking 
imaginatively about logistics. For the first six months of 1863, under his leadership, the Army of 
the Cumberland adopted new techniques and innovative practices, which would benefit not 
only his army but also those of General George Thomas, and General William T. Sherman in their 
1864 and 1865 campaigns. Between January and June 1863 Rosecrans’s engineers and pioneers 
would develop new mapping technology, design a new pontoon system, and introduce the use 
of fabricated truss bridges to rest on original masonry piers. Historian Philip L. Shiman argued 
that it was Rosecrans who institutionalized his innovations establishing a foundation for “the 
continuing development of his organizations and technology.”54  
In early January 1863 along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad at Murfreesboro, 
Rosecrans ordered a forward supply base built large enough to withstand a siege of at least sixty 
thousand men. With depots for the commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments, 
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Captain Morton’s pioneers constructed warehouses, a sawmill, blockhouses, redoubts, and 
mutually supporting lunettes called Fortress Rosecrans.55  Once the fortification was completed 
and his supply lines secure, Rosecrans believed his army was capable of greater movement 
toward Chattanooga and Tullahoma, Tennessee where Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was 
lurking. Halleck was anxious for Rosecrans to attack Bragg because the Union War Department 
was fearful that Bragg’s army would be sent to rescue Pemberton at Vicksburg.  Nonetheless, 
Rosecrans was deliberate in his preparations, which angered Halleck. 
While Fortress Rosecrans was under construction, Rosecrans asked Captain William E. 
Merrill, of the Corps of Engineers, to reorganize the army’s topographical department because 
Rosecrans gave top priority to mapmaking. Merrill, different from his predecessor, Captain 
Nathaniel Michler, and other corps members such as Captain J. C. Duane, did not resent 
volunteer engineers and believed that the northern war effort depended upon the abilities of 
these civilians.  Consequently, Merrill began to detail volunteer officers from various brigades 
and divisions to his topographical staff, and with prismatic compasses and portable drafting kits, 
he trained these men in the rudimentary art of mapmaking.56  
Merrill then devised a process in which topographical information was managed. 
Mapmakers assigned to brigades sketched out areas and then passed their information on to 
division topographers who compiled the data with their own information, and then transmitted 
the material to corps topographers who eventually passed it to army headquarters. Moreover, 
Merrill adopted a system designed to create “information maps” where individual topographers 
would take county maps and add to them additional geographic information, which was then 
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forwarded to headquarters where they would revise existing maps and reissue the new 
information to general officers. The challenge here was to print and to disseminate the new 
maps in a timely manner.57  
The army first used photography as a means of reproducing maps, yet photography 
proved problematic. The photographic equipment was bulky, lenses were inadequate to take 
sharp and clear pictures at a close distance, and sunlight was needed to develop the 
photograph. After studying this problem, Merrill then procured lithographic presses and the 
results were clear, legible maps. The image of the map was traced on a flat specially prepared 
stone that was then inked and pressed onto the paper. A topographical clerk could revise a map 
by drawing directly on the stone.58  The drawback to this method was that maps were difficult to 
produce in the field because the stones were heavy and the preparation process cumbersome. 
The most ingenious technique for reproducing maps was devised by Captain William 
Margedant of the Tenth Ohio Infantry. An experienced photographer before the war, 
Margedant was serving with Rosecrans during the western Virginia campaigns in 1861, when 
Margedant demonstrated how to copy maps using photographic chemicals.  So perhaps at 
Rosecrans’s suggestion Merrill adopted this creative method. A map was drawn on tracing paper 
in black ink on top of a piece of chemically treated paper. In the sunlight the treated paper 
stayed white under the black ink, while the remainder of the treated paper turned black from 
the sunlight. The resulting black maps, as they were called, had white rivers hand colored in 
blue, and white roads colored in red to avoid confusion. These maps had the benefit of quick 
revision, and the equipment used to make the maps could be transported quite easily anywhere 
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forward of headquarters. Merrill institutionalized this mapmaking technique, and it proved 
valuable to the entire Union army throughout the last twenty-two months of the war.59   
During the Tullahoma Campaign between June 23rd and June 28th, Rosecrans skillfully 
maneuvered Bragg’s Army of Tennessee into a precarious position with its their back to the Elk 
River. Only Forrest’s Confederate cavalry prevented the Army of the Cumberland from springing 
the trap by blocking northern mounted infantry from destroying the bridge on which Bragg 
would escape. As a result Bragg managed to slip across the river and destroy all bridges over the 
Elk, setting the stage for the Chickamauga Campaign. The topographical maps produced by his 
engineers enhanced Rosecrans’s operation around Tullahoma. Yet during the heavy rains that 
highlighted the six days of complex flanking movements around Bragg’s army, Rosecrans 
observed that his engineers and pioneers had a miserable time trying to move the pontoon train 
through muddy, viscid, and narrow roads.  The Army of the Cumberland used Russian-type 
canvas pontoons. The canvas was stretched over a wooden frame lashed in the center then 
wrapped around the stern and bow, pulled tightly and lashed down again. The wooden frames 
were not as heavy as the Army of the Potomac’s French pontoons, but they were cumbersome 
and required special wagons. Rosecrans had designed a prototype that his engineers built which 
had two sections that would be joined together by pins. Unfortunately, he did not have the 
facilities to make a number of frames so he established an engineer shop in Nashville that would 
eventually build what became known as Cumberland pontoons.60  
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With Bragg’s army in Georgia, Rosecrans hesitated to pursue the enemy until his supply 
line back to Murfreesboro was secure, which meant rebuilding the turnpike and railroad bridge 
across the Elk River. John B. Anderson’s civilian construction corps, Morton’s pioneers, fatigue 
parties drawn from infantry divisions and the Michigan Engineers were available to do the work. 
The latter were assigned the railroad bridge. The stone piers were intact so the 470-foot-long 
span contained at least twenty bents and made use of the three existing stone abutments. 
Timber for the bents and stringers were cut from the surrounding woods, but nails, railroad 
spikes and rails, and sawed planks for the flooring had to be hauled in from Nashville.61  The 
span was more than 50 feet high, and the portion over the river was built in five feet of water. 
The first tier of trestle was built level with the tops of the three abutments, at least 30 feet 
above the water.62 Because of the delay in receiving nails and other materials it took the 
engineers six days to build the bridge, one day less than it took Lee’s engineers to build a 
pontoon bridge across the Potomac.  
Rosecrans recognized that the makeshift railroad over the Elk River could collapse if a 
thunderstorm suddenly dropped three or four inches of rain and produced freshets in the 
rapidly running river. Thus, early in the year Rosecrans had contracted with the Covington & 
Cincinnati Bridge Company to build a railroad bridge near Murfreesboro, and after the Michigan 
Engineers completed the bridge at the Elk River, the commanding general hired the bridge 
company to manufacture some bridge sections in Ohio and ship them disassembled to the front 
for installation of a bridge over the Tennessee River near Bridgeport, Alabama.63 The practice of 
building bridge sections off sight and moving them to the proper locations was in its infancy, but 
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nonetheless, still a remarkable technological achievement. In May 1862, Herman Haupt had 
experimented with prefabricated truss structures called shad belly trusses. He had made spans 
sixty feet long and approximately 1,000 feet of bridge was prepared. Now Rosecrans was asking 
private companies to do the same.64     
Unlike the administration of military railroads in northern Virginia, however, the 
operation of the railroads in Tennessee lacked leadership and centralized control. John 
Anderson had clashed on numerous occasions with Colonel Innes over the use of civilian repair 
crews, the usage of trains, and on who should first get replacement parts for track repairs. In 
August, the ambitious Innes finally got himself appointed military superintendent of all military 
railroads within the department. He was now in charge of all aspects of running the railroads 
including setting passenger and freight rates, repairs, and expenditures. Yet, unlike the Virginia 
theater where Daniel McCallum and Herman Haupt spent over eighteen months building a 
management system, which included a civilian construction corps with divisions and 
subdivisions based on specializations necessary to operate a railroad, Innes’s work force 
consisted of civilian employees, pioneers, and regular army officers, all of whom reported to 
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different people.65 Colonel Charles R. Thompson and his Twelfth Regiment United States Colored 
Troops (USCT) also reported to Innes and they performed admirably in the face of racist 
comments and unfriendly behavior.  
The operation of the railroads was not Innes’s only headache. Bridge building continued 
unabated as Rosecrans’s army readied itself for the September offensive against Bragg and the 
Michigan men now had to get the Army of the Cumberland across the Tennessee River. First the 
engineers had to select the best places to cross the river, and then they had to gather the 
material and build the bridges to make the actual crossings. The four sites selected were at 
Bridgeport, Shellmound (east of Bridgeport), Battle Creek (north of Bridgeport), and Caperton’s 
Ferry (south of Bridgeport).66 Pioneers attached to various divisions built two of the bridges and 
one ferry. At Shellmound Major General Joseph Reynolds’s Fourth Division constructed a 
floating bridge with captured boats and bridge building material. Brigadier General John 
Brannan’s Third Division pioneers built rafts to ferry men over the river, and Brigadier General 
Jefferson C. Davis’ First Division built a pontoon bridge at Caperton’s Ferry.67  
At Bridgeport, a detachment of Michigan engineers under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Kinsman Hunton, and men from Morton’s Pioneer Brigade, had the most difficult task 
among the four sites because they had only about sixty-two pontoons and 1,200 feet of river.68  
Hunton’s companies started work on a trestle bridge from the west bank of the river to an 
island, and the pioneers built a pontoon bridge from the island to the east bank. The evidence is 
not clear, however, whether material arrived from the Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Company 
to aid in the construction.  
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The timber for the trestle bridge was cut by infantry working in nearby woods, cut 
planks for flooring were delivered by train to Bridgeport from army run saw mills, and additional 
flooring was secured by stripping area barns and houses. The lumber might have come from a 
captured sawmill at Scottsboro, twenty-eight miles west of Bridgeport, that the pioneers 
operated, and from a sawmill at Anderson, Tennessee, or perhaps from the Ohio bridge 
company.  Within a day the engineers had anchored the trestles one-third of the distance, and 
stringers and planks were laid as quickly as possible. Men worked through exhaustion so that in 
four days the entire bridge was finished, but the problems were not. In the middle of the 
afternoon on September 2nd, as General Philip Sheridan’s infantry and artillery crossed the 
Tennessee, part of the bridge collapsed throwing supply wagons and animals into the river. The 
tired engineers waded into the river, and over the next six hours, made repairs to the bridge.  
Wagons continued to cross, but close to mid-night seven bents fell as a result of wash at the 
bottom of the piles and the bridge was closed.69 Working twelve hours the following day to 
correct the problem, the engineers finished their work, and the remainder of Sheridan’s wagon 
train and cavalry crossed the river.  
Rosecrans was relieved his army was on the eastern bank of the Tennessee, but not 
satisfied that in the unfortunate circumstance of a retreat, the Bridgeport Bridge would carry a 
large portion of his army back to the western side of the river.  So he ordered the Michigan 
engineers to remain at Bridgeport to construct more than fifty pontoons, and with them, build a 
second bridge parallel and close to the existing one. In hot and humid weather, men in long 
sleeve cotton shirts wearing a variety of hats to protect them from the sun, toiled another week 
to finish the bateaux and begin construction on the bridge.  Rosecrans understood the demands 
he placed on the Wolverine regiment, and he understood that more engineer soldiers were 
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needed to carry out the multiple tasks essential for the Army of the Cumberland’s operations 
against Bragg’s army. These responsibilities included corduroying roads, building supply 
warehouses, repairing track, and constructing pontoon trains. In addition, the engineers were 
conducting reconnaissance, making and reproducing maps, and operating engineer shops in 
Nashville, and sawmills throughout southeastern Tennessee. The Pioneer Brigade, under the 
command of Captain Morton, theoretically provided additional manpower, yet the structure of 
this organization made the pioneers an unreliable resource. Most corps and division 
commanders resented the Pioneer Brigade, and many men detached with the pioneers resented 
the assignment. 
Men on pioneer duty were not under the control of their division or brigade 
commanders, they did not have to drill, they were careless with their tools, and they did not 
maintain the same discipline enjoyed when they were part of their regiments or brigades. 
Brigadier General William B. Hazen bitterly complained to headquarters, “The whole pioneer 
concern [is] a stench in everybody’s nostrils, and no one seems disposed to use them.” He 
continued, “As it is now, the pioneers get no drill, very little control, no sympathy, but the 
contempt of everybody.”70  
A pioneer soldier, for his part, was seldom promoted because as historian Philip Shiman 
pointed out, “his services were rarely observed by his own regiment’s officers [who were 
responsible for pay and promotion] and because the colonels did not want to waste a 
promotion on a soldier who was for all practical purposes permanently separated from his 
regiment.”71 Furthermore, Morton had been granted permission from Rosecrans to give officers 
                                                             
70 William B. Hazen, A Narrative of Military Service (Boston: Ticknor, 1885), 407-408. 
71 Shiman, 104. 
 361 
“acting” ranks in the pioneers, yet these men were paid according to their official infantry rank. 
This led to anger and antipathy on the part of some pioneer officers.72  
Throughout the summer and early fall Rosecrans implored the Engineer Bureau and 
Congress to transform the Pioneer Brigade into an official organization. Captain Merrill, 
Rosecrans’s chief engineering officer asked the Federal army’s chief engineer, Brigadier General 
Totten, to consider the Army of the Cumberland’s proposal. Merrill wrote, “We have now the 
means of doing everything that can be called for in the line of Engineering, and all we ask from 
Washington is a little help in carrying through a necessary measure which we cannot effect 
ourselves.”73 During Rosecrans’s tenure as commander of the Army of the Cumberland, Totten 
and Congress would not authorize a permanent Pioneer Brigade until the spring of 1864. 
Meanwhile, with his army southeast of Chattanooga, Rosecrans would attack Bragg’s army, 
seeking the great victory for which Lincoln, Halleck, Stanton, and the northern public were 
hoping. 
The Confederate high command did not want to wait for Rosecrans to attack. 
Beauregard, Johnston, Bragg, and Lee agreed that the fastest way to bring peace and an 
independent Confederacy was to bring the Yankees to the negotiation table.  To do this a 
decisive “Napoleonic victory” followed up by another invasion north would bring about the 
desired results. The question that remained was where to concentrate manpower for the 
decisive blow?  Lee, a powerful voice among the president’s military advisers, suggested to 
Davis another move north in the fall of 1863 confident that given a second chance he would 
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defeat the cautious George Meade.  This time, however, Davis rejected Lee’s suggestion, and 
feeling pressure from what historians Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones described as 
the Western Coalition, decided that Bragg’s Army of Tennessee would be reinforced and defeat 
Rosecrans in northern Georgia.74  This would be followed up by a move against Grant’s 
communications network. General Beauregard, the most vocal supporter of the plan to strike 
Rosecrans, reasoned that troops from both Mississippi and Virginia could reach Chattanooga 
within five to seven days. Bragg also had an excellent supply line along the Western & Atlantic 
directly to Atlanta.75 After two weeks of mulling over his options, Davis agreed to send Bragg 
assistance and two divisions from James Longstreet’s corps were selected for the journey south. 
It was 500 miles by rail via Lynchburg and down the Tennessee Valley over the Virginia & 
Tennessee Railroad, and Longstreet was confident he could do it in four to five days.76  
Quartermaster General Andrew R. Lawton and Major Frederick W. Sims, chief of the 
Confederate Railroad Bureau, were in charge of moving Longstreet’s men, horses, artillery 
pieces, and equipment. Historian George Edgar Turner described the mission as “an immense, 
laborious and vexatious piece of work.”77 The amount of work required to transport men from 
Lee to Bragg’s army became even more arduous when it was discovered that Union General 
Ambrose Burnside entered undefended Knoxville, Tennessee on September 3rd, and as a result, 
blocked Longstreet’s intended route. With the Knoxville road cut, Sims decided the only 
alternative was a circuitous 1,000-mile route using at least ten different poorly maintained 
railroads.78  Part of Longstreet’s two divisions would travel to Raleigh, Charlotte, and Branchville, 
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South Carolina, before heading east to Atlanta. Others would move due south through 
Goldsboro, Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah before moving northwest to Atlanta. The 
new routes required eight separate transfers because of unconnected track, incompatible 
gauges, and deteriorated tracks.79  G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s chief of staff, said: “Never 
before were so many troops moved over such worn-out railways, none first-class from the 
beginning. Never before were such crazy cars—passenger, baggage, mail, coal, box, platform—
all and every sort, wabbling on the jumping strap-iron—used for hauling good soldiers.”80 
Notwithstanding the fact that Sims often had to cajole railroad presidents for the use of 
their engines and rolling stock, and despite soldiers having to offload freight, move it to a 
connecting line, and reload it, men from Longstreet’s two divisions were delivered to Bragg in 
time to participate in the battle of Chickamauga. Only five of the general’s ten brigades, 
however, made it in time to participate in the fight. Longstreet’s artillery, under Colonel E. P. 
Alexander, arrived in Dalton, Georgia, twelve miles from Chickamauga, early in the morning on 
September 25th, five days after the battle was over.81 
Although only half of Longstreet’s infantry and none of his artillery arrived in time for 
the battle, the transfer of Longstreet’s men from Virginia to Georgia was the most successful 
Confederate railroad operation of the war. Yet, it highlighted, once again, the Confederacy’s lack 
of managerial coordination, poor railroad maintenance, and few men available with the skills 
necessary to repair track, bridges, and engines. So on September 19th as Longstreet leaped from 
the halted train at a little flag station called Catoosa Platform and rode off to find Bragg, he did 
not realize, nor did anyone else, perhaps with the exception of Moxley Sorrel, that he had just 
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been a part of the Confederacy’s greatest railroad operation of the war. Instead, he was excited 
to get his men into the battle, which had already begun, and bring about a crushing blow to 
Rosecrans’s army. 
At Chickamauga, Rosecrans was both unlucky and lucky. Unlucky because Rosecrans’s 
misunderstanding as to the location of his units among the thick woods led him to order the 
unnecessary realignment of troops. Instead of strengthening his defensive line, which was the 
intended consequence of his order, he inadvertently created a huge gap and Longstreet hit the 
exact point left open by the Federal army’s mistake.  As Confederate infantry rushed through 
the hole created by the miscommunication, the Army of the Cumberland’s right wing feared 
being enveloped, panicked and fled back toward Chattanooga.  
Fortunately for Rosecrans, his left wing, under the command General George Thomas, 
remained on the field, and anchoring around Snodgrass Hill, held fast to his embattled position 
until nightfall. After dark, Thomas and his weary but stalwart soldiers, pursued by Bragg’s 
Confederates, followed the rest of the Union army back to Chattanooga.  Now it was the South’s 
turn to besiege a Union army, forcing it to surrender or starve to death. Bragg’s men occupied 
the heights surrounding three sides of the city, and they blocked access to the Tennessee River 
north. The Army of the Cumberland’s only available supply route for its 51,000 tried and hungry 
men was over crude wagon roads to Bridgeport, Alabama, sixty-miles away. Under the best of 
circumstances this would have been an undesirable connection to the supply base, but with 
numbers of horses and mules weakening and dying by the day the situation was untenable.  
At the War Department in Washington the telegraph clicked and clattered out an 
ominous message from Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana: the Army of the Cumberland 
had been driven from the field at Chickamauga and was now besieged by Confederate forces in 
Chattanooga. Dana’s telegram made it clear: “No time should be lost in rushing twenty to 
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twenty-five thousand efficient troops to Bridgeport.”82 It was a bold suggestion, but Stanton 
convinced the President, Halleck, and several cabinet secretaries that it could be done. It was 
agreed that the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac would be sent south 
under General Joseph Hooker. Next, President Lincoln immediately issued a blanket order 
authorizing Hooker to take military possession of all railroads and their equipment, “which may 
be necessary to the execution of the operation.”83 
The next morning Stanton’s transportation advisers, Samuel M. Felton, Thomas Scott, 
John W. Garrett, and William P. Smith poured over maps, timetables, and equipment availability 
to recommend a feasible route for Hooker’s two corps. These four men wielded enormous 
power in the railroad industry, and each had important contacts with other railroad executives 
in the North. Stanton had chosen wisely.84 They agreed to divide the operation into three 
sections: D. C. McCallum would be responsible for the initial stage supervising Hooker’s 
embarkation from his base in Culpeper, Virginia, to Washington. From there Garrett would 
manage the two corps’ movement west to Jeffersonville, Indiana. Scott would oversee the final 
leg of the trip from Jeffersonville to Louisville, and then along the Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
to Stevenson and Bridgeport, Alabama.  Two days after Dana’s telegram arrived in Washington, 
two trains, fifty-one troop cars, and another four cars carrying field artillery, rumbled through 
the nation’s capital on its way to relieve Rosecrans’s starving and demoralized soldiers.  
The War Department made it clear in a directive to everyone from lowly civilian station 
managers to powerful generals, that the army would not tolerate interference of any kind in this 
critical transportation operation. So along the route, when General Carl Schurz, discovered he 
                                                             
82 Turner, 287. Collected papers of Edwin M. Stanton (Library of Congress), September 1863. 
83 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXIX, part 1, 151. 
84 Turner, 289. Felton was president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad. Scott 
was vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Garrett was president of the Baltimore & Ohio, 
and Smith was master of transportation for the B & O. 
 366 
was well behind elements of his Third Division of the Eleventh Corps and he wired ahead telling 
a station agent to hold up his men’s train so he could catch-up to it, the agent ignored Schurz’s 
message. The agent sent the train on its way without waiting for the imperious general. When 
Schurz arrived and discovered the agent had disobeyed the general’s order, Schurz broke out in 
a rage and threatened to bring the agent up on charges. Instead, Stanton reprimanded Schurz 
telling him that if the major general attempted to interfere in the operation of military railroads 
he would be arrested and removed from command.85  
On the 1,200-mile trek they used approximately 400 miles of track that had been 
severely damaged by Lee’s army or Morgan and Forrest’s cavalry, and subsequently repaired by 
Haupt’s Construction Corps or the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics. The first trains rolled 
into Bridgeport nine days after departing Washington DC. Hooker’s entire force of 
approximately 16,000 men, ten batteries, 1,000 horses and mules, and additional equipment 
and wagons, completed the journey in eleven and a half days.86 It was an incredible feat of 
railroad management supported by skillful repair work to tracks and bridges, as well as, a 
tactical victory for the Union army during the siege of Chattanooga. Hooker’s men could guard 
the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad from Confederate saboteurs.  At least now the Army of 
the Cumberland was assured that supplies would get from Nashville and Murfreesboro to 
Bridgeport unmolested. 
Yet, Hooker could not move on to Chattanooga because he barely had enough food and 
fodder for his own men and animals, and they, too, would starve inside the city just like the 
Army of the Cumberland was starving. So before any attempt was made to reestablish the 
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initiative and drive Bragg’s army off the mountains surrounding the city, a new supply line had 
to be opened.  The army needed an alternative to the treacherous sixty-miles of roads through 
narrow mountain passes and ankle deep mud contested by Rebel sharpshooters who killed 
exhausted and frightened horses and mules trying to haul wagons. The situation was desperate. 
Yet, like the canal dug around Island No. 10, the bridges built during the Peninsula Campaign, 
and the floating roads and bridges built on the Mississippi River floodplain at Vicksburg, 
northern ingenuity and innovation would turn the tide at Chattanooga. Historian James 
McDonough would write of the Chattanooga Campaign that “once in a great while, and perhaps 
when least expected, the awful drama of war narrows to a very small focus, to a relatively 
handful of men, and the story of a great struggle takes a decisive turn through the execution of 
a simple, daring plan—and the fearful momentum of war begins to swing from one army to the 
other. So it was at Brown’s Ferry.”87    
Inside Chattanooga, Rosecrans had ordered the Michigan engineers to start building 
pontoons. With typical ingenuity they used an old steam engine that had been found, and after 
getting it to run, created a makeshift sawmill, which cut timber found in town and logs obtained 
from across the river. Couriers on horseback brought in supplies of nails, and cotton was used as 
caulk.88 Rosecrans also requested from the War Department that he be allowed to convert some 
of his infantry regiments into engineers under a law authorizing the formation of “veteran 
volunteer engineers.” The War Department did not respond.89 
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Charles Dana was concerned, however, that Rosecrans was both micro-managing 
everything, and that he would try to pull his army out of Chattanooga over the sixty-mile wagon 
road instead of trying to work to open a second supply route and break the siege. Dana wrote 
Stanton, “…General R[osecrans] insists on personally directing every department, and keeps 
every one waiting and uncertain till he himself can directly supervise every operation.”  Then 
regarding a pull out of Chattanooga, he warned Stanton that the conditions of the road for the 
only way out were almost impassable. Dana continued, “The returning trains [supply wagons] 
have now for some days been stopped on this side of the Sequatchie, and a civilian who reached 
here last night states that he saw fully five hundred teams halted between the mountain and 
the river, without forage for the animals and unable to move in any direction…. And if the army 
is finally obliged to retreat, the probability is that it will fall back like a rabble….”90  
Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln were disturbed by this news, and consequently, felt the 
only way to extradite the Army of the Cumberland from the hazardous predicament it was in 
was to remove “Old Rosy” before the army collapsed.  Halleck issued an order on October 16th, 
which created the Military Division of the Mississippi, and General Grant was made its 
commander. Grant’s first decision was to replace Rosecrans with General George Thomas.   
Meanwhile, the situation in Chattanooga continued to deteriorate. Colonel Francis T. 
Sherman described the scene: “The present ration issued officers and men alike is a half pound 
of hard bread, a quarter ration of sugar, a quarter ration coffee, and a full ration of salted fresh 
beef—only about a third [of the] ration allowed by law. It is piteous to see the men half fed and 
half clothed, with keen appetites and no way to satisfy the cravings of the stomach.”91  
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 Rosecrans may have had a plan to establish a second supply route, the “Cracker Line,” 
but to Grant’s puzzlement, did not carry it out.92 Historian Albert Castel argued that on the same 
day Rosecrans’s new chief engineer, Brigadier General William “Baldy” Smith suggested laying a 
pontoon bridge at Brown’s Ferry, Rosecrans received word he was relived of command, and 
consequently, did not have the opportunity to approve or execute Smith’s plan. Perhaps this 
was true, yet if so, it took Rosecrans almost five weeks, from September 24th when the siege 
began, to October 19th when he was fired, to develop some attempt to break off the 
Confederate strangle hold. Smith claimed that when he arrived on October 10th he tried 
unsuccessfully to convince Rosecrans that the army simply could not exist unless the river 
[Tennessee] was opened.93   
For the officers and men the waiting and suspense was terrible. Captain Alfred L. Hough 
wrote to his wife in early October: “To live, and to go to sleep knowing that a hundred or so 
cannon are looking one another in the face, and may at any moment open on each other, that is 
our daily life. But it must soon end, a fight or a fall back by one side or the other must take place 
before many days.”94 Yet, Grant showed no signs of waiting. Prepared both to open the 
Tennessee River and fight the Rebels, he rode, with his staff and cavalry escort, the sixty-mile 
Walden Ridge and Sequatchie Valley roads in driving rain and perilous conditions to arrive at 
Thomas’s headquarters on October 23rd in the late evening. Everyone on Thomas’s staff knew 
that Grant had been thrown from a horse weeks before and had badly sprained his angle. So 
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with the injury and miserable weather they were shocked when Grant, wet and cold, limped 
through the doorway of the house Thomas used as his command post, refused dry clothes, and 
immediately asked to hear about plans to open the Cracker Line. Grant’s demeanor signaled 
that he was there to manage the situation rather than allowing the situation to manage him.95  
The scene was tense. Grant and Thomas had a cool relationship with each other. 
Perhaps it was because after Shiloh, when Grant was demoted to second in command behind 
Halleck, Thomas was given temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee, and Grant 
suspected Thomas had something to do with the change. Whatever the feelings both men acted 
as professionals, and Grant listened intently as Baldy Smith presented his idea (with Thomas’s 
approval) of opening a supply line that would avoid Confederate artillery atop Lookout 
Mountain, and the Southern sharpshooters at the Raccoon Mountain bend in the Tennessee 
River.96  Smith proposed floating pontoons from the city south toward Chattanooga Creek and 
then around the “U” shaped bend in the river north to Brown’s Ferry about two and a half miles 
from Lookout Mountain, where a bridge would be constructed. Now supplies could be 
transported by river to Kelley’s Ferry, hauled by wagon through a pass in Raccoon Mountain to 
Brown’s Ferry, on to Moccasin Point, and over another pontoon bridge into Chattanooga. 
Simultaneously, Hooker would move his two corps along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad 
into Lookout Valley and then tie into the Brown’s Ferry position.97 The following morning Grant 
scouted Brown’s Ferry, and then he approved the plan. 
After Grant had listened to Smith’s ideas the previous evening, the commanding general 
also sent word over the telegraph wires calling for General Sherman to leave Iuka for Nashville 
and then to move rapidly into Chattanooga. With Sherman was General Grenville Dodge’s 2nd 
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Division of the XVI Corps. Grant grasped quickly that with additional manpower from Hooker 
and Sherman, and the likelihood he would need to supply Burnside’s command in East 
Tennessee, a single- track railroad was not optimal. Remembering Dodge was a railroad builder 
before the war, Grant sent a second message to Sherman ordering him to halt Dodge and his 
8,000 men at Athens, Alabama, to repair the Central Alabama Railroad below Nashville, extend 
it to the Tennessee River at Decatur, then repair the Memphis & Charleston between Decatur 
and Stevenson, giving the army two roads as far as Stevenson over which to run supplies.98  
Dodge first assigned men to guard against Confederate raiding parties, and then others 
gathered food and forage from the surrounding countryside. Once these detachments started 
their work, Dodge recruited blacksmiths from the men in the ranks, and assigned them to set up 
portable blacksmith shops to make the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axmen 
were put to work cutting timber for bridges and fuel for locomotives, and mechanics worked to 
repair whatever engines and cars could be found. To support Dodge’s efforts, Grant ordered 
General McPherson to send eight engines and rolling stock from Vicksburg to Nashville. He 
arranged to have rails taken from track not in use and other inactive locomotives and cars sent 
to Nashville. John Anderson, who succeeded his former replacement, Colonel Innes, was also 
directed to furnish rolling stock and as much bridge material as possible.99  
In forty days, Dodge and his men were to lay or repair 102 miles of track and rebuild 182 
bridges and culverts. This was northern ingenuity at its finest.  Now, like the military railroad 
management system McCallum and Haupt developed in Virginia, and acumen displayed by 
Stanton’s transportation board in moving Hooker’s army south, Grant, Dodge, and Anderson 
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had serendipitously established the foundation for the efficient management of military 
railroads in the western theater of operations.  
Dodge, however, was not the only one with a unique engineering story to tell during the 
siege.  In Bridgeport, Alabama, after Hooker’s arrival in early October, Captain Arthur Edwards, 
an assistant quartermaster from Detroit, and before the war, a shipbuilder from Lake Erie, 
prepared to convert a scow into a steamboat.100 The scow, mounted with an engine, boiler, and 
stern-wheel, would carry and tow supplies to Kelley’s Ferry nine miles west of Chattanooga. 
Here the food and forage would be unloaded and transported overland to the city. The captain 
retained the services of a master mechanic named Turner and a number of carpenters who 
framed the boat and then set it on blocks about six feet above the water level of the 
Tennessee.101 
Suddenly the water began to rise in the river. Before the planking was finished, and the 
caulk and pitch applied to the bottom, the water was within sixteen inches of the planks. Using 
pig iron left behind by Confederates, Turner started to weigh down the hull to prevent it from 
being swept off the blocks and being broken apart by the current.  Another quartermaster, 
Lieutenant Colonel William Gates Le Duc, suggested to Turner and Edwards that carpenters 
cross-timber the blocks, but Edwards pointed out the futility in trying to keep pace with the rise 
in water level. Le Duc reminded Edwards that Thomas’s starving soldiers needed the steamboat, 
and that if the planking got wet it would be another two to four weeks before the planking 
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would dry and the caulk and pitch applied. Edwards understood the predicament, yet believed 
nothing could be done except wait for the river to run her course.102 
Le Duc had an idea. Using extra pontoons floated along side the steamboat, carpenters 
bored two-inch holes in the bateaux gradually filling them with water. When the pontoons rode 
low enough they were pushed under the steamboat as the blocks were hammered out. As soon 
as the steamboat was secure atop the several pontoons, the carpenters plugged the holes and 
other men began to bail the water out. Within six hours of starting the steamboat was safely 
riding on the top of the rising water. The hull was caulked and pitched and three weeks from the 
start of the project the U. S. S. Chattanooga was launched. On October 30th the steamboat, 
under the direction of Le Duc and a soldier named Williams, who had steered on a steam-ferry 
running between Cincinnati and Covington, (in the years before Roebling’s suspension bridge 
was completed) landed at Kelley’s Ferry with 40,000 rations and 39,000 pounds of forage.103  
Meanwhile back in Chattanooga, immediately after Grant approved “Baldy” Smith’s plan 
to build a pontoon bridge at Brown’s Ferry, Smith spoke with Captain Perrin V. Fox of the 1st 
Michigan Engineers and Mechanics. Fox was told that the army needed fifty pontoons in two 
days. Already, the Wolverines had built most of the boats from unseasoned lumber and with a 
limited supply of nails. He now needed to collect equipment and tools, assemble a bridge team 
train because infantry would ride in the pontoons, and he had to make 250 oars and rowlocks. 
Regular army engineer Lieutenant George W. Dresser scavenged train car wheels from the 
railroad shop, and these would be used as anchors. All was completed with dispatch and late on 
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the night of October 26th Perrin, his men, and members of the assault team, set off across 
Moccasin Point, over difficult roads, to within 1000 feet of the bridge site.104 
The assault team was made up of hand picked men from the brigades of Brigadier 
General William Babcock Hazen and Brigadier General John Basil Turchin, a.k.a. Ivan Vasilevitch 
Turchininoff.105 At 3:00 A. M. the pontoons were loaded with twenty-five men and five oarsmen 
each, and they quietly pushed off gliding over the water so as not to be heard by Confederate 
pickets lining the western bank of the river. The river, approximately two and a half football 
fields wide, and heavy with fog, provided the cover the Union force needed. Then at around 
4:30 A. M. signal fires were lit on Moccasin Point to orient the boats to their position.  With 
stealth and speed the men sprang onto the western shore taking Confederate pickets by 
complete surprise.106  
Infantry on Moccasin Point were ferried across the river to support the initial assault 
wave, and once the west bank was secured Fox’s men began building the 870 foot-long bridge. 
It took fewer than eight hours to complete. Reinforcements were moved across the new bridge 
to protect the bridgehead from Confederate counterattacks, one led by Colonel William C. Oates 
of the 15th Alabama, who four months earlier had fought tenaciously to capture Little Round Top 
at Gettysburg. General Longstreet, in overall command of Confederate forces at the bridge 
could only muster 4,000, while at the same time 5,000 bluecoats had established firm control of 
the area. Longstreet, at the battle of Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, would also try to stop 
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Hooker’s two corps from linking up with the Army of the Cumberland at Brown’s Ferry, and he 
failed.  As Captain Alfred Hough would write to his wife regarding the operation at Brown’s 
Ferry, “It was as fine a thing as was ever done.”107  
With the Cracker Line opened, supplies flowed into Chattanooga, and Grant once again 
took the strategic initiative culminating in late November at the battles of Missionary Ridge and 
Lookout Mountain. Bragg’s Army of Tennessee was driven from Chattanooga, and this would set 
the stage for the start of Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign in the spring of 1864. From December 
1863 to March 1864, both in the eastern and western theater, Union armies prepared for major 
offensives.  Grant was called to Washington in March where he received his commission as the 
army’s only lieutenant general and became commander-in-chief of the United States Army.108 
After deciding to operate his headquarters in the field along side the Army of the Potomac, he 
promoted Sherman to command the three army groups of the Division of the Mississippi: 
Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee, and John Schofield’s 
Army of the Ohio. 
Perhaps because he learned from Rosecrans the importance of engineering, Thomas 
would take the time between Chattanooga and Atlanta to refurbish his combat engineer 
organization. In May 1864, Congress would authorize Thomas’s Pioneer Brigade into an official 
engineer unit, and would create the First U. S. Veteran Volunteer Engineers. Merrill, Thomas’s 
chief engineer, trained soldiers from each brigade in the army as mapmakers, made sure the 
engineer shops in Nashville were building railroad cars, repairing locomotives, producing 
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portable sawmill’s to cut lumber at bridge sites, and build a new lighter pontoon. The original 
idea was Rosecrans’s, but the improved design was Merrill’s. Instead of using pins to hold 
sections together, Merrill substituted hinges so that the frame folded and did not come apart. 
Each corps would carry a train sufficient to bridge a nine hundred foot river.109  
Because of the daunting task facing the Michigan engineers of repairing railroads and 
building a backup line to transport supplies to Nashville, the Engineer Regiment of the West 
consolidated with the 25th Missouri Infantry to form the 1st Missouri Engineers. The new 
regiment would construct the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, and at one point build the 
track over a ravine 1,200 long and 800 feet deep.110 Another bridge over Running Water Ravine 
was built to complete the direct line from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.  A pioneer company from 
the 59th Illinois Infantry under the command of First Lieutenant Chesley A. Mosman, built the 
bridge. Trestles, sixteen feet high and layered atop each other, rose from the riverbed, until four 
tiers 116 feet high completed the 780-foot long structure. During the construction Mosman 
wrote, “I have a hundred men at work on the bridge, mostly soldiers from Colonel William 
Grose’s brigade who get one dollar a day extra. Two more bents (poles) were erected today. The 
pioneers have rigged up a windlass, a device for raising or hauling objects. With a windlass and 
tackle they raise bents in place.”111  
Sherman’s offensive into Georgia required that railroads and bridges be in sound 
condition. When he finally began his campaign against Confederate General Joseph Johnston’s 
army, Sherman’s initial point of contact with the enemy would be three hundred miles from his 
main supply base, and it would grow longer as Sherman’s three armies, comprised of over 
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110,000 soldiers, moved farther southeast toward Atlanta. Therefore, David McCallum was 
called to Nashville to assess the condition of the railroads, and he determined that an 
insufficient number of cars and locomotives existed for such an ambitious operation. 
Furthermore, he reported that track conditions were poor. John Anderson was relieved from 
command of military railroads, and in his place Adna Anderson was appointed general 
superintendent of transportation and maintenance, and W. W. Wright chief engineer of 
construction in the military division of the Mississippi.112  
Adna Anderson was replacing Herman Haupt who resigned from the military railroad 
department in September.113 Fortunately for the Yankees, Anderson was an excellent railroad 
engineer, a skilled manager, and he inherited a remarkable operation. The Construction Corps, 
now a permanent organization, was well organized into five divisions: bridges and carpentry, 
track, water stations, masonry, and train crews. New types of interchangeable bridge trusses 
were stockpiled, and a simple ark had been made for transporting eight loaded freight cars by 
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water.114 Under Anderson’s leadership the United States Military Railroad in the western theater 
would develop into an even larger organization, just as resourceful and proficient as that of the 
operation in the eastern theater. 
During January and February 1864, both Union and Confederate soldiers huddled by 
campfires, wrote long letters home, and tried to recover from emotional and physical wounds 
sustained in the hard fighting of the past year. Generals sat in their headquarters reorganizing 
their division and corps commanders, contemplating their next move and that of their enemy. In 
Richmond, the Davis government continued to wrestle with railroad presidents and states’ 
rights governors about the use of railroads for military purposes, and engineers continued to 
direct slave labor in building fortifications in northwestern Georgia, Atlanta, and around 
Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia. Conversely, the Army of the Potomac and the Military 
Division of the Mississippi prepared to go on the offensive. Union engineers would play a major 
role, as they did at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, in determining the outcome of those operations. 
Moreover, Union engineers, pioneers, Construction Corps workers, and sometimes details of 
infantry, readied the rails for the big push to come. Locomotives were collected and repaired; 
rolling stock was gathered and made, and supplies were stockpiled. As men from both sides 
drilled, stood guard, played dice and cards, they thought of some of their dead comrades and 
wondered if they would be alive the same time next year. The waiting and guessing were about 
to end.  The cars were about to leave the station. 
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CHAPTER 9  
RED RIVER, PETERSBURG AND ATLANTA 
 
We cannot train them for every possible encounter…because we cannot anticipate what those 
encounters will be like. Instead we have to develop them to be the kind of people who can 
sort it out for themselves once they get there.                
              Colonel Barney Forsythe on the Cadet Leadership Development System, 
              In David Lipsky’s Absolutely American: Four Years at West Point 
 
  
 At the corner of Third Street and Vines sat the majestic Burnet House, Cincinnati’s 
handsomest hotel.  The Illustrated London News called the neoclassical styled golden domed, 
five-story building “the finest hotel in the world.”1 There in March 1864, generals Grant and 
Sherman met to plan the spring campaigns, which they believed would finally bring the 
Confederacy to its knees. Sitting in Parlor A, Grant revealed to Sherman his strategy, which 
called for simultaneous Union offensives along the entire Confederate line.  The Army of the 
Potomac would attack Lee’s army in northern Virginia, Sherman would strike at General Joseph 
Johnston’s forces along the Chattanooga-Atlanta corridor, the newly formed Army of the James, 
under Ambrose Burnside, would pressure Lee from the south or shift their concentration to 
coastal North Carolina, and Nathaniel P. Banks’s Department of the Gulf would prepare a 
combined operation with the navy to capture Mobile, Alabama.2   
 While Grant and Sherman worked to ready their forces for a coordinated pincer 
movement against the Confederacy’s two major armies, Union forces under Nathaniel Banks, in 
the Department of the Gulf, had launched a successful campaign against Southern fortification 
along the southeast coast of Texas with the hope of threatening the French in Mexico. In March, 
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Banks was fully engaged with Confederate forces from the Trans-Mississippi region for control 
of the Red River, the wealthy cotton plantations along the river, and the Trans-Mississippi 
Department’s headquarters at Shreveport, Louisiana.   
 During the Texas coast operations, Bank’s engineers were the 1st and 2nd Regiment, 
Engineers, Corps d’Afrique.  Formed from the Louisiana Native Guards, the Corps d’Afrique was 
made up of property owning freeborn creoles and blacks, and later freedmen from refugee 
camps. Much of the work done by the engineers included building fortification and digging 
trenches and latrines. It was the hard backbreaking work that white soldiers preferred not to do. 
Banks demanded that white troops respect the work of his soldiers of color, and he also 
believed that black soldiers were better at performing the hard duty of “throwing up defensive 
earthworks…unwillingly performed by white troops.” A captain of the 53rd Massachusetts wrote 
to his wife about the black engineers, “The[y] can be put into the unhealthy localities in the 
department and not suffer like white men.”3  
 This, of course, was not true. During the siege of Port Hudson in the summer of 1863, 
Corps d’Afrique troops died at an alarming rate as a result of typhoid and dysentery.  The 
engineers’ presence, however, aided in the capture of this Confederate stronghold.  The 3rd 
Regiment, Engineers, had built a bridge over the Tunica River at Bayou Sara Road, which allowed 
Banks’s forces to approach Port Hudson from both the north and south. On May 27th, the First 
and Third engineers participated in the first assault on the city and lost 37 killed, 155 wounded, 
and 116 captured. The First’s regimental commander, Captain Andre Cailloux, one of the first 
black officers in the Union army, was one of those killed.4 Incidentally, Confederate Major 
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General Franklin Gardner had no engineers available inside the fortifications so he promoted 
Private Henry Glinder to lieutenant of engineers because Glinder had been a member of the 
Coast Survey before the war.  
 In the months following the Port Hudson and Texas coast operations, a number of 
soldiers in the Corps d’Afrique deserted.  Poor treatment by the white soldiers and officers, and 
cruel conditions under which they lived, were the primary reasons for their actions. 
Furthermore, by the fall Banks had purged the corps of all the black officers and their white 
replacements acted the role of overseers and martinets. The Bureau of Colored Troops, 
established May 22, 1863, under the command of Major Charles W. Foster, a Lincoln Republican 
from Ohio, attempted to recruit other soldiers, but most of the regiments remained under 
strength. Two additional engineer regiments, the Fourth and Fifth, were organized in time for 
the Red River Campaign.  The Fourth would be stationed in New Orleans, and the Fifth Regiment 
would join the Third engineers and take part in two of the most remarkable and least 
remembered engineering feats of the war. 
 In brief, in the spring of 1864, General Banks had intentions of capturing Mobile Bay, 
closing off the Confederacy’s last major port in the Gulf of Mexico. His plans, however, were 
interrupted when General Halleck insisted Banks move along the Red River and defeat 
Lieutenant General Richard Taylor’s trans-Mississippi forces.5 Grant was promoted to lieutenant 
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(accessed August 9, 2013). 
5 Taylor was the son of Zachery Taylor, twelfth president of the United States, Mexican War 
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General Taylor was Ulysses S. Grant’s idol. Zachery Taylor cut a military figure diametrically 
opposite the other famous general of the Mexican War, Winfield Scott. Scott, referred to by his 
men as “Old Fuss and Feathers,” took the pomp and pageantry of military decorum and regalia 
to a whole new level. Conversely, Taylor, nicknamed Old Rough and Ready,” looked like a sack of 
flour sitting upon a horse. His uniform was wrinkled and dirty, and the only difference between 
 382 
general and given command of all Union armies after the Red River Campaign commenced. 
Grant agreed with Banks that Mobile Bay, not Taylor’s army should be the focus, but out of 
deference to Halleck, the commanding general did not call off the Red River effort. Nonetheless, 
he did give Banks a time limit—either Banks complete his objectives by April 25th or the 
campaign would be halted. This time constraint placed additional pressure on Banks, which 
almost led to a disaster, averted only by the creative skill of the engineers. 
 Banks’s plan called for three movements. First, the general’s army, elements of Thomas 
Edward Ransom’s XIII Corps, William Buel Franklin’s XIX Corps, a cavalry division, and four 
infantry regiments of the Corps d’Afrique, would march northwest along Bayou Teche, and 
Vermillion Bayou to Alexandria.6 From the confluence of the Mississippi and Red River to 
Alexandria was at least seventy river miles.   McPherson would send a detachment of soldiers 
from Vicksburg down the Mississippi, join Admiral Porter’s fleet (13 ironclads and seven light-
draught gunboats) at the Red River and move to Alexandria. General Frederick Steele, operating 
in Arkansas, would send forces from Little Rock.  All three groups would converge at Shreveport. 
The 3rd and 5th Regiment Engineers, Corps d’Afrique built pontoon bridges both at Vermillion 
Bayou and Cane River as Banks made his way north.   
 At Alexandria the problems began. Low water made it just possible, taking ten days, for 
the fleet to pass the double rapids above the city.  Then moving forward, Banks’s men clashed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
his attire and that of privates was the rank insignia worn on his shoulders.  Grant admired the 
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with Confederates in the first major engagement of the campaign at Sabine Cross-Roads (April 
8), where Banks was driven south toward Pleasant Hill, suffering a significant loss of men and 
material. After another fight the following day at Pleasant’s Hill, Banks decided to abandon his 
attempt to capture Shreveport. Confederate partisans, 1,000 cavalry, obstructions in the river, 
demanding terrain, and Steele’s failed attempt to pressure Shreveport made the conclusion an 
easy one, but getting Porter’s fleet safely back to Alexandria represented a monumental 
undertaking. The water level of the Red River continued to drop. Taylor divided his forces 
between harassing Banks in Alexandria and obstructing the river twenty-five river miles south of 
the city at Snaggy Point.  
 By April 25th Banks’s situation was dire. His twenty-five thousand man force could fight 
its way back to the Mississippi, but Porter’s fleet, twelve ironclads and six gunboats were 
trapped above Alexandria, and the prospect of losing all of them, along with the valuable cotton 
they carried, to a small Confederate force was both real and alarming.7 Just as the hopes of the 
Federal government and nation rested on the spring offensives of Grant and Sherman, the 
announcement that the navy lost twenty ships and the army was soundly defeated by a smaller 
force in the Red River Campaign, would devastate Union morale and boost their enemies. 
Furthermore, members of Lincoln’s own party, led by the politically ambitious and 
untrustworthy Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, were attempting to win the 
Republican nomination for president in the fall election. An overwhelming loss in Louisiana 
would be a severe blow to Lincoln’s re-election efforts.  
 On April 25th, Colonel Joseph Bailey, acting chief engineer for General Franklin’s 
Nineteenth Corps, suggested a unique plan for rescuing Porter’s ships. Colonel Bailey was born 
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in Ohio, received a common school education, and was employed as a civil engineer and 
lumberman before the war. Remembering a technique used by his fellow Wisconsin lumberman 
to funnel logs down river to mills, he proposed to build wing dams, both to deepen the water 
and shoot the boats over the rapids. Porter’s flotilla needed seven feet of water to prevent 
grounding, and the water over the rapids was three feet deep. Franklin, thought the idea 
impractical, but the fleet was still 300 miles from the Mississippi, and Banks’s army had just 
three weeks of half rations remaining and virtually no forage for the animals. Franklin conferred 
with Banks, and the latter gave Bailey permission to begin.8 
 What happened next lent some controversy to Bailey’s project. In the colonel’s report 
dated May 17, 1864, he mentioned the technical aspects of the dams, the regiments involved in 
constructing the dams, and as if it were an afterthought, he wrote: “In addition to the dam at 
the foot of the falls, I constructed two wing-dams on each side of the river at the head of the 
falls.”9  
 There were two dams built. The first one was constructed above the second set of 
rapids, closest to Alexandria where the river was 758 feet wide and the current at ten miles an 
hour. The left dam was built of felled trees laid in the river with the current, their branches 
locked and trunks tied together. The right dam consisted of a crib filled with stones and scrap 
iron, and placed in a way that there was a 150-foot gap between the two wings. Finally, 
transport barges filled with rubble were sunk in the gap. It took eight days and nights to 
complete the dam and everything was ready for May 8th. The idea was that the barges would be 
hauled away and the rising water behind the dam would explode through the opening with such 
force and enough water to funnel Porter’s ships through. Sailors stripped side armor from the 
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boats and brought ashore anchors, chains, ammunition, and guns to be transported by wagons 
downstream to reunite with their ships later. 
 The water pressure, however, was too much for the sunken barges as they were pushed 
aside by the great weight of the water sending ships behind the dam bouncing, dipping, 
scraping, and skating into the river with enough water to float them into the deeper part of the 
river. It was a great success, but ten boats, not yet ready for the break in the dam, remained 
upstream beyond the first set or upper falls. It was for this reason Bailey wrote that another 
dam was built.  
 Bailey thanked a number of officers for their determination and zeal working on the 
dams, including Colonel George Dorgue Robinson, commander of the 97th Regiment Colored 
Troops, and Lieutenant Colonel Uri Balcom Pearsall’s 99th Regiment Colored Troops. Before April 
4th these units had been designated the 3rd Regiment, Engineers, Corps d’Afrique and the 5th 
Regiment, Engineers, Corps d’Afrique. They remained engineer troops by a different name. 
Others mentioned by Bailey included the 29th Maine, 116th New York, 24th Iowa, 16th Ohio, 27th 
Indiana, and the 19th Kentucky.10 He received the Thanks of Congress and a presentation sword 
from the Navy Department for his engineering feat that saved the fleet during the Red River 
Campaign.11  
 Colonel George D. Robinson, commanding the 97th Regiment, U. S. Colored Troops (3rd 
Regiment, Engineers), however, reported a slightly different version of Bailey’s story.  
Immediately after Bailey received permission to begin his dam project, Robinson, an 1861 
graduate of the University of Michigan, was ordered to meet with Bailey.  Along with Lieutenant 
Colonel Pearsall, commander of the 99th Regiment, U. S. Colored Troops (5th Regiment, 
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Engineers), the three men walked to the river bank and discussed where to build the dam.12  
Pearsall suggested building two dams, at both set of rapids, but Bailey insisted that a dam at the 
lower rapids was sufficient. Robinson then set his men to work removing barricades from the 
town, cutting timber, and constructing a battery for six guns along Bayou Rapids Road.  When 
the upper dam was built, Robinson mentioned that it was Pearsall’s idea, and the men of the 
97th and 99th who built it.13 Robinson wrote: “The plan for building two dams across Red River, 
which from necessity was finally adopted, was originally proposed by him [Pearsall], and the 
success of the dam was in my opinion, mainly due to his efforts.”14 
 Pearsall, in his report, was more emphatic. During the building of the first dam, it was 
the men of the 97th and 99th that built the crib section, and the men of the 29th Maine, 110th and 
161st New York, and the XIII Corps’ pioneer brigade that built the log section. Then, when the 
center section gave way on May 9th, Bailey told Pearsall, who had already suggested a second 
dam, to build a dam at the upper rapids. The upper dam that saved ten gunboats and ironclads 
in Porter’s fleet was Pearsall’s idea, and built primarily by U. S. Colored Troops. 
 Pearsall was familiar with wing dams. Born in Owego, New York, Pearsall attended 
common schools and Oxford Academy in Owego, and worked for his father, who built the first 
dam on the Susquehanna, in the lumber business. At sixteen years old, Pearsall moved to 
Wisconsin to work for his uncle in the same trade. Now at twenty-four, he would use his 
knowledge and creativity to save more than half of Porter’s boats. His men built two-legged 
trestles for a “bracket dam.” Because of the swift current, “Some pieces of iron bolts (size one-
half inch) were procured and one set into the foot of the legs of each trestle; also one in the cap 
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pieces at the end resting on the bottom up stream…. The trestles were fastened as soon as they 
were in position by means of taking “”sets’’ and driving the iron bolts above referred to down 
into the bottom.” The conditions were dangerous. Some men standing in four feet of water 
were swept away only to be rescued down stream. Finally, however, planks were placed 
horizontally on the trestles to form the dam, and the design worked as imagined. The remaining 
boats in the fleet were pulled through the funnel on May 12th, and the entire armada was safely 
below Alexandria.15 
 Colonel Bailey deserved credit for originally suggesting the idea of the wing dams to 
Franklin and Banks, and for the design of the lower dam. He was also responsible for the entire 
operation. In addition, on May 18th as the Union army approached Simsport near the Mississippi 
River, Taylor’s Confederates threatened to catch Banks’s troops with their back to the river.16 To 
his sole credit, Bailey came to a unique solution. Mooring twenty-two steamboats side by side, 
and then nailing planks over the bow of each, Bailey built a floating bridge. During the next two 
days, the army, and its wagon train crossed unimpeded. There was an encomium of praise for 
Bailey. Wickman Hoffman, an adjutant with General Franklin wrote, “We crossed the 
Atchafalaya by a novel bridge constructed of steamboats. This, too, was Bailey’s work.”17 John 
Merwin of the 161st New York recorded in his diary, “May 19th…No bridge, but Colonel Bailey is 
equal to the occasion once more, and has lashed twenty-two steamers together bows on and 
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using the boat bridges or gang planks has formed a bridge that covers the muddy waters from 
shore to shore, over which we cross in safety.”18  
 There was no doubt during the Red River campaign that Bailey performed at a high level 
of efficiency, and he was responsible, on two occasions, for contributing to the army’s salvation. 
He deserved praise.  The historian for the XIX Corps, Richard Irwin, summed up how most white 
soldiers and sailors felt about Bailey: “At Simmesport [sic] the skill and readiness of Bailey were 
once more put to good use in improvising a bridge of steamboats across the Atchafalaya.”19  It 
was not surprising then, that a recommendation from a former politician like Banks combined 
with support from the Department of the Navy earned Bailey a “Thanks of Congress.” It was also 
not surprising given the treatment of black soldiers by their white comrades, and the disparity in 
the military between white officers and white officers commanding black soldiers, that with the 
exception of Bailey’s brief comments, Robinson and Pearsall’s efforts went unrecognized.  
 Many white officers would have been scornful and cynical of the white men leading 
black troops, but it did not stop Pearsall and Robinson from expressing their opinions. Pearsall 
thought it was incredible that naval authorities reported that Bailey was the only person who 
believed the dam project practicable. Pearsall wrote that he had suggested the idea of wing 
dams days before Bailey when the army was in Grand Ecore. He continued, “I beg leave to state 
that the project of building a dam across Red River, although difficult, could never have been 
pronounced impracticable by any man who followed a similar avocation [lumbering] in civil 
life.”20  
                                                             
18 John W. Merwin, Roster and Monograph, 161st Reg’t, New York State Volunteer Infantry 
(Elmira, NY: Gazette Print, 1902), 130. 
19 Richard B. Irwin, History of the Nineteenth Army Corps (New York: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1893), 
346-347. 
20 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XXXIV, part 1, 256.  
 389 
 Colonel Robinson was more direct: “If the thanks of Congress are due to any one for the 
final success of this dam I believe they are due to him [Pearsall] as much as to any one else.” He 
also did not equivocate when he spoke of his men. “In conclusion, I would say that the 
organization of colored engineers is regarded as a complete success by all who have witnessed 
their operations.”21  
 In the Union army as blacks and whites attempted to work out a cooperative 
relationship in their fight for the common cause of victory, the Confederate army and 
government made it perfectly clear that there would be no such co-dependent relationship in 
their armed forces. In the spring of 1864 when Colonel Thomas M. R. Talcott, commander of the 
newly formed 1st Confederate Engineers, proposed that free blacks be impressed to form 
pioneer companies, Secretary of War James A. Seddon reminded Talcott that free blacks and 
slaves worked on projects as impressed laborers not as soldiers.  
 There were a number of slaves and free blacks who had developed technical skills 
before the war. Slaves, on large plantations, had learned blacksmith and carpentry skills, and 
many could operate and repair machinery. Free blacks also worked as carpenters, ironworkers, 
and toolmakers, and could have been important additions to repair the dearth of engineer 
troops. In the months before Grant’s Overland Campaign and Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, the 
Confederate military attempted to strengthen its engineering organization. There was isolated 
success, yet for the most part little was accomplished. The Confederate army had skilled 
engineers, and they did well with what they had on hand. Some of the men in the ranks also 
made good engineer soldiers and pioneers. They were, however, not enough.  
As the war progressed and the value of engineers became apparent, the South simply 
did not have the skilled manpower to meet the army’s needs. Brigadier General E. P. Alexander, 
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for example, was jealous of the size and quality of the Army of the Potomac’s engineer units. He 
believed they were worth the equivalent of a corps to Grant and Meade.22  
 By the spring of 1864 the Army of Northern Virginia did have a functioning engineer 
regiment, although it was a meager asset. The 1st Confederate Engineers commander was 
Colonel Talcott, a railroad engineer before the war.  The second in command was Lieutenant 
Colonel William W. Blackford. Blackford had studied engineering at the University of Virginia, 
served briefly as a civil engineer, and then joined the army as a cavalry lieutenant. Both men 
were good engineers, but recruiting and training additional officers was a significant problem. 
Whatever was learned was from the few military engineers in the regiment or from books such 
as A Treatise on Field Fortifications by Dennis Hart Mahan, and the Manual for Engineer Troops 
by Captain J. C. Duane.23  
Some of the men recruited were among the veteran infantry, but because division and 
brigade commanders were reluctant to give up their experienced soldiers, some of the engineer 
troops were conscripts.  The training the men underwent was not rigorous. In the Civil War diary 
of Lieutenant Henry Herbert Harris, he recorded how the engineers guarded Yankee prisoners 
and worked on repairing corduroy roads. It was not until April 19th that companies began 
pontoon drill on a millpond. Two days later he wrote: “Took the company out near the pond 
where two other companies were pontooning and looked on for a while.” The next day he 
“…went out to see the pontooners exercise…Hunted two ducks without killing either and fished 
a while without getting…a nibble. In the afternoon I busied myself on the company clothing 
                                                             
22 Hess, 12. See also Gary Gallagher, ed., Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections 
of General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 370. 
23 Harry L. Jackson, First Regiment Engineer Troops P. A. C. S.: Robert E. Lee’s Combat Engineers 
(Louisa, VA: R. A. E. Design and Publishing, 1998), 24. 
 391 
account, which occupied me until nearly ten o’clock….”24 There was no school for pontooniers in 
the Confederate army. In comparison, the Army of the Potomac did have a school near Belle 
Plain, Virginia in 1862. General Benham, who established the school, reported on January 25, 
1864 that it made a vast difference in the engineer troops of the Union army. Practice was 
constant. For example, on March 6, 1864 the Volunteer Engineer brigade received the following 
general order: “The Ponton [sic] drills of this command will be resumed at once. These [sic] will 
be a drill by successive Pontons on Monday, Wednesday & Friday mornings…. On Tuesday & 
Thursday…there will be pontoon drill by battalion under the direction of a Field Officer of each 
regiment when practicable….”25Virtually every company in a regiment could maintain a bridge 
and install one.26 Only five companies from the eleven company 1st Confederate could build a 
bridge.27 
Also in April, Colonel Talcott ordered all company commanders to classify”…as artificers 
those that they know to be such.”28 This was done to identify those men in the regiment who 
demonstrated ability as skilled craftsmen and artisans. According to the regimental roster one 
soldier in ten was promoted to artificers. This did not compare favorably with the 15th New York 
Engineers where one in four was similarly ranked.29  
 The Engineer Bureau attempted to recruit the 2nd Confederate Engineers but only two 
companies were raised—G and H. As it turned out the Second, as a separate command did not 
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exist. It had no commanding officer and G and H companies were placed under the command of 
the First engineers. An additional eight undersized companies were formed and spread 
throughout the southeast reporting to local commanders.30 Finally, the 3rd Confederate 
Engineers was raised and served with the Army of Tennessee for the remainder of the war. After 
the 4th Confederate Engineers were organized in late 1864 they were scattered over the 
expansive Trans-Mississippi Department until General Kirby Smith surrendered to Union forces 
on June 2, 1865 in Galveston, Texas, the last major Confederate army to do so.31  
In the spring of 1864 before Grant’s Overland Campaigns began, Lee appointed Major 
General Martin Luther Smith as chief engineer, Army of Northern Virginia. An 1856 graduate of 
West Point, Smith served as a topographical engineer before resigning his commission to join 
the Confederate army. In 1863 he had supervised the Vicksburg defenses, and now on Lee’s 
staff would be instrumental in laying out the fortifications around Petersburg and Richmond. In 
Richmond, Captain Alfred L. Rives was appointed acting head of the Engineer Bureau in Jeremy 
Gilmer’s absence. Rives was a skilled engineer, and he served as department head for the rest of 
the war.  Despite the shortage of equipment and money, and a lack of centralized control, Rives 
managed well with what he had. During the Petersburg Campaign, in cooperation with the 
Railroad Bureau, he assigned engineers to repair forty miles of track destroyed by Union cavalry, 
along the Richmond & Danville Railroad. This was a crucial line connecting Lee’s army with 
essential supplies from North Carolina and South Carolina. In addition, at Burkesville the line 
connected with the Southside Railroad, the latter running east to Petersburg.  
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In perhaps the apex of Confederate railroad engineering, men took up rails from the 
York River Railroad and forwarded them to the construction sites, while others, according to 
Corporal Charles Venable “began cutting hewing and delivering the cross ties as rapidly as 
possible. The road bed was gone over and prepared so that track laying would be practicable, 
and by judicious distribution of our forces we soon had the repairs well in hand.”32 Colonel Rives 
wrote to his wife July 24th and told her that a large crew was working hard and that “We hope to 
have the trains running again & the road better than ever in a fortnight.”33 Unfortunately, the 
success enjoyed by the engineers in July would not be repeated, and for the rest of the war 
Confederate railroad operations steadily declined.34 
Local carriers refused to lend their skilled workers to the army. State railroad companies 
had the manpower and not the iron, and the Confederate Railroad Bureau had some iron, but 
not the workers.  Disintegrating tracks, cars, and engines and increasing demands by the 
government to use the railroads did not elicit assistance from private companies. Furthermore, 
since the government had no central control of the lines and equipment some private 
companies increased their fares and decreased their service.  Sly business deals made some 
railroad companies a fortune, while Confederate armies operated with tenuous supply lines. 
Historian Robert C. Black, III wrote “many bondholders of the Alabama & Florida Railroad…after 
1863…deliberately withheld coupons due and payable in Confederate money. Not until 1865 did 
they present them, for payment in the currency of the United States.”35  
Although the Confederate railroad network collapsed the fortifications Confederate 
engineers designed and built during Grant’s Overland Campaign and around Richmond and 
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Petersburg were effective in extracting a high price from the Yankees in human life and in 
frustrating Grant’s efforts to draw Lee’s army out into the open.36  
  From his headquarters in Culpeper County, Virginia, in early 1864 General Grant had 
started to prepare for his spring offensive against the Army of Northern Virginia, which he 
hoped would end the war.37 His plan was to move South outflanking Lee’s army. The Corps of 
Engineers also began preparations for the campaign under new leadership. Brigadier General 
Totten, stricken with pneumonia in the early spring, died at the age of seventy-six on April 22, 
1864. His replacement was the sixty-six year old Richard Delafield, who prior to his 
appointment, supervised harbor fortifications for the City of New York. Delafield was a part of 
the first class in West Point history (1818) to be assigned class ranks.  He graduated first in his 
class and then went on to a distinguished career in the engineers including an assignment given 
by then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, to observe the operations of European armies in the 
Crimean War.38   
 Delafield proved to be a competent chief engineer, but like several of his colleagues, he 
was too old for fieldwork. Fortunately, of the eighty-six officers in the regular corps of engineers, 
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Grant had twenty-four officers at his disposal whereas Sherman only had nine.39  Two of the 
oldest engineer officers with Grant were forty-year-olds James C. Duane, chief engineer, and 
Nathaniel Michler, chief of mapping, both with the Army of the Potomac.  Others like Cyrus B. 
Comstock and John Parke, were in their thirties, and several such as Francis U. Farquhar, George 
L. Gillespie, and Peter Smith Michie were recent graduates of West Point.40  
 Thirty-three year-old James St. Clair Morton, who commanded General Rosecrans’s 
Pioneer Brigade the previous year, was appointed chief engineer of Major General Ambrose 
Burnside’s IX Corps, which until May 24th was formally part of the Army of the Ohio, and thus 
reported to Grant rather than Meade. In a similar fashion, Grant created the Army of the James, 
which also reported to him and operated with the Army of the Potomac, under the command of 
Benjamin F. Butler. Farquhar and Michie, served with this army, but all the engineers in Grant’s 
combined forces operating against the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond reported to 
Major General John Barnard, who Grant appointed to his headquarters’ staff and named Chief 
Engineer of the Armies in the field.41   
 The United States Engineer Battalion was now under the command of Captain George H. 
Mendell, and Brigadier General Henry W. Benham directed the Volunteer Engineer Brigade, 
made up of the 50th New York Engineers, eight companies of the 1st New York Engineers, and 
the 15th New York Engineers.42 In the spring of 1864, the Fifteenth Engineers were detached to 
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the Engineer depot in Washington, DC to repair and build pontoons. Benham, because of his 
demonstrated bridge building skills, was detached from the army in the field to supervise 
construction work at the depot.  Consequently, because of his new assignment, Ira Spaulding 
commander the Fiftieth, and Edward W. Serrell, commander of the First, reported directly to 
Duane rather than Benham.  
 Duane divided the 50th New York into three units of three companies each, and he 
designated two companies, under the command of Ira Spaulding as a reserve. Each unit carried 
fourteen pontoons, except the reserve unit, which carried twenty-four, and each were assigned 
to a corps. Only on rare occasions, and only for several days, was Mendell’s regular engineer 
battalion attached to a corps.43  
 As the engineers continued to gather equipment and train for the up coming offensive, 
Grant collected several thousand wagons to carry vast quantities of supplies necessary to press 
the attack against Lee.  The depots in Washington and Alexandria shipped supplies by train 
along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad to Culpeper. Then Grant’s plan was to cross the Rapidan 
River and establish bases on the river, which would allow him to operate on Lee’s right flank. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
troublemakers or those who had demonstrated the potential for trouble. The third possible 
reason was the awkward command structure. Duane, a major, was chief engineer of the Army of 
the Potomac, and Benham, a major of engineers (brigadier general of volunteer infantry), 
commanded the Volunteer Engineer Brigade. Benham was eleven years older than Duane, and 
he was promoted major of engineers two years ahead of his chief. Furthermore, Mendell, a 
captain, commanded the more prestigious regular army engineer battalion, whereas Benham, a 
major, commanded volunteers. By sending Benham to Washington, Grant temporarily solved his 
chain of command problem. Finally, and perhaps the real reason for the assignment combined 
Benham’s skills, the army’s chain of command, and the undersized 15th New York regiment. In 
late summer of 1863 many soldiers’ three-tear enlistments ended, and as a result, the fifteenth 
lost seven companies or about 700 men. Now in the spring of 1864, the 15th New York under the 
command of Colonel Clinton G. Colgate, had added two additional companies, D and E, to reach 
battalion strength. Companies D and E were originally recruited in November 1863 to form the 
2nd New York Volunteer Engineers. This new regiment never mustered more than two 
companies so they were transferred into the 15th.     
43 Hess, 10.  
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With water borne supplies Grant would not have to worry that Rebels would cut the O & A.  
Unlike Sherman, whose lifeline was the railroad, Grant anticipated that his wagon trains would 
be more than adequate for his movements.44  
Grant was tenacious at attacking Lee during the Overland Campaign, but at every turn, 
especially at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, the Army of Northern Virginia had anticipated the 
Federal’s movements and the results were Union frontal assaults with ghastly consequences, 
earning Grant the sobriquet “the Butcher.” Grant’s lost 55,000 men killed, wounded, or missing, 
and it was too much. He needed to move on Lee’s flank before the southern general had time to 
prepare strong defensive positions.  “Without greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to 
make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside the City [Richmond],” Grant 
wrote.45 Yet, how would Grant quietly disengage his 110,000 men from Lee’s forces and transfer 
his army south to seize Petersburg and then turn north to operate against Lee’s remaining rail 
line into Richmond? 
The plan Grant decided upon was both bold and complex because it required crossing 
his army over the James River and doing so undetected.  First, Grant’s army would extricate 
itself from the Army of Northern Virginia by a wheeling maneuver in which units on the right 
flank would pull out successively and march across the rear of adjacent units to the roads by 
which they were to move toward their respective bridges assigned for their crossing.  The length 
of the army trains, which included 2,800 cattle, was sixty-two miles long.  That meant that a by-
stander watching the trains pass would see the tail pass thirty-one hours after the head.46 
Second, to move the entire army across the James River, the engineers would first have to 
                                                             
44 Turner, 337-338. 
45 Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant & Lee, 202. 
46 James A. Huston, “Grant’s Crossing of the James with the Longest Ponton Bridge Ever Built,” 
The Military Engineer 45 (January-February 1953): 18; Warren T. Hannum, “The Crossing of the 
James River in 1864,” The Military Engineer 15 (May-June 1923): 237. 
 398 
bridge the Chickahominy River. That job would fall to the 50th New York Engineers and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding. 
There were sixty wooden pontoons and sixteen canvas pontoons travelling with the 
Army of the Potomac.47 Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding of the 50th New York Engineers was 
placed in charge of the Chickahominy crossing, and on June 12th he selected three sites: Long 
Bridge, fifteen miles southeast of Cold Harbor, Jones’s Bridge, five miles east of Long Bridge, and 
Windsor Shades, four miles east of Jones’ Bridge.  
Major George W. Ford commanded the engineers responsible for the bridge at Long 
Bridge. Accompanied by the V Corps, Ford quickly discovered that the bridge had burned and 
little was left of it. He would need to clear the debris off the remnants of the old bridge and cut 
down the abutments.  Broad swamps bordered the approaches, and it was necessary to place 
the new bridge near a narrow passage formed by the roadway to the old bridge. Ford, with a 
cavalry escort, then crossed the river only to realize that the land mass he saw standing on the 
river bank was actually an island between the main channel 100 feet wide and the south branch 
of the river 60 feet wide.  To make matters more troubling, Confederate pickets opened fire at 
the engineers and cavalrymen from the south bank, killing one engineer. The Confederate 
soldiers were soon driven off and in three hours the two pontoons were completed, the V Corps 
crossed, and by 5:30pm on the 13th, the engineers had dismantled the bridge and started 
moving toward the James.48 
At the same time Major Ford’s engineers were working at Long Bridge, Major Edmund 
O. Beers moved his pontoon trains to Jones’ Bridge. Here, as at Long Bridge, there were two 
branches of the river to be bridged, the island between being about 800 feet wide. Lieutenant 
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Mahlon B. Folwell’s company built a canvas pontoon bridge over each branch, and Captain Asa 
C. Palmer bridged both branches with wooden pontoons. The bridges over the north branch 
were sixty feet in length, and those over the south branch forty feet. The following day Beers 
and his men constructed a permanent bridge over both branches and by 10:00am on June 14th 
the VI and IX Corps crossed.49   
The final bridge built over the Chickahominy was a testament to northern engineering 
and innovation. Captain Walter V. Personius and his Company G were headed for Windsor 
Shades when Colonel Spaulding found the marshes and swamps in the area too extensive to 
construct the proper approaches.  The next closest potential place to cross was at Cole’s Ferry, 
ten miles southeast of Windsor Shades. Topographical engineers had scouted the area ahead of 
the bridge builders and discovered an old farm road led to the disused Cole’s Ferry.  The final 
alternative to cross the Chickahominy was at Barrett’s Ferry, twenty-five miles south of Cole’s 
Ferry and a mile and a half from the James River well south of the site picked to cross the 
James.50  
The lower Chickahominy flowed through flat bottomlands and in mid-June considerable 
rain had raised the water level, which widened the river at Cole’s Ferry to 1,200 feet. This 
presented a considerable problem for Captain Personius because he did not have enough 
pontoons for a bridge that long. Early on June 14th, a messenger was sent to find Major Duane 
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and report on the precarious situation faced by Captain Personius. When Duane received the 
news he ordered Colonel Spaulding to collect sufficient material, ride to Cole’s Ferry, and get the 
work done.51  
Meanwhile, Personius, following the army maxim, “he succeeds who hustles while he 
waits,” began to build a wharf of boats on each side of the river and a large pontoon raft, which 
ferried squads of cavalry and wagons to the south bank of the river. Other men built rafts, of 
four boats each, with material on each for making connections when the additional pontoons 
arrived.52  
Major Beers arrived from Jones’ Bridge at 1:00pm and immediately began unloading his 
equipment to aid in constructing the bridge of rafts begun by Personius. In addition, Captain 
Peirce, assistant chief quartermaster, and men from the U. S. C. T. started to build a timber 
approach of about 250 feet in length on the north shore. By 5:00pm, after a twelve mile march 
from Charles City Court House, Major Ford arrived on the south bank of the river, bringing 
together all the “land pontoons” the army had in its possession with the exception of eight 
canvas pontoons, which Lieutenant Folwell had with General Phil Sheridan’s cavalry, and those 
were on their way to Cole’s Ferry, as well. This was tuning into a remarkable operation, which 
required ingenuity, teamwork, cooperation, and deft management.53  
Two of Ford’s captains, James H. McDonald (Company K) and Asa C. Palmer (Company 
D), started working on different sections of the bridge. McDonald constructed the south 
abutment and his men tacked on their pontoons to those already placed by Personius’s men. 
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Palmer set to work, with another detail of U. S. Colored Troops, on a 200 foot raised corduroy 
approach road over wetlands. With the arrival of Captain Von Brocklin’s eight canvas boats 
attached to McDonald’s pontoons, and at nightfall, Lieutenant Folwell’s eight canvas pontoons 
added to the rafts from the north end, all the material was used and the bridge was still short in 
the middle by thirty feet. Personius and Folwell had attempted to lengthen the spans with 
additional balk, but this still left the bridge short in the center of the river.54  
It was a wild situation. Darkness fell. Men slept standing. Mosquitoes bit. Soldiers 
cursed. Some urinated in the river.  All drank its water. Major Ford, taken sick at Long Bridge, 
was too ill to walk. Fourteen miles south lead elements of Grant’s army were about to cross the 
James River. Yet, waiting impatiently to first cross the Chickahominy before moving to the James 
was the Army of the Potomac’s sixty-two mile long wagon train, 2,800 head of cattle, and an 
army division of about 5,000 men. Nerves were on edge.55 
The engineer officers all agreed that it would be necessary to detach the bridge from 
the north shore and connect it to the southern section. Then the men set to work constructing 
additional cribs and corduroy to make up the thirty-foot difference. They did it by 3:00am on 
June 15th and the bridge was opened to traffic. The total length of the bridge was 1,240 feet, and 
the length of the timber and corduroy approaches was about 450 feet, and the engineers had 
completed the bridge in an impressive fourteen hours. By late on the 16th the trains, men, and 
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cattle had crossed without delay or incident, the bridge was then dismantled and towed to the 
James River where the pontoons met up with the wagons, which had gone overland.56   
Three days before army wagons started across the bridge at Cole’s Ferry, General 
Godfrey Weitzel, chief engineer, Army of the James, directed his assistant, Lieutenant Peter S. 
Michie to reconnoiter specific sites for the crossing of the James River. The site chosen was at 
Douthart’s house, midway between Wilcox’s Landing and Wyanoke Landing, on a neck of the 
river, which ran north to south. The bridge would hit the opposite shore between Windmill 
Point and Fort Powhatan. The site was well beyond the observation of Confederate cavalry out 
trying to discover the location of Grant’s army, and constructing the approaches would not 
require the same man hours necessary as would be required over extensive marshlands at the 
two other possible sites. The difficulty would come in the actual bridge building. The width of 
the river was close to 2,000 feet, the currents were strong here where the tides rose and fell 
about four feet, and because the army wanted to keep the area open to river traffic, a draw 
would need to be built into the center of the bridge where the water in the main channel, 
reached depths of eighty to ninety feet.57  
On June 13th, without official approval from Grant’s headquarters, Weitzel sent Michie 
back to the site to begin work on the approaches and by nightfall a detail of soldiers had cut and 
trimmed 1,200 feet of timber in logs averaging six inches in diameter and twenty feet in length. 
On the southwestern shore above Fort Powhatan, the engineers cut 3,000 feet of timber, 
formed rafts, and floated them to the bridge site. Cypress logs, almost three and a half feet in 
diameter, were used in building approaches in the shallow part of the river.  By mid-morning on 
June 14th the approaches on both sides of the river were completed—on the southwestern side 
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a ramp was built, ruts and gullies filled over, and a roadway constructed to connect with 
Petersburg and City Point Road. On the northeastern side of the river, trees were cleared and a 
150-foot pier over a small marsh was finished.  At the same time Grant had approved the 
location of the bridge, and he directed General Benham at the engineer depot at Fort Monroe, 
to send Grant all the available pontoons as quickly as possible to the bridge site. Finally, the 
regular battalion of engineers was ordered to the site on the 14th to construct the bridge, under 
the direction of Major Duane.58  
The following morning, June 14th, Weitzel paced the riverfront waiting anxiously for the 
pontoons Benham promised, to arrive. Finally, after his patience was worn thin by the delay and 
the recognition that Grant’s lead elements were due to appear anytime, Weitzel sent a dispatch 
boat down the river to look for the steamer towing the pontoons. At noon, after being en route 
for twenty-two hours, travelling three miles per hour, they arrived, approximately 155 pontoons 
enough for 3,100 feet of bridge.59  Now there was excitement and chaos at the bridge site. 
Pontoons were taken off their towlines and bobbed freely in the river. Men from Captain 
George Mendall’s United States Engineer Battalion jumped into the four foot high water trying 
to push some of the boats on shore, while other men, slipping on underwater rocks and getting 
their feet encased in ooze and mud, started building an abutment that reached out into deeper 
water. 
Once Duane established control over the chaos of the unmoored pontoons he ordered 
Mendall’s men to steer fifty boats to the south bank of the river, while members of the 15th New 
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York who had arrived with the pontoons from Fort Monroe, and the 50th New York, except 
Major Wesley Brainerd’s battalion, were assigned building the pontoon bridge from the north 
side. Brainerd was instructed to report to II Corps headquarters to support General Hancock’s 
separate movement across the James. Grant anticipated that at least seventy-two hours would 
be required to get his entire army across the James River, and by then Lee might learn of Grant’s 
grand flanking movement and beat him to Petersburg. It was decided, therefore, that Hancock’s 
II Corps would not wait for the pontoon bridge to be completed, but instead, would have his 
men ferried across the river. The operation began on the 14th, yet by late afternoon that day, 
the landing was progressing at a painstakingly slow pace. A wharf would help matters, and an 
old one, nearly destroyed by fire, was found.60  
Sometime after 7:00pm, Brainerd was summoned to the headquarters of Third Division 
commander Major General David B. Birneys, and the general informed the engineer that he 
could have all the men he needed to rebuild the wharf to speed up the ferry crossings. Orders 
went out and soon men began tearing down neighboring barns for timber and then hauled the 
planks to the riverbank. Brainerd and his engineers worked on the pilings. The old ones that had 
not rotted out needed additional support, and the new ones were difficult to sink two feet 
beneath the riverbed.  By three o’clock in the morning on the 15th some progress was made, but 
Brainerd believed it would be at least another nine hours before the wharf was finished.61  
Progress on the pontoon bridge, however, developed with alacrity. After the 50th New 
York Engineers worked ten hours on the structure, by eleven o’clock in the evening the 
remarkable bridge was finished. Because the current flowed in both directions at different times 
during the day, the pontoons had to be anchored both upstream and downstream. To provide 
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anchorages in the main channel, the pontoons were fastened by guy wires running from each 
boat to one of three schooners anchored above the bridge, and to one of three schooners 
anchored below the bridge. To permit passage of vessels up and downstream, a draw section 
made up of rafts 100 feet in length was built into the 2,200 foot long bridge, and at 1:00am June 
15th Benham received word from Meade to open the bridge to traffic.62  
Twenty minutes later, Meade countermanded the order. His stated reason was to wait 
for the big supply train lumbering up from Cole’s Ferry “to get nearer to us.” Meade did allow 
Benham to send over the bridge trains and surplus artillery of three corps perhaps thinking he 
was carrying out Grant’s earlier order to Meade stating that one corps was to remain on the 
east side of the river “until the artillery and wagons were well over.”63  
Meantime, someone at the James River Bridge thought of Brainerd. At 3:00am a 
transport towed a half dozen extra pontoons to the wharf. Brainerd thought it was “Providential 
Interference.”  Within three hours, using the boats in place of the pilings, the wharf was 
completed. Brainerd wrote: “Soon after, General Hancock came over in a transport and seemed 
much pleased with the undertaking. Then the troops began to pour over by Regiments, Brigades 
and Divisions. The transports came up to the wharf and soon the Troops were off while the 
boats went back for another load.”64  
Back at the bridge at six o’clock in the morning of the 15th the men of the Army of the 
Potomac began to cross—the V, VI, and IX Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division, the Army 
Headquarters, and finally the sixty-two mile long wagon train. The combat units crossed in 
fifteen hours.65 Astonishingly, the only snafu came three hours after the bridge was open to 
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infantry traffic. An upstream schooner slipped her anchor, drifted into the bridge and carried 
away a part of it. The damaged section was restored in several hours, and the march of Grant’s 
army continued.66  
Eyewitnesses to the movement of the army across the James River were mesmerized by 
the sight. Private John H. Westervelt, 1st New York Volunteer Engineers observed: “This is the 
first time I have seen anything like an army cross a pontoon bridge and I can assure you it is well 
worth seeing. From sunrise till 12M it was one steady stream tramp, tramp an a roar like a R 
road train all the time.”67 A correspondent of Harper’s Weekly reported: “As we approach the 
pontoon bridge we see distinctly huge bodies of infantry, cavalry, horses, artillery, and wagons 
moving across the bridge.  They extended across the entire length of the bridge, and can be 
seen wending along from far away up the east bank of the James, enveloped in a dense cloud of 
dust, while on the western bank is a part of the great body which has already effected its 
crossing.”68 
When the last animals crossed the bridge in the early evening of June 18th General 
Benham “breathed free again.”  Finally feeling a sense of great accomplishment, he wrote, 
“…The most successful effort on a large scale with pontoon bridging that has ever occurred in 
our country, if it does not rival those in any other land.”69 Benham’s praise was merited.  
The engineers had taken Grant’s vision of a never before attempted grand turning 
movement and made it a reality. Unfortunately, costly mistakes on the eastern outskirts of 
Petersburg and skilled Confederate generalship by P. G. T. Beauregard prevented the advance 
elements of Grant’s army from capturing Petersburg in June 1864, and instead, began a siege 
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that would last until April 1865.  Before the work of laying out and building fortifications and 
trenches began, army engineers had built 8,678 feet of bridges. Now beginning in July the Army 
of the James, which occupied the northern portion of the siege lines deployed troops from 
Richmond to Petersburg from its position on the Bermuda Hundred peninsula. The army’s 
tactical movements required the engineers to build a number of bridges on the James and 
Appomattox Rivers, including a 1,320 foot pontoon bridge across the James at Aiken’s Landing 
built by the 1st New York Engineers. The engineers even attempted to dig a canal at Dutch Gap 
similar to the one dug around Island No. 10, but heavy Confederate shelling made it impossible 
to complete the canal.70  
In the months after the army crossed the James the siege of Petersburg required the 
engineers to build signal towers, make abatis, gabions, and fraise, build magazines and bomb-
proofs, construct parapets, lunettes, revetments, and platforms for guns, make maps, and draw 
plans for forts.71 A significant amount of time was also spent corduroying roads and making 
covered ways.  The latter were sunken roads wide enough to allow the passage of wagons and 
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artillery to connect two or more fortifications.72 Yet, of all the work engineer soldiers did during 
the eleven-month siege, the efforts that became most daring, and very dangerous, was mining. 
Both sides employed this tactic during the siege yet neither side enjoyed the success hoped for, 
although the first attempt made by the Federals might have worked had it not been for a 
mismanaged assault.  
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry believed he and his 
men, many of them professional miners, could dig a mine beneath the 125 yards of soil 
separating Union from Confederate soldiers. By doing so he would punch a gaping hole in the 
Confederate trenches, which would then be exploited by thousands of Union infantry.  With this 
break in the trenches the entire Confederate line would collapse and lead to a crushing 
Confederate defeat and an end to the war. Approval for the mine had to work its way up the 
army’s chain of command, and as it did, Pleasants started the work. Sergeant Henry Reese of 
Company F was named foreman of the project, and improvisation and hard work were the 
essential tools used to tunnel under the unsuspecting but slightly suspicious Confederates.73  
Army pioneer companies had adequate numbers of picks and shovels for building 
fortifications, trenches, and roads, yet since the flukes on the picks were too wide for swinging 
in confined spaces, they were inadequate for mining operations. Consequently, the men filed 
down the flukes and made them more suitable for digging underground. Next, wheelbarrows 
were unavailable so hardtack boxes, reinforced with iron bands taken from pork barrels were 
jury-rigged to haul dirt from the tunnel.74  
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Pleasants wanted to be certain he had the correct distance from the mine entrance to 
the Confederate lines, and to accomplish this he triangulated using a theodolite. Historian Earl J. 
Hess explained the work: “His crew laid out short lines at five different locations within the 
Union position and created the other two sides of an imaginary triangle from each end of these 
lines to Pegram’s Salient. The degrees of the angles at the sides were noted and the distance to 
the salient deduced from this and the length of the third, base line.” Confederate guns were 133 
yards from the Union front line.75   
For ventilation, first the miners dug vertically from the gallery to the surface, twenty-
two feet tall. Next the men constructed a square wooden pipe and laid it along the base of the 
tunnel with a small iron furnace added to the bottom of the shaft. Finally, the partition, with a 
door, was build along the outside edge of the shaft so fresh air entered the wooden pipe and 
exited deep within the gallery, then the heat from the furnace drew the exhaled carbon dioxide 
up the shaft. To make sure Confederates observing Union line did not detect unusual activity, 
several campfires were maintained as decoys to draw attention away from the mineshaft.76  
By the end of June, Pleasants had the mine ready. His men had dug two wings each 
about thirty-six feet long and packed these chambers with a total of 8,000 pounds of explosives. 
The tunnel was 510 feet long, and although Southern soldiers had dug two countermines to 
determine if rumors about a Yankee mine were true, most Confederates had no idea what was 
about to happen. At about 4:45am on June 30, 1864 the mine exploded leaving a hole in the 
ground 200 feet long. 60 feet wide, and 30-feet deep. The blast and killed or wounded more 
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than 300 men.  John Haley of the 17th Maine wrote, “Earth and heaven were rent by an 
explosion that would have done credit to several thunderstorms.”77  
What happened next, however, was the result of incompetence. Instead of pouring 
through the breech as planned, Union soldiers got to the crater carved out by the explosion and 
just stopped. They were uncertain as to what to do next largely because their commanding 
officer, General James Ledlie, was sitting in a bombproof shelter drunk, and the soldiers had not 
been trained. A black regiment had prepared to attack after the explosion, but General Meade 
replaced them with white soldiers at the last minute. Confusion ensued as Union 
reinforcements, including the African-American troops originally trained for the assault, rushed 
to the Crater. By this time Confederate Brigadier General William Mahone managed to regroup 
his forces, stem the Union assault, and bottle up several thousand northern soldiers inside the 
crater. By the time the fighting ended the South suffered 1,491 casualties and the North, which 
lost a golden opportunity to break the Confederate lines, had 3,798 killed, wounded, or 
missing.78  
After the mine explosion at Pegram’s Salient both sides mined and countermined 
throughout the remainder of the campaign with no success. Confederate engineers Hugh T. 
Douglas and W. W. Blackford led efforts to dig mines under Federal lines. For example, on 
August 5th a mine was detonated under Gracie’s Salient to no effect because the explosive 
charge was only 850 pounds of powder and because it exploded short of Union lines. Many 
Northern commanders could not figure out the purpose of the mine. Douglas wrote that the 
mine was intended to break up the earth to prevent the Federals from tunneling under their 
works. Lieutenant Colonel Blackford believed the mine was intended to stop a sap and sap-
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roller, and General Beauregard reported that it was a successful experiment in innovative mine 
design and digging.79  
The most creative devise used to assuage Confederate soldiers’ beliefs that the ground 
was about to erupt was a simple earth auger with which two men could bore a hole about three 
and a half inches in diameter to a depth of twenty feet. The holes were filled with water, which 
the clay soil retained, and if the water disappeared everyone would know that the Yankees were 
beneath them.80  
As Southern soldiers continued to resist assaults above and below ground from Grant’s 
massive army, they clung to the belief that Southern independence was still possible. The 
Richmond Sentinel reported that “the war has continued for more than three years, the United 
States being weaker today than when hostilities commenced while the Confederate States are 
infinitely better prepared than ever before to resist the attacks of the enemy.”81  Perhaps if the 
war could be prolonged by forestalling Union offensives around Petersburg and Northern 
Georgia, even with the loss of Mobile Bay to the Union navy on August 5th, it might be possible 
that the Northern public would grow tired of the slaughter and elect someone to the White 
House in November who would be willing to negotiate a peace with slavery intact. Certainly 
Lincoln thought this was distinctly possible. On August 23rd the President wrote: “This morning, 
as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-
elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union 
                                                             
79 Jackson, 82-83. 
80 Nichols, 108. 
81 Levin, 28. 
 412 
between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground 
that he can not possibly save it afterwards.”82  
Despite the President’s dour prediction, in the summer of 1864 there was still time to 
bring about the victory the citizens of the United States needed to persuade them that the war 
was worth continuing, and that Lincoln was the man to continue to lead them. With Grant 
bogged down in Virginia, the best hope was for Sherman to take Atlanta, a difficult enterprise. It 
was a formidable task to move 100,000 soldiers and fight through the mountains of northern 
Georgia, with a dangerous enemy blocking their way. Furthermore, the army’s supply line was 
along a single-track railroad from Nashville to the front lines.  
For two years of war Union engineering and railroad management had helped 
accelerate the advance made by northern forces as they cut their way into Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. Looking back, delays at Forts Henry and Donelson, 
Nashville, Island No. 10, Vicksburg, and the loss of an army at Chattanooga and a flotilla at Red 
River, all would have had a significant effect on the country’s morale just as Sherman was 
prepared to launch the Atlanta Campaign.  
Instead, skillful and innovative engineering, the development of sound railroad 
management and policy, along with determined generalship and fine soldiers, brought the 
Military Division of the Mississippi to the gates of northern Georgia. Beginning on May 7, 1864 
when Sherman’s forces broke winter camp and started toward Dalton, Georgia, again the 
Federal’s formula for success would have to be innovative engineering, skilled generalship, and 
determined soldiers. 
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Sherman faced the most difficult logistical challenge because he would need to rely on 
single-track railroads extended over 300 miles, for his sole source of supplies for his 100,000 
men. His goal was to move 130 cars carrying supplies to the front daily. When Colonel McCallum 
arrived in Nashville to head railroad operations he discovered that the fifty locomotives and 537 
cars available were woefully inadequate to meet Sherman’s needs. McCallum estimated that the 
campaign would require 200 locomotives and 3,000 cars along with sophisticated maintenance 
and construction facilities. The line itself would require constant attention because the track, 
according to McCallum, “was laid originally on an unballasted mud road-bed in a very imperfect 
manner, with a light U-rail on wooden stringers, which were badly decayed and caused almost 
daily accidents by spreading apart and letting the engines and cars drop between them.”83   
 McCallum first set about recruiting able assistants: Adna Anderson, superintendent of 
the transportation and maintenance department, and William W. Wright, chief engineer in 
charge of the Construction Corps.  Then with authority from Secretary of War Stanton and 
General Sherman, McCallum made the chain of command clear to both men. Anderson and 
Wright would report directly to McCallum, but in the latter’s absence, they would take orders 
only from Sherman or his corps commanders, McPherson, Schofield, and Thomas.  
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 The organizations established under Anderson and Wright were derived from the 
blueprint Herman Haupt had drawn in the eastern theater in 1862, but they were expanded to 
address the scope and complexity of railroad operations in five states: Mississippi, Alabama, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia. The management structure for Anderson’s transportation 
department consisted of masters of transportation who moved over certain sections of road to 
“see that the employes [sic] attended properly to their duties while out with their trains.” At 
stations a dispatcher made sure locomotives were in good order, the superintendent of repairs 
maintained the roads, and the master machinist managed repairs of locomotives. Each manager 
was independent of each other and reported directly to the general superintendent.84  
 Wright’s Construction Corps was organized into six divisions, and each division was 
made independent and equipped with tools, camp equipage, and field transportation. The 
division was under the command of a civilian engineer and was divided into sections, the largest 
of which was comprised of the track layers and bridge builders. There was a foreman for each 
fifty men (a gang), and a sub-foreman for each ten men (a squad).85  
 Once Anderson and Wright started to build their respective work forces and requisition 
tools from the quartermasters, McCallum turned his attention to finding additional locomotives, 
cars, shops, and machine tools necessary to sustain the planned spring offensive. To add 
gravitas to this endeavor, the secretary of war, on behalf of President Lincoln, wrote to every 
locomotive manufacturer in the country requesting/ordering their assistance. Stanton wrote: “In 
order to meet the wants of the military departments of the Government you will deliver to his 
[McCullum’s] order such engines as he may direct, whether building under orders for other 
parties, or otherwise the Government being accountable to you for the same.” Stanton 
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reminded the railroad presidents that the need to supply the army in Tennessee was urgent, 
and it rendered “the engines indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication, 
and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognized by you as a military necessity, paramount to 
all other considerations.”86 
 The Union government’s approach to the problem of acquiring additional locomotives 
and the private sector’s response to the government’s request stood in stark contrast to how 
private companies in the South had responded to the Confederate government’s needs. In 
places such as Taunton, Massachusetts (Mason Machine Works), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
(Norris Locomotive Works), and Manchester, New Hampshire (Manchester Locomotive Works), 
fifty-three engines and hundreds of cars were built at a startling rate and then driven to 
Nashville.  General Superintendent Anderson ordered under utilized locomotives and cars 
operating around Memphis transferred to the Atlanta operation. In April fifteen engines and 120 
cars were taken from the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and in May, two engines and sixty-eight 
cars were impressed from the Kentucky Central Railroad.87 By June seventy-seven additional 
locomotives and 1,051 cars brought the totals to 124 engines and 1,488 cars available for 
supplying Sherman’s armies. Furthermore, extensive machine and car shops were built at 
Nashville and Chattanooga, the former large enough to hold 100 locomotives and 1,000 cars at 
once.  
 This incredible effort on the part of northern railroad manufacturers and the centralized 
authority of the railroad bureau was the precursor to the efforts made by Boeing aircraft, 
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General Motors, Chrysler, Rheem and Kaiser Corporations, in 1942, to produce rapidly the 
materials necessary for World War II on a smaller scale, railroad companies in 1864 
demonstrated the industrial capacity of the United States even in its infancy.  Moreover, 
whereas American industry in the 1930s had time to prepare for expansion since the war began 
in 1939 and our entry was not until December 1941, and management systems were already in 
place, the situation in 1864 was entirely different. In 1864 the railroad industry was only twenty-
five years old, and the management system for such an elaborate operation was less than two 
years old.  
 So as bacon, pork, salt beef, bread, flour, corn meal, peas, hominy, mixed vegetables, 
coffee, sugar, and vinegar were loaded onto cars each day the Construction Corps repaired, 
maintained, or rebuilt track to carry the supplies that sustained 100,000 men and 50,000 horses.  
To put things in perspective, if Sherman had to depend upon animal drawn wagon trains, he 
would have needed approximately 39,000 wagons and 220,000 horses to haul the supplies 
necessary twenty miles a day. It would have been impossible.88  
 The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, 151 miles long, was Sherman’s main artery. 
About 115 miles of track were re-laid, and sidings were put in at intervals of eight miles.89 Each 
siding built could hold eight car long freight trains. Eventually, nineteen miles of new sidings 
were added to the road, and forty-five new water tanks were built.90  A string of blockhouses 
were also constructed to guard against enemy cavalry and partisan raiders.91 
 Three other railroads would serve as auxiliary lines during the campaign, and in the early 
spring also needed the attention of the Construction Corps and army pioneers. The first was the 
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line between Nashville and Decatur, completed by General Dodge, which connected with the 
Memphis & Charleston east of Stevenson. Next, was the newly built military track running west 
from Nashville to the Tennessee River at Johnsonville. Finally, the East Tennessee and Georgia 
Railroad, from Chattanooga to Knoxville, was opened after the construction corps built the 
Tennessee River bridge at Loudon.92  
 The maintenance of all these single-track lines would determine how quickly Sherman 
could press his offensive against Johnston’s army defending northern Georgia, and ultimately 
the grand prize, Atlanta. By the end of April everything was ready. Quartermaster General Meigs 
reported to Sherman that there was enough food accumulated at Nashville to feed 200,000 
soldiers for four months, and sufficient grain to feed 50,000 animals for the rest of the year.93  
On May 4, 1864, General Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, the center of Sherman’s three-
prong attack, marched out from Ringgold, Georgia prepared to begin the most arduous and 
arguably the most critical campaign of the war.94  
Sherman’s new chief engineer, Captain Orlando Metcalfe Poe, had spent most of his 
time before the campaign restructuring the army’s engineer organization, which he deemed was 
inadequate to meet the demands of 100,000 men moving in three separate armies. Poe was an 
interesting fellow. He graduated sixth in his 1856 West Point class and originally wanted to be 
an artillery officer. He believed that in a system where promotion came through seniority only, 
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his best chance of promotions was in the artillery. He soon learned, however, that artillery 
openings were limited, so the young second lieutenant decided to switch to the topographical 
engineers.  
After his graduation, he worked for three years with then Captain George Meade doing 
survey work in the Great Lakes Region. Meade admired the lieutenant’s determination and 
creativity, and by 1860 Poe completed several projects, which included building nineteen 
weather stations on the five Great Lakes.95 When the war began, Poe served on George 
McClellan’s staff organizing the defenses around Washington, DC, commanded the 2nd Michigan 
Infantry, and he led his regiment at Fair Oaks and Second Bull Run. Unfortunately, Republicans 
did not look upon the apolitical Poe favorably because of his connection with McClellan. 
Consequently, in the spring of 1863 when Poe had been recommended for a brigadier 
generalship of volunteers, Congress never confirmed the appointment. After the Emancipation 
Proclamation and fearing Democratic Party fallout, the Radicals were intent on purging the 
military of political generals who were also strong Democratic voices. Poe was unknowingly 
considered connected with these men because of his association with McClellan.  
So Poe went from being an unconfirmed brigadier general of infantry back to a 
lieutenant of engineers in the Regular army. Yet, his reputation among his fellow officers and 
the men in his command was solid, and soon he was made a captain of engineers for the Army 
of the Ohio. He was serving in this position when Sherman made him chief engineer. 
Poe’s performance throughout the summer of 1864 only confirmed the faith others had 
placed in him. In readjusting the engineer organization, he first took stock of what he had. The 
huge Army of the Cumberland had two field-tested engineer units, the First Michigan Engineers 
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and Mechanics and the First Missouri Engineers. The Michigan boys, after building a magazine in 
Chattanooga seventy by one hundred feet with twenty foot high walls, and a railroad spur to the 
magazine,  were assigned the critical task of building railroad blockhouses to help prevent 
Confederate cavalry and partisan raiders from destroying track and most especially, bridges. The 
blockhouses, designed by Captain William Merrill, chief engineer of the army, with the help of 
Lieutenant Colonel Kinsman Hunton of the Michigan engineers, were two stories high. The first 
story walls were forty inches thick, and the second story, set diagonal to the ground floor, was 
made twenty inches thick for better stability. Each blockhouse could hold a garrison of twenty 
men.96 The First Missouri were currently focused, along with McCallum’s Construction Corps, on 
completing the newly built military railroad running west from Nashville to the wharves on the 
Tennessee River at Johnsonville.97  
Thanks to the efforts of General William Rosecrans the year before, the Army of the 
Cumberland had a regiment of volunteer engineers made up of enlisted men who had served 
with the army’s Pioneer Brigade. These men from the 13th, 21st, and 22nd Michigan Infantry 
regiments, and the 18th Ohio Infantry had worked extensively on building blockhouses, 
operating sawmills, and building field works around Chattanooga. Captain Merrill, who was 
commissioned a colonel, led the First Veteran Volunteer Engineers.98 The army also had a 
pontoon train made of the new Cumberland “hinged” bateau, with additional pontoons and 
equipment held in reserve in Nashville.  
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Colonel George P. Buell and the 58th Indiana Infantry were placed in charge of bridging 
operations. The Indianans, Michiganians, and Ohioans, were typical infantry regiments in the 
Union Army, many of the enlistees had mechanical and carpentry skills acquired before the war. 
With the shortage of engineer troops, these men were transferred to the engineers to perform 
the vital tasks of building roads, bridges, and fortifications critical for the success of Sherman’s 
campaign. Both the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio also faced a shortage of 
engineer troops and they, too, would turn to infantry units for help.99   
The Army of the Tennessee, with the exception of a well established pioneer 
organization and a pontoon bridge train, had no engineer troops so upon Poe’s suggestion, 
Sherman transferred the First Missouri Engineers to the army. Conversely, the Army of the Ohio 
had an Engineer Battalion, which had been established at Chattanooga when Grant was 
planning a move on Knoxville and East Tennessee.100 Poe also had nine regular army engineers 
attached to the various field armies who were responsible for laying out fortifications for 
strategic points, conducting topographical surveys, and reconnoitering the enemy positions.101  
Sherman invaded Georgia in the late spring and summer of 1864 He planned to use a 
series of flanking maneuvers to force Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston to abandoned 
fortified positions and withdraw toward Atlanta. These movements would require maintaining a 
supply line over a tenuous single-track railroad from his advance positions to Chattanooga and 
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Nashville. It would also require crossing more than 100,000 soldiers over three major rivers: the 
Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee.   
The first of Sherman’s flanking movements came in mid-May when the general’s 
engineers determined that enemy forces were stretched across the Western & Atlantic Railroad, 
four miles northwest of Dalton, Georgia, on a north/south axis along Rocky Face Ridge. The 
Confederate commander hoped the Yankees would launch a frontal assault against a strong 
position, but Sherman would not oblige. Instead, he planned to have Thomas and Schofield 
demonstrate against Johnston’s front, while McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee would move 
twenty-five miles southeast through Snake Creek Gap, and occupy the area around Resaca and 
hold the railroad and telegraph. This forced the Confederates to abandon their stronghold on 
Rocky Face Ridge, and move into their defenses north and east of Resaca, north of the 
Oostanaula River.102  
Buell’s pontoon train had covered approximately fifty miles from Chattanooga through 
Snake Creek Gap in about forty-eight hours, and had stopped to eat and rest for no more than 
three hours during this grueling and often up hill march. Now in a valley east of Horn Mountain, 
and west of Resaca, the men of the 58th Indiana had finally halted and started to settle in for a 
longer break when orders arrived to get the pontoons to Lay’s Ferry on the Oostanaula. 
Exhausted and ornery, Buell’s command then spent four hours moving about in dense thickets 
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on unidentified roads until they reached the east bank of Snake Creek, one mile from where it 
flows into the Oostanaula.103  
Sherman had attempted to get around Johnston’s right flank with no success and on 
May 15th decided to gain a lodgment on the eastern bank of the river with the hope of cutting 
off the expected Confederate’s retreat from Resaca. Brigadier General Thomas Sweeny of 
County-Cork, Ireland, and a regular army officer, were selected by McPherson to establish the 
bridgehead. Sweeny’s soldiers described the hot-tempered general as speaking three languages, 
“English, Irish-American, and Profane,” and claimed he was most eloquent in the last.104 Now 
with an infantry escort, Buell’s men assembled the Cumberland pontoon boats and after 
stretching on the canvas covers, paddled them down Snake Creek to the Oostanaula and Lay’s 
Ferry. Eventually, two pontoon bridges were built to accommodate Sweeny’s division, and 
McPherson’s Corps, and allowed these forces to gain the Confederate’s flank. This forced 
Johnston to evacuate his formidable defensive position and move further south toward Atlanta.  
Colonel Buell’s 58th Indiana Infantry, with pontoon train in hand, conducted a similar 
amphibious operation like the one at Lay’s Ferry on July 8th when the regiment launched their 
canvas pontoons filled with infantry, down the Soap Creek into the Chattahoochee River, 
debarked the soldiers to establish a bridgehead, and then Buell’s men threw two pontoon 
bridges over the river so the entire Army of the Ohio could cross. The 58th Indiana then took up 
the pontoon bridge and the Engineer Battalion built a more permanent trestle bridge to replace 
it.105 In his official report Poe noted, “that whenever it was deemed necessary to use a bridge for 
a greater length of time than forty-eight hours the pontoon bridges were invariably replaced by 
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wooden trestle bridges constructed from materials at hand, either by engineer troops or the 
pioneer forces.”106  
One pioneer force that performed admirably throughout the campaign, yet received 
little recognition in Poe’s reports, was that of the Army of the Tennessee under the command of 
Captain William Kossak, an aide-de-camp to Sherman turned engineering officer. Perhaps 
because both Sherman and Grant admired Kossak’s skill and work, and because he was not a 
West Pointer, petty jealousy prevented Poe, or other members of the Corps of Engineers, from 
publically acknowledging Kossak’s efforts. Kossak was born in Prussia and immigrated to the 
United States in 1848. When the war began he joined the 5th Missouri Infantry as a lieutenant, 
and by 1863 he was a member of Sherman’s staff at Vicksburg. Prior to becoming chief engineer 
of the XVII Corps during the early stages of the Atlanta Campaign and an engineer on Sherman’s 
staff, Kossak had demonstrated his ingenuity as an engineer at Vicksburg.107 
During the Vicksburg siege, he took charge of the trenches along Graveyard Road that 
led into the city. Kossak discovered that once his work parties had advanced to within twenty 
feet of the Confederates’ counterscarp, obstructions in front of the sap-roller made “it 
impossible to move the roller one inch without having the party engaged in the moving killed 
outright.”108 He tried moving to the left and right to raise trench cavaliers parallel to the 
enemy’s counterscarp or sloped wall, when again Kossak had to change plans because he 
discovered Confederates digging a mine under his sap. The mine was detonated with little 
effect. Kossak then decided to dig a right oblique tunnel of his own, seventy-sixty feet long, 
which then cut another seventeen feet rising to the surface landing behind a large, heavy log 
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resting across a gully. Then turning ninety degrees, another mine was dug seventy feet toward 
the Confederate parapet. Working day and night underground until Kossak “received orders 
from Major General U. S. Grant to stop all work, the place having surrendered.”109 
Now at Atlanta, Kossak’s pioneers would build seven trestle bridges, each one about 350 
feet long on the Chattahoochee River for Sherman’s wagon trains to cross. The bridges were 
constructed from trees cut from the bank of the river, and five of the bridges were double 
tracked to accept two-way traffic. The efforts were impressive. Although in his report, Poe only 
singled out Captain Reese and lieutenants Wharton and Twining, all West Pointers, his engineer 
and pioneer officers and men, most of whom were volunteers, performed extraordinarily well.  
Poe’s experience with Congress in 1863 might have explained his reluctance to focus his report 
on others and not himself. After the campaign he wrote to his wife Nell, “not even a Congress 
can sever my name from its official connection with them [the history of the Atlanta 
Campaign]”.110   
Poe’s subordinates laid out fifty miles of infantry and artillery parapets, six bridges over 
Peachtree Creek, averaging eighty feet long, five bridges over the Flint River, and numerous 
small bridges and repaired many miles of roads. As Poe’s biographer, Paul Taylor pointed out, 
“Some of this work had even been undertaken at night, once the infantry’s main body had gone 
to sleep. Then the engineer crews would often go to work by moonlight [or torchlight], having 
new bridges built or old ones rebuilt in time for the next day’s march.”111  In addition, Poe’s 
topographers made surveys of all the routes passed by infantry columns, and he drew a map on 
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a scale of four inches to one mile illustrating the siege of Atlanta. In all, 4,000 copies of 
campaign maps were issued to officers to facilitate military operations.112 
Confederate engineers at times performed well, but were plagued by a lack of engineer 
soldiers and in some cases poor planning. For example, most of the defensive positions at places 
such as Hardee’s Salient, the Kennesaw Mountain Line, and the Chattahoochee River Defense 
Line, were all constructed in advance of the Confederate army’s occupation, as was the 
fortifications surrounding the city of Atlanta. The latter, with redans and lunettes, posed a 
formidable obstacle to Sherman’s three armies. Yet in an article written by archaeologist Robert 
J. Fryman in 2001, the author pointed out that although the defenses were carefully designed 
and built in 1863, a critical flaw still existed.  
Using archaeological analysis, old maps, and hand-held GPS units, Fryman discovered 
that the forts themselves were designed to be approximately 1.25 miles from the center of the 
city, and the woods were cleared a distance of one mile from the forts.  In December 1863, 
Colonel J. F. Gilmer, chief of the Confederate Engineer Bureau visited Atlanta and approved 
what he saw.113 The Army of Tennessee’s artillery preferred the accuracy and strength of the 
bronze smoothbore 12-pounder Napoleon field gun, which fired solid shots and shells about 
1,680 yards. As Fryman wrote: “The construction of Atlanta’s defensive perimeter at an average 
distance of 1.25 miles would have provided more than adequate protection for the city’s 
buildings and infrastructure had the opposing Federal forces been armed with identical field 
artillery.”114 They were not. By 1863, Gilmer should have been aware of the capability of the 
Union army’s artillery and planned accordingly. Sherman had weaponry far more powerful than 
the Confederates had expected. 
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Sherman’s three armies used 3-inch ordnance rifle, 10-pounder and 20-pounder Parrott 
rifles, and eight 4.5-inch rifled siege guns, which could fire an average distance of 4,160 yards. 
This meant that during the siege the Federal artillery could bombard Atlanta from distances 
beyond the Confederate defensive lines.115  
The greatest advantage Sherman had, however, during the campaign was the use of the 
railroads. The USMRR maintenance shops in Nashville repaired one hundred locomotives and 
one thousand cars each month. McCallum’s construction teams built a rolling mill in 
Chattanooga, and then rerolled rails for one-third the cost of new rails. His men rebuilt eleven 
bridges and laid seventy-five miles of track during the campaign.116  
Retreating Confederates had burned the bridge across the Oostenaula at Resaca, but in 
W. W. Wright’s Construction Corps was one of Herman Haupt’s master bridge builders E. C. 
Smeed. Smeed was able to repair the bridge in three days, although both Wright and McCallum 
got the credit. It was the same with the construction of the railroad bridge over the Etowah 
River. Smeed and his men arrived at the bridge on June 5th, and the following day started work. 
For three days gangs removed the old structure, and then cut and hauled timber from the 
woods to the bridge site. The Construction Corps built a 600-foot trestle bridge, made up of five 
trestles, sixty-seven feet high. It was a magnificent piece of work, yet the most remarkable 
performance by Smeed and the Construction Corps was still to come.117   
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The railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee had to be 780 feet long and 90 feet high, 
which was almost twice as long as the Potomac Creek bridge Haupt built with Smeed’s 
assistance in 1862. Again using timber cut from the areas’ woods, Smeed used the stone piers 
left standing by the Confederates to form a sturdy foundation.  In four and a half days the bridge 
was finished. Haupt called the building of the Chattahoochee Bridge “the greatest feat of the 
kind that the world has ever seen.”118 The teacher’s effusive praise for his student aside, the 
word of Northern ingenuity and proficiency in bridge building soon traveled overseas and in 
1868 the British Association for the Advancement of Science invited Haupt to attend its meeting 
to describe how these remarkable feats of engineering were constructed.119  
McCallum also deserved credit for the management system he put into place during the 
campaign. With some modifications, the system mirrored the one he designed for the Erie 
Railroad back in 1857. Supplies such as rails, spikes, crossties, and iron were placed at collection 
points along the line, and detachments of men from the Construction Corps, with an ample 
supply of tools, were stationed at certain intervals. McCallum wrote: “Each detachment was 
under the command of a competent engineer or supervisor, who had orders to move in either 
direction, within certain limits, as soon as a break occurred, and make the necessary repairs 
without delay, working day and night when necessary. Under this arrangement small breaks 
were repaired at once, at any point on the line, even when the telegraph wires were cut and 
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special orders could not be communicated to the working parties.”120 When larger breaks 
occurred one or more divisions of the Construction Corps were moved as quickly as possible. 
Sixty-eight days after Sherman’s army marched into Atlanta, the general ordered Poe 
“to take charge of the destruction with engineer troops all railroads and property belonging 
thereto; all storehouses, machine shops, mills, factories, &c, within the lines of the enemy’s 
defenses of Atlanta.”121 The following day, November 8, 1864, Abraham Lincoln was re-elected 
president. As church bells rang with the news of the President’s victory, smokestacks toppled 
and buildings collapsed under the weight of sledgehammers, wielded by Union engineers and 
pioneers in Atlanta.  The engineers heated torn up rails and then with a cant hook at each end 
twisted them around their horizontal axis.122 The objective was to deny the Confederates use of 
the railroad, so it was considered essential to damage the tracks.  Beyond repair.   
Now as Sherman’s juggernaut started for Savannah and Lincoln, with four more years, 
prepared to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, the Confederate Army of Tennessee 
and the Army of Northern Virginia would each make one more desperate attempt to escape the 
grasp of the Union Army and perhaps link up to form a larger army.  Northern engineers had 
clearly proven that there was no place the Confederates could safely hide. No swamp, river, 
mountain, unmarked roadway or wilderness would block the Yankees from getting at their 
enemy.  The end of the war was near at hand.   
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CHAPTER 10 
A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF BRIDGING 
 
If his army goes to hell, it will corduroy the road. 
     General Joseph Johnston, CSA about Sherman’s march through the Carolinas. 
 
 
          When 1865 opened President Lincoln was preparing for his second term, and with 
congressional Republicans planned to convince several Democratic congressmen to vote to 
adopt the Thirteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. Lincoln wanted to make 
emancipation permanent, and he wanted to end the war.  His reelection had signaled that the 
northern public was unwilling to negotiate a settlement with the Confederate government, 
allowing them to co-exist peacefully with the Union.  Fortunately, for the President’s reelection 
prospects, the war had taken a significant turn with Sherman’s capture of Atlanta the previous 
fall, and now the electorate was ready to follow the Lincoln administration to a military victory. 
Everyone felt victory was near and people were euphoric. Sherman’s army was on the move 
through the Carolinas, and Grant’s forces continued to tighten its grip on Lee’s army at 
Petersburg. 
The war, however, was not over and Lincoln understood well that northern hopes could 
turn sour if Union armies in the field were not successful or if Confederate forces under Lee and 
Joseph Johnston somehow managed to link up and operate against Union supply centers and 
garrisons in the south. Lincoln needed his generals, especially Sherman, to pursue Johnston 
tenaciously to prevent the Confederate commander from coming to Lee’s rescue. The swamps 
and tangled forests of central South Carolina and North Carolina, however, were the greatest 
obstacles to Sherman’s movements to trap Johnston.   
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The operation through South Carolina and North Carolina was a massive road and bridge 
building project. It was an amazing effort and was performed by pioneers and engineers during 
what became General William T. Sherman’s Carolina Campaign during the winter of 1865. 
Sherman had three important goals: first, to damage or destroy any manufacturing operations, 
agricultural surplus not consumed by the Union army, and railroad capacity essential to sustain 
the Confederate war making effort. Next, to occupy Columbia, South Carolina and Goldsboro, 
North Carolina and by doing so to render rail traffic and the shipment of supplies blocked from 
the vital coastal ports of Charleston and Wilmington to Johnston and Lee’s armies. Finally, by 
reaching Goldsboro, Sherman would control the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, the critical 
supply link with the Army of Northern Virginia. Sherman’s campaign began on January 30, 1865 
from Pocotaligo, South Carolina, and his forces arrived in Goldsboro on March 24, 1865.   
The engineers carefully had chosen the line of march. During the march from Atlanta to 
Savannah the army followed a parallel line to the large watercourses.  For the Carolina 
Campaign the same concept was applied. The march was chosen near the junction between the 
clay of the uplands with the sand of the lower country, which Colonel Orlando Poe, Sherman’s 
chief engineer, wrote, “may be tolerably well defined by tracing [the] line through the lower 
rapids on each stream we crossed.” This way he hoped the best roads would be used and the 
minimum amount of mud and swamp would need to be crossed.1   
Poe took great pains to organize the engineers and pioneers before the campaign 
began, and he readied the pontoon trains and inventory the tool chests and other equipment 
including a significant number of axes that would be carried by the infantry brigade wagons. The 
left wing of the army consisted of the XIV and XX Corps and the 58th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, 
under command of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Moore, served as the engineer troops. They 
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hauled a pontoon train of eighty-five wagons, which was enough to construct a bridge 1,000 
feet long.2   
The right wing of the army consisted of the XV and XVII Corps and was accompanied by 
the 1st Missouri Volunteer Engineers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William 
Tweeddale. The 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, led by Colonel J. B. Yates were 
unassigned and used as Colonel Poe saw fit.3  The role Poe saw fit to assign the Michigan 
engineers was the destruction of Southern railroads. Poe instructed generals on how their men 
were to destroy the rails. The infantry would tear up the railroad and lift the iron laying it across 
piles of burning ties.  Following behind them, the engineers would carefully lift the red-hot rails 
and twist them until effectively destroyed.4  
The area Sherman’s army needed to move through presented unique problems for his 
engineers and pioneers. For example, the natives regarded the Big Salkehatchie River and its 
adjoining swamplands near the tiny communities of Allendale, South Carolina to the south, and 
Barnwell, South Carolina to the west, as impassable for troops.  For the men of Captain George 
L. Searle’s Pioneer Corps attached to Union General O. O. Howard’s XVII Corps, the swamps 
were just places of cold, wet, misery. The pioneers and infantry detachments had bridged the 
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Savannah River, the Coosawhatchie and Whippy swamps, and now on February 3, 1865, their 
task was to get the XVII Corps over another river and through a swamp their commanding 
officer described as “indescribably ugly.”5  
 General Sherman wanted to cut the South Carolina Railroad that linked Charleston to 
Augusta, and the Big Salkehatchie River was in the way of accomplishing this objective. Joe 
Johnston’s Confederates understood the importance of blocking the determined Yankees, and 
consequently, had formed a battle line on the east bank of the river. The lead elements of Major 
General Joseph Mower’s 1st Division had been directed to cross on Rivers’ Bridge, but the 
enemy, dug in along a narrow causeway on higher ground, were waiting to greet Mower’s men 
with an array of led and iron projectiles that would, they hoped, send the invaders to their 
almighty reward.  
 The environment was as much an enemy to the bluecoats as were the Confederate 
soldiers trying to kill them. The winter weather was brutal. Orlando Poe noted how “water froze 
in a tin cup almost instantly,” and that it was “very imprudent to put water on the hair when 
washing for it froze before one was even aware of it.”6 In addition, even when the temperature 
crept above thirty-two degrees, the frequent rains and chronic marshlands kept hands arthritic 
and feet in wet, unsanitary, cold conditions. Soldiers would notice their feet blister and develop 
open sores.  If they were unlucky gangrene would set in. Warm and dry were the solutions to 
some of the men’s foot problems, but there was none of that around the Big Salkehatchie.  
 The swamp itself was eerie, dank, and wild. Shooting up from the mucky soil was a 
mixture of tall bald cypress, water tupelo, and green ash trees. Cypress knees surrounded the 
base of the bald cypress. These knees were stumps or woody projections that looked like 
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stalactites. Vegetation in the swamp included saw grass, cattails, and pickerelweed.  Alligators 
and cottonmouth snakes, normally very active in the warmer weather, were in a state of torpor 
among the tangle of trees roots, shrubs. The cold weather had slowed their metabolism, but 
they would strike if disturbed.  
 The swamp covered approximately a mile in width on the western side of the river and 
another half mile on the eastern bank. The Confederates had built rifle pits and two redoubts 
for artillery on elevated ground just beyond the swamp on the eastern side. Since the artillery 
commanded the bridge and the narrow causeway leading out of the swamp, a Union frontal 
assault was out of the question. The river leaked a number of tiny streams, and because of the 
heavy freezing rains and occasional snow, the ground was roofed with one to eight inches of icy 
cold water. Mower’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Charles Christensen, had swum the river on the 
night of February 2nd to determine where the best place was to build a road and bridge in order 
to bypass the Confederate defenses and exit the dreary swamp. He was almost captured by 
Southern pickets, but dove back into the river and swam the fifty yards back to Union lines.7  
 On the morning of the 3rd, under harassment from Confederate artillery, the pioneers 
began constructing a series of raised roadways through the swamp, both above and below 
Rivers’ Bridge. Men from the 25th Wisconsin and 63rd Ohio cut trees and gathered planks from 
nearby houses and barns to use both for corduroying and bridging the Big Salkehatchie River in 
three places in order to move the entire brigade across the river as quickly as possible. As a 
diversion, Mower ordered the 43rd Ohio over the Rivers’ Bridge and up the causeway, while two 
other brigades moved over roadways and bridges built by the pioneers. By late in the day a 
lodgment was gained on the eastern bank of the river, and consequently, with the Union threat 
of flanking the Confederate’s entrenched positions, the latter evacuated their line and 
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disappeared northeast. Mower wrote in his official report, “Captain Searle and his pioneers 
were for two days and nights in the water constructing roads, and at the conclusion of their 
labor were well-nigh exhausted.”8  
 The following day at Buford’s Bridge, just five miles north of Rivers’ Bridge, pioneers 
from the XV Corps built twenty-two bridges scattered over a mile of swampland, and by early 
evening had also built a corduroyed road through the swamp. Corduroy roads had been built for 
centuries, and in the United States frontiersmen found them significantly helpful in aiding the 
movement of wagon trains and settlers over difficult terrain. This knowledge of road building, 
however, did not make the job any easier. For fourteen hours men felled trees, hauled lumber, 
hammered log piers into the ground, and in some cases dug drainage ditches under the roads. 
All of this was done while standing in water sometimes as high as four feet. Furthermore, the 
pioneers had to remain in the frosty swamp while the corps passed in order to repair shifting 
logs, which made the roadway hazardous to wagons and dangerous to horses.  
 Roads were not all level with the ground and none were hard. Pioneers had to build 
roads that were able to limit sliding logs and withstand heavy traffic, but they required 
considerable time to construct. The men would lay longitudinal support timbers on either side 
of the road, and notch the timbers so that the transverse logs could be fitted into the supports. 
The logs would be tied into place, and a second longitudinal support was laid and tied on either 
side across the top of the transverse logs. These log mats would need to be anchored when the 
road was under water.9 It was an amazing effort, and the example of the work done at both 
Rivers’ and Buford’s Bridge was only a part of the extraordinary performance of pioneers and 
engineers during the campaign. 
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After the action around the Big Salkehatchie River, the army continued north and the 
engineers and pioneers continued to labor in the swamps and thickets, exceedingly cold, wet, 
tired, sick, and sore.  Poe, in his official report, made the operations appeared routine. He 
described the army’s movement between February 9th and February 18th as follows: “During the 
night of the 9th a pontoon bridge was thrown at Binnaker’s, and the enemy driven away from 
the position he had taken to dispute crossing. Another pontoon bridge was thrown at Holman’s, 
and all our force was across by the evening of the 11th…. The enemy opposed the crossing of the 
North Fork of the Edisto River, but, as usual, he was driven away and three pontoon bridges 
built…. A pontoon bridge was built at the Saluda River bridge [February 16th], near a factory, and 
a portion of the Fifteenth Corps crossed during the night. The Left Wing pontoon bridge was 
built over the Saluda at Zion Church, nine and one-half miles above Columbia, and some force 
crossed. On the 17th a pontoon bridge was built just above the ruins of the former bridge over 
Broad River, three miles above Columbia…. On the 18th the Left Wing crossed the Broad River on 
a pontoon bridge thrown at the mouth of Wateree Creek, near Freshly’s Mills….”10  
 Yet, although Poe made the work of the pioneers and engineers appear routine, there 
was nothing routine about it. Colonel Moore’s description of the 58th Indiana’s crossing of the 
Catawba River beginning on February 22nd was anything but practiced. His men had constructed 
a 660-foot pontoon bridge across the river during the night. Yet, the following day the skies 
opened up with a cold torrential rain, and over the next two days as XX Corps and cavalrymen 
crossed the bridge, three problems made the march over the Catawba increasingly dangerous. 
First, the steep hill on the opposite bank of the river had turned into an almost impassably 
muddy egress from the bridge. Second, the river rose, and finally the current became rapid. 
Moore had to place heavy timbers on the lower ends of the pontoons to prevent them from 
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sinking or filling with water. At midnight on the 26th a 400-foot section of the span broke loose 
and washed away.11  
Moore’s men quickly used a cable tied to trees on both sides of the river, and using the 
pontoon as a raft, moved over the rapidly running water holding tightly to the cable. They 
collected the remaining pontoons, floated them to the western bank of the river, and hauled 
them out of the water. It was still raining hard. Then with the pontoons from the original bridge, 
and those that remained on the wagons, the volunteer engineers moved downriver about 500 
yards and prepared to assemble another bridge. This operation was suspended until they 
received further orders.  
The following day the weather improved, so moving once again to a spot on the river 
where the current was less swift, the 58th constructed a pontoon bridge 680 feet in length, and 
by February 28th the rest of the right wing crossed. Moore then ordered his exhausted men to 
take up the bridge, and join the march to Haile’s Ferry on the Great Pedee River, reaching there 
five days later.12  
It was close to midnight when Moore’s men arrived on the banks of the Great Pedee 
River, and as soon as the soldiers finished unloading the pontoons, balk, and chess, several men 
rowed to the opposite bank of the river to gather a measurement. The river was 920-feet wide, 
and the engineers had only 820 feet of pontoons and 460-feet of balk and chess. Furthermore, 
Colonel Moore was now incapacitated with rheumatism, and the regimental commander, 
Colonel Buell, was in charge of the operation.13 Buell ordered the men to begin construction on 
a trestle bridge for the last 100 feet.  The pioneers worked the entire day and night of March 6th, 
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cutting trees then trimming them to the proper length, framing the trestle section of the bridge, 
and then placing it in the water. Anchoring the first trestle was not difficult, but driving in the 
legs of the other trestles became a huge problem because of the river’s current. The pioneers 
had to determine the proper length of the legs by first using a pole to measure the depth of the 
water, then a pontoon was brought alongside the first trestle placed, two balks were laid from 
the bridge, and the next trestle was laid on the balks. Pioneers moved the pontoon to the next 
spot for placing the trestle and the latter was righted into the water.14 The legs were driven into 
the river’s floor, and the process was repeated. 
The current was fastest in the middle of the river where the engineers hoped to use the 
pontoons. It took all morning on March 7th, however, to get the upstream anchors to hold. 
Finally, at 3 pm the bridge was completed and the men of the XIV and XX Corps started to cross.  
On March 8th a detachment of the 58th Indiana took up the bridge, and then marched twenty 
miles toward Fayetteville. Since February 23rd when a 400-foot span of bridge broke loose in the 
Catawaba River to their arrival in Fayetteville, the 58th Indiana had been constantly at work or 
on the march. 
Hundreds of privates from infantry regiments now had joined the pioneers and 
engineers in corduroying roads and building bridges. A private wrote in his diary, “Our whole 
division was put to work with engineers…. It was not a pleasant job in our wet clothes with 
water up to our knees but we had the work done….”15 Sixteen days, four pontoon bridges, and 
endless corduroyed roads later, all of Sherman’s army walked into Goldsboro, North Carolina.  
The army was exhausted and needed all kinds of supplies. In addition to essential items 
such as clean dry clothes, new shoes, and good food, the engineers required new canvas 
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pontoon covers. The Cumberland pontoon had held up well, but the covers, which had been in 
water almost every day for sixty days, were torn, mildewed, and rotting.16  
Colonel Poe estimated that during the Carolina Campaign, engineers, pioneers, and 
infantry had built 400 miles of corduroyed roads, and many with the absence of fence rails, 
which when found, made road construction less tedious. The First Missouri Engineers had built 
for the right wing of the army, fifteen pontoon bridges, estimated to have an aggregate length 
of 3,720 feet. The 58th Indiana constructed about 4,000 feet of bridging. The XVII Corps pioneers 
kept their own records of the immense worked they performed, which augmented Poe’s report, 
and pointed to the mechanical ability many Union soldiers possessed. General Mower’s First 
Division built 13,135 yards of corduroyed roads, 133 yards of bridges, and six artillery batteries.  
Major General Mortimer Dormer Leggett’s Third Division constructed 24,753 yards of roadway, 
and 303 yards of bridges, while Major General Giles Alexander Smith’s Fourth Division built 
32,975 yards of roads and 439 yards of bridges.17  
The Carolina Campaign broke the last major supply chain of the Confederacy, and the 
speed with which Sherman’s army moved through the mud and swamps of central South 
Carolina and eastern North Carolina prevented southern General Joseph Johnston from coming 
to the assistance of Robert E. Lee. Within one month, on April 26, 1865, Johnston would 
surrender his army to Sherman near Durham, North Carolina. Johnston would remark, “When I 
learned that Sherman’s army was marching through the Salk swamps, making its own corduroy 
roads at the rate of a dozen miles a day and more, I made up my mind that there had been no 
such army in existence since the days of Julius Caesar.”18  
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The campaign was a remarkable achievement. Poe’s staff, which included Amos 
Stickney, William Ludlow, and Chauncey Reese were West Point trained engineers, and they 
deserved credit for the proper execution of orders. The work building corduroy roads in the 
swamps, however, required improvisation, skill with an axe, saw, and hammer, and the ability to 
work out problems in brutal conditions.  The First Missouri, the First Michigan Engineers and 
Mechanics, the Fifty-eighth Indiana Infantry, and about six thousand men who served as 
pioneers in the army did this work. These men were not West Point trained, but rather had 
learned their skills before the war in the mechanics’ shops, mills, railroad and boat yards, and 
farms in the North. By 1865 Union engineers could take the army anywhere their generals 
wanted to go over the vast and varied terrain of the Confederacy.  
In the eastern theater during the winter and early spring of 1865 the engineers were 
also hard at work against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, hoping to bring the 
American Civil War in Virginia to a close. 
 Grant had every intention of stretching Lee’s lines as far as possible, around Richmond 
and Petersburg. This not only included an extensive flanking movement southwest of 
Petersburg, but also maintaining pressure on the northeastern defensives near Dutch Gap Canal 
in the area of the Bermuda Hundred.19 Union supply distribution in this northeastern sector had 
used a pontoon bridge, built in September, but by December, freshets, floating ice, and 
driftwood in the river made passage over the pontoon bridge dangerous.  
Therefore, in order to continue to bring quartermaster stores and ordnance into this 
area planning began for a permanent pile bridge. Grant’s strategy was to extend Lee’s lines 
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southwest of Petersburg, but to do so effectively, he needed to prevent Lee from acquiring 
reinforcements by shifting men from the northeastern sector to the southwestern one. The 
northeastern sector had to remain active, and consequently, it required a significant amount of 
supplies. The pile bridge was essential and troops from the 1st New York Volunteer Engineers 
began milling timber cut from the surrounding forests for it. On January 5th, Lieutenant William 
R. King, Corps of Engineers, and pioneers under the command of Captain James W. Lyon, 4th 
Rhode Island Infantry, began work on the bridge.20  
The weather was erratic, and this caused delays. Private John H. Westervelt recorded in 
his diary entry for January 10th: “This is decidedly the wettest day I ever saw. All that I can see of 
Virginia is afloat.” The 16th he described as beautiful and warm and then the next day it snowed. 
Five days later he wrote: “This morning it rains and the earth here is covered with a complete 
glade of ice. The day was one continual deluge but the earth was so completely coated that the 
water ran off as fast as it fell.”21  
These were difficult conditions in which to build a 1,350-foot long bridge with piles 
averaging forty feet long. Furthermore, because the main channel was twenty-five feet deep the 
piles there had to be 150 feet long. Each pier consisted of three piles driven into the riverbed 
and connected by a cap piece, and the piers were joined together to form bays fifteen feet wide. 
To form icebreakers, an inclined brace was attached to the piles at one end, and the other end 
was chained to a new pile ready to be driven into the riverbed. The new pile was sawed nearly 
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through just above the chain so once it was driven into the bed the pile could be broken off 
beneath the surface.22  
On the left flank of Grant’s army the engineers were also called upon to build bridges 
and roads intended to aid in the extension of the Federal line west, in order to force General Lee 
to stretch his already thinly held defensive positions even further.  Major M. Van Brocklin had 
taken four companies of the 50th New York engineers along the Vaughan Road to Hatcher’s Run 
just ten miles east of Five Forks to build a pontoon bridge and log bridge for the passage of army 
supply trains. The engineers then began to construct a permanent corduroy road from Hatcher’s 
Run to Fort Siebert with the assistance of 2,000 men from the Second Corps and 2,000 men 
from the Fifth Corps.  By the middle of February the work was completed and Van Brocklin was 
making a reconnaissance for an extension of the U. S. Military Railroad to Hatcher’s Run.23  
Raw, damp, miserable weather throughout February and March continued to beleaguer 
the army’s flanking movement west and on result of heavy rains was that Van Brocklin’s log 
bridge over Hatcher’s Run was washed away. So on March 15th the engineers completed a 
bridge over Hatcher’s Run 285 feet long, supported by eleven cribs each sixteen feet long, six 
feet wide, and from two to six feet high. The new roadway of the bridge consisted of two tracks, 
each eight feet wide, separated by median strip nailed to the flooring.  The rain had also 
damaged parts of the Vaughan Road, and consequently time was spent making the necessary 
repairs there.24  
Ten days later, 100 miles to the north near the point where the Confederate left flank 
rested on the Appomattox River, Confederate General John Brown Gordon, launched a surprise 
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attack of the Union line at Fort Stedman, Petersburg. After the initial breakthrough, a Federal 
counterattack drove the Southerners back to within their own lines, and signaled to an 
observant General Grant that this was Lee’s last effort to take back the initiative before 
evacuating Petersburg.25  
In response, Grant wanted to move as quickly as possible to collapse the Confederate 
right flank and roll up Lee’s army before the Virginian’s army escaped, and began his race to link 
up with General Joseph Johnston’s men, at this time in North Carolina. Consequently, the 
engineers work along the Vaughan Road and at Hatcher’s Run allowed General Warren’s V 
Corps to advance north, occupying ground on an east/west axis in Confederate General A. P. 
Hill’s front. Major General Edward O. C. Ord’s, Army of the James, then filled in between Warren 
on his left and the entrenched VI Corps of the Army of the Potomac on his right.26  
Between March 30th and April 3rd, the engineers of the 1st New York, attached to Ord’s 
army, the 50th New York, and the Engineer Battalion, skillfully and swiftly repaired roads and 
built bridges, which enabled Union infantry and cavalry to deliver a coordinated strike against 
southern forces, and brought on the final chase to Appomattox Court House and Lee’s 
surrender. Colonel Spaulding arrived at Hatcher’s Run late in the afternoon on March 30th and 
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found that persistent rain had raised the water in the stream to where it was overflowing its 
banks making the approach to the log bridge unserviceable. Working until midnight, and 
resuming at 4:00am, some companies labored to repair washed out roads, while other 
companies raised the abutments of the pontoon bridge about four feet, and built a corduroy 
bridge 100 yards long over the flooded road to the small rise that ran to the south end of the 
bridge crossing the stream.27 
With incessant rain turning the soil into sludge the 50th New York continued carving out 
a path for soldiers and the troop trains. Spaulding wrote, “During the 1st and 2nd of April my 
whole command was…engaged in building a double corduroy track on the Vaughan road [sic] 
from the old stage road to Hatcher’s Run. During the whole of this time Major Van Brocklin had 
a pontoon bridge [different from the one next to the log bridge] over Hatcher’s Run near W. 
Perkins house, and also one over Gravelly Run, near the Friends’ Meeting House. He was 
ordered to keep these bridges in use until the whole of the trains on the route of the old stage 
road had passed.”28 
The Engineer Battalion maintained the roads beyond Hatcher’s Run to assure that 
General Sheridan’s sweeping flank movement toward Five Forks was successful. It was. On April 
1st, Sheridan and Warren combined forces to overwhelm Pickett, and immediately orders were 
issued along the entire western sector of the Union army to move forward. Spaulding moved his 
command and pontoon trains along the Boydton Plank Road, the River Road, and Cox’s Road, 
toward Burkeville. They repaired old roads and cut new roads for the movement of the V 
Corps.29  
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Meanwhile, the 1st New York engineers marched ahead of the Army of the James 
parallel to the South Side Railroad also repairing roads and bridges. Other engineer troops were 
kept just as busy. In the city of Petersburg, General Benham ordered the 15th New York 
Volunteer Engineers to repair and reopen three bridges damaged by the Confederates in their 
evacuation. Under the command of Colonel Brainerd, his men entirely rebuilt one bridge, 
repaired the railroad bridge, and threw a pontoon bridge across the Appomattox, eliciting high 
praise from Benham.  In the city of Richmond, a detachment of the 1st New York constructed a 
2,400-foot pontoon bridge across the James River to connect Manchester with Richmond.30 
During the momentous days of April 4 to April 9, 1865, it was General Ord’s 1st New York 
engineers, the vanguard of his Army of the James who first arrived at the Appomattox River at 
Farmville, Virginia, on April 7th.  The engineers left from the vicinity of Five Forks on April 3rd and 
had hauled their pontoon train over sixty miles in four days, at one point passing through the 
village of Blacks & Whites.31 Just the day before, the Army of the Potomac’s Second, Fifth, and 
Sixth corps pressing toward Sailor’s Creek, which meandered just about two miles to the east of 
High Bridge and four miles east of Farmville, managed to cut off one quarter of Lee’s army from 
their escape route over High Bridge.  Sheridan’s cavalry had blocked the Confederate’s access to 
the bridge, and Union infantry and artillery working in conjunction with cavalry delivered a 
devastating defeat to an already depleted Army of Northern Virginia. Almost 8,000 Southerners 
were captured including nine generals.32 
Now the 1st New York was ordered to throw a bridge over the Appomattox River at 
Farmville. Colonel Peter S. Michie, chief engineer, Army of the James wrote, “The pontoon train 
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of our army having been well kept up to the front, notwithstanding its overloaded condition, 
was fortunately able to pass over the artillery and train of the Sixth and Second Army Corps and 
enable them to follow in rapid pursuit of the enemy that night.”33 General Sheridan telegraphed 
Grant to say that with the Sixth and Second Corps on Lee’s heels, if Sheridan and the lead 
elements of the Army of the James could press ahead to the vicinity of Appomattox Court 
House, Union troops might surround the Army of Northern Virginia forcing Lee to surrender. 
President Lincoln had seen Sheridan’s correspondence with Grant. Now Lincoln telegraphed 
Grant on April 7th at 11:00am: “General Sheridan says, “”If the thing is pressed I think that Lee 
will surrender.”” Let the thing be pressed.”34  
The final months of fighting for the Army of Northern Virginia in March and April 1865 
were indicative of the difficulties southern armies had in engineering operations. On April 2nd 
and 3rd, the Army of Northern Virginia evacuated the city of Petersburg and started marching 
west toward Danville and the railroad there, hoping to find supplies for Lee’s starving men and 
horses. Colonel Talcott, in advance of Lee’s escape from Petersburg, had ordered Captain G. W. 
Robertson of the 1st Engineer Regiment, to examine the crossings of the following: the Staunton 
River above the railroad, Moseley’s Ferry to Russell’s Ferry, eight miles above Clarksville, and 
South Boston on the Dan River.35  These places would need to be bridged for the army to get to 
their waiting supplies.  
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Robertson managed to throw a pontoon bridge across the Staunton River near the 
railroad bridge on March 30th. The following day, however, freshets from the recent downpours, 
exploded down the river and tore away six bateaux, one-third of his chesses, half of the balks, 
and a quarter of the anchors. Robertson acted quickly. He ordered his men to salvage what they 
could of the bridge, and the captain sent off a message to Major Grandy, quartermaster in 
charge of river transportation, asking for additional pontoons and lumber.36  
The response to Robertson’s plea came six days later, when Grandy’s assistant informed 
the captain that the major was not available, and furthermore, he had no orders to allow the 
engineer troops the use of the pontoons! This response, moreover, was not the only 
questionable occurrence involving the engineers. Because Lee found his southwestern line of 
march blocked by Union cavalry and the high water around Bevil’s Bridge, he immediately 
redirected his columns to march north to Goode’s Bridge where his entire Petersburg force 
would cross the Appomattox River. Lee inquired into the whereabouts of a pontoon bridge he 
had ordered shipped to Genito, fifteen miles north of Goode’s Bridge. It turned out that some 
bureaucrat had appropriated the pontoons so he could float himself and his personal property 
up the James River. Therefore, with one bridge inaccessible due to high water, and one bridge 
purloined, Lee ordered the engineers to plank over the railroad bridge at Mattoax. Once across, 
both the railroad, and for some unexplained reason, the pontoon bridges were destroyed.37 
Now the Army of Northern Virginia moved west toward Farmville with the hopes of 
crossing the Appomattox over High Bridge. With a head start and perhaps some luck, Lee hoped 
to beat the Union army to the South Side Railroad somewhere west of Appomattox Court 
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House, gather supplies, and move on to Lynchburg, and then a link-up south with Johnston’s 
army. This was the only possible route left. Taking the roads north, away from Grant’s line of 
march was an option, but eventually by moving north Lee’s army would need to cross the James 
River. He had no pontoons with him to make the crossing.38  
When the army reached High Bridge on April 6th it immediately began to cross the two 
thousand four hundred foot span. The river at the bridge was only one hundred feet wide, but a 
wide and steep valley on either side of the river required that the structure be built to such 
length.  The height of the bridge varied from sixty feet, at the abutment, to one hundred 
twenty-five feet near the river. Twenty-one brick piers on stone bases supported the South Side 
railroad bridge, and the trestles were made of pine with a tar coating. Just below the 
superstructure was a wagon bridge, which made it easy for horses and artillery pieces to cross.39  
On the following morning, April 7th, after Lee’s army had crossed, Confederate soldiers 
prepared to burn the bridge. Then from almost nowhere the 19th Maine Infantry appeared, and 
rushed the wagon bridge. As some Mainers used their bayonets to toss the lighted hay bales 
into the water, others crossed and established a skirmish line with both flanks anchored on the 
river. The upper bridge caught fire more readily, and Confederate engineers from Company G 
fought furiously to keep the Yankees off the bridge. Some portion of High Bridge was damaged, 
but the lower bridge was unharmed. Consequently, the slight distance Lee believed he had 
placed between his army and that of the pursuing Federals was gone because his men had failed 
to destroy both bridges. That afternoon Grant wrote a brief note to Lee: “The results of the last 
week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of 
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself 
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the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion 
of the Confederate State’s army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.”40 
The bridge had not been burned sooner due to a lack of flexibility and initiative. Colonel 
Talcott and his engineer troops were prepared to fire the bridge as soon as they received the 
order from their infantry commander, General William Mahone. The general, a railroad engineer 
before the war, more than likely, rode off with his rear guard without giving the order, or 
assumed the engineers would proceed without his express permission. Either way, it was a 
costly miscommunication, and it demonstrated little initiative on Talcott’s part. When Lee 
learned what had happened he lost his temper. A staff member observed, “He spoke of the 
blunder with a warmth and impatience which served to show how great a repression he 
ordinarily exercised over his feelings.”41 
Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia to General Grant on April 9, 1865. It was 
only fitting that in one of the final acts of the war an engineer played a central role. After Grant 
had written out the surrender document in pencil and Lee both read and approved it, Grant 
turned the paper over to Assistant Adjutant General Theodore Bowers requesting he make a fair 
copy in ink. Bowers, feeling the solemnity of the proceedings and overcome by the weight of the 
historical moment, made several flawed attempts to copy Grant’s surrender document to Lee. 
Frustrated and nervous, Bowers turned the responsibility over to another member of Grant’s 
staff, General Ely Samuel Parker.42  
Parker was a Seneca Indian chief, and after graduating from Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute as a civil engineer, he worked on the Erie Canal and engineering projects in Illinois, 
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where he meet Grant. When the war broke out he asked to join the army as a Union engineer, 
but Secretary of War Simon Cameron told him he could not because he was Indian.43 He 
contacted Grant, who needed engineers, and he assigned Parker to Brigadier General John 
Eugene Smith. Parker served throughout the Vicksburg Campaign as an engineer before joining 
Grant’s staff.   
Now the engineer made a handsome clean copy of the surrender document, which both 
Grant and Lee signed.  The war in the east was over. 
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CHAPTER 11 
“THE BRIDGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FINISHED LONG AGO.” 
 
                                     Honor and shame from no Condition rise; 
                                     Act well your part, there all the honor lies. 
                                                                           Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man 
 
The day after Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union General Ulysses 
S. Grant Lee wrote his Farewell Address: “After four years of arduous service, marked by 
unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield 
to overwhelming numbers and resources.”1 Beginning in the winter of 1862-1863, when Lee’s 
army went hungry and it became increasingly difficult to replace soldiers lost to capture, 
wounds, or death, the southern army fought a losing battle against declining resources, which 
gnawed away at their ability to sustain the fight. The lack of food, clothing, footwear, medical 
supplies, and manpower made conditions brutal. In the final days of the war, Lee believed and 
wanted everyone else to believe that overwhelming resources had crushed the Confederate 
army.  
On paper the North did have overwhelming resources. At the start of the war twenty-
two million Americans lived in the North, and only nine million lived in the South including 3.5 to 
4 million African American slaves who would never support the Confederacy. The North was the 
manufacturing center of the country, and as such, had a monopoly on industry, iron, textiles, 
machine shops, railroad and shipyards. The Northern railroad system was three times the size of 
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the South’s, which directly contributed to the flow of supplies from farmers in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, and factories in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, to army depots in Philadelphia, 
Boston, New York, Louisville, and Cincinnati.  These resource advantages were especially 
prevalent when it came to manpower on the battlefield. In reviewing the ten costliest battles of 
the Civil War, in all but one—Chickamauga—the North outmanned the South.2 Furthermore, 
during the Peninsula, Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Carolina campaigns the South was outnumbered.  
As historian Richard N. Current posited in the 1960s, and what has become the most common 
explanation of why the South lost the Civil War, it was overwhelming resources.  
Yet, the overwhelming resources argument alone did not account for northern victory. 
First, delivering these abundant supplies to the forward areas of advancing Union armies 
presented a unique challenge. It was one made particularly problematic by the great advantage 
the South had in fighting on home soil, in the number of civilians the South had acting as scouts 
and spies, and in the operation of guerilla bands wreaking havoc on Union supply lines. 
Furthermore, two other Confederate advantages neutralized the North’s considerable 
resources: tactical warfare in the mid-nineteenth century and terrain. 
Soldiers carried muzzle-loading rifles into combat with an effective range of 150 to 200 
yards. Generally, a soldier could fire three shots in a minute, discounting the panic and terror 
that would come from being shot at by an enemy intent on killing you. Therefore, as regiments 
attacked and attempted to close upon the opponent, the attackers firepower was diminished as 
they ran forward toward the enemy’s lines. Consequently, for those on the defensive their 
advantage was significant. Standing or kneeling behind barricades provided the soldier with a 
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greater chance of firing and reloading quickly, getting off several shots before the enemy was 
close enough to use their bayonets. Artillery canister and grapeshot also played havoc with the 
attackers. As a result, to attack successfully required overwhelming numbers of men at the point 
of attack, which meant you needed at least three times the number of men to drive the enemy 
from a well-defended position. In addition, defenders had the advantage of hastily moving men 
from one place in the defensive line to the point under attack. Operating on internal lines of 
communication this gave the defender another distinct advantage over the attacker.    Southern 
forces had fewer soldiers than their northern enemy, but they had the tactical and strategic 
benefit of defending ground of their own choosing to defend and of moving men and material 
on more direct and shorter internal lines.  
In addition to the strategic and tactical advantage the South had, the terrain, which had 
to be overcome and tamed by Northern troops as they extended into Southern territory, was 
vast. The eleven seceding states formed an area of approximately 750,000 square miles. There 
was no central road system and Southern railroads, built hastily and engineered as cheaply as 
possible offered no help to the invading armies.3  The Appalachian Mountains, the lowlands and 
swamps in North Carolina and South Carolina, the Mississippi flood plain, the Cumberland, 
Tennessee, and Mississippi Rivers, and the myriad of lakes, streams, and small rivers, and dense 
forests provide fierce natural obstacles to the North’s strategic planning.  
With strategic, tactical, and terrain advantages in mind, many southerners after the war 
rejected the overwhelming resources theory (yet accepted the noble experiment theory) in an 
attempt to explain why the South lost.  General P. G. T. Beauregard claimed that, “no people 
ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederates; and if, as a 
military question they must have failed, then no country must aim at freedom by means of war.” 
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He continued, “The South would be open to discredit as a people if its failure could not be 
explained otherwise than by mere material conquest.”  Beauregard, no admirer of Jefferson 
Davis, blamed flawed strategy and the president’s lack of leadership for Confederate defeat.4 
Flawed strategy arguments were difficult to prove. Beauregard, Joseph Johnston, and 
Braxton Bragg represented a western bloc of generals who had, throughout the war, insisted on 
focusing manpower resources in the western theater, much to the disapproval of Lee in the 
eastern theater. Davis was in the middle. He did not want to alienate either side, and for the 
most part, supported General Lee’s suggestions. Davis’s favoritism toward the eastern theater 
certainly had an impact on military operations in the west, but did not result in the 
Confederacy’s military failure.  
Some southerners blamed President Jefferson for defeat. The argument went that the 
Confederacy collapsed because Davis was unable to see beyond the South’s states’ rights 
dogma, and he failed to manage Congress and state governors in a more courageous fashion. 
For example, as historian David M. Potter pointed out, the Confederate Congress adopted an 
economic policy, which Davis supported, that lacked the central controls necessary to sustain 
the war effort financially. The embargo on cotton, the failure to pass a national tax to curb 
inflation, and the impressment of goods and services placed the South on financial quicksand. 
These policies drained Southern bank accounts, and brought suffering and starvation to millions 
of Confederate civilians. Defeats on the battlefields and hardships at home eventually weakened 
the South’s will to fight.  
Davis’s adherence to states’ rights policies by not insisting on a national tax, his 
decentralized command structure, his failure to nationalize the railroads, and his inability to 
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persuade state governors such as Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, to adopt a more unified 
view of sharing resources and services throughout the entire Confederacy, might just have led 
to the South’s breakdown.  
Yet, although Davis lacked diplomatic or political skills, and bickering generals, flawed 
economic policies, and declining morale have been the focus of historians’ inquiries as to why 
the South lost the Civil War, these explanations appear inadequate. Even though Davis’s 
leadership skills compared unfavorably to Lincoln’s, even though a poor fiscal and monetary 
policy, limited resources, poor economic policies, suffering on the home front, and the lack of a 
military grand strategy hindered the Confederacy, the South still had an opportunity to win its 
independence. 
Certainly in 1863 after Gettysburg and Vicksburg it seemed unlikely that the 
Confederates would enjoy their own Cannae, Agincourt, or Rorke’s Drift, but there still remained 
the possibility that the South could force the Union to the bargaining table, and with a war 
weary northern citizenry, and pressure from the Democratic Party, gain their independence. 
Therefore, the question to ask is up to what point in the war did southern independence remain 
possible? Why after this point was southern independence impossible?  How should historians 
assess the years of fighting leading up to this critical breaking point?  
In November 1864, when Abraham Lincoln was elected president for a second term, 
defeating the Democratic candidate George McClellan, who ran on a platform that left open the 
possibility of a negotiated peace, the hopes of the Confederacy vanished. Lincoln had promised 
to prosecute the war until the Confederacy collapsed and the Union was restored. Now 
Confederate morale fell precipitously, desertions in the army soared, and the economy with 
three hundred percent inflation was on the verge of collapse.  
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The Confederacy’s hopes had rested on the outcome of the North’s November election, 
and for sometime it had looked as if McClellan and the Peace Democrats would win. The war 
had dragged on for four long, brutal, and heartbreaking years, and although Union armies had 
achieved some success, the northern public and press perceived the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, 
and Spotsylvania as accomplishing nothing but more dying and suffering. Was it all worth the 
cost? In early August, Grant was stalled outside Petersburg, and Sherman was struggling around 
Atlanta. Wilmington, North Carolina and Mobile, Alabama remained in Confederate hands. If 
Southern armies could prolong the war by maintaining control of Atlanta, Petersburg, and 
Richmond until at least the election, disillusioned northern voters might put another man in the 
White House.  
Of course, they did not. Southern forces ran out of real estate between Chattanooga 
and Atlanta, and they had to evacuate the city on September 1, to escape being completely 
surrounded. They were unable to delay Sherman’s advance any further. Confederate partisans, 
cavalry, and guerrillas had tried to block Union soldiers, with little success, from advancing 
farther south through Georgia in the summer of 1864. Union engineers were also more skillful at 
circumventing those roadblocks when they did occur.  
It was like this during the four years of war. On numerous occasions, southern forces 
had tried to cut off or delay Union supply trains from reaching combat areas as Confederates 
damaged railroads, blocked roads with felled trees, and destroyed bridges.  Furthermore, the 
natural geographic barriers, including cypress swamps, flooded rivers, and deep ravines piled on 
to the obstacles the Union army had to overcome. If delays of just weeks or a month, had 
stopped Union armies from controlling the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers or prevented 
them from getting to Vicksburg when they did, perhaps Sherman would not have arrived in 
Atlanta, if at all, until November too late to help swing the election in Lincoln’s favor. So in 
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looking back at the crucial campaigns and battles in 1862 at Forts Henry and Donelson and 
Island No. 10, or in 1863 at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, if these events had turned out 
differently, or more importantly, if they had delayed the advance of the Union army longer than 
they did, would the Confederacy’s chances for independence been conceivably greater?  It is 
difficult to speculate, but the evidence strongly suggests that the real difference maker in the 
war was the North’s ability to sustain military operations deep inside the Confederacy, and the 
South’s problem in fighting a war of logistics.  
The North was able to sustain military operations in the South over vulnerable and 
lengthy supply lines subject to frequent sabotage and disruptions because they had a large pool 
of trained civil engineers, mechanics, toolmakers, and managers to draw upon. Conversely, the 
South’s pool of men with mechanical ability and managerial skills was too small primarily 
because the South was blinded by its own cultural assumptions, and because before the war the 
constraining factor of slavery contributed to a culture that denied ordinary southern white men 
the benefits of common school education, prevented the dissemination of ideas out of fear, 
blocked attempts to expand industrial development, and promoted a top-down “planters know 
best” mentality.  
What made the difference between winning and losing the war was in the Union’s 
ability to sustain the operations of armies deep inside the Confederacy, and the South’s inability 
to manage a war of logistics, which would have allowed for greater flexibility in both strategic 
and tactical planning. If Lee’s army was better fed and supplied in the winter of 1862-1863 
would a Gettysburg campaign have been necessary? If better railroad management and 
engineering had been present in the winter of 1862, would Sidney Johnston would have been 
able to hold onto upper Tennessee and the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers longer than 
several months preventing Yankees from taking over Nashville so early in the war?  
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Channing M. Bolton, a young man who had studied engineering at the University of 
Virginia for one year before joining the State of Virginia’s Engineers in 1861 and then served 
with the Army of Northern Virginia, remembered a time he had travelled with General Lee. The 
engineers had been ordered to build a bridge over the Rappahannock River, but the work had 
been delayed far too long to suit the general. After learning who was in charge, Lee spoke to the 
lieutenant sternly. “What is the trouble here? My people have been waiting for hours to cross 
this stream. The bridge should have been finished long ago.”  The lieutenant responded that he 
did not have the necessary guy ropes to complete the construction. Dismounting, Lee walked 
toward the bridge and noticed the end of a rope under the seat in one of the boats. Bolton 
continued, “He [Lee] called to a soldier to pull it out, and this proved to be a coil of just such a 
rope as the lieutenant needed. The general told the soldier to drop it in front of the lieutenant, 
and without saying a word more, he mounted his horse and rode off.”5 The limited amount of 
competent Southern engineering and poor logistical management damaged the Confederate 
war effort.  
The reason for the small pool of skilled men who, before the war, were trained as 
professional engineers and managers was the result of the constraining factor of slavery on 
many levels. Besides the horrific toll slavery took on the men, women, and children enslaved, it 
also was responsible for choking off intellectual growth among its citizens. The upper class South 
carefully protected their status in society, and opportunities for financial and intellectual growth 
were consciously limited. Information and ideas were contained. When talk of bringing 
manufacturing to western Virginia reached the halls of the state’s legislature, the controlling 
planter elite blocked efforts to pass laws that might assist in supporting industry because 
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manufacturing was perceived as a threat to the establishment’s power. When the few 
manufacturing businesses in the South did required training to adjust to changing technological 
developments, owners were careful to select white men who would not spread ideas about 
liberty and freedom to the predominately black labor force. Furthermore, ideas in the South 
only flowed one way: top down. Labor, white or black, did not dare suggest ideas to 
management.  
This relationship between management and labor mirrored the relationship between 
owner and slave.  The parochial worldview established in the years before the war was directly 
linked to how the Confederacy managed, not the fighting—for commanding men came naturally 
to Southerners—but the most critical business of war. The South’s vulnerability in conducting 
the massive logistical operations required during the Civil War was exemplified in the 
educational, and transportation systems established during the antebellum period.  
Before the war the South paid considerable attention to higher education and the 
development and growth of private academies to instruct the sons of plantation owners and the 
small middle class. Following in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson whose concept of the 
university maintained by the state and free to young men who intellectually qualified, the South 
pioneered the state university and before 1830 had established five of six institutions of this 
class in the United States.6  
The academies were represented by a variety of institutions, some private, some aided 
by the state, and many under denominational control. Yet, they all had one thing in common: 
these schools were designed to prepare the sons of the wealthy for college, and consequently, 
provided a classical education, which included the study of Greek and Latin. Discipline was 
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Spartan like, so it was not uncommon for the famous headmasters of these schools, such as 
Moses Waddell and Robert L. Armstrong to “ruin many a heavy pair of winter pantaloons at a 
single whipping.”7 
For the majority of Southern citizens, however, there was little opportunity to master 
the basics of learning. The common school movement in the South, with the exception of North 
Carolina, was virtually non-existent before the war. The teachers in the few schools that did 
exist were often incompetent. State legislatures did not supervise nor care about these schools, 
there were no district libraries, and the schoolhouses themselves were in many cases without 
furniture and books. Furthermore, many farmers wanted their sons to handle an axe and plow, 
and believed formal learning was only required of the upper classes.  
This lack of attention to the development of common schools was a choice. Comfortable 
in maintaining the social hierarchy, the men who held the power to change the system had no 
interest in doing so. This did not mean, of course, that illiterate Southerners did not possess 
remarkable good sense and intelligence.  It did mean, however, that during the Civil War when 
men were needed to repair railroads or build bridges, those with more than good sense were 
hard to find.  Bridge building and repairing locomotives also required some mechanical 
knowledge and some basic mathematics and science. Therefore, it should not be surprising that 
when the Confederate First Regiment Engineers were formed in 1863, only half the companies 
could be designated as pontoon bridge builders. 
The Confederacy’s management, or mismanagement, also had its roots in the 
antebellum period. Southern railroads, with the exception of a half dozen lines, were built in 
places that allowed the owners to transport the wealth of crops grown on the plantations to the 
market. Frequently, these lines did not connect with others creating serious gaps in the system. 
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For example, the West Feliciana Railroad, Clinton & Port Hudson, and Baton Rouge, Grosse Tete 
& Opelousas all ran from the countryside to the Mississippi River. Moreover, the management 
of these short lines closely guarded their turf, running them as cheaply as possible because the 
low volume of passenger traffic generated little revenue. Since they were small lines, 
management could be highly centralized supervising every aspect of the business. The reliance 
on others who might have to manage a station on a longer line 150 miles away, was not 
something Southern railroad management, for the most part, had to consider.  
Repair work on the tracks, bridges, water stations, and locomotives was done locally, 
which impaired the manufacturing of railroad supplies and locomotives. There were a small 
number of locomotive manufacturers and rolling mills in the South and this kept demand 
limited. There were also not enough skilled mechanics to support a booming manufacturing 
sector of the economy. Limited demand, few skilled workers, a transportation system with 
significant gaps, and a dominant planter class worked in conjunction to create a business culture 
that was not prepared for the logistical challenges of the Civil War. In the final days of the Army 
of Northern Virginia’s existence, the Richmond & Danville Railroad had managed to rescue all of 
its engines and cars from the burning city, and the president of the company, Lewis E. Harvie, 
wanted Jefferson Davis to order the small labor force working to build fortifications at Danville 
instead, to work to change the width of the Piedmont Railroad so it matched the gauge of 
Harvie’s trains. The disagreement between Davis and Harvie was moot. It does reveal, however, 
that right until the end, the Confederacy’s management issues haunted them.8 
During the first two years of war there was enough Confederate firepower to block 
Union advances into Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama. Poor planning and a limited number 
of skilled engineers and mechanics resulted in careless engineering efforts at Forts Henry and 
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Donelson, confusion and conflict between private railroad companies and the Railroad Bureau, 
the loss of Pemberton’s army at Vicksburg, Bragg’s failure to capture Grant’s army at 
Chattanooga, and the Confederate army’s unwillingness to form engineering regiments until the 
spring of 1863. Confederate difficulties during the first half of the war did not exist because of 
limited manpower, but because of the skills or lack of particular skills men in both armies 
possessed. Engineering constituted the “tipping point,” as author Malcolm Gladwell coined the 
phrase, of the war. Both sides had skilled warriors and generals; only one side had an 
overwhelming number of skilled mechanics, craftsmen, and engineers. 
A major number of skilled craftsmen in the South were African-American slaves. These 
men were forced to construct forts and earthworks throughout the Confederacy during the war, 
but many slave owners were obstinate in their refusal to lend their slaves to the military. In 
December 1864 the War Department’s Bureau of Conscription, announced a plan, approved by 
General Lee, to impress African-American slaves into Confederate labor gangs based on a state 
quota system. Governor A. G. Magrath of South Carolina asked his state agent, R. B. Johnson to 
investigate how his citizens would respond to the new War Department directive. On January 
10, 1865, Johnson reported to the governor: “…I am fully assured, from my knowledge of the 
difficulties and embarrassments which attend the levying of slave labor, that the conscript 
authorities cannot successfully proceed with such impressment.” He continued, “The aid and 
the authority of the master is indispensable, and as the Confederate authorities possess no 
control over him, can impose upon him no pain or penalties, they must in the present condition 
of affairs be powerless to act effectually. I am satisfied that slaves can be impressed only 
through the agency of the State authorities in conformity with State law.”9 
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With no money and a limited labor force, Southern engineer officers and their men 
would perform as well as possible considering the circumstances. An example of this was the 
Third Regiment Engineers, which accompanied the Army of Tennessee from the late spring of 
1863 to the end of the war. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Presstman 
and Major John W. Green, the regiment spent the Atlanta Campaign building field fortifications 
and throwing pontoon bridges. On some occasions, as in the lines at “East Point” (Atlanta), 
Presstman’s men served as infantry.10  
The regiment officially listed nine companies, but only eight were raised, and of those 
only five were effective bridge builders.11 In December 1864, when General Hardee sought to 
leave Savannah one step ahead of Sherman’s approaching army, engineers from companies B 
and F used three pontoon bridges to aid in the southern army’s escape. The first connected the 
wharves of Savannah with Hutchinson’s Island and was 1,000 feet long. Next a bridge was 
thrown over the Middle River, and a third spanned Back River to the rice dams of South 
Carolina. The bridges were made up of barges because of the shortage of pontoons. Once the 
army crossed the bridges were destroyed.12 
Unfortunately, the successful extraction of Hardee’s army from Savannah was not 
enough to prevent the eventual surrender of Joseph Johnston’s army. In mid-January 1865, 
Company E, Hart’s Engineers, and Company A, under the command of Captain Robert C. 
McCalla, were ordered to report to General Jubal Early to form the Engineer Battalion of the 
Department of Western Virginia and East Tennessee. They were assigned the impossible task of 
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repairing thirty-three destroyed railroad bridges on the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.  It was a 
forlorn hope.13 
 It took days to get a pontoon bridge in place, and once men crossed, engineers often 
failed to take up the bridge or destroy it.  On February 17, 1865 a pontoon bridge was ordered 
across the Savannah River on the road between Abbeville, South Carolina and Washington, 
Georgia. A Major McCrady was charged with the duty. Two days later the bridge was still not in 
place and Captain A. H. Buchanan, Army of Tennessee engineers, reported that he would 
assume responsibility for its construction.14  
The three other Confederate engineer regiments also experienced difficulties in the final 
months of the war. The 4th Regiment Engineers had formed in the summer of 1864 at 
Shreveport, and most of the men who signed on with the unit were from Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Texas. They worked on the Mobile, Alabama defenses, but no more than three companies 
were formed, and the regiment was broken up in early 1865. 
In the eastern theater, General Lee’s pioneers and the First and Second Engineers did all 
in their power to maintain the defenses around Petersburg. According to engineer Lieutenant 
Henry Herbert Harris, the engineers spent their time countermining, working on fascines, and 
repairing bridges. He noted in his diary, “September 24, Saturday…Again…worked on the 
bridge…a showery day and I got quite wet…. In the afternoon prepared a sermon for tomorrow’s 
exercises.”15 Four days later he wrote, “Got our bridge passable for footmen.” Then finally on 
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September 30, “We finished our bridge.”16 Harris never mentioned the type of bridge nor its 
length, yet six days was a long time to finish the structure. 
In addition to suffering from a lack of skilled mechanics and engineers, the Confederate 
military had a thorny time trying to solve its persistent and vexing railroad problems. The 
Railroad Bureau in Richmond had tried valiantly to repair damaged lines, collect and operate 
engines, cars, and repair facilities, manage a train schedule, negotiate with owners of private 
companies regarding issues of military traffic and freight rates.  The bureau could not, however, 
overcome poorly laid track, few repairmen, egotistical generals, a command structure that was 
dysfunctional, and a government committed to ideological purity rather than military necessity.  
For example, after the fall of Atlanta, the Army of Tennessee, led by General Hood, 
requested that the Mobile & Ohio and Memphis & Charleston be repaired as far as Decatur, 
Alabama. The request was sent to General Bragg, military adviser to Jefferson Davis. Bragg 
passed the message on to General Beauregard who was recently appointed commander of the 
Military Division of the West. Beauregard finally approved the request, but no one 
communicated the decision to Major George Whitefield, the railroad engineer in charge of 
repairs. When Whitefield was notified of the need for his services, he quickly organized a work 
force of impressed slaves, and they managed to mend the tracks so supplies could be forwarded 
to Hood’s army.17  
In Virginia, General Lee had hoped to use the Piedmont, the South Side, and the 
Richmond & Danville railroads as his supply line as the army moved west after evacuating 
Petersburg. Depots were filled with food and ammunition at Greensboro, Danville, and 
Lynchburg, but the railroads themselves were in considerable disrepair. Since June 1862, 
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Captain Edmund T. D. Myers of the Confederate Corps of Engineers had supervised the 
construction of the forty-eight mile Piedmont Railroad between Danville, Virginia and 
Greensboro, North Carolina. It was completed in May 1864, and yet in the winter of 1865 the 
railroad still had no water stations, supplies of wood, or sufficient sidings.18 Furthermore, 
throughout the month of January 1865, Colonel Sims, chief of the Railroad Bureau, had to 
negotiate with the management of both the South Side and Danville & Richmond, because 
neither was willing to interchange their rolling stock. The two railroads finally compromised. 
They agreed to share their cars for one month until “neutral” cars could be brought in from the 
Virginia & Tennessee Railroad, which had been destroyed by Union General George Stoneman’s 
cavalry.19  
Government control of the railroads was needed, it had been always needed, and with 
the collapse of the Confederacy looming, it was finally addressed.  On February 19, 1865 the 
Confederate Congress overwhelmingly passed “an act to provide for the more efficient 
transportation of troops, supplies and munitions of war upon the railroads, steamboats and 
canals in the Confederate States, and to control telegraph lines employed by the 
Government.”20 It was, of course, too late to change the outcome of the war.  
 For popular historians like Bruce Catton and Shelby Foote, the problems with the 
Confederacy’s railroad system during the war only highlighted the accomplishments of Southern 
railroads and made manifest how remarkable it was that the South achieved any success at all—
like the transfer of Longstreet’s men to Chickamauga—working with so little.21 The limited 
                                                             
18 Jackson, 121. 
19 Black, III, 282. See also the Richmond Daily Examiner, January 3 and January 31, 1865.  
20 Journal, Confederate States Congress, VII, 584-586. 
21 Clark, Jr., 231.  
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accomplishments were impressive, but these historians failed to address why the South was 
working with so little.  
Historian James Huston remarked that the Confederacy did not have a Lincoln or 
Stanton, a Tom Scott, Herman Haupt, David McCallum, and the skillful mechanics working in 
support of these great minds.22  The flaw in Huston’s argument, however, was the implication 
that these men just happened to live in the North before the Civil War, when in reality during 
the antebellum period, the South chose to invest in plantation farming in general, and cotton in 
particular, and not in manufacturing. Historian John E. Clark, Jr. wrote: 
“Southerners…demonstrated entrepreneurial initiative in those enterprises that they valued. 
Unfortunately for the Confederacy, they spurned those endeavors that would have taught them 
the variety of talents most needed to a fight a war of logistics. Excellence in managing cotton 
plantations does not seem to have given them adequate transferable skills for war 
management.”23 
Conversely, the efforts of the railroad men of the North should not be taken for granted. 
Shelby Foote’s “the North could have fought the war with one hand tied behind its back,” 
interpretation was a far cry from the innovation, labor, and effort expended to supply the 
armies in the fields. For example, in Daniel McCallum’s final report in 1866 for the United States 
Military Railroad Department, he wrote about the experimental nature of managing military 
railroads and said, “The fact should be understood that the management of railroads is just as 
much a distinct profession as is that of the art of war…” and that “it was extremely difficult to 
induce those who were really valuable to leave the secure positions and enter upon a new and 
                                                             
22 James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 210-211. 
23 Clark, Jr., 223. 
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untried field of action.”24 Moreover, “the attempt to supply the army of General Sherman in the 
field [1864], construct and reconstruct the railroad in the rear, and keep pace with its march…” 
was regarded by many railroad men as a dangerous experiment that could result in disaster and 
defeat.25  
Yet, the damage done by guerillas and cavalry was so quickly repaired by the 
Construction Corps that Sherman never worried about delay, and Sherman continued to press 
forward confident that the railroad would catch up to him.  Similarly, around Petersburg, 
Virginia, General Grant’s campaign to capture the Army of Northern Virginia, or drive Lee’s army 
into the open, was supported by logistical arrangements made possible by United States Military 
Railroads. From City Point, Virginia, at the confluence of the James and Appomattox Rivers, 
where supplies were unloaded, to beyond the left flank of the Union army, the Construction 
Corps restored nine miles of the Petersburg & City Point Railroad, and over ten months built an 
additional twenty-one miles of track.  
A detachment of the Virginia Construction Corps ordered to North Carolina in January 
1865 to assist with logistical operations during Sherman’s Carolina Campaign, worked until 
Construction Corps members could be sent from the military division of the Mississippi. Before 
Sherman reached Goldsboro, North Carolina in late March, both the Atlantic & North Carolina 
Railroad ninety-five miles from Morehead City to Goldsboro, and the eighty-five mile section of 
the Wilmington & Weldon, from Wilmington to Goldsboro were repaired.  Of these roads, in 
addition to two others, twenty-five miles of main track were rebuilt, and five miles of side- track 
were laid. On the same roads 3,263 lineal feet of bridges were built, and at Morehead City the 
                                                             
24 Daniel C. McCallum, United States Military Railroads. Report of Bvt. Brig. Gen. D. C. McCallum, 
Director and General Manager, from 1861 to 1866, 42. 
25 McCallum, 43.  
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Construction Corps built a wharf covering an area of 53,682 square feet, using 700,000 board 
feet of timber.26  
When the war ended, McCallum reported to the War Department a series of staggering 
numbers quantifying the work of the railroad organization during the war. The USMRR 
department obtained 419 locomotives during the conflict, and of that number 312 were built in 
Northern shops.  In addition, the department operated 2,105 miles of track, used or built 6,330 
cars, constructed or rebuilt 137,418 feet (twenty-six miles and one hundred thirty-eight feet) of 
bridges, laid or re-laid 641 miles of track, and a total of 24,964 men were employed with an 
average monthly rate of 2,378 men working in the Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland sector 
in 1864, and 11,580 men working monthly in the Division of the Mississippi, which covered 
Tennessee, Georgia, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas.27 
The success of the North’s military railroad organization was due to several factors not 
the least of which was the practical training men received working on the railroads in the years 
before the war. With many lines over 150 miles long new management systems had to be 
invented to operate a decentralized business, and men such as Daniel McCallum and Herman 
Haupt designed new organizational charts that were essential for large railroad companies. First 
Haupt, then McCallum, took their organizational models and transferred them to the military 
railroads. It was easy to look at the USMRR in 1865 and marvel at its efficiency and 
sophistication. It was easy to forget that in April 1861 the USMRR did not exist, and there was 
no previous military model.   
                                                             
26 McCallum, 34.  
27 McCallum, 10, 31, and 45. In the Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland sector the average 
number of persons employed monthly rose over the four years of war. In 1862 the average was 
750 men, in 1863, 1,974 men, in 1864 2,378 men, and in 1865 3,060 men. In the Division of the 
Mississippi the monthly average went from 11,580 men in 1864 to 10,061 men in 1865. For 
North Carolina only the greatest number of persons employed monthly in 1865 was recorded. 
That number was 3,387. 
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Next, the military railroads were only as good as the men who worked on them. 
Whether it was machinists in repair shops, carpenters building trestle bridges, mason’s working 
on foundations, laborers laying track or cutting timber, and mechanics and blacksmiths working 
on locomotives and cars, these men educated in common schools, mechanics’ institutes, or on 
the job in shipyards, clock factories, or textile mills, had learned how to work with their hands, 
repair their own broken tools, and innovate when necessary, which was often.  For example, in 
October 1864 Private James Woodward of the 24th Wisconsin, Private William E. Ott of the 46th 
Pennsylvania, and Private James Nichols from the 13th New Jersey were ordered to report to the 
USMRR, Division of the Mississippi, for special assignment.28  Ott and Nichols had been part of 
the Army of the Potomac until the 11th and 12th Corps were transferred by rail to Sherman’s 
army, and now these infantry soldiers were assigned railroad work. No doubt when asked, the 
regimental colonels selected these men because of their mechanical skills.  
Finally, the USMRR succeeded because President Lincoln and his Secretary of War, 
Edwin Stanton, had the foresight to nationalize the railroads and the temerity and toughness to 
trust and support USMRR operations. Stanton’s Special Order No. 337 summed up the 
secretary’s conviction. In part it said, “No officer, whatever be his rank, will interfere with the 
running of the cars as directed by the superintendent of the road. Any one who so interferes will 
be dismissed from the service for disobedience of orders.”29 
Of course, the railroads were only one means of moving the Union army’s men and 
supplies inside enemy territory over harsh terrain. Getting at the enemies’ forces, or in one case, 
                                                             
28 Record of the Office of the Quartermaster General: Transportation, 1834-1917. Printed and 
Manuscript Orders, Circulars, and Letters of Instruction Relating to the U. S. Military Railroad, 
1861-1864, Box number1, National Archives, Washington, DC. 
29 McCallum, 41. 
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escaping from their clutches, required the critical skills of the men who served as combat 
engineers and pioneers.  
The North’s better engineering efforts and management superiority made the 
difference. Despite its vast amount of resources, the Union army still had to execute strategic, 
tactical, and logistical operations in order to destroy Southern forces. Delivering the Federal 
army to those key points of contact and providing the essential support to keep the army in 
ammunition and food was the job of the army engineers and the United States Military Railroad. 
The manpower resource to draw from could not come from a small cadre of railroad managers 
or West Point trained engineers; the war was much too grand in scale for that. Instead, the 
manpower came from the ranks of the citizen soldiers, many of whom had developed 
mechanical skills before the war. Even when volunteer engineers were unavailable, men from 
infantry regiments, such as privates Woodward, Ott, and Nichols assigned to the USMRR, could 
be called upon to execute repairs to roads or build bridges often with a pontoon train. It was 
remarkable.   
For example, Sherman’s Atlanta campaign could have turned out differently if Union 
engineers and the railroad Construction Corps did not keep transportation lines repaired and 
open. The Construction Corps, engineers, and pioneers built roads and bridges that allowed 
Union generals to move their armies over difficult and problematic terrain. Grant’s ability to 
move his army through the floodplain along the western side of the Mississippi River in eastern 
Louisiana in 1863 was the result of inventive engineering, not overwhelming resources. The 
rescue of Banks’s army along the Red River, Grant’s army in Chattanooga, and even McClellan’s 
army on the Peninsula, was the result of inventive thinking, the exchange of ideas, sometimes 
from the bottom up, and the mechanical skill of the men required to execute the plan. The 
Union Army engineered the victory in the American Civil War.  
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The statistics alone are striking. For example, Colonel Ira Spaulding of the 50th New York 
wrote in June 1865 that his regiment had built eighty-six bridges from September 1862 to May 
1865 totaling 21,248 feet or just over four miles. This data did not include the large number of 
trestle, timber, and corduroy bridges built by the 50th New York, nor the bridgework done by 
the 1st and 15th New York or the regular engineer battalion. In addition, over the course of the 
war, the Union adopted better management techniques. By 1864 each engineer company was 
furnished with a company wagon, a commissary wagon, forage wagon, tool wagon, and a 
carpenters’ tool chest. Spaulding wrote, “By this means the whole or any portion of the 
regiment was prepared to move at any time of the day or night, with fifteen days’ supplies and a 
complete outfit for the performance of all kind of engineer duty.”30  
The greatest feat of military engineering during the war, and perhaps the greatest feat 
in American military history, came at Vicksburg. Grant began the campaign with only the 
company of First Kentucky Engineers and Mechanics and three regular army engineers attached 
to his headquarters’ staff. Recognizing and utilizing the skills he had within his ranks, Grant 
tapped officers, who in civilian life had engineering experience, and infantry units with men of 
mechanical ability. The results were incredible: two attempted canal projects, a series of floating 
and trestle bridges, corduroy roads through wetlands, wooden towers built for sharpshooters, 
fabricated sap rollers, fascine from pork barrels, and gum tree mortars.  
What made this work possible was the attention paid to industrial development, 
railroad management, and common school reform in the North in the years before the Civil 
War. No doubt the density of the northern population helped ideas to bubble up during the 
antebellum period, yet there was a fundamental belief that ideas were important. Information 
was exchanged all the time, whether at agricultural fairs, lyceum meetings, mechanics institutes, 
                                                             
30 O. R., ser. 1, vol. XLVI, part 1, 649-650. 
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or universities. State governments recognized the need to reform common schools because an 
educated citizenry was good for individuals including those in the working class, and it was good 
for business.   
Lincoln spoke often of providing opportunities for the laboring classes to improve their 
station in life.  He believed that there was an important positive relationship between labor and 
capital, and the evidence suggested that many people in the North felt the same way. On March 
6, 1860 in New Haven, Connecticut, Lincoln said: “So while we do not propose any war upon 
capital, we do wish to allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with everybody else. 
When one starts poor, as most do in the race of life, free society is such that he knows he can 
better his condition; he knows that there is no fixed condition of labor, for his whole life.”31  
Northern laborers recognized opportunities to improve their station in life. Risk and 
reward was a part of the culture in the industrialized North. Risk and reward, business acumen, 
and entrepreneurship applied to the South as well, but generally only for those who ran 
plantations and sold their crops for enormous profits. Labor, and especially slave labor, was 
viewed as the necessary “mud-sill” of society. Education and ideas were reserved for the elite. 
Slavery represented the economic backbone of the Confederacy, and slavery contributed to the 
Confederacy’s doom. Not just because the war came as a result of the peculiar institution, but 
because the institution of slavery permeated Southern culture, and consequently, limited 
creativity, innovation, openness, and adaptation to change. These were all essential elements in 
a war that required enormous logistical considerations, and consequently demanded creativity, 
innovation, and adaptation to change. Island No. 10, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Atlanta 
required ideas and innovations that had never been attempted before on such a scale. 
Generating new ideas was often the difference between victory and defeat. Chances of success 
                                                             
31 Fehrenbacher, ed., “Speech at New Haven, Connecticut,” 144. 
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increased, therefore, when those ideas came from as many people as possible. It was not just 
the generals who were relied upon to offer a new approach to a new problem. In the North, a 
volunteer engineer captain from New York who worked as a civil engineer before the war, an 
infantry sergeant from Pennsylvania who had been a miner, or a private from Illinois who had 
worked as a machinist, generated ideas. This was the advantage the Federal army had over the 
Confederacy. It was the reason why the North won the Civil War. 
The free flow of information and ideas has always been the United States’ greatest 
strength. The freedom to create, to challenge, and to disagree, has been the sure foundation of 
our people and nation. In the twenty-first century this exchange of ideas between manager and 
laborer, teacher and student, politician and citizen is more important than ever. Yet, in the 
United States over the past twenty years alarming voices have been raised signifying that the 
nation would be better off celebrating sameness rather than diversity. Tolerance, respect, and 
compromise have come under attack. Freedom to think and act differently has become instead, 
for some, freedom from those who think and act differently. 
Today it is critical we maintain a prosperous, accessible, accountable press. It is 
important we address the challenges of public education and access to higher education. It 
remains essential that we provide opportunities for all citizens, not just the wealthiest. The 
stakes are high. 
Between 1861 and 1865 the United States fought a Civil War to both maintain “the last 
best hope on earth,” and to deliver “a new birth of freedom.” The reason for the North’s victory 
was because at significant times during the four-year struggle Union engineers, the majority of 
them volunteers, were able to apply ingenuity and innovation to the complex problem facing 
them. In the spring of 1861 both sides prepared for the one great, decisive battle that would 
determine the outcome. It never happened. Battles continued to unfold and men continued to 
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die. These historic battles have captured the imagination and attention of Americans ever since. 
What ended the war, however, was not the battles per se but the Union army’s ability to 
overcome the geography of the South and the chronic damage done to the railroads, bridges, 
and roads as Confederates relentlessly tried to cut supply lines and stop the Yankees from 
pressing any advantage. The adroitness, proficiency, and versatility of the Union’s citizen 
soldiers were the sine qua non of their army’s success. Indeed, the North engineered victory in 
the Civil War.   
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TABLES 
Table 1: West Point Graduates who served as Engineers, 1802-1860, Union States 
 
     
Engineers from Union States     
   
 
Served in Corp of 
Engineers 
Upon Graduation     
Entered 
Engineers 
Served in Civil 
War as an 
Engineer 
Served in Civil War 
as a general 
officer 
Connecticut: 6 5 4  
Delaware: 2 2   
District of Columbia: 3/1* 2 1* 1 
Illinois: 1    
Kentucky: 2 1  1 
Maine: 2 1   
Maryland: 3/1* 2   
Massachusetts: 19 16 6 2 
Michigan: 2 2   
Missouri: 1 1   
New Hampshire: 5/1* 3 2/1* 1 
New Jersey: 4/1* 3 2/1*  
New York: 27/1* 26 13/1*/1** 2 
Ohio: 9 6 5 4 
Pennsylvania: 13 8 6 2 
Rhode Island: 1    
Wisconsin: 1/1* 1 1*  
Vermont: 7 6 1  
     
Totals: 108 85 41 13 
 
 
 
*Some cadets received at large appointments.  In these cases Cullum’s Biographical Register 
indicated the state of birth, not the state where cadets lived at the time of their appointment. 
  
** One graduate from New York served during the war as a Confederate engineer, and one 
graduate from North Carolina served as a Union engineer. 
 
On August 3, 1861 Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to expand to six more officers, 
three from the West Point class of 1861 that graduated May 6th, and three more from the West 
Point class of 1861 that graduated on June 24th.  Three cadets, from Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, and Rhode Island received at large appointments.  The cadet from the District of 
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Columbia resigned his commission and served during the war as a Confederate engineer.  The 
other five cadets were from the following states:  Massachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, and Connecticut. 
 
During the war twenty additional members of the Corps of Engineers came from the West Point 
classes of 1862, 1863, and 1864.  Two graduates, one from the District of Columbia and the 
other from New York received at large appointments.  The others represented the  
following states:  Indiana (2), Illinois (2), Maine (1), Massachusetts (2), Nebraska (1), New York 
(4), Oregon (3), Pennsylvania (2), and Tennessee (1). 
 
Note:  The first column represents the total number of West Point graduates from each state 
who served in the regular army Corps of Engineers.  For Example, in New York, twenty-seven 
men served in the engineers, one of them received an at large appointment.  In addition, of the 
twelve who served in the Civil War, one was the graduate who received the at large 
appointment and the other served in the Confederate engineers. 
 
These numbers include the years 1802 to 1818 when no class rank was assigned to cadets.  
During these years twenty-two men entered the Corps of Engineers, and they received their 
appointments from the following states:  Connecticut 1; District of Columbia 1; Maryland 1; 
Massachusetts 5; New York 3; Pennsylvania 2; Vermont 4; Georgia 1; North Carolina 1; South 
Carolina 2; Virginia 1. 
 
Source:  George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United 
States Military Academy at West Point New York since its establishment in 1802, vol. I and II, 3rd 
ed.  (Cambridge, MA:  The Riverside Press, 1891). 
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Table 2: West Point Graduates who Served as Engineers, 1802-1860, Confederate States 
Confederate States       
     
 Served in Upon Graduation Served in Civil War Served in Civil War  
  Corp of Engineers Entered Engineers as an Engineer as a general officer 
     
Alabama: 2 2 1  
     
Florida: 1 1   
     
Georgia: 2 2 1  
     
Louisiana: 3 3 2  
     
North Carolina: 4 3 1/1**  
     
South Carolina: 2 2   
     
Mississippi: 2/1* 1  1* 
     
Tennessee: 4 4   
     
Virginia: 8/1* 6 1 4/1* 
     
Totals: 28 24 7 5 
 
*Some cadets received at large appointments.  In these cases Cullum’s Biographical Register 
indicated the state of birth, not the state where cadets lived at the time of their appointment. 
  
** One graduate from New York served during the war as a Confederate engineer, and one 
graduate from North Carolina served as a Union engineer. 
 
On August 3, 1861 Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to expand to six more officers, 
three from the West Point class of 1861 that graduated May 6th, and three more from the 
West Point class of 1861 that graduated on June 24th.  Three cadets, from Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, and Rhode Island received at large appointments.  The cadet from the 
District of Columbia resigned his commission and served during the war as a Confederate 
engineer.  The other five cadets were from the following states:  Massachusetts, Vermont, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Connecticut. 
 
During the war twenty additional members of the Corps of Engineers came from the West 
Point classes of 1862, 1863, and 1864.  Two graduates, one from the District of Columbia and 
the other from New York received at large appointments.  The others represented the  
following states:  Indiana (2), Illinois (2), Maine (1), Massachusetts (2), Nebraska (1), New York 
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(4), Oregon (3), Pennsylvania (2), and Tennessee (1). 
 
Note:  The first column represents the total number of West Point graduates from each state 
who served in the regular army Corps of Engineers.  For Example, in New York, twenty-seven 
men served in the engineers, one of them received an at large appointment.  In addition, of 
the twelve who served in the Civil War, one was the graduate who received the at large 
appointment and the other served in the Confederate engineers. 
 
These numbers include the years 1802 to 1818 when no class rank was assigned to cadets.  
During these years twenty-two men entered the Corps of Engineers, and they received their 
appointments from the following states:  Connecticut 1; District of Columbia 1; Maryland 1; 
Massachusetts 5; New York 3; Pennsylvania 2; Vermont 4; Georgia 1; North Carolina 1; South 
Carolina 2; Virginia 1. 
 
Source:  George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United 
States Military Academy at West Point New York since its establishment in 1802, vol. I and II, 
3rd ed.  (Cambridge, MA:  The Riverside Press, 1891). 
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Table 3: Statistics from the 6th Census of the United States Regarding Manufacturing Totals 
1840 
 
     
Manufacturing totals  1840       
     
New York:  $          88,200,209     
Pennsylvania:  $          51,950,935     
Massachusetts:  $          41,774,446     
Virginia:  $          18,803,885     
Ohio:  $          16,905,257     
Connecticut:  $          13,669,139     
Rhode Island:    $          10,696,136     
New Hampshire:  $             9,252,448     
Tennessee:  $             6,847,431     
Vermont:  $             4,326,440     
North Carolina:  $             3,838,900     
South Carolina:  $             3,216,970     
Michigan:  $             3,112,240     
Georgia:  $             2,899,565     
 
 
Source:  Statistics of the United States of America as collected and Returned by the 
Marshals of the Several Judicial Districts under the 13th section of the act for taking the 
6th Census corrected at the Department of State June 1, 1840 (Washington, DC:  Blair 
and Rives, 1841). 
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Table 4: Statistics from the 8th Census of the United States Regarding Employment Statistics 
1860  
 
 
Employment Statistics 1860  
 
 
Civil and 
Mechanical 
Engineers 
Iron 
Workers 
Iron Railing 
Manufacturers Machinists Carpenters Wheelwrights 
       CA 717 6 0 448 3,923 619 
CT 507 170 0 2,677 3,333 523 
DE 92 27 0 229 954 208 
IL 1,555 61 0 1,356 12,668 3,098 
IN 1,226 18 0 947 10,584 1,881 
IA 675 21 0 292 6,526 1,013 
KS 194 0 0 35 1,295 156 
KY 693 214 0 406 5,858 964 
ME 344 90 0 954 4,952 273 
MD 389 107 0 1,046 5,572 849 
MA 1,503 656 0 6,897 14,541 1,182 
MI 949 66 0 603 8,045 1,046 
MN 241 0 0 95 1,757 154 
MO 1,134 107 0 608 9,333 1,478 
NH 161 0 24 1,260 3,075 381 
NJ 960 288 85 1,923 7,444 1,197 
NY 4,103 105 1,296 8,774 38,897 2,579 
OH 2,107 10 642 2,487 21,571 2,684 
OR 65 0 0 31 761 135 
PA 4,284 43 3,942 6,541 29,855 4,240 
RI 210 0 70 1,630 2,137 150 
VT 73 0 12 478 2,739 409 
WI 587 0 14 538 6,709 1,878 
        
Source:  Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 Compiled  
From the Original Returns of the Eighth Census (Washington, DC:  Government Printing 
Office, 1864). 
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Employment Statistics 1860 (continued from previous page) 
 
          
 
Civil and 
Mechanical 
Engineers Iron Workers 
Iron Railing 
Manufacturers Machinists Carpenters Wheelwrights 
       
AL 375 26 0 295 2,386 431 
AR 137 0 0 72 1,613 363 
FL 117 0 0 70 693 76 
GA 445 37 2 615 3,219 592 
LA 917 24 0 256 4,865 204 
MS 255 20 0 225 2,100 336 
NC 286 2 26 194 3,217 588 
SC 298 0 12 175 1,844 355 
TN 406 0 55 368 5,391 970 
TX 237 0 10 73 2,773 526 
VA 760 0 226 936 9,482 1,657 
       
Total number from Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri:  
       
             
 
 Civil and 
Mechanical 
Engineers  
 Iron 
Workers  
 Iron Railing 
Manufacturers  
 
Machinists   Carpenters  
 
Wheelwrights  
 2,308 455 0 2,289 21,717 3,499 
       
Total number from all other Union States:    
 
                         
20,461  
       
1,534  
                  
6,085  
        
37,966        180,812  
              
23,598  
       
Total number from the Confederate States:    
 
                            
4,233  
          
109  
                     
331  
          
3,279          37,583  
                
6,098  
              
 
Source:  Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Population of the United States in 1860 Compiled  
From the Original Returns of the Eighth Census (Washington, DC:  Government Printing 
Office, 1864). 
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Table 5: Colleges in the United States in 1860 
 
         
Union States(continued 
onto the next page)        
      Law or   Medical or Scientific or  Agriculture or 
  Iron Dept  Dept Dept  Dept 
  Literary Theological of Law Military of Medicine of Science Normal of Agriculture 
         
CA 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CT 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 
DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DC 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
IL 12 9 1 0 2 0 1 1 
IN 12 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 
IA 7 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 
KS 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ME 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
MA 6 4 1 0 3 2 5 1 
MI 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
MN 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
NH 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 
NJ 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NY 10 13 5 0 8 5 2 1 
OH 20 10 1 1 3 0 3 1 
OR 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA 19 13 1 0 5 1 4 1 
RI 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
VT 2 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 
WI 8 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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Confederate States (continued from previous page) 
          
     Law or   Medical or Scientific or  Agriculture or 
   Dept   Dept of Dept of  Dept of 
  Literary Theological of Law Military Medicine Science Normal Agriculture 
         
AL 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 
AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LA 8 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
MS 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
NC 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SC 4 5 0 2 1 0 1 0 
TN 7 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 
TX 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VA 10 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6: School Attendence in the United States in 1860, Confederate States 
 
        
Confederate States           
        
 
Number of 
White Children 
Between Common 
Number of 
Students in  
Percent of 
Children 5-14 
years old in 
Number of 
Grammar 
Schools 
Number of 
Students in 
  5-14 years old Schools Attendance   Attendance Or Academies Attendance 
        
AL 
            
152,808  
         
1,903  
           
61,751   40% 206 10,778 
AR 
               
97,672  
             
727  
           
19,242   19% 109 4,415 
FL 
               
22,007  
               
97  
             
2,032   9% 138 4,486 
GA 
            
168,269  
         
1,752  
           
56,087   33% 242 11,075 
LA 
               
87,570  
             
713  
           
31,813   36% 152 11,274 
MS 
            
101,414  
         
1,116  
           
30,970   30% 169 7,974 
NC 
            
169,907  
         
2,994  
        
105,025   61% 434 13,169 
SC 
               
78,219  
             
757  
           
20,716   26% 226 8,277 
TN 
            
230,346  
         
2,965  
        
138,809   60% 264 15,793 
TX 
            
115,580  
         
1,218  
           
34,611   29% 97 5,916 
VA 
            
278,738  
         
3,778  
           
85,443   30% 398 13,204 
        
Totals: 
         
1,502,530  
       
18,020  
        
586,499   34% 2,435 106,361 
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Table 7: School Attendence in the United States in 1860, Border States 
 
Border States       
           
 
Number of 
White Children 
Between Common 
Number of 
Students in  
Percent of 
Children 5-14 
years old in 
Number of 
Grammar 
Schools 
Number of 
Students in 
  5-14 years old Schools Attendance   Attendance Or Academies Attendance 
DE 
               
22,431  
             
256  
           
11,736   52% 40 1957 
KY 
            
251,229  
         
4,507  
        
156,158   52% 223 17597 
MD 
            
125,511  
             
935  
           
36,216   28% 140 4745 
MO 
            
281,666  
         
4,120  
        
175,855   62% 240 20143 
        
Totals: 
            
680,837  
         
9,818  
        
379,965   55% 643 44,442 
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Table 8: School Attendence in the United States in 1860, Union States 
Union States       
           
 
Number of White 
Children Between Common 
Number of 
Students in  
Percent of 
Children 5-14 
years old in 
Number of 
Grammar 
Schools 
Number of 
Students in 
  5-14 years old Schools Attendance   Attendance Or Academies Attendance 
CA 41,169 496 24,977  60% 92 3,153 
CT 89,277 1,805 82,530  92% 197 8,749 
IL 429,701 8,489 433,018 * 100% 211 13,205 
IN 362,234 6,563 293,089  81% 261 22,971 
IA 177,155 3,836 165,588  93% 67 4,949 
KS 26,323 123 4,758  18% 29 1,059 
ME 144,159 4,376 186,717 * 130% 110 8,273 
MA 240,871 4,134 206,974  86% 319 14,001 
MI 177,370 4,007 201,391 * 113% 84 9,683 
MN 38,475 879 31,038  81% 29 1,605 
NH 64,613 2,301 70,539 * 110% 208 11,444 
NJ 148,026 1,496 110,000  74% 251 12,892 
NY 850,650 10,650 697,283  82% 910 86,565 
OH 589,568 11,783 590,549 * 100% 131 54,035 
OR 12,511 239 8,158  65% 15 1,654 
PA 710,189 11,597 565,303  80% 487 33,638 
RI 34,684 426 25,570  74% 58 3,127 
VT 68,976 2,696 80,904 * 117% 96 7,851 
WI 197,602 3,795 198,676 * 100% 120 10,031 
        
Total: 4,403,553 79,691 3,977,106  90% 3,675 308,885 
 
 
*The Eighth Census compiled population numbers for while males and females by age ranges  
such as Under 1, 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, and 15-19.  In addition, counting school attendance was an 
Inexact science because some children attended school for only several months throughout a year  
and others attended for as long as ten months.  These numbers were compiled from population  
statistics between the ages of five and fourteen.  These were the most common ages of school attendance.   
Yet district school records indicated that a small percent of students were fifteen 
and sixteen years old.  For example, for the October 1860 to January 1861 term, the 
Fairfield, Connecticut North School District recorded that of the twenty children in attendance, 
nineteen were between five and fourteen years old and one was sixteen years old. 
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Sources:  Fairfield North School District Journal, 1851-1861.  The Connecticut Historical Society, 
Hartford, Connecticut.  Statistics of the United States Including Mortality, Property, etc. in 1860 
Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census (Washington,  
DC: Government Printing Office, 1866), 506-509 and 592. 
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MAPS 
Map 1:  A.S. Johnston’s Western Defensive Corridor, January 1862 
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Map 2: Operations around Island No. 10 
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Map 3: Bissell, Tweeddale, Mahon, and Engineers By-Pass Island No. 10 
 
 
 
 491 
Map 4: Union Bridging During the Peninsula Campaign, 1862 
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Map 5: Vicksburg Operational Area, Spring 1863 
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Map 6: Yazoo Pass, Steele’s Bayou, and Lake Providence Operations 
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Map 7: Grant Crosses the Mississippi and Engineers Open a Supply Line 
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Map 8: Engineers, Pioneers, and Infantry Build Four Bridges over the Big Black River 
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Map 9: Union, Confederate Troop Movement for Chickamauga, Chattanooga Campaigns 
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Map 10: Cracker Line at Chattanooga 
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Map 11: Bailey and Pearsall’s Dams on the Red River 
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Map 12: Crossing the James River, June 1864 
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Map 13: Sherman’s Supply Line During the Atlanta Campaign 
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Map 14: Battle of River’s Bridge 
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APPENDIX A 
UNION ARMY ENGINEERING ASSETS DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
 
1861: 
 
• Engineer Department 
  Chief of Engineers, Brigadier General Joseph Gilbert Totten 
 
• Topographical Engineers Department 
  Chief of Topographical Engineers, Colonel John James Abert, retired 
  September 1861. 
  Chief of Topographical Engineers, Colonel Stephen H. Long,  
  September 1861 to March 1863 
 
• Corps of Engineers: (40) engineers  
  On August 3, 1861 six engineers added to the corps.  
   
 First Engineer Battalion, Captain James C. Duane, Commanding 
  Company A organized in 1846. Three companies more companies  
     recruited beginning August 1861.  
 
• Corps of Topographical Engineers: (37) topographical engineers 
  On August 3, 1861 six topographical engineers added to corps. 
   
• Volunteer Engineers: 
 
First Regiment, New York Volunteer Engineers or “Serrell’s Engineers” 
  Lieutenant Colonel Edward Wellman Serrell, Commanding 
  Organized October 1861. Ten companies 
 
Fifteenth Regiment, New York Volunteer Engineers 
  Colonel John McLeod Murphy, Commanding 
  Mustered-in as Infantry regiment, June, 1861 and converted to an  
  Engineer regiment, October 1861. Twelve companies 
 
Fiftieth Regiment, New York Volunteer Engineers 
  Colonel Charles H. Stuart, Commanding 
  Mustered-in as Infantry regiment, July 1861 and converted to an 
  Engineer regiment, October 1861. Twelve companies 
 
First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics 
  Colonel William Power Innes, Commanding 
  Organized October 1861. Twelve companies 
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Patterson’s Independent Company of Volunteer Kentucky Engineers 
  Captain William F. Patterson, Commanding 
  Organized September 1861. 
 
Engineer Regiment of the West or “Bissell’s Engineers” 
  Colonel Josiah Wolcott Bissell, Commanding 
  Organized July 1861. Twelve companies 
 
• Volunteer Engineers that served three to thirteen months: 
 
Wolster’s (Voerster’s) Independent Company Sappers and Miners 
  Organized May 1861 and disbanded September 1861 
 
Howland’s Battle Creek Engineers 
  Organized September 1861 and disbanded December 1861 
 
Balz’s Company Sappers and Miners 
  Organized October 1861 and disbanded February 1862 
 
Gerster’s Independent Company Pioneers 
  Organized August 1861 and disbanded September 1862 
 
• Corps of Topographical Engineers assisted by United States Coast Survey 
 
1862: 
 
• Fifteenth New York Engineers}     Engineer Brigade formed March 1862/ 
    combined with  Recognized by Congress July 1862 
   Fiftieth New York Engineers} Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury, Commanding 
 
• United States Military Railroads (USMRR) 
  Military Director and Superintendent: David C. McCallum 
 
   Eastern Theater: 
  Chief of Construction and Transportation: Colonel Herman Haupt 
   Construction Corps: 
    Squad (Ten men) Supervised by civilian foremen 
    Gangs (Groups of squads) Supervised by army  
     Engineers 
  Western Theater:  
  Manager of Railroads: John B. Anderson 
    Construction and Repair:  
Detachments from Bissell’s Engineers and First 
Michigan Engineers and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry 
 
• Wrigley’s Independent Company of Pennsylvania Engineers 
  Organized August 1862 
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  Captain Henry E. Wrigley, Commanding 
 
• Pioneer Brigade attached to Army of the Cumberland 
  Organized December 1862 
  Captain James St.Clair Morton, Commanding 
 
1863: 
 
• Topographical Engineers consolidated with Corps of Engineers 
   March 3, 1863 
 
• Corps de Afrique: Department of the Gulf     
 
First Regiment Engineers 
   Organized April 1863 
   Captain Andre Cailloux, Commanding 
 
   Second Regiment Engineers 
   Organized August 1863 
   Colonel Spencer H. Stafford, Commanding 
 
   Third Regiment Engineers 
   Organized August 1863 
   Colonel George D. Robinson, Commanding 
 
   Fourth Regiment Engineers 
   Organized September 1863 
   Colonel Charles W. Drew, Commanding 
 
   Fifth Regiment Engineers 
   Organized February 1864 
   Colonel Uri B. Pearsall, Commanding 
 
• Infantry used as Engineers or Pioneers at Vicksburg: 
 
   15th Iowa; 48th, 49th, and 59th Indiana; 4th Minnesota;  
   18th Wisconsin; 35th Missouri; 114th Ohio; 127th Illinois 
   45th Illinois, 20th Illinois, 9th Connecticut 
 
• Temporary Engineer Brigade at Chattanooga: 
 
   Detachment First Michigan Engineers; 13th, 21st, and 22nd  
   Michigan; 18th Ohio 
 
 
1864: 
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• Engineer Department 
  Chief of Engineers, Brigadier General Richard Delafield 
 
 
• First Veteran Volunteer Engineers: Army of the Cumberland 
   Organized April 1864 
   Colonel William E. Merrill, Commanding 
 
• Corps de Afrique redesignated April 1864 
   First Regiment Engineers now  
   95th United States Colored Troops (U. S. C. T.) 
   Second through Fifth Regiments Engineers now 
   96th U. S. C. T. 
   97th U. S. C. T. 
   98th U. S. C. T. 
   99th U. S. C. T. 
 
• Engineer Regiment of the West (Bissell) consolidated with 25th Missouri Infantry 
   now First Missouri Engineers 
 
• First Pontoniers:     Department of the Gulf 
   Organized March 1864 
   Captain Peter C. Hains, Commanding 
 
• Pioneer Brigade disbanded September 1864 
 
• 58th Indiana Infantry organized as Pioneer regiment April 1864 
   Colonel George Pearson Buell, Commanding 
 
• Western Theater USMRR reorganized April 1864 
  Adna Anderson     W. W. Wright 
General Superintendent of Transportation             Chief Engineer of Construction 
 And Maintenance 
 
Construction Corps: 
Division (Supervised by army engineer) 
 Five Subdivisions (Supervised by assistant army engineer) 
  Bridges and Carpentry (Supervised by foreman and sub-foreman) 
   Squads (ten men); Gangs (groups of squads) 
  Track 
  Water Stations 
  Masonry 
  Ox Brigade 
   Train crew, conductors, brakemen, locomotive engineers 
   Firemen, cooks 
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1865: 
 
• A large number of infantry regiments served as pioneers during General  
 Sherman’s Carolina Campaign 
 
 
Sources: Thomas H. S. Hamersly, Complete Regular Army Register of the United States: For One 
Hundred Years, 1779 to 1879 (Washington, DC: T. H. S. Hemersly, 1881). Phillip M. Thienel, 
“Engineers in the Union Army. 1861-1865,” The Military Engineer 315 (January-February 1955).   
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APPENDIX B 
CONFEDERATE ENGINEERING ASSETS DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 
1861: 
 
• Corps of Engineers organized in spring. (50) Engineer officers appointed all with  
the rank of either captain or lieutenant. 
 
• Engineer Bureau established in April:  
  “Acting Chief” Major Josiah Gorgas (April to August 1861) 
   Gorgas also served as Chief of Ordnance for the entire war 
  “Acting Chief” Major Danville Leadbetter (August to November 1861) 
  “Acting Chief” Lt. Col. Alfred L. Rives (November to September 1862) 
 
• Quartermaster Department established in April 
  Quartermaster General Colonel Abraham C. Myers 
 
• Director of Railroad Transportation to the Confederate armies in Virginia 
  Major and Assistant Quartermaster William Sheppard Ashe 
 
 
1862: 
 
• Corps of Engineers expanded to 100 officers 
 
• Engineer Bureau: 
  Chief of Bureau Lt. Col. Jeremy F. Gilmer (September to August 1863) 
 
•Military Department of Richmond: 
  Chief Engineer Lt. Col. Walter Husted Stevens 
  Establishment of Map Office July 1862 
 
• Map Office established within Engineer Bureau November 1862 
  Chief officer Captain Albert H. Campbell 
  Civilian mapmakers hired, i.e. Jedidiah Hotchkiss and others  
 
• Quartermaster General’s Office: 
  Director of Railroad Transportation in Virginia: 
  Captain Mason Morfit 
 
• Director of Military Traffic, North Carolina: 
  President of the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad, John D. Whitford 
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• Superintendent of Government Railroad Traffic (November): 
  Colonel William W. Wadley 
 
 
1863: 
 
• Engineer Bureau: 
  “Acting Chief” Lt. Col. Alfred L. Rives (August 1863 to March 1864) 
 
• First Regiment Engineers organized in August. Eight companies. 
  Colonel Thomas M. R. Talcott, Commanding 
 
• Quartermaster General Alexander R. Lawton (August to May 1865) 
  Quartermaster officers at all principal railroad station points 
  Throughout the Confederacy 
 
• Commissary General Lucius B. Northrop (1861-1865) 
  Commissary officers at al principal railroad station points 
  Throughout the Confederacy 
 
• Presidents of southern railroads maintained control of their own lines throughout 
the war. 
 
• Railroad Bureau functioned by name beginning in fall 1863. Bureau, however,  
never officially recognized by the Confederate Congress. 
  Lt. Col. Frederick William Sims, Bureau Head 
 
 
1864: 
 
• Engineer Bureau: 
  Chief of Bureau Major General Luther Martin Smith (March to April) 
  “Acting Chief” Colonel Alfred L. Rives (April to June) 
  Chief of Bureau Major General Jeremy F. Gilmer (June to end of war) 
   Engineer Bureau asks Conscription Bureau for a force of  
   20,000 slaves 
  War Department ordered the rebuilding and repair of railroads the 
   Purview of the Engineer Bureau 
 
• Second Regiment Engineers organized in summer. Two companies. 
  Second Regiment did not exist as a separate command 
  Eventually six undersized companies served in the southeast 
   Under local commanders 
  Four companies were folded into the First Regiment Engineers 
 
• Third Regiment Engineers organized in the summer. Eight companies 
  Lt. Col. Stephen Wilson Presstman, Commanding 
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• Fourth Regiment Engineers organized in the summer. Four companies. 
  Colonel Hugh T. Douglas, Commanding 
Records indicate that the nucleus of the Fourth Regiment Engineers came from the First 
Engineer Battalion organized by Douglas sometime between December 1863 and April 1864. 
 
• Railroad Bureau announced the service of two new administrators: 
  Captain John M. Robinson, Supervisor of Railroad Transportation 
   Between Wilmington, North Carolina and Richmond, Virginia 
  Major George Whitfield, Supervisor of Railroad Transportation  
   Beyond the Alabama River 
 
 
1865:  
 
• Confederate President Jefferson Davis signs bill March 1, 1865 to nationalize southern 
railroads. 
 
 
Sources: Robert C. Black, III, The Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998). Robert E. L. Krick, Staff Officers in Gray: A Biographical Register of 
the Staff Officers in the Army of Northern Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2003). George T. Ness, Jr., “Engineers of the Civil War,” The Military Engineer 299 (May-
June 1952).  
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APPENDIX C 
GENERAL OUTLINE OF DANIEL C. McCALLUM’S ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
FOR THE NEW YORK & ERIE RAILROAD, 1854 
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APPENDIX D 
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY’S CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND 
CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS 
 
 
 The formation and history of the Corps of Engineers and Corps of Topographical 
Engineers can be broken into five periods: (1) The Foundational Period, 1775 to 1783, (2) The 
Post-Revolutionary War Period, 1784 to 1800, (3) The Jeffersonian Period, 1800 to 1819, (4) The 
Jacksonian Period, 1820 to 1845, and (5) The Mexican War and Peacetime Period, 1846 to 1861.  
 After British soldiers from His Majesty’s 43rd Regiment of Foot, “fired the shots heard 
round the world” on the morning of April 19, 1775 at the North Bridge in Concord the thirteen 
American colonies found themselves moving rapidly towards a war of revolution with the 
greatest military power in the western world, Great Britain. It also soon became apparent to the 
colonies’ new commander-in-chief, General George Washington, that militia critical in defending  
states from British encroachment, could not be relied upon to operate and contest the British 
Army over considerable time and space. Yet, in addition to efforts required to recruit foot 
soldiers for the new Continental Army, Washington needed military engineers. Eighteenth 
century warfare demanded that armies build both reliable field fortifications and conduct 
effective siege operations, and to do so required the expertise of skilled military engineers. At 
the start of the Revolution, however, few colonists had any knowledge of military engineering.  
 For the Foundation Period (1775-1783) of the Corps of Engineers, Washington and the 
Second Continental Congress would first have to rely on the few New Englanders who had 
gained some engineering experience during the French and Indian War and some who were self 
taught mechanics and builders. 
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 Colonel Richard Gridley was one of those Yankees who had studied mathematics as a 
boy in Boston, as a young man applied his knowledge to mechanical problems in the city, and 
during the French and Indian War joined the British forces as a military engineer. He observed 
the professional engineers in the British Army, and participated at the siege of Louisburg in 
1745. He had gained valuable experience throughout the war.  
Gridley had laid out an excellent defensive plan on Bunker Hill with the help of two 
others, Captain Jeduthan Baldwin and Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Putnam. Baldwin was from 
Woburn, Massachusetts and as a civilian had demonstrated an aptitude for building and 
carpentry. Baldwin, no doubt, also obtained his interest in the mechanical arts from his most 
likely relative Loammi Baldwin, a civil engineer also from Woburn. Loammi was a cabinetmaker 
in town but would frequently walk to Cambridge to attend lectures on mathematics and science 
by Professor John Winthrop of Harvard. Rufus Putnam, also from Massachusetts, gained a 
rudimentary understanding of engineering before the war. As a boy he was apprenticed to a 
millwright and in the mid-1770s worked as a builder and surveyor.  
 When Washington arrived in Cambridge in the summer of 1775 he immediately 
recognized Gridley’s skills and as a result, made him the Continental Army’ first chief engineer. 
The Congress had authorized the establishment of the Continental Army on June 16, 1775 and 
they provided for a Chief Engineer and two assistants with the army, and a Chief Engineer and 
two assistants in an Engineering Department if one was established. Gridley, a capable engineer 
and brave soldier, remained chief engineer until September 1776, when because of his age (66) 
he was replaced by Rufus Putnam as chief engineer.  
 It was Colonel Putnam who orchestrated one of the war’s most remarkable engineering 
operations. Following Lexington and Concord in April 1775 the British army had come under 
siege in Boston by the Americans who occupied Cambridge and the surrounding communities. 
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The British attack on Bunker Hill was an attempt to break the siege, but very high English 
casualties prevented British General William Howe from following up his brief albeit costly 
victory.  
In 1775 Boston was a peninsula. The only way out of the city on foot was over a tiny 
neck of land leading to the town of Dorcester. As the siege dragged on into the bitterly cold 
months of January and February 1776 Washington became increasingly impatient. The general 
was anxious to strike at his enemy by crossing the ice on the Charles River and attacking the 
British in the city. The other generals believed an attack over the frozen Charles would only 
invite disaster, and instead, suggested that a better strategy was to draw the redcoats out of 
Boston by taking possession of Dorchester Heights.  
 Washington told Putnam of the suggestion to take Dorchester Heights, and the engineer 
informed the general that the ground frozen twenty-two inches deep and hard as a rock made it 
impossible to establish a lodgment in the usual way on the heights. Putnam needed time to 
study the problem, which Washington happily granted. Washington would now pursue his 
original plan of crossing the Charles reminding his generals that the army needed to take the 
initiative and attack. Putnam, in the meantime, would visit the quarters of General William 
Heath just to pay his respects. Putnam’s social call would change the course of the siege of 
Boston.  
 On Heath’s table was a copy of M. le Chevalier de Clairac’s book Ingenieur de Campagne 
ou Traite de la Fortification Passagere, which Putnam asked to borrow.1  Heath agreed to loan 
the book.  Putnam, returning to his tent, began to review the treatise. Almost immediately 
Putnam stumbled over the word chandilears. He was unfamiliar with the word but discovered 
an illustration of one and realized he had a solution to the lodgment problem on Dorchester 
                                                             
1 The Field Engineer or a Brief Treatise on Fortifications. 
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Heights. The chandilear was a type of crib used to build a section of fortification during siege 
operations. A ten-foot long board was laid on the ground, and at about three feet from each end 
other boards were placed, which looked like narrow pyramids and ran perpendicular to the 
floorboards. These were braced to the boards themselves for support. Two of these structures 
would be placed four or five feet apart and then large pieces of timber and dirt were placed 
between them creating a wall approximately ten feet high.  
 These chandeliers were built in camp and then moved stealthy into position on the night 
of March 4th and early morning of March 5th. Work parties moved tools, stones, barrels filled 
with stone and sands, and hay to the heights to build a makeshift fortification approximately 
four hundred feet long and ten feet high. Perhaps it was apocryphal, but it was reported that 
when British General William Howe saw the fort at sunrise on March 5th he said, “the Americans 
did more work in one night than his whole army would have done in six months.” Archibald 
Robertson, one of Howe’s engineers, did call the effort “a most astonishing night’s work.”2   
 Despite Putnam’s successful chandelier fortification and the British Army’s evacuation of 
Boston on Saint Patrick’s Day 1776, Washington continued to request more engineers from 
Congress, and Congress in response to the general’s plea, turned to France for assistance. The 
story of the arrival of French engineer officers was a complex one, yet by the end of 1777 
Congress appointed Louis Lebègue Duportail brigadier general and chief engineer. Duportail, 
who held his position throughout the rest of the war, contributed considerable energy to 
training American officers as engineers. With his political connections in Congress, and his easily 
recognized professionalism, Duportail managed to persuade Congress to both authorize three 
                                                             
2 Paul K. Walker, Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in 
the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (Alexandria, VA: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1981), 65-
70. See also Mark M. Boatner, III, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 1994). 
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companies of Sappers and Miners in 1778, and on March 11, 1779, to pass a resolution, which 
formed the Continental Army’s first Corps of Engineers. Two years before the Corps of Engineers 
formed Congress had appointed Robert Erskine as Geographer of the Army, and upon Erskine’s 
death in 1780, appointed Simeon De Witt Geographer for the Northern Army and Thomas 
Hutchins Geographer for the Southern Army.  
 After the American victory at Yorktown in 1781, in which French and American 
engineers and the companies of Sappers and Miners played an important part, the Congress 
turned its attention to governing the new nation. Among the myriad of questions to address, 
and the one that would stir debates during the second or Post-Revolutionary Period (1784-1800) 
of the Corps of Engineers development was whether the new nation should maintain a 
peacetime army. 
 General Washington believed a peacetime army essential for American security. He had 
spent eight years fighting a revolutionary struggle to win independence from Great Britain, and 
he believed that in order to sustain and defend the new nation that military preparedness was 
essential. His experience, moreover, taught him that a well trained corps of engineers and 
expert artillerists could not be raised in a day or a month, or even a year because a firm grasp of 
mathematics and geometry were required of these officers, as well as considerable technical 
training and practice. He proposed to Congress a four-part plan for the future of the army. First, 
the nation should maintain a small regular army with professional officers. Second, the states 
would continue to train their militia companies. Third, the government would establish military 
supply depots throughout the country, and finally, schools would be created to train artillerists 
and engineers in military science.  
 Congress had a different view. They remembered the quartering of English officers in 
private homes, the arrogance those officers displayed, and the deference paid to them. The war 
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had broken the yoke of tyranny and absolutism, including the tyranny of the British Army. So 
despite Washington’s rational and recommendations for a peacetime army, Congress was not 
interested. Between 1783 and 1793 the army was reduced to several regiments and no 
engineers served in it.  
 In March 1794 as tensions began to boil between the United States and Great Britain 
over the impressment of American sailors by British naval commanders, Congress authorized 
President Washington to appoint temporary engineers to direct fortifications of key harbors 
along the east coast. In May 1795 Congress decided to organize a Corps of Engineers and 
Artillerists under the command of Lieutenant Stephen Rochfontaine at West Point, New York, 
and Congress also created a national coastal defense policy known as the First Defense System. 
Three years later when the XYZ Affair precipitated a Quasi War with France, Congress authorized 
a second regiment of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers.3   
 In 1801, two years after hostilities between the U. S. and France came to a close, 
Thomas Jefferson was elected (by the House of Representatives) President of the United States. 
He would usher in the Jeffersonian Period (1800-1816) in the development and history of the 
Corps of Engineers with the establishment in 1802 of the United States Military Academy at 
West Point, New York.   
 Jefferson realized that the country needed trained engineers to design and build the 
harbors and roadways of the new nation, and thus he supported Congress’ decision to separate 
the engineers from the artillerists and establish the military academy on March 16, 1802. The 
president believed that if the government created a military school then it could also influence 
both the mission and curriculum. A military school, which trained young men to serve as 
                                                             
3 The History of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Alexandria, VA: The U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 1988), 17-22.  
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scientists, naturalists, and civil engineers made perfect sense to Jefferson. Finally, the recent 
conflict with France impressed upon everyone the need stop relying on foreigners for engineers 
and to divorce their direct influence from the army. Jefferson selected Colonel Jonathan 
Williams to be the academy’s first superintendent. Williams had joined the American 
Philosophical Society in 1788, and he had published articles on scientific subjects. Williams was 
in Jefferson’s mind a scientist and engineer first and a soldier second. 
 Once again as war with Great Britain threatened the United States in 1807, Congress 
renewed its fortification program and the Second Defense System was born. The fort that would 
become the prototype for the nation’s coastal protection was designed and supervised by 
Colonel Williams. One half mile from the southern tip of Manhattan, Castle Williams still sits on 
Governors Island in New York harbor, a testament to early American military engineering. 
 When the War of 1812 broke out, the seventeen engineer officers and nineteen enlisted 
men in the corps of engineers performed admirably. They had constructed permanent defenses 
along the Atlantic coast, and at times, the officers had assumed command responsibility for 
troops in the field. This necessary transfer of engineer officers from staff to line positions, 
however, caused confusion. To whom did the engineers report? Did the commanding officers in 
the field have responsibility for the engineers serving in their forces? Were engineer officers 
responsible to the chief engineer? Were engineers responsible to the Secretary of War?  These 
questions made for a faulty command structure, which remained unanswered up to the 
beginning of the Civil War.  
Yet, changes were made to the Corps of Engineers that enabled the organization to 
provide great service to the growing nation. The Corps of Engineers entered the Jacksonian 
Period (1817-1846) of its development, and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina became one of 
the corps advocates and leaders. 
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 As secretary of war (1817-1825), Calhoun made several critical changes to the 
engineers’ organization. First, he determined that West Point would be assigned to the corps of 
engineers and that the superintendent of the academy would be appointed from the corps. 
Next, he ordered that the inspector of West Point was always to be the chief of the corps of 
engineers. Next, Calhoun decided to move the chief of engineers from West Point to 
Washington, DC to head the Engineer Bureau within the War Department. It was also under 
Calhoun’s leadership that the army formed the topographical engineers and a topographical 
office to serve within the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. 
 Finally, with memory of the War of 1812 firmly implanted in its mind, Congress 
authorized, and Calhoun led, an ambitious program to build fifty new forts along the coast, thus 
inaugurating the nation’s Third Defense System.4 The government formed a Board of Engineers 
for Fortifications to oversee the construction projects and to maintain tight control over all 
expenditures. The building of the fort to guard the entrance to Savannah harbor (Georgia), Fort 
Pulaski, was for a short time supervised by a young second lieutenant named Robert E. Lee. By 
1861, forty-three of the fifty planned fortifications had been constructed.  
When West Point was assigned to the corps of engineers the curriculum developed 
principally under three men: Sylvanias Thayer class of 1808, Dennis Hart Mahan class of 1824, 
and Henry Wager Halleck class of 1839. Thayer, called the “Father of West Point,” spent two 
years studying at the École d’Arts et Métiers at Metz, France where he acquired valuable 
experience and knowledge, which he incorporated into West Point’s mathematics, science, and 
engineering curriculum.  Mahan, who became a professor of civil and military engineering at the 
                                                             
4 For an outstanding discussion of the Third Defense System see Mark A. Smith, Engineering 
Security: The Corps of Engineers and Third System Defense Policy, 1815-1861 (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2009). Some of the forts built during this period included Fort 
Sumter (South Carolina), Fort Monroe (Virginia), Fort Pulaski (Georgia), Fort Pickens (Florida), 
Fort Adams (Rhode Island), and Fort Trumbull (Connecticut). 
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academy, introduced the study of field fortifications into the curriculum. His book, A Treatise on 
Field Fortifications influenced the strategy and tactics of many a Civil War general. 
 Mahan’s favorite student was Henry Halleck. Unlike his teacher, however, Halleck was 
as interested in military theory as he was in applied military science. His ideas were influenced 
by the Austrian Henri Jomini, and in Halleck’s book The Elements of Military Art and Science 
(1846), he wrote at length about Jomini’s theory of using internal lines of communication to 
take advantage of the enemy’s weakest position. Halleck also argued that the body of 
knowledge necessary to be a good officer could only be mastered through professional 
education. 
 During the Jacksonian Period army engineers made significant contributions to the 
development of the country’s emerging transportation system. West Point trained engineers 
surveyed the country, and built roads, canals, bridges, and railroads. They improved waterways 
and harbors, designed and built lighthouses. Captain Richard Delafield designed and supervised 
the building of the first cast iron bridge in the United States. The Dunlap’s Creek Bridge at 
Brownsville, Pennsylvania is still in use today.5     
   Like the engineers, the corps of topographical engineers worked on harbor and 
lighthouse projects. The tallest lighthouse in the Florida Keys and built on a reef was designed by 
Lieutenant George G. Meade just seven years before he faced Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern 
Virginia at Gettysburg. Meade was a member of the corps of topographical engineers. In July 
1838 Congress had authorized a separation of the corps of topographical engineers with the 
corps of engineers, and it established a Topographical Engineer Bureau within the War 
                                                             
5 Richard Delafield would become Chief Engineer of the U. S. Army in 1864. 
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Department. Furthermore, the government turned over all civil engineering projects to the 
corps of topographical engineers.6 
 At the same time that West Point was becoming more professional and army engineers 
and topographical engineers were working on improving the country’s infrastructure, some 
Jacksonians led by Tennessee Congressman Davey Crockett, and former West Point 
superintendent Alden Partridge raised the question as to whether a federally funded military 
academy was even needed. They argued that a well-educated and trained officer corps was 
dangerous to free government. Public funding of the academy, moreover, was a misuse of the 
country’s resources because the nation could rely on its citizen-soldiers to defend our homeland 
in time of crisis as our forefathers had done. Sylvanias Thayer had replaced him as 
superintendent of the academy but Partridge refused to step down, and consequently was 
court-martialed. 
Two states’ legislatures, Ohio and Tennessee, also passed resolutions asking their 
federal congressmen and senators to work to close West Point. Eventually, a board of visitors 
defended the academy, as did the U. S. House Committee on Military Affairs. In 1834, the latter 
produced a report entitled a “Statement to the History and Importance of the Military Academy 
at West Point, New York and Reasons Why it Should Not be Abolished.”7 The political attacks 
among the Jacksonians finally subsided and the nation focused on its Manifest Destiny and 
especially expansion in the southwest. 
                                                             
6 Henry P. Beers, “A History of the U. S. Topographical Engineers, 1818-1863,” U. S. Corps of 
Topographical Engineers, www.topogs.org/History.htm (accessed February 2, 2014). 
7 For an excellent discussion on West Point’ struggle to survive in the 1830s see Captain Mark 
Rice, “Defending the Ramparts: The United States Military Academy’s Struggle for Survival In the 
Age of Jackson,” United States Military Academy, digital-
library.usma.edu/libmedia/archives/toep/usma_struggle_survival_age_jackson.pdf (accessed 
March 1, 2014). 
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 When war broke out along the Texas border between the United States and Mexico in 
1846 the corps of engineers and topographical engineers entered a new era. This period 
covered both the war and the peace which followed until hostilities erupted in 1861.  
 Just prior to the outbreak of the Mexican-American War, the Corps of Engineers had 
forty-three officers and the corps of topographical engineers had thirty-six officers. The corps’ 
work, with the exception of the Seminole Wars (1817-1818, 1835-1842, and 1855-1858) served 
a peacetime function, and its labor force came from the civilian population. When hostilities 
between Mexico and the United States erupted on the Texas border in April 1846, Major 
General Winfield Scott asked Congress to increase the army’s strength, including the Corps of 
Engineers. Scott and Chief Engineer Joseph Gilbert Totten, for a number of years, had argued for 
trained engineer soldiers. Congress finally responded favorably to their request one day before 
it declared war on Mexico. Congress increased the army from 7,000 to 18,000 regulars and 
established a 100-man company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers who became Company “A,” 
Corps of Engineers.8  
 The company was to consist of ten sergeants, ten corporals, thirty-nine artificers or 
privates first-class, thirty-nine laborers or privates second-class, and two musicians. Three 
officers were placed in command of the company: Captain Alexander Swift, who had spent two 
years at the École d’Application d’Artillerie et de Génie at Metz; Lieutenant Gustaf W. Smith, a 
faculty member at West Point; and Brevet Second Lieutenant George B. McClellan.9  
                                                             
8 Congress approved the creation of a company of engineer troops on May 15, 1846 and 
declared war on Mexico May 16, 1846. 
9 Paul K. Walker, “War with Mexico: The Northern Campaign, 1846-1847,” Engineer (December 
1996). For a detailed discussion on the role topographical engineers played during the Mexican-
American War see Adrian Traas, From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U. S. Army 
Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1993). McClellan was one of Smith’s students at West Point, and Smith 
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 Recruitment for the company was slow and it never reached one hundred men. The 
company, however, distinguished itself on numerous occasions during the war including at Vera 
Cruz, Cerro Gordo Pass, Contreras, and Chapultepec. By the end of the war, both the officers 
and men of the company took considerable pride in their accomplishments and they believed 
that their unique skills and versatility made them an elite unit within the army. This attitude was 
on display when Artificer (Private First-Class) Frederick W. Gerber told the story of an argument 
he had with a sergeant of infantry just after the war ended. The two men had been drinking, and 
eventually started to quarrel over the question of who won the war, the infantry or the 
engineers. At some point the sergeant threatened to arrest Gerber for disturbing the peace. 
Gerber replied, “No damned infantry sergeant has rank enough to arrest an artificer of 
engineers.” This prompted the two men to draw swords, and to the amusement of onlookers, 
they began swing at one another until the sergeant had his sword knocked out of his hand by 
the deft artificer. Gerber, pride intact, was immediately arrested and only released after his 
company commander came to claim him. For his part, the company commander did not punish 
Gerber but instead promised him a promotion. Gerber was promoted and remained in the army 
after the war. By the Civil War he had become sergeant major of the Engineer Battalion.10 
Company “A” returned to West Point where it was stationed until war began in 1861. 
 In the final decade before the Civil War the corps of engineers focused its attention, as it 
did before the Mexican-American War, on the nation’s infrastructure and fortifications. Second 
Lieutenant Nathaniel Michler worked on a survey of the interoceanic ship canal from the Gulf of 
Darien to the Pacific Ocean, and Second Lieutenant William Rosecrans supervised repairs to Fort 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
recommended Cadet McClellan as the junior lieutenant in Company “A.” Consequently, 
McClellan was appointed to the company several days before he graduated from the academy. 
10 William M. Robinson, Jr., “The Engineer Soldiers in the Mexican War,” The Military Engineer 
133 (January-February 1932). 
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Adams in Newport, Rhode Island. Second Lieutenant Gouverneur Warren surveyed and mapped 
the Dakota and Nebraska Territories, and Second Lieutenant Frederick Prime supervised the 
building of a fort on Alcatraz Island, San Francisco harbor.11 
 When shots were fired at Fort Sumter in the early morning hours of April 12, 1861 army 
engineers and topographical engineers were scattered throughout the continent working on 
projects that for the most part, were designed to bring peacetime prosperity to the United 
States. Now some engineer and topographical engineer officers would resign from the army and 
join the Confederate cause. Whether serving as Union or Confederate engineers, map makers, 
or general officers, their work now would turn from peacetime pursuits to wartime operations. 
Harbor improvements, navigational problems, and lighthouse building would give way to 
pontoon bridge construction, corduroy roads, mines, and trenches.  
 
Chief Engineer of the Continental Army: 
               Date of Service Birthplace 
Colonel Richard Gridley           1775-1776 Massachusetts 
Colonel Rufus Putnam                               1776  Massachusetts 
Major General Louis Duportail                             1777-1783 France 
 
Chief Engineer, United States Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Rochefontaine  1783-1798 France 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Burbeck   1798-1802 Massachusetts 
 
Chief Engineer, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Colonel Jonathan Williams       1802-1803/1805-1812 Massachusetts 
                                                             
11 George W. Cullum, “Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States 
Military Academy at West Point, New York, Since its Establishment in 1802,” Cullum’s Register 
Penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Army/USMA/Cullu
ms_Register/home.html (accessed February 4, 2014). The Gulf of Darien is in the southern most 
area of the Caribbean Sea, north and east of the border between Panama and Columbia. 
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Colonel Joseph Gardner Swift    1812-1818 Massachusetts 
Colonel Walker Keith Armistead    1818-1821 Virginia 
Colonel Alexander Macomb    1821-1828 Michigan 
Colonel Charles Gratiot     1828-1838 Missouri 
Brigadier General Joseph Totten   1838-1864 Connecticut 
Brigadier General Richard Delafield   1864-1866 New York 
 
Chief Topographical Engineer, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Major Isaac Roberdeau     1818-1829 Pennsylvania 
 
Chief Topographical Engineer, U. S. Army Corps of Topographical Engineers 
Colonel James Abert     1829-1861 Maryland 
Colonel Stephen Long     1861-1863 New Hampshire 
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APPENDIX E 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
ILLUSTRATION 1 
SAW USED BY MISSOURI ENGINEERS ISLAND NO. 10 
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ILLUSTRATION 2 
POTOMAC CREEK BRIDGE 
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ILLUSTRATION 3 
CHESS WAGON 
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ILLUSTRATION 4 
WOODEN PONTOON BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION 
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ILLUSTRATION 5 
RAILROAD BRIDGE WITH TRUSSES 
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ILLUSTRATION 6 
BRIDGE WITH GUARD TURRETS AND BLOCKHOUSES BUILT BY MICHIGAN ENGINEERS 
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ILLUSTRATION 7  
 
BAILEY’S AND PEARSALL’S DAM: RED RIVER CAMPAIGN  
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